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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I have set out to perform two interlocking, although separable, 
tasks. The first is to provide some insight into the philosophical and theoretical 
roots of ethnomethodology by investigating the work of Garfinkel and others who 
have in some way assimilated, borrowed from, or been influenced by his work, in 
a context provided by a discussion of the work of Husserl and Schutz on the one 
hand and that of Wittgenstein on the other. I will show the ways in which Schutz 
has adapted Husserlian phenomenological insights to further his own fundamentally 
sociological ends and how Garfinkel, borrowing only selectively from Schutz and 
allowing many other influences to play upon his work (here Kaufman, Parsons and 
Gurwitsch are important sources of ideas), transforms ideas generated in the 
phenomenological tradition to an extent which suggests that his writings should be 
seen in a context set by Wittgenstein's writings (in terms particularly of 
notions such as 'form of life' and trulel in a sense of those terms which will 
become apparent), rather than encumbering it with too uuch phenomenological baggage 
I will move on from there to investigate the writings of other ethnomethodologists, 
showing how some - for example Cicourel - remain more firmly within the 
phenomenological tradition, whilst others have taken various of Garfinkel's 
ideas (although few have taken them whole and undiluted) and investigated, in their 
various ways, their implications for the study of -social order and society. In 
the process of this arm of the discussion I will point out some of the weaknesses 
and strengths of various ethnomethodological positions, suggesting in conclusion 
that there is important work being done and waiting to be done in the areas 
currently being investigated. 
The second task of the thesis is less historically oriented. Here the focus 
will be upon theoretical issues surrounding the problem of social order and the 
problem of meaning, problems which will be seen to be interrelated. The chief 
concern here will be to show the ways in which Wittgenstein and Garfinkel 
struggle to present and make coherent a sense of Imeaning' which is fundamentally 
different from that which is espoused by phenomenologists like Schutz and by many 
other contemporary sociologists, and how this difference rests side by side, in 
Garfinkel's work, with a radically different approach to the problem of social 
order from that which characterises the work of Parsons and others. The thrust 
of this difference lies in an attempt to reconceptualise 'meaning' in a way that 
does not posit as fundamental the distinction between 'subjectivity' on the one 
hand and an 'objective' world on the other, but which instead, by emphasising the 
omniprevalence of 'language games' and the lindexicalityl of expressions, focuses 
attention on some notion of 'form of life' or of the 'formal structures of 
practical actions'. The effect of this shift of emphasis, I will suggest, is that 
#meaning' becomes transformed from seEm: hg to be a 'thing' of some kind contained 
within a 'structure' of meanings to become instead an lembeddedi phenomenon, bound 
up with what we do in the social world, where the things we do generate and exhibit 
those orderly features which make meaning possible. 
CHAPTER I 
AN INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an investigation of some of the philosophical and 
theoretical roots of ethnomethodology. The strategy involved will be 
to set the work of Garfinkel against a background provided by an 
unravelling of the phenomenology of Husserl and Schutz on the one hand, 
and the analytic philosophy of Wittgenstein on the other. The hope is 
that as various points of convergence and divergence emerge and are 
pointed out over the course of the discussion, so the motivating problems, 
the aims and aspirations and the general theoretical position of 
ethnomethodology as conceived by Garfinkel will be thrown into fresh 
relief. 
The following chapters approach the task on two levels which 
although complexly interrelated can be separated for the purposes of 
this introduction to act as a key to reading the remainder of the thesis. 
The two levels can be termed the 'historical theme' on the one hand, 
and the ? theoretical theme' on the other. I will outline something of 
the sense of these in turn. 
The 'historical theme' is shorthand for a concern to map some of 
the relationships between the work of the thinkers who are the subject 
of this thesis. The first set of significant relationships comes with 
the ways in which Schutz adapted the transcendental phenomenology of 
Husserl in order to make it available as a theoretical grounding for 
an empirical sociology. I shall argue that in fact Schutz's use of 
phenomenology leads him into severe difficulties which his own 
orientations towards social phenomena cannot resolve for him. Garfinkel's 
relationship with the phenomenological tradition that comes from Husserl 
via Schutz will also be examined, and in the process it will become 
-2- 
apparent that numerous other influences upon his thought - most 
significantly the influences of Parsons, Kaufmann, and Gurwitsch - 
colour his reading of Schutz in such a way that a fundamental 
transformation is effected in the texture of the web of problems that 
motivated Schutzian sociology. This transformation, I will argue, takes 
Garfinkel's thought in a direction which enables close parallels to be 
drawn between his own ethnomethodology and the type of analyses that 
Wittgenstein engaged in. This particular link, it will be suggested, 
is especially important in as much as certain Wittgensteinian concepts 
such as 'language games' and 'form of life' are useful in highlighting 
something of Garfinkel's position. 
This particular clutch of 'historicaV links. is concerned chiefly 
with the germination of theethnomethodological position as it appears 
in Garfinkells work. The main figures are Schutz, Husserl, Wittgenstein 
and Garfinkel, with a few other philosopher; -s and sociologists playing 
minor roles. There is also a second set of such interrelationships 
which focus on the development of the ethnomethodological perspective. 
Within this set, it will be argued, significant differences can be 
discerned between the orientations of various thinkers who are concerned 
to carry through, in one way or another, some of the insights into the 
workings of society that can be found in Garfinkel's work. These 
differences will be illustrated both in terms of substantive points. of 
disagreement between writers, and by reference to the work of the 
sociologists and philosophers already discussed above. Thus substantive 
differences between the work of Garfinkel and Cicourel can be seen in 
terms of the different relationships that their work has to Schutz's 
sociology, whilst the work of Blum and McHugh on the one hand and 
conversational analysis on the other can be contrasted in terms of 
their differing approaches to problems of 'the given' and of 'structure' 
within the general notions of 'form of life' (Wittgenstein) and 'taken 
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for granted reality' (Garfinkel). The position of post-Wittgensteinian 
philosophers of the social sciences - specifically Winch and Louch - 
will also be examined briefly, and set into the overall perspective 
in terms of the different implications for sociology that they draw 
from insights in the work of Wittgenstein. 
The 'theoretical theme' is focused on two main issues. These are 
firstly the problem of social order, and secondly a concern with 'meaning' 
and the way in which it is conceptualised in thR! social science. These 
two important areas of concern should not, for the purposes of this 
thesis, be thought of as entirely separate from one another; it will 
become apparent over the course of the following discussions that there 
are significant linkages to be made between 'order' and 'meaning'. For 
this introduction, however, I want to look, briefly, at each area in 
turn to signpost the directions of the following chapters. 
The problem of order is a concern with the ways in which order in 
society is possible. It is concerned, in other words, with providing 
some account of how it is that society manages to carry on as a more or 
less organized whole - with the mechanisms that make society work. The 
problem has been solved traditionally, in a variety of different ways 
which include notions like 'social contract's 'conscience collective'. 
Opowerts 'norms and values' and so on. Such solutions generally posit 
specifically social entities of some sort, such as 'norms' or trules', 
which stand over and against the members of society and either determine, 
control, govern, or orient the actions of such members. Thus the more 
or less orderly character of their behaviour, and of society at large, 
is accounted for by reference to such social entities. The theories of 
Hobbes and Parsons, which will be discussed in a later chapter, are 
examples of this sort of theorizing. 
- Garfinkel's work, as will become apparent, is directed towards this 
problem. He approaches it, however, -from a fresh angle. Rather than 
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investigate 'norms' and tvalues' as Parsons does, he directs his 
attention towards those practices and procedures on the basis of which 
members of society organize the social world. Instead of looking at 
what people think, or at what they ought to think, or at the rules they 
think they follow, and so on, Garfinkel shifts his attention to what it 
is that people do. It is because members of society do things in 
certain ways that society is an orderly place, and the problem for the 
ethnomethodologist becomes to try to find some way of studying what it 
is that people do such that social order is possible. In a sense, what 
is being looked at is some of the practices that form what Durkheim. 
referred to as the non-contractual elements of contract - at those 
practices which make any form of contract possible in the first place. 
In short, the problem of order in society is treated by specifying its 
solution in terms of particular practices and procedures at a particular 
level of social structure, (a level which, it will later become apparent, 
is bound up with 'cognition' in a special sense of that term), and by 
further identification of that level by empirical investigations. 
The problem of order connects with the question of 'meaning' in 
that the possibility of 'meaningful' interaction depends upon there 
being a certain amount of order in the world - for example, there must 
be a degree of agreement about what there is in the world, and about 
what certain things are called - whilst at the same time social order 
itself is in part dependent upon people interacting tmeaningfully' - 
consider the way in which what is talked about in a conversation (e. g. 
counselling) can influence ones subsequent behaviour. This interweaving 
of the two areas is important because it suggests that those practices 
and procedures which are conceived to enable social order at a particular 
level of social structure, will also be important to an understanding of 
'meaning'. Such practices will be seen to provide the possibility of 
communication in the social world, and will provide the foundation for 
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the lintersubjectivel realm. Thus the concern with social order will 
also throw light upon 'meaning' in the social world. 
My primary concern with *meaning' will be to show that the work 
of Garfinkel, with his emphasis'upon a particular level of social 
structure, provides a fundamentally different approach towards Imeaningi 
from that which can be found in the work of Schutz, in the early work 
of Wittgenstein, and, by implication, in the writings of the majority 
of sociologists. This orientation, I will suggest, has much in common 
with the later work of Wittgenstein which provides a clear exposition of 
some of the points contained in Garfinkel's writings but from a 
philosophical rather than a sociological point of view. It is thus 
useful, for the purposes of the present thesis, as an illustration, 
further explication, and broadening of some of the central issues with 
which I will be concerned. 
What is involved in this shift in perspective upon 'meaning' is a 
move away from the type of position that Schutz takes, in which ? meaning, 
is seen as somehow an independent phenomenon that is bound up with 
'structures' (e. g. Ameaning structures'), and towards a view which insists 
that 'meaning' must be seen as 'embedded' within the practices and 
procedures of our daily round. To help illustrate precisely the sense 
of 'meaning' involved in the work of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein I will 
use four indicators which are useful to the extent that they provide a 
framework for the discussions of the following chapters. These are: 
1. The problem of universals. 
2. Language. 
3. The subject object distinction. 
4. The problem of intersubjectivity. 
It is worth saying something, briefly, about the relevance of these 
indicators for the problem at hand. 
Whilst each of these indicators can be seen as related in some way 
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or other to the problem of social order, this is particularly apparent 
with the problem of universals. The problem concerns, in basic terms, 
how it is possible to group a series of particulars - for example, 
chairs, games, men, etc. - under one concept such that one can say that 
they are all instances of the same thing. How is it, for example, that 
all the different activities that we call 'games$ can be grouped together 
such that they are all seen to be games? The answers that are generally 
given to this question usually suggest that either all of the things 
that are so grouped have some thing in common - some 'essential' 
substance or property - or alternatively, that the sole reason why such 
things are so grouped is that the same concept is used to refer to them. 
These are the realist and nominalist options respectively. 
The importance of this problem for the problem of social order, and 
for the general purposes of this thesis, can best be drawn out by 
considering that the solution given to it determines the way in which we 
conceptualize the possibility of 'agreement' between people about what 
is the case. According to the 'realist' option, for example, lagreement, 
is possible because there actually is, in reality, something common to 
all of those things that are collected under the same term, whilst for 
the nominalist the possibility of *agreement' lies in the fact that 
things are called by the same name. The connection between agreement 
and $meaning' is perhaps obvious, but it is worth drawing out. In order 
for someone to 'mean' something when he speaks, and for that meaning to 
be understood by another, there must be some minimum of agreement between 
them. They must agree about what certain things in the world are called, 
about what certain words mean, and so on. Thus in a stroqg sense, the 
possibility of meaningful interaction depends upon the possibility of 
'agreement' - i. e. upon some solution to the problem of universals. 
What will emerge over the course of the thesis is that Husserl, 
Schutz and the early Wittgenstein conceptualize the solution to the 
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problem of universals in terms of 'essences' of some kind, whether 
that is seen in terms of an eidetic structure attainable by the 
phenomenological reductions, or of a structure of Ideal types', or 
in terms of a picturing relationship between propositions and states 
of affairs. Garfinkel and the later Wittgenstein, however, think 
rather in terms of sets of practices within a form of life, which enable 
concepts to be used in a 'family resemblance' fashion - i. e. there is 
no one thing that all things collected under the same concept have in 
common, but rather there are overlapping, criss-crossing similarities, 
rather like the resemblances between members of the same family, which 
account for us collecting them under the same concept. The precise 
sense of this will become apparent in chapter three when Wittgenstein's 
work will be discussed at length. For the present it is enough to 
notice that there are important and significant differences to be found, 
here, in the way the problem of universals is approached, and this has 
implications for the way in which 'meaning' is conceptualized. Briefly, 
if this'problem is seen in terms of practices and procedures, then 
'meaning' will most likely be seen as an embedded phenomenon - as 
inextricably woven into the practices and procedures which make up our 
form of life. 
The second indicator, language, is straightforward enough. Language 
is one of the most important ways we have of expressing 'meaning' - of 
interacting in a Imeaningfull fashion -ý so that the way in which it is 
conceptualized must inevitably reflect the orientation being taken 
towards meaning itself. Here the important division is between those 
who, like Shutz and the early Wittgenstein, see language as a 'structure' 
or Icalculus' which somehow contains meanings - which contains -kernal 
meanings' or 'essential meanings' - and on the other hand, those like 
Garfinkel and the later Wittgenstein who insist that the most important 
thing about language is that it is used in'a variety of different contexts, 
for a variety of different purposes, to make sense over the course of our 
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daily lives. Once again, by insisting that language must be seen as 
something used, 'meaning' is seen as dependent upon what we do in our 
daily lives - i. e. as embedded within practices and procedures. 
Thirdly, it is important to look at the way-in which the distinction 
between subject and object is handled. If it is seen as a fundamental 
distinction which must be taken into account in any attempt at 
understanding the status of knowledge, or theory, or science, and so 
on, then the type of problems that are likely to arise will be concerned 
with the ways in which 'subjective meanings' or 'subjective perceptions' 
relate to something else which is conceived to be lobjectivel - for 
example 'objective meanings' or a Ireal worldt. The fundamental datum 
of man's existence is thought to be the opposition between his 
subjectivity and something that is other than it, and the problem of 
knowledge isoneoffinding guarantees that it is possible to get beyond 
the purely subjective. This opposition appears in Schutz's work in 
terms of a relationship between subjective and objective meaning 
contexts. In the early work of Wittgenstein, although he is careful to 
avoid subjectivity as such, there is none the less present a parallel 
distinction between 'reality' on the one hand, and something else - in 
this case the propositions that 'picture' reality. 
The importance of this distinction for an orientation towards 
'meaning' is that if 1what is the case' is conceived of in terms of a 
fundamental dichotomy between subject and object, then 'meaning' too 
will have to be conceptualised in these terms. There will be two aspects 
of 'meaning' at large in the world, 'subjective' meaning, which is 
essentially personal, particular and possibly private in some sense, 
and lobjectivet meaning, which will be dependent not upon some particular 
subjectivity but upon its relationship to an 'objective' 'real world', 
or alternatively to its being intersubjectively available and communally 
validated. The task for the theorist interested in meaning will then be 
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to articulate these two aspects of 'meaning' in a coherent fashion. 
If what is fundamental is not taken to be some distinction between 
subject and object, however, but something else, then inevitably the 
notion of 'meaning' that emerges will be different. The framework 
within which it is conceptualized will be different. What one in fact 
finds in the work of both Wittgenstein and Garfinkel is that instead of 
the subject object distinction being primary, a 'form of life' or a set 
of practices and procedures are seen to be the tgiven' - as the most 
fundamental datum of our existence. Thus it becomes possible to see 
'meaning' in a different way - as 'embedded' in a form of life rather 
than as something with two-aspects, one subjective and the other 
objective. The place that the subject object distinction holds within 
a theory about the social wor14 then, is significant as an indicator of 
the way in which 'meaning' is being conceptualised. 
The fourth and final indicator is the notion of lintersubjectivity'. 
This is really an extension of the previous one, but it bears emphasising. 
The point here is that if what is fundamental is taken to be a 
distinction between subjectivities and something opposed to them 
'objectivity' - then a further problem will be concerned with the 
possibility of lintersubjectivity', or communication between different 
subjects. This brings us back to the problem of universals and the 
possibility of ? agreement' - i. e. the possibility of 'agreement' about 
what is the case in the world is what provides for the possibility of 
an intersubjective world, whether that be conceptualized as a treality, 
out there or the concepts of language itself. The problem of 
intersubjectivity becomes, on this account, a problem concerning the 
transference of 'meanings' from one subjectivity to another, and the 
theorist must specify the conditions which make this possible. 
In suggesting that the distinction between subject and object is 
not, be to taken as fundamental, Garfinkel and Wittgenstein posit as 
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basic a radically intersubjective realm - i. e. it is not lintersubjectivel 
just in the sense that communication between subjectivities is possible 
for reasons x, y, and z, but rather that communication is possible is 
the fundamental fact about man's existence. Thus 'meaning' ceases to 
be something that has to be passed between subjectivities, and about 
which there is some problem as to how such passing is possible, but 
instead that a 'form of life' is meaningful becomes a fundamental fact 
about it. 'Meaning', once again, becomes seen as 'embedded'-within the 
practices and procedures of our daily round. 
In sum, then, the theoretical theme is focused upon two problems, 
concerned with social order and meaning, which are linked with one 
another at a particular level of social structure which is indicated by 
Garfinkel's work, and upon which the later writings of Wittgenstein can 
throw some light. What is involved at this level is those practices 
and procedures which make social order-possible, which enable meaningful' 
interaction, and within which 'meaning' is embedded. The central 
concerns of Garfinkel's work are with what it is that people do that 
provides for the possibility of social order and of meaningful interaction. 
This is a concern with the mechanisms of society and social interaction, 
and as such it is relevant to the attempt to grasp the social world in 
a sociological manner. Over the course of this thesis, I will trace some 
of the ways in which the work of Garfinkel and ethnomethodologists differs 
on these important issues from that of other sociologists, and I will 
show some of the ways in which their empirical work illuminates and 
develops their particular insights into an aspect of the social world. 
I will suggest that in the work of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein can be 
found the beginnings of what could be a rigorous sociological approach 
towards some important social phenomena, and an approach that takes 
Imqaning' as an embedded phenomenon seriously. Over the course of the 
discussion, other important issues will be raised. Questions concerning 
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the nature of theory, of truth, of 'reality', and many more will 
emerge and be discussed, and some of the relevance of an 
ethnomethodological perspective upon such matters will be indicated 
in each case. At the same time, some of the implications of this 
position for empirical research will be examined, and some of the 
research that has been done will be set forward for examination. 
It is perhaps worth mentioning two subsidiary themes specifically, 
to highlight their importance within the overall context of the 
discussion to follow. The first is the problem of relativism, the 
second the question of the nature of 'rules'. I do not want to expand 
at any length on either of these at the present stage, since the 
substance of their significance is bound up heavily with the substance 
of the arguments of following chapters. Suffice it to say, however, 
that I will suggest that a way of conceptualizing the problem of 
relativism such that it becomes an empirical question, rather than a 
purely a priori one, is provided by the work of conversational analysts, 
and that this 3 '. s entwined with a notion of 'rule', indicated in 
Wittgenstein's later writings, that is to do with a 'form of life'. 
This important notion of 'rule', indeed, which concerns the 'bedrock' 
manifest in particular cases of obeying or going against the rule, will 
be seen to be what unites, at a deep level, the thought of Garfinkel 
and Wittgenstein. 
Having indicated the general directions which this thesis will 
take, and having highlighted some of the concepts that will be of central 
concern to what follows, I want now to move on to look at the work of 
Husserl and Schutz to provide the first stages of the background 
necessary to an understanding of Garfinkel and ethnomethodology. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HUSSERL AND SCHUTZ 
"The point is not to secure objectivity, but to understand it". (1) 
The aim of both this chapter, and the one that follows it which will 
deal with the work of Wittgenstein, is to provide a background of 
philosophical and theoretical considerations in the light of which to 
discuss the work of Garfinkel and ethnomethodology. My main purpose will 
not, therefore, be to provide exhaustive accounts of the work of Husserl, 
Schutz or Wittgenstein and much, indeed, will remain unconsidered. For 
example in the present chapter, little will be said about the nature of 
'evidence', 'sense data', and thyletic data' in Husserl's work, and the 
discussion of Schutz will not be concerned to explicate his notion of 
'relevance'. The focus will be, rather, upon those aspects of the work 
of the thinkers involved which shed the most light on the themes that 
have been introduced in the previous chapter and which will help to throw 
into clear relief those same themes in the work of ethnomethodologists. 
In the present chapter, I will begin by giving an account of 
Husserl's phenomenology, concentrating particularly on those aspects of 
it which seem to present promise to a sociologist interested in meaning 
in the social world, but at the same time pointing out some of the 
difficulties with which they present the sociologist. I will then move 
on to show how Schutz develops his own sociological position by 
incorporating certain of Husserl's notions but at the same time adjusting 
them to articulate with his sociological concerns. I will suggest that 
these adjustments lead Schutz into an untenable position in which a 
fundamental tension between lobjectivel and Isubjectivel meaning contexts 
fails to find any satisfactory resolution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Before giving an account of the basic method and conceptual 
apparatus of Husserl*s phenomenology, I will discuss briefly the driving 
concerns and goals of the work. 
Spiegelberg has written that Husserl seems to have had some idea 
that he had a mission set out for him under God's will. (2) Whether 
or not this is the case, it is undoubtedly true that his writings show 
a strong sense of purpose. He saw phenomenology as being potentially a 
force that could transform the whole consciousness of man, as something 
that could enable men to see the world with new eyes and to realize the 
true nature of the world and its relationship to consciousness. 
Phenomenology can be seen as something vocational, to which a philosopher 
can justifiably devotehis whole life. As Husserl writes: 
"Perhaps it will even become manifest that the total 
phenomenological attitude and the epoche belonging to it 
are destined in essence to effect, at first, a complete 
personal transformation, comparable in the beginning to 
religious conversion, which then, however, over and above 
this, bears within itself the signiiicance of the greatest 
existential transformation which is assigned as a task to 
mankind as such". (3) 
Farber relates an incident that demonstrates this point in somewhat 
different fashion: 
"That Husserl regarded his teaching as extending 'seeing' 
in philosophy and psychology 6ay be illustrated by an 
incident which occured in his Freiburg period. Upon asking 
the wife of a visiting scholar what she got out of 
listening to his technical lectures, he was told that the 
lessons in phenomenology gave her so many new eyes. In 
Husserlls opinion this aptly expressed the spirit of his 
undertaking". (4) 
The way in which this new ? seeing' was to be brought about was by 
the phenomenological methods, notably the phenomenological reductions, 
which were to enable the phenomenologist to 'bracket' the taken for 
granted everyday world in which we all live, and to move reflectively 
in a realm of new experience. 
Two questions arise at this point. Firstly, what-exactly is the 
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nature of this world of new, and obviously important, experiences, 
and secondly, what is the point of finding ones way into it in the 
first place? I will answer each question in turn. 
Although the realm into which Husserl's phenomenology is-to move 
the meditating philosopher is not entirely unproblematic (5) it is 
possible to characterise it in broad term s by saying that it is that 
'transcendental' realm in which lie the 'presuppositions' of knowledge. 
It is a realm where the 'essence' of knowledge lies. The precise sense 
of these terms will become more apparent later, but for the time being 
I will use them - as well as other technical terms like 'reduction' - 
simply to give an overall impression of what Husserl is attempting to 
do. This will serve as a prelude to more detailed discussions of what 
is involved-in his work. 
The phenomenologist moves, then, with the 'phenomenological and 
eidetic reductions', into the realm of 'consciousness' where he finds 
structures of essences which he must describe as faithfully as possible, 
setting out their 'intentional' nature, their relationships to one 
another, and their relationship to the 'stream of consciousness'. 
The nature of this realm is to be uncovered by the investigations 
themselves, but nonetheless the researcher can be sure that if he 
genuinely carries out the phenomenological methods then he is confronted 
with a genuine realm of Being - as Husserl puts it, the goal of the- 
reduction is 
"the winning of a new region of Being, the distinctive character 
of which has not yet been defined, a region of individual Being, 
like every genuine region". (6) 
But what is the point of trying to win such a new region of Being? This 
question can be, approached from two directions. Firstly there is the 
question of the precise nature of knowledge. Husserl believed that 
"A philosophy with problematic foundations, with paradoxes 
which arise from the obscurity of the fundamental concepts, 
is no philosophy, it contradicts its very meaning as 
philosophy. Philosophy can take root only in radical reflexion 
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upon the meaning and possibility of its own scheme. 
Through such reflexion it must in the very first place 
and through its own activity take possession of the 
absolute ground of pure pre-conceptual experience, which 
is its own proper preserve; then, self-active again, it 
must create original concepts, adequately adjusted to 
this ground, and so*utilize for its advance an absolutely 
transparent method". (7) 
This being the case, it is necessary to search out the region of 
being where the presuppositions of knowledge lie, and to examine it in 
such a way that the "obscurity of the fundamental concepts" of philosophy 
is overcome. Husserl considered that by doing this, philosophy could be 
rescued from many of its uncertainties and set on a path that would lead 
eventually to a scientific phenomenological philosophy. He concludes 
his important "Logos" article of 1911 thus: 
"Thus the greatest step our age has to make is to recognize 
that with the philosophical intuition in the correct sense, 
the phenomenological grasp of essences, a limitless field 
of work opens out, a science that without all indirectly 
symbolical and mathematical methods, without the apparatus 
of premises and conclusions, still attains a plenitude of the 
most rigorous and, for all further philosophy, decisive 
cognitions". (8) 
In this way, not only could phenomenology clean up philosophy, as 
it were, but it could provide a firm foundation for natural scientific 
study by showing how any form of knowledge is possible. As things are 
with philosophy before the advent of phenomenology it is not even an 
imperfect science, "It is not yet a science at all". (9) 
Husserils second reason for wanting to approach towards, the 
presuppositions of knowledge in the way that he does is connected with 
the first in that it is, equally, grounded in a determination to find a 
firm foundation for knowledge. It is this that leads him to attack the 
'psychologism' that was so prevalent in his day, (10) and against which 
much of his early work is directed. As long as the laws of logic-are 
founded on nothing more than psychological principles, Husserl considered& 
then there was no way that a philosopher could avoid a vicious relativism 
which sweeps away the possibility of any true knowledge. I will briefly 
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give an account of the psychologistic position, and of Husserl's 
response to it. 
S 
Plychologism claims that the laws of logic can be reduced to laws 
of psychology. This means that the necessity that seems to characterize 
logical laws can be accounted for entirely in terms of the expectations 
or beliefs of men. The distinction between inductive and deductive 
knowledge is thus reduced to a matter of the degree of certainty that 
is felt to hold in each case. Thus, for example, a deductive argument 
of the form "All 'A's are IBI, ICI is 'A', therefore ICI is IBIII is an 
inductive generalization about what all men believe to be the case in 
the same way that "All swans are white" is, based on counting the number 
of instances in which this has in fact been the case, and subject to 
some probability of being eventually found wrong - as "all swans are 
white" was. The syllogism above can thus be rewritten, according to 
the psychologistic position, "As a matter of fact, anyone who believes 
that all 'A's are 'B's, and that ICI is 'At, will believe that ICI is 
IBI". There is always the possibility that someone or another, perhaps 
from another planet or another culture, will not believe this to be the 
case and could convincingly demonstrate'his case, in which case the . 
hypothesis would be proved false. An example of just this happening is 
in the story of Achilles and the Tortoise, told by Lewis Caroll, in 
which the Tortoise simply refuses to accept the logical conclusion from 
the premises. (11) 
Husserl, however, was not at all happy with the tenuous position in 
which this put. logic and, by implication, the possibility of knowledge. 
He does not-, however, go for some variant of the logical positivist 
'solution' which sees the necessity of logical propositions as depending 
upon the fact that suA propositions are 'analytic' or 'tautologous' 
and thus true by definition, (12) but prefers instead to seek for his 
solution in the 'transcendental$ realm. Thus he argues (13) that "Logic 
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as the theory of science is (accordingly) a normative discipline". (14) 
Rather than it being an empirical pursuit, it is an art. "It is the 
business of logic to ascertain whether given sciences or methods fulfill 
their purpose". (15) This being the case, logic cannot be just like any 
other science, or based on some empirical science like psychology, since 
its whole essence is fundamentally different. Empirical science is based 
on experience - it is "real" - whereas logic is based upon the "ideal" 
and is a priori. -Thus if there is a science upon, which logic is based, 
then it could not be psychology - an empirical discipline - but must 
be upon an ideal science or a science of the ideal. Thus what is needed 
if one is to understand logic in its fullness, is a science of the ideal 
-a science of essences - which could reach to the genuine presuppositions 
of knowledge instead of supposing that all knowledge can be explained 
Psychologically. It is this science which, Husserl conceives phenomenology 
to be. 
It is important to realise that Husserl always, even at the end of 
his life, saw himself as just beginning his task. Spiegelberg makes 
the point that Husserl never constructs a system of philosophy after 
the manner of an Hegel or a Spinoza, but that his work remains programmatic, 
with Husserl himself always wanting to be a "true beginner". Thus his 
"Crisis" (16) is yet another attempt to find a route into phenomenology 
and into the realm of the presuppositions of knowledge, and stands as 
yet another 'introduction' to his method even though it is his last major 
work. In spite of the considerable role that he saw for phenomenology. 
Husserl himself seems never to have realised its promise, continuing 
instead to attempt to bring others to "see" for themselves, by the use 
of the methods which he describes at length, the importance and potential 
of phenomenology. It is this, perhaps, that accounts for the difficulties 
that the reader has in making out the precise import of some of Husserlts 
remarks, and the directions in which his concepts should be taken. 
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Perhaps it accounts, too, for the wide variety of more or less different 
interpretations that have been given of Husserl's work over the course 
of the years since his death. (17) 
Having made these few general remarks about the point of Husserl's 
writings, I want now, in the next section, to move on to discuss in more 
detail something of his method of analysis, the ways in which he 
attempts to bring the meditating philosopher to the transcendental 
realm, and something of what that philosopher will find once he gets 
there. 
HUSSERLIS METHOD AND THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
Perhaps the best way of introducing Husserl's method is to look at 
the remarks which he has to make about Descartes, since this provides 
some historical perspective upon what it is that Husserl is trying to 
achieve with the phenomenological and eidetic reductions. (18) 
In "Ideas", Husserl claims that Descartes, in his Meditations does 
not do as he sets out to do - i. e. to doubt all that could possibly be 
doubted in order to find that which could not be called into doubt and 
which could therefore be used as a certain starting point for knowledge 
- but rather his doubting the world becomes a denial of it. (19) The 
reasons for Husserl's claim become clear from his discussion of Descartes 
in the "Cartesian Meditations" where he argues against the prejudice 
that 
"With our apodictic pure ego, we have rescued a little 
tag-end of the world, as the sole unquestionable part of it 
for the philosophizing Ego, and that now the problem is to 
infer the rest of the world by rightly conducted arguments, 
according to principles innate in the ego. " (20) 
It is the case, however, that 
"Unfortunately these prejudices were at work when Descartes 
introduced the apparently insignificant but actually 
fateful change whereby the ego becomes a substantia cogitans, 
a separate human "mens sive animus". and the point of. 
departure for inferences according to the principle of 
causality - in short, the change by virtue of which 
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Descartes became the father of transcendental realism, 
an absurd position, though its absurdity cannot be made 
apparent at this point. " (21) 
In other words what Descartes did was to move from "Cogitoll to 
"ergo sum" - an invalid step as far as Husserl is concerned - and by 
doing so he put the meditating ego in the real, actually existing, world 
of everyday life. Because of this, the only way of conceiving the world 
as existing, was to see it in its relationship to the mundane empirical 
subject - i. e. to people as actual human beings. In this way, Descartes' 
method of doubt can be more adequately characterized as a denial - it is 
the actual concrete ego as existing in the world that is denying the 
actual existing objects of everyday life until such a time as he can find 
some apodictically certain reason for admitting their existence. This 
reason is found in the, for Husserl unwarranted, assertion "Cogito, ergo 
sum". Put in another way, Husserlts claim amounts to saying that as 
long as the meditating ego is taken to be the real empirical ego of the 
everyday world then no attempt to provide a truly radical philosophy that 
approaches the true presuppositions of knowledge can be possible, and 
indeed will result only in the denial of the actually existing world 
Of everyday life. 
What is the alternative? For Husserl, the only radical way to 
investigate the presuppositions of knowledge, is to perform the 
phenomenological reduction -a concept that I will explicate later. He 
must "bracket" his belief in the existence of the everyday world in which 
we all live in a "free epoche". (22) By doing this he discovers a 
different Ego - the transcendental Ego which is the trne origin of-the 
world. The-empirical Ego and the Empirical world remain exactly as 
they are, existing as we experience them in the natural attitude, yet 
at the same time the meditating philosopher is able to move into this 
new realm of experience. There, as Husserl puts it 
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"This Ego, with his Ego-life, who necessarily remains 
for me, by virtue of such epoche, is not a piece of the 
world; and if he says, "I exist, ego cogito", that no 
longer signifies, III, this man, exist". No longer am 
I the man who, in natural self-experience, finds himself 
as a man and who, with the abstractive restriction to 
the pure contents of "internal" or purely psychological 
self experience, finds his own pure I'mens sive animus 
sive intellectus"; nor am I the separately considered 
psyche itself. " (23) 
What the meditating ego finds, once he is in the world characterized 
by the reduction, is a "transcendental Ego", an Ego without which there 
would be nothing: 
"The Objective world, the world that exists for me, 
that always has and always will exist for me, the only 
world that ever can exist for me - this world, with all 
its Objects, I said, derives its whole sense and its 
existential status, which is has for me, from me myself, 
from me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego who comes to 
the fore only with transcendental phenomenological epoche. 11 (24) 
In the epoche, I, as meditating ego, realize myself as transcendental 
principle of the world - as the "World-form". I do not need, as an 
empirical Ego, to deny the world as Descartes had done, for with the 
insights of Phenomenology and by careful use of its methods, I can 
discover the true presuppositions of knowledge in the transcendental Ego 
itself and in this transcendental realm I can uncover and describe the 
structures of the essences that lie there. 
What, then, are these methods that provide the meditating 
philosopher with the means of access to this realm of the transcendental 
ego? What is this lepochel or 'bracketing' which will enable one to 
"see" the presuppositions of knowledge? 
In the introduction to the Gottingen lectures, Husserl speaks of 
three steps which must be taken in order to ascend to the transcendental 
realm, and to produce a phenomenological analysis of consciousness. (25) 
I will take these in turn. 
1. He begins by asking what it is that is 'given' in the process 
(act) of knowledge. He takes the classical distinction between 
'transcendent' (i. e. existing independently of consciousness) and 
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'immanent' (i. e. existing within consciousness) and suggests that only 
that which is 'immanent' is truly 'given' to us. But this immanence is 
not to be taken as 'existing within me' but only as 'that which is given 
in the act of cognition' - in the stream of consciousness. In other 
words immanence is not to be taken psychologically. Thus, in an 
investigation of knowledge, one must make use of the 'genuinely immanent* 
- the adequately self-given - since that is what all knowledge is based 
on. To that end I must "accomplish a phenomenological reduction: I 
must exclude all that is transcendentally posited" (26) (i. e. all that 
is constituted as existing independently of consciousness). This means 
"everything transcendent (that which is not given to me 
immanently) is to be assigned the index zero, i. e. its 
existence, its validity is not to be assumed as such, 
except at most as the phenomenon of a claim to validity. 
I am to treat all sciences only as phenomena, hence not 
as systems of valid truths, not as premises, not even as 
hypotheses for me to reach truth with. " (27) 
Thus, in the first stage, we attempt t6-strip away the presuppositions 
of the natural attitude - the existence of the empirical world, the 
validity of scientific truths and so on - and simply stand face to face 
with what is given. We have performed the $phenomenological reduction' 
which entails 'bracketing' our belief in the existence of the world. 
We have accepted only what is given - the, phenomena - and have now to 
go about the task of describing them. 
2. We now move to a higher level. We have already left behind all 
empirical sciences in favour of the 'pure phenomenal. We are no longer 
dealing with man in the world, but with pure phenomena of cognition. We 
can now "see" the realm of phenomena, free of preconceptions about 
existence and their mundane status. But so far we seem to be "seeing" 
only individual, unconnected phenomena. What we in fact find when we 
inspect what is given, is not a series of unrelated phenomena, but 
11inspectable universals, species, essences". (28) By eidetic abstraction 
- the eidetic reduction - we rise to a realm of essences. Just as we at 
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first saw disconnected phenomena, so we now "see" the universals - 
the essences - which enable us to see certain phenomena as instances 
of "the same" thing. Phenomena take shape as'instances of the genus 
'chair' and 'table' for example, instead of being unrelated shapes. 
In this way we are able to see that the objectivity of essences is 
'given' to us in consciousness, although it is not given immanently. (29) 
So far the impression may have been given that givenness is a 
wholly passive affair. The first, phenomenological, reduction seems to 
be a matter of sitting back and allowing the phenomena to simply float 
into ones consciousness. The givenness of essences that characterizes 
the eidetic reduction on the other hand is not at all a passive affair. 
Essences are not just beings existing in consciousness in some way; as 
Fink puts it 
"Rather, the eidos is the correlate of an operation of 
thought, or of a spontaneous intellectual act. The 
eidos is known as the invariable element of something 
held fast in terms of its self-identity throughout its 
variation and the reflective running through of its 
possible modifications; Since mention of essential 
insight was to have indicated the manner in which a 
thought-intention was fulfilled (and whose meaning, 
therefore, was only analogous to sensory perception), 
the phenomenological definition of essence itself as 
an actual objectivity does not signify its hypostatized 
substantiality, but simply indicates the eidos' "categorial" 
existence, that is, its being engendered through spontaneous 
acts of thought. " (30) 
The emphasis is not on the passive reception of sense data, but upon 
cognition - upon lacts' of consciousness. Thus the analysis of essences 
involves. an analysis of the acts of consciousness which constitute these 
essences as lobjectivel (although in a sense that does not, note, imply 
existence). The precise nature of these essences will be examined in 
" moment. 
Thus, with the phenomenological and eidetic reductions, we are in 
" realm of essences - as Husserl puts it 
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"Thus the field is now characterised. It is a field 
of absolute cognitions, within which the ego and the 
world and god and the mathematical manifolds and 
whatever else may be a scientifically objective matter, 
are held in abeyance. Cognitions which are, therefore 
also not dependent on these matters, which are valued 
in their own right, whether we are sceptics with 
regard to the others or not. All that remains as it is. " (31) 
We have thus reached the realm where the true presuppositions of 
knowledge lie. The mundane world remains exactly as it is, but we, as 
philosophers who have moved from the natural to the phenomenological 
attitude, have gained access to the ultimate realm, a realm of cognitions 
and of essences. 
3. The final stage is to look carefully at this ideal realm of 
essences and to describe what one sees. As Husserl puts it elsewhere 
"We should and must strive in each step we take to 
describe faithfully what we see from our own point 
of view and after the most earnest consideration. Our 
procedure is that of a scientific traveller in an 
unknown part of the world who carefully describes what 
he finds in the trackless ways he takes - ways that 
will not always be the shortest. " (32) 
What is described is the structures of the essences, the relationships 
between the appearing thing and the act of cognition, between various 
possible acts of consciousness (perception, imagination etc. ) and 
between essences and the stream of consciousness. our reflections show 
us the ways in which things are 'constituted' in consciousness - as 
Husserl puts it we find 
"mental processes of specific and changing structure, 
such as perception, imagination, memory, predication 
etc. and in them the things are not contained as in a 
hull or vessel. Instead, the things comes to be - 
constituted in these mental processes, although in 
reality they are not at all to be found in them. " (33) 
The job of the phenomenologist is thus to describe as faithfully as possible 
the ways in which things come to be constituted in consciousness - the 
structure of acts and essences which is the presupposition of all 
knowledge. 
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It is difficult to overemphasise the importance of the methods of 
phenomenological reduction in Husserl's work. Without thems 
phenomenological analysis would become impossible, and all investigations 
of consciousness or of the presuppositions of knowledge would be condemned 
to be carried on in the mundane attitude of everyday life. Thus, without 
the reductions, Husserl could never have argued as he did against 
Descartes, the distinction between the transcendental and mundane realms 
of experience could never have been substantiated so graphically, and an 
eidetic science of a phenomenological kind could never have been 
suggested as a possibility. Indeed Phenemenology, to a large extent, is 
a set of methods - methods that carried through faithfully will enable 
the phenomenologist to see with new eyes the transcendental presuppositions 
of the world. The method of reduction provides access to the 
phenomenological realm, the method of description enables the philosopher 
to move usefully within this realm, and tintentional analysist. (of which 
more will be said) provides a framework within which the phenomenologist 
works in his descriptions of consciousness. Husserl himself writes at 
the conclusion of Cartesian Meditations that he has shown "the concrete 
possibility of the Cartesian idea of a philosophy as an all-embracing 
science grounded on an absolute foundation", in terms of the development 
of adequate methods. As he puts it 
"To exhibit this concrete possibility, to show the 
feasibility of such a philosophy though of course 
in the form of an endless program Means exhibiting 
a necessary and indubitable beginning and an equally 
necessary and always employable method - whereby, at 
the same time, a systematic order of all senseful 
problems is predelineated. 11 (34) 
This "endless program" is phenomenology, for Husserl. The philosopher 
must constantly return to the roots of knowledge using phenomenological 
methods in order to transform awareness of these roots. The point is 
not to secure worldly objectivity (35), but to understand it, and thus 
to prevent the naive dogmatism that threatens to hide. the true origins 
-25- 
of the world from man. Positive science, with its mathematization of 
nature, has hidden from man the true transcendental origins of the world 
in consciousness, and has thus taken the world away from him. Husserl 
puts it thus: 
it ... we must note something of the highest importance 
that occurred even as early as Galileo: the surreptitious 
substitution of the mathematically substructed world of 
idealities for the only real world, the one that is 
actually given through perception, that is ever experienced 
and experienceable - our everyday life-world. This 
substitution was promptly passed on to his successors, the 
physicists of all the succeeding centuries. " (36) 
What must be done, is to recover the 'life-world' of everyday 
experience, and then moving on from there, one must go back to the 
transcendental origins of the world. (37) It is the phenomenological 
methods that make this process possible. 
The point can be stressed further by pointing out that criticisms 
of phenomenological concepts that remain wholly within the "natural 
attitude", cannot adequately grasp the true nature of that which they 
are supposed to be assessing. Anyone who would understand the reductions 
must carry them out himself, for otherwise his stance in the mundane 
world will prevent him from ever coming fully to grips with their true 
nature; as Fink puts it 
"He (Husserl P. M. ) could be satisfied with this first 
and provisional account of the reduction in trusting 
that the actual carrying out of the given analyses 
(in "Ideas" P. M. ) (and not simply their being read) 
would create the disposition to set authentically the 
phenomenological reduction in motion. " (38) 
Statements such as these make it-clear that the phenomenological methods 
are not only crucial to the practice of phenomenology, but also to any 
adequate understanding of it. Criticism that does not itself perform the 
reduction will inevitably be inadequate. 
The phenomenologist who makes use of the methods Husserl lays out 
for him thus brackets his belief in the existence of things in the world, 
and moves from the 'natural attitude$ into the $phenomenological attitude'. 
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With this shift of attitude, a new realm of experience becomes available 
to him and it becomes possible for him to describe the structures of 
essences and acts of consciousness that provide the possibility of 
knowledge. The question that must be answered now is what do these 
structures actually look like? 
For Husserl, there are three basic elements in the structure of 
consciousness, namely the legol, the 'cogitol and the Icogitatuml. I 
will deal with each of these briefly in turn. 
The 'ego' can be seen as having three aspects. (39) Firstly there 
is the "human ego", the III which lives in the everyday world in the 
natural attitude. It is this ego that is left behind when the meditating 
philosopher 'brackets' his belief in the existence of the world by 
performing the phenomenological reductions. Secondly, there is the 
"transcendental ego" for whom, as Fink puts it, "the world is pregiven 
in the flow of the universal apperception and who accepts it". (40) 
Finally, there is the ego which is the "onlooker" who actually performs 
the reductions and does the describing of the intentional structures of 
consciousness. The ego which is important for present purposes is the 
transcendental ego which has been attained by means of the reductions. 
The 'cogitol, or 'I think', which is also called by Husserl the 
tnoetict aspect of consciousness, is the cognitive acts which the 
transcendental ego performs. Thus, for example, perception, imagining, 
remembering, judging and so on, are all noetic acts of consciousness. 
The cogitatum, or Inoematict aspect of consciousness, is the 
'objective' correlate of a noetic act. 
It must firstly be remembered that the 
real world. It is not, for example, a 
we perceive it in the natural attitude 
is found after the reductions, then it 
existing objects - like trees, chairs, 
This notion needs some explication. 
Inoemat is not an object in the 
'tree' complete with existence as 
Since what is being described 
is concerned not with actually 
tables etc. - in the real worlds 
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but with 'essences' with the 'presuppositions' of knowledge. Thus 
the noema, as correlate of a noetic act of consciousness, is to be 
clearly distinguished from the actually existing object in the real 
world. At the same time, however, it should not be thought that it is 
nothing but an aspect of the noetic act itself. The same noema can be 
the object of different acts - of perception, imagination, etc. - and 
thus does not depend upon any single noesis. (41) Thus the noema is 
both different from the 'real' object, and independent of individual 
acts of consciousness. So, what is it? Gurwitsch gives the following 
account: 
"The noema, as distinct from the real object as well as 
from the act, turns out to be an unreal or ideal entity 
which belongs to the same sphere as meanings or 
significations. This is the sphere of sense (Sinn). " (42) 
The noema, in other words, is bound up with the 'meaning' of objects as 
they are perceived, imagined etc. in consciousness. It is the noema that 
relates consciousness towards 'objects' - "that allows our conscious acts 
to be directed toward object". (43) It is bound up with the 'sense' 
that the world has for us that objects have for us - and it is a 
fundamental aspect of the structure of consciousness. 
The relationship between the noetic act and its noematic correlate 
is called an 'intentional' relationship. It must be stressed, however, 
that the sense of intention that is meant here cannot be related 
unproblematically to the normal English sense of 'intend' as in 'I intended 
to cross the road$. (44) Rather, it is meant to describe the relationship 
between noesis and noema - it is a technical term whose purpose is this 
description. 
With this notion of 'intentionality' is described what is, for 
Husserl, a fundamental fact about consciousness - the fundamental structure 
of consciousness. Having performed the reduction, the phenomenologist 
must then describe the intentional relationships which he finds, for in 
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this way he can lay bare the presuppositions of knowledge. By 
unravelling the ways in which noetic acts and their noematic correlates 
are related, the 'essences' of things can be set forth and the origins 
of the world brought to experience. It must not be thought, however, 
that what is being dealt with here is a set of. discrete and particular 
events that follow on, one after another, - noetic act after noetic 
act - like the tick of a clock. Rather, consciousness is characterized 
by Husserl in terms more reminiscent of the sweep of the second hand 
round the dial. It is here that the concept of the 'stream of 
consciousness' becomes important. Husserl himself says of the reduction 
"If I put myself above all this life (i. e. the life of 
the natural attitude) and refrain from doing any believing 
that takes 'the' world straightforwardly as existing - if 
I direct my regard exclusively to this life itself, as 
consciousness of Ithet world -I thereby acquire myself as 
the pure stream of my cogitationes. 11 (45) 
In a sense, then, consdousness is a tpure stream' of cogitationes, rather 
than a succession of discrete noetic acts following one upon the other. 
Consciousness is a pure stream of lived experience, undifferentiated and 
yet, nonetheless, tintentionall at a fundamental level. (46) It is for 
the phenomenologist to unravel the precise ways in which noetic acts and 
their noematic correlates phase in and out of the stream of consciousness 
to give us our Isensel of the world - to give the sense that the world 
has for us. Thus the way in which the world is 'constituted' by the 
transcendental ego will be described and the presuppositions of our 
knowledge of the world made apparent. 
I have tried to give here, then, a general-impression of the type 
of method and analysis that Husserl engages in, and which he recommends 
to all philosophers that they might Iseei as he has seen. Upon this 
notion of the intentional structure of consciousness is grounded the 
rest of Husserl's work. His thoughts on 'evidence', on tintuitiong, on 
'certainty' Ifulfilmentl and lapodicticityl and so on are all dependent 
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upon - indeed generated from - this fundamental notion of 'intentionality', 
and are subject to 'intentional analyses'. For present purposes, the 
most important of Husserlts intentional analyses is that which is found 
in the "Cartesian Meditations" in which he attempts to account for 
intersubjectivity, and it is to this that I want to turn next. Before 
doing so, however, it will be useful to make a few observations about 
the notion of 'intentional analysis' in Husserl's sense. 
It should be noticed firstly, that Husserlis notion of intentionality 
enables him to avoid difficulties created by problems concerned with 
'illusion'. It makes no difference, as far as he is concerned, whether 
a perceived (or remembered, etc. ) object actually exists or whether it 
is an hallucination, or a misremembering etc. Because he has bracketed 
belief in the mundane existence of objects in the world, his intentional 
analyses of the 'objects' of consciousness which is to unravel the 
presuppositions of knowledge, does not depend upon the actual existence 
of the objects perceived. Whether the object does exist, in other words, 
makes no difference to the intentional structure of consciousness itself, 
so that an examination of that structure need not depend at all upon the 
existence of an external world. Existential, or ontological, status, 
once within the reduction, is something that is conferred upon an object 
by an act of consciousness - by a special act of 1positing' existence - 
and not something that belongs to the object itself. once the meditating 
philosopher has placed the mundane world of the natural attitude within 
brackets, it remains there throughout all intentional analyses. 
Secondly, it is worth noticing that intentional analysis in Husserl's 
sense depends upon a particular sort of abstraction. It is an abstraction 
in the sense that by bracketing belief in the existence of the mundane 
world, it abstracts from the world as we actually know it in order to 
uncover the presuppositions of knowledge. The question then arises as 
to what the relationship is of this abstract knowledge, gained within 
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the reduction, to the world of the natural attitude, to actually 
existing reality. Spiegelberg states the problem: 
"Reduction may be ever so important for sharply 
isolating the sphere of those phenomena which are 
indubitably certain .... But if it is correct that "bracketing" means simply disregarding the question 
of reality, it can never be the means of -deciding it. 
Breaking off the bridges across a stream can never 
be the way to determine what is on the other side, ',.. " (47) 
At the same time, however, that there is a problem here, there is also 
a sense in which the analyses are directed towards 'objects' which may 
be trealt by virtue of the investigation of the Inoematict component of 
consciousness. Although it is not necessary that the object to which 
the noema refers does in fact exist, in as much as a noema is bound up 
with the 'sense' or Imeaningt of the world it does relate to the way in 
which we "see" the world (where "see" includes perception, judging, etc., 
etc. ). It provides, in a sense, the 'categories' through which the 
world is grasped; as Solomon puts it 
"Husserl is not simply offering us a modification of 
Brentano's thesis, he is giving us a radical alternative 
to it. That radical thesis is essentially a Kantian 
thesis: the claim that concepts are basic not only to 
conceptual thought but to the most primitive perception 
and experience as well ... In Kantian terms, we would 
say that all our experience is concept-laden and 
meaning-full, that what we experience is "constituted" 
through our judgements. The Husserlian thesis is 
strikingly similar to this, except that he would speak 
of an "essence" where Kant spoke of "concept". " (48) 
In short, once again, what Husserl appears to be doing with his abstraction 
is to provide access to the realm of the presuppositions of knowledge. 
Intentional analyses thus relate to the 'real' world to the extent that 
they uncover those presuppositions, which are the structures of essences 
and acts that constitute the sense of the world. 
With these remarks, I want to turn now to discuss Husserl's account 
of intersubjectivity. The first thing that must be noticed about this 
is that it is an intentional analysis of the constitution of 
intersubjectivity in consciousness. The goal of this analysis is to 
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describe the processes whereby the world becomes for us an intersubjective 
reality rather than a mere correlate of our solipsistic perceptions. 
It is, in other words, an analysis of the presuppositions of 
intersubjectivity, rather than a metaphysical account of its concrete 
reality. (49) As Husserl puts it, to find answers to all of the possible 
questions about intersubjectivity 
"it is necessary to begin with a systematic explication 
of the overt and implicit intentionality in which the 
being of others for me becomes "made" and explicated in 
respect of its rightful content - that is, its 
fulfilment-content. " (50) 
Since we are dealing here with an intentional analysis, the 
structure of noetic/noematic relationships which is an intentional 
structure, is the pivot of the analysis. 
Husserl's analysis of intersubjectivity is treated most fully in 
the fifth of his "Cartesian Meditations". There his strategy is to begin 
by performing a new sort of reduction within transcendental consciousness, 
which is to lead to the sphere of lownness'. He suggests that if one 
performs this reduction one finds a basic division between that which is 
particularly my own, and that which is other. By bracketing all that is 
other, and concentrating only on that which is mine - my own ego, my own 
perceptions etc. - one comes to see oneself as a monad, separated from 
that which is other than oneself and which has an objectivity apart from 
ones' own perceptions of it. The problem for the intentional analysis 
is now to trace the structural links between this sphere of ownness and 
the sphere of otherness, which contains within it other Imonads' who 
seem to share this sphere of otherness, and who seem to share in its 
constitution as 'other' and as 'objective'. Indeed it is they that make 
it a sphere of 'otherness' in relation to ones own monadic sphere of 
lownness', such that the whole of consciousness cannot be reduced to 
ownness. It is they that ensure that transcendental subjectivity is not 
a solipsistic subjectivity. 
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The relationship between the monads - between ones own monad and 
that of others - is described broadly in terms of *empathy'. It is 
this 'empathy' that suggests the joint constitution of the world to 
tEgol. It is the basic experience Ego has of others. The whole idea 
of the objective world, rests upon this notion of intersubjectivity 
gained from the "harmony between monads" - as Husserl puts it 
"The objective world as an Idea - the ideal correlate 
of an intersubjective (intersubjectively communalised) 
experience, which ideally can be and is carried on as 
constantly harmonious - is essentially related to 
intersubjectivity (itself constituted as having the 
ideality of endless openness) whose component particular 
subjects are equipped with mutually corresponding and 
harmonious constitutive systems. Consequently the 
constitution of the world essentially involves a 'harmony' 
of the monads ... 11 (51) 
This basic notion of a harmony of monads, is filled out by Husserl 
over the remaining pages of the fifth meditation. His argument here - 
which, it must be remembered, is intended as an intentional analysis and 
not a metaphysical statement - can be summarized in a serious of four 
points. 
1. There is what Husserl calls lanalogising apperceptiont. His 
argument here bears some relationship to the usual argument for other 
minds from anology, except that it is stronger. The 'other$, is not 
simply 'seen' as an animated organism similar to oneself, and then given 
the status of an alter ego on the basis of inference, but rather, is 
directly lapperceived' as another in harmony with oneself. Just as in 
ordinary apperception one grasps an object in its entirety - i. e. one 
apperceives not only the face of a building that is turned towards you, 
but also the hidden sides as well - so in lanalogising apperception' 
one grasps the whole of alter, as another monad, with his own stream of 
consciousness etc. 
2. The second element in the move to transcendental intersubjectivity 
is 'pairing' or 'association'. Pairing is: 
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"a primal form of that passive synthesis which we 
designate 'association' in contrast to passive synthesis 
of 'identification. " (52) 
Pairing is 'seeing things as of the same kind'; it is associating 
two things with one anotherý This is part of intentional constitution, 
part of the mechanisms by which objectivities'are constituted in 
consciousness. What is paired in this case, is laltert with 'ego'. 
The other is apperceived as an instance of myself. 
3. 'Harmony' is a third point. We have, as 'evidence' of alter ego, 
the fact of harmoniousness both in the constitution of the world, and of 
alter with ego. This is an ongoingly present evidence, and in this sense 
it is unusual - i. e. most tevidencel for the 'existence' of an object, 
or for the truth or falsity of a statement is of a more discrete kind. 
Nonetheless it "consistently verifies something indicated" (53) - which 
is 'others'. 
4. The last point here is that there is a possibility of making 
myself 'other' by moving spatially (or in imagination) from my there' 
to my 'there' - which may be the others 'here'. This is a constant 
possibility for me - this interchangeability of my position with that 
of alter - and again it is a part of the 'apperception' of other Imonads'. 
What Husserl has done here, then, is to take his analysis of the 
structure of transcendental consciousness, and extend it, via the 
distinction between the realms of ownness and otherness, to incorporate 
the intersubjective realm. It is an analysis of the way in which the 
idea of an objective world is possible, and it finds this possibility in 
an intersubjectivity which is first experienced through empathy. 
Objectivity is, essentially, intersubjective constitution. Intersubjectivity 
itself is characterized as a harmony of monads and the intentional 
structure of this is described in terms of analogical apperception, 
pairing, harmony and the possibility of interchangeability of positions 
between alter and ego. This whole analysis attempts to move from 
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transcendental subjectivity, to transcendental intersubjectivity. 
In his later work, Husserl's concern with intersubjectivity led 
him to formulate the concept of the 'life-world', a concept that has 
been highly influential in the work of Merleau Ponty (54), and which 
is important in Schutz's writings. It seems probable that the concept 
was developed as another stage on the way to transcendental subjectivity 
- i. e. as a stage in the phenomenological reductions - rather than 
itself the ultimate point of a new kind of reduction which has as its 
goal intersubjective reality rather than the subjective consciousness 
that was the goal of the reduction in "Ideas", for example. I will give 
a brief account of the concept here. 
The life-world is that world of intersubjective experience upon 
which all thought, all science, all knowledge etc. is based. It is not 
the world of the natural attitude, but is the world of basic experience, 
stripped of the pollutions of scientific objectivism. (55) It is an 
'intuitive' world, that waits to be revealed as the experiential 
foundations of all science, instead of being continually hidden by the 
'objective' facts of scientific theorizing. There has been a "surreptitious 
substitution of the mathematically substructed world of idealities for 
the only real world" (56) and this has hidden the fact that all science 
is in fact built upon the intersubjective life-world - the world of 
experience. 
"as for the 'objectively truet world, the world of 
science, it is a structure at a higher level, built 
on pre-scientific experiencing and thinking, or rather 
on its accomplishments of validity". (57) 
Thus, in order to truly understand science, it is necessary to 
investigate the life-world as that intersubjective world which makes all 
science possible (58) - and this leads back, once again, to an analysis 
of the constitution of intersubjectivity within transcendental subjectivity. 
In this way, the life-world links back into the notion of intersubjectivity 
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that I have been discussing above, and thus into the rest of Husserl's 
phenomenology. 
HUSSERL AND SOCIOLOGY 
Before going on to discuss Schutz in the next section, I want first 
to make a few remarks about Husserlts philosophy with a view to pointing 
out some of the difficulties with which it presents any sociologist, 
who is interested in the possibility of incorporating phenomenological 
insights into the study of the social world. In this way, hopefully, 
the context of the decisions which Schutz took concerning Husserl's work 
will be made apparent. 
The most obvious point that needs to be made is simply that Husserl 
was not by any means a sociologist himself, but a philosopher. His 
problems are philosophical problems that have troubled philosophers over 
the generations, and all of his writing is aimed at providing some 
solution to these, and not to investigating the social world. This, as 
I have suggested above, (59) goes as much for the later concept of 
the life-world as it does for his earlier analyses of transcendental 
subjectivity. All of Husserl's analyses are framed with transcendental 
intent - they are aimed at the essences of things. As Sokolowski has 
put it, the transcendental turn enables us 
"to understand essences or eidetic structures as the 
anonymous conditions for the appearing of things as 
individuals and as facts, but conditions which in their 
turn can also become manifest to consciousness through 
essential intuition. Thus essences function in the 
appearing of things, and it is only when we focus on 
the appearing things that the status of essence becomes 
intelligible. The. transcendental viewpoint lets us do 
this. " (60) 
It is the focus on the transcendental that makes essential structures, 
as the presuppositions of knowledge, become apparent to us, as meditating 
egos. It is a focus which provides us with access to a realm of *immanence' 
where the possibility of gaining 'truth' - of achieving certainty - can 
be realised and thus a firm foundation fDrtknowledgel provided. Husserl 
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was not interested in securing worldly objectivity, but in understanding 
what makes it possible - in the transcendental. As the quotation at 
the head of the chapter says "The point is not to secure objectivity, 
but to understand it. " 
The sociologist, on the other hand, is interested in the real world. 
It is that world - the world of the natural-attitude, - in which the 
members of a society live and of which they are a part, which is the 
primary focus of the sociologist's attention. The point of departure 
for his analyses is various twordlyl problems, concerning the nature of 
social order, the nature of deviance and so on rather than those 
concerns which drove Husserl. He needs to be able to grasp, in an 
empirical fashion, the various objects and events of social life, and to 
display them in a perspicuous fashion to his fellow sociologists for 
their appraisal. 
This being the case, what is the sociologist to make of the 
following remarks of Fink's, taken from an essay that is endorsed by 
Husserl himself? 
"The unmotivated character of the phenomenological reduction 
(the absence of any worldly problem which could serve as 
its real motive) expresses the reduction's unfamiliar nature 
in a similar way. Because it is the suspension of the 
"natural attitude" it cannot appear within this attitude 
and it therefore must be unfamiliar. The reduction becomes 
knowable in its "transcendental motivation" only with the 
transcending of the world. This means that the reduction 
is its own presupposition insofar as it alone opens up that 
dimension of problems with reference to which it establishes 
the possibility of theoretical knowledge. This strange 
paradox of the beginning of philosophical reflection finds 
expression within the fundamental perplexity into which all 
attempts to explicate the phenomenological reduction fall. 
Unmotivated and unfamiliar with respect to its possibility, 
every exposition of the phenomenological reduction is in a 
unique way false. This falsity is caused by the exposition's 
worldly point of departure, that is, its starting upon the 
basis of the 4-'natural attitude" which the performance of the 
reduction is to suspend. " (61) 
This same fact about phenomenology is also called by Fink "the 
paradox of the phenomenological statement". The phenomenologist must use 
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ordinary language to express his analyses, but this language stems from 
the natural attitude and not from the transcendental. 
"For this reason no phenomenological analysis, above all 
the analysis of the deeper constituting levels of 
transcendental subjectivity, is capable of being 
adequately presented. " (62) 
The transcendental realm, therefore, can only be talked about in an 
ideal language - and yet if an ideal language were invented for this 
purpose, it too would only be, in the final analysis, another version 
of the mundane language of the natural attitude. Such a language, in 
other words, is impossible. 
In a very real sense, then, what is uncovered by the phenomenological 
reductions cannot be communicated, but can only be experienced by the 
philosopher in his own carrying out of the methods provided by Husserl. 
Husserl himself (to quote Fink again) 
"could be satisfied with this first and provisional 
account of the reduction in trusting that the actual 
carrying out of the given analyses (and not simply 
their being read) would create the disposition to set 
authentically the phenomenological reduction in motion. " (63) 
The sociologist, on the other hand, cannot be so satisfied. If the 
methods which form the fundamental aspect of Husserl's phenomenology 
lead to a position in which all one can do is experience the transcendental 
presuppositions of the world, then they can be of no use to the sociologist 
investigating the empirical world and attempting to communicate the 
results of his investigations. Husserl's phenomenology is a seeking 
after 'truth' and 'certainty', and as Kolakowski has put it 
"We gain or we imagine to have gained access to certitude 
only as far as we gain or imagine to have gained perfect 
identity with the object, an identity whose model is the 
mystical experience. This experience however is 
incommunicable; any attempt to hand it over to others 
destroys the very immediacy that was supposed to be its 
value - consequently it destroys certitude. " (64) 
It is Husserl's own concerns with the transcendental, and with providing 
a sure foundation for knowledge that led him in this direction. The 
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sociologist, whose interests do not lie in such a direction, need not 
follow him through all the meanderings of his methods and reductions. 
He must stay in the world of the natural attitude, along with the rest 
of society. 
At the same time, however, as the ultimate objective of 
transcendental phenomenology appears as wholly alien to sociology 
conceived of as an empirical discipline, there is still a sense in 
which it could, at one level, be seen to be more helpful. This possibility 
is best illustrated by considering the relationship between the mundane, 
psychological ego on the one hand, and the transcendental ego on the 
other. I will unravel this by examining the relationship between 
psychology and transcendental phenomenology. 
There seem to have been two aspects to the relationship between 
these two different disciplines. Firstly, Husserl seems to have seen 
a form of psychology that examines the empirical psyche by introspectively 
analysing its -structure in terms of basic phenomenological concepts 
(i. e. intentionality, noetic and noematic components etc. ), as being a 
way into a genuine phenomenological (transcendental) analysis - as 
being the first step towards a transcendental reduction. Thus he writes 
in a footnote in the "Crisis" in a section about the struggle between 
"Objectivistic', and "Subjectivistic" philosophy in the history of 
thought, that psychology is the decisive field 
"i. e., decisive for the struggle between subjectivism 
and objectivism. For by beginning as an objective 
science and then becoming transcendental, it bridges 
the gap. " (65) 
There is a form of descriptive psychology, (66) that performs a 
sort of reduction that brackets the existence of beings in the world$ 
but which does not attempt to ascend to the transcendental realm, 
remaining rather, in the mundane world of empirical science. However, 
it leads towards the transcendental: 
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"Thus we see with surprise, I think, that in the pure 
development of the idea of a descriptive psychology, 
which seeks to bring to expression what is essentially 
proper to souls, there necessarily occurs a 
transformation of the phenomenological-psychological 
epoche and reduction into the transcendental. " (67) 
In this sense, then, psychology is a means towards transcendental 
phenomenology. There is, however, another sense in which transcendental 
reflections are relevant to psychology. The analyses of consciousness 
which are performed by the philosopher within the transcendental 
reduction run side by side with those performed by the phenomenological 
psychologist within the mundane world. The difference lies in the 
'attitude' taken, and in the scope of the analyses - i. e. the one 
uncovers the presuppositions of knowledge, the other the grounds of 
empirical psychology. Thus, Fink writes 
"The extensive and important analyses of noesis and 
noema are nevertheless invested with a peculiar ambiguity, 
for with respect to content they are equally valid in the 
psychological attitude; they are, so to speak, indifferent 
to the distinction between phenomenology and psychology. " (68) 
This "disturbing indifference" (69) to a crucial distinction 
however, is not fatal as long as the reader realizes what is going on, 
and doesn't take it that the analyses are meant to be complete accounts 
of the empirical psyche of the mundane Ego. Thus: 
"The ambiguity in terms of which the thematic analyses 
of the "Ideas" are to be understood (in having both 
phenomenological and psychological relevance) is not a 
dangerous one so long as one genuinely moves along with 
these analyses purposely neutral with respect to this 
differentiation and keeps the overall sense of the 
transcendental-phenomenological aim firmly in view. " (70) 
One must, in other words, keep in mind that there is an important 
distinction to be made here. As Kockelmans puts it "Phenomenological 
psychology hopes to expose only the foundations of empirical psychology" 
whilst transcendental phenomenology "reduces the already psychologically 
purified to the transcendental, to that most general subjectivity which 
constitutes the world and its "souls". " (71) 
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This relevance of transcendental analyses for psychology seems to 
open up for the sociologist, the possibility that phenomenological 
analyses of, for example, tmeaning' or lintersubjectivityl could in 
some way be relevant to the study of the social world. just as 
phenomenological psychology is conceived to offer, through an intentional 
analysis of the 'psychic', a framework of basic concepts which is to 
provide the foundations for an empirical psychology, SO, perhaps, with 
concepts such as the Ilife-worldl it could provide the grounds for a 
systematic social science. There are, however, considerable problems 
here. 
In the first place, it should be noticed that as far as psychology 
is concerned, Husserl's reflections have not been assimilated as they 
stand. Kockelmans puts it that 
"The truth is, however, that only a very few psychologists 
actually use Husserl's concepts without making major 
modifications. Furthermore, many psychologists talk about 
phenomenology without stipulating precisely what is meant 
by the term. " (72) 
It may well be that, as Spiegelberg suggests, "Such partial influences 
may actually be more valuable than (the) total ones" (73) but it does 
suggest nonetheless that there may be difficulty that the empirical 
scientist ought to be aware of in uncovering the precise relevance of 
Husserl's work for his enterprise. I want to suggest something of that 
difficulty here. 
The reduction, whether it is transcendental or merely psychological, 
takes the philosopher out of the physical world. It is the case, however, 
that the subject matter of psychology, and for that matter sociology, is 
not only psychical., but also physical in that the events that are 
investigated are happenings within the physical world. It seems to be 
a necessary fact about psychology that it is based not on a purely 
psychical foundation, but upon psycho-physical grounds - the events 
with which it is concerned have both psychical and physical aspects. 
Kockelmans puts the point thus 
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"In other words, the apriori of empirical psychology 
is not exclusively phenomenological, for it depends 
not only on the essence of the psychical but also upon 
the essence of the physical, and more particularly 
upon the essence of the psychophysical of organic 
nature. " (74) 
To attempt to reduce the physical aspects to the psychical, which it 
would be necessary to do if one were to have a purely phenomenologically 
based psychology whose concepts were formulated in terms of the 
intentional nature of consciousness, would severely limit the scope of 
a possible empirical psychology or sociology. 
This difficulty can perhaps be reformulated as a difficulty with 
knowing quite what to make of Husserl's analyses in general from an 
empirical scientific point of view. If Husserl's main concern with 
psychoýogy was, as it seems to have been, with providing another means 
of access to transcendental phenomenology, then it is small wonder that 
his analyses often seem irrelevant to the practicing scientist. Husserl 
himself is adamant that 
"The meaning of eidetic science excludes in principle every 
assimilation. of the theoretical ýesults of empirical 
sciences. " (75) 
and yet one does not have to have a Baconian model of science to suggest 
that there is at least some interplay between the apriori presuppositions 
of a science and its empirical findings, at least to the extent that 
those presuppositions have some consciously accepted effect upon the 
methods and procedures of that science. Such reflections, in their 
turn, lead one on to wonder quite what is involved in the transcendental 
ego itself, as distinct from the ego that is the subject matter of 
psychology and that which is the mundane 'human' ego of the 'real' world. 
Just what is it, in the end, that the transcendental reductions give 
us access to? Are we really confronted with a realm of presuppositions, 
a world of immanence which will enable us to ground our knowledge in 
apodictic certainty? Or do we end up simply abstracting from the one 
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and only 'real' world in such a way that-the abstract knowledge gained 
can have no relevance for real worldly concerns - for the scientific 
enterprise? Perhaps, as Schmitt has suggested, the whole notion of 
the transcendental ego is, in fact, a muddle: 
"Husserl ascribes quite diverse functions to the 
transcendental ego and its acts. He ascribes to it the 
rules by which we validate series of acts, rules of 
formal logic and rules of evidence, and he ascribes to 
it the first-person statements which give last ditch 
support to observation statements. The former are 
plausibly said to be nonempirical but cannot-really be 
said to be "mine" or "yours". The latter are clearly 
mine or yours, but cannot plausibly be said to be 
nonempirical. But both serve to validate, in different 
ways, my empirical claims about the world. Husserl's 
notion of the transcendental ego seems to confuse these 
two very different ways of validating emorical claims ... 
...... 11 (76) 
Considerations such as these can lead easily to a situation in which 
the empirical scientist comes to see the whole notion of the transcendental 
reduction, and of the transcendental realm in general, as being an 
illusion of some kind, based perhaps on a category mistake, (77) and 
with the rejection of the transcendental much of the raison dletre of 
Husserl's phenomenological psychology disappears. 
In sum, then, Husserl is not himself a sociologist. His driving 
problems are different from those of sociology, with the result that even 
in places where it might seem that his analyses have something to offer 
the empirical scientist there are problems as to quite how to make use 
of them. For the empirical sociologist, working in the everyday world, 
the whole notion of the transcendental can come to seem superfluous - as 
not related at all to the problems with which he is concerned. But at 
the same time the adjustment of the transcendental analyses to the mundane 
world is not without difficulties, simply because of the reduction - the 
method of abstraction - which removes phenomenological findings from 
straightforwardly empirical concerns. If the reduction involved in 
phenomenological psychology is justified, in the end, as a stage on the 
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way to the transcendental reduction, one wonders what its justification 
is once the transcendental has been abandoned. 
The above remarks are aimed primarily at problems that are the 
result of considering the differences between the transcendental 
phenomenological enterprise as it was conceived by Husserl himself, and 
the more empirical concerns of psychology and sociology. For the 
sociologist, however, there is another set of problems which are internal 
to phenomenology itself concerned with intersubjectivity. I have outlined 
above the way in which Husserl attempts to account for intersubjectivity 
in terms of empathy, by way of an intentional analysis of the 
constitution of the sense of the 'other' in transcendental subjectivity. 
It is evidently of some importance that the sociologist, who is interested 
in an intersubjective world, should examine this-notion to assess the 
extent to which it can provide an adequate basis for conceptualizing 
the social world. Unfortunately such an examination uncovers problems. 
Elliston, -at the beginning of one of the few sypathetic accounts 
of Husserl's account of intersubjectivity, admits that "few of his (i. e. 
Husserl's P. M. ) interpreters or critics have been satisfied with his 
solution. " (78) Lauer expresses some of the dissatisfaction felt when 
he writes that 
"The theory of intersubjectivity is, as it were a 
particular application of intentional constitution, an 
application which could not be avoided, as were most 
other applications, since the central concept of 
objective validity demands an objectivity recognized as 
binding on all possible subjects; and the very admission 
that other subjects are possible demands that the theory 
account for the constitution of such subjects - even if 
only as possible. Thus, it is impossible to escape the 
impression that the numerous pages consecrated by Husserl, 
in both his published and unpublished works, to 
intersubjective constitution add no explanation whatever 
to the problem of objectivity. " (79) 
The weakness of Husserl's account lies in the fact that lobjectivityO is, 
in a sense, constituted intersubjectively. It is not enough simply to 
analyse the subjective constitution of the other, since that does not 
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add anything to what has been said about subjective constitution in 
general - it does not start to unravel the peculiarly intersubjective 
status that the tobjectivet world has for us. A satisfactory analysis 
would include all of the complex structures of intersubjective 
constitution as well as an account of the constitution of 'others', 
and this, evidently, would considerably complicate the analysis of the 
constitution of 'others' itself. 
In a sense, remarks such as these address themselves only to the 
completeness of Husserlls account rather than to the possibility of 
providing such an account at all. There are, however, difficulties 
with the actual intentional analysis which Husserl gives us of the 
constitution of the other. To what extent, for example, is it genuinely 
possible to perform the reduction to the sphere of lownness' - to a 
sphere in which all that is 'other', which must include such intersubjective 
phenomena as language, cultural objects, and so on, has been excluded? 
Is it, in principle, possible to uncover such a sphere of monadic 
isolation, or to 'experience' it in some sense of the word, or has 
Husserl suggested an impossibility as the first stage in his analysis of 
the constitution of tothers' within transcendental subjectivity? To 
suggest that what he tries to do here is, indeed, impossible would be to 
present Husserl with in principle difficulties concerning the relationship 
between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity, 
and between the subjective and the intersubjective constitution of 
objectivity. 
For the sociologist, working with an intersubjective world, both of 
these types of difficulty present problems. Any notion of 'society' 
which posits more than simply a collection of atomic individuals must 
contain some idea of intersubjectivity as something qualitatively distinct 
from individual subjectivities, however that distinctiveness is 
formulated. At the same time, it is necessary to provide some account 
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of the relationship between the individual members of a society and 
society as a whole. Thus, for example, subjective meanings must be 
articulated with 'social' meanings in some way, or collective representations 
with individual representations. Now should it prove the case that the 
phenomenological analyses which are to provide the foundations for 
sociology cannot themselves provide clarification of the relationship 
between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity 
in a satisfactory manner, then the concepts that will be made available 
to the empirical scientist through such analyses are unlikely to be able 
to handle adequately the sociologistst subject matter. The phenomenological 
analyses which are intended to produce clarity and a new framework for 
investigating the social world will end by producing confusions. 
It could be argued, perhaps, that the 'life-world' concept does 
hold promise for the investigation of the social world in that it does 
contain within it the notion of intersubjectivity. Certainly it is this 
concept that has excited the most interest and which has been incorporated 
in the work of Schutz and Merleau Ponty in particular. At the same-time, 
however, in each case what has been developed moves on from Husserl's 
own notion which, as I mentioned above, he saw as leading back to the 
analysis of transcendental subjectivity rather than as a, new 
conceptualization of the ultimate goal of the reductions. It thus 
remains the case that for Husserl, at least, the matter of the relationship 
between transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity 
is still important within the concept of the life-world itself. It is 
for those who would develop the concept to provide some solution to 
these problems. 
In this section I have tried to give some impression of the type of 
problems that face the sociologist who wants to use some of Husserl's 
insights in the service of an empirical social science. My intention 
has not been to demonstrate the impossibility of carrying out phenomenology, 
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or to suggest that the whole of Husserl's enterprise is fundamentally 
misconceived. There is, indeed, much of importance to be found within 
both Husserlts own work and in the phenomenological literature as a 
whole. Rather, all I have tried to do is to demonstrate the particular 
difficulties which someone interested in both Husserl's writings and in 
sociology is likely to encounter in any attempt to marry the two into a 
coherent sociological theory. It is in the context of those difficulties 
that I want to turn now to the work of Schutz. 
ALFRED SCHUTZ 
The above discussion of Husserl has given some idea of the difficulties 
that confronted Schutz when he set about laying the foundations of a 
phenomenological sociology. Since Husserl's concerns were primarily 
philosophical, and led him towards the analysis of the intentional 
structures of transcendental subjectivity, it would not have been 
possible for Schutz, with his sociological concerns, to have taken the 
whole of Husserlian phenomenology as it stood and to have injected it 
undiluted into existing social theory. Instead, it was necessary for 
him to tease out the relevance of phenomenological insights for what he 
saw as the fundamental problems of sociology. These problems, which he 
distilled from the work of Max Weber, he considered to cluster round the 
problem of 'meaning'. He writes in the preface to 'The Phenomenology 
of the Social World' 
"The present study is based on an intensive concern of 
many years' duration with the theoretical writings of 
Max Weber. During this time I became convinced that 
while Weber's approach was correct and that he had 
determined conclusively the proper starting point of the 
philosophy of the social sciences, nevertheless his 
analyses did not go deeply enough to lay the foundations 
on which alone many important problems of the human 
sciences could be solved. Above all, Weber's central 
concept of subjective meaning calls for thoroughgoing 
analysis. " (80) 
It was to Phenomenology that Schutz turned to find the machinery for 
this 'thoroughgoing analysisf of subjective meaning - as he put it 
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"Only in the work of these two thinkers, (i. e. Bergson 
and Husserl. P. M. ) especially in Husserl's transcendental 
phenomenology, has a sufficiently deep foundation been 
laid on the basis of which one could aspire to solve the 
problem of meaning. " (81) 
Schutz's work, then, is an attempt to synthesize the transcendental 
phenomenological insights of Husserl and the theoretical writings of 
Max Weber in such a way that fundamental sociological problems will be 
given a fresh perspective and hopefully some solution. The problems 
themselves are those that had preoccupied Dilthey, Rickert, Simmel and 
the other philosopher's and social theorists concerned with the cultural 
sciences in Germany at the end of the last century, (82) and the central 
position which he gives to the question of meaning reflects his roots 
within the hermeneutic tradition. His efforts at solving them, if 
unsuccessful in the final analysis, are nonetheless interesting and 
instructive, particularly to the extent that they highlight the problems 
that a phenomenological sociology must face. 
SCHUTZ AND WEBER 
Schutz sets. out his intentions in the 'Phenomenology of the Social 
World' as follows: 
"It seeks to determine the precise nature of the 
phenomenon of meaning, and to do this by an analysis of 
the constituting function. Only after we have a firm 
grasp of the concept of meaning as such will we be able 
to analyse step by step the meaning-structure of the 
social world. " (83) 
Here we have the kernel of Schutz's sociology. He is interested 
on the one hand in showing how 'meaning' is constituted - and this is 
done both within consciousness and socially - and on the other he is 
concerned to give an analysis of the 'meaning structure' of the social 
world. Where Husserl had analysed the 'transcendental' constitution of 
'essences' - the intentional structures of the presuppositions of 
knowledge, Schutz gives us an analysis of the presuppositions of the 
social world in terms of the constitution of meaning and of the structures 
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of meanings - i. e. of the typifications that form the basis of our 
meaningful interpretations of the social world. The difference in 
perspective between the two men is immediately obvious, and makes 
itself felt in the initial formulation of the object of Schutz's 
'phenomenological' analyses. In this section I will give some substance 
to the account of the social world that Schutz gives and the ways in 
which he draws on the work of Weber to provide himself with an entre 
into sociological concerns. 
Schutz begins his discussion of Weber with the latters definition 
of the task of sociology. Thus: 
"According to Weber, the task of interpretive sociology 
is to understand and interpret social action. Social action 
is that action which "by virtue of the subjective meaning 
attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), 
takes account of the behaviour of others, and is thereby 
oriented in its course. "" (84) 
The problem with this, as far as Schutz is concerned, is that the 
notion of subjective meaning is a difficult one to grasp within Weber's 
theory. As Schutz puts it: 
"the subjective meaning of another person's behaviour need 
not be identical with the meaning which his perceived 
external behaviour has for me as an observer. " (85) 
Since sociology is defined in terms of social acts, and those 
social acts themselves are defined in terms of 'subjective meanings', then 
given the difference (or possible difference) between the observing 
sociologist's and the observed actor's understandings of precisely what 
a given action means, it seems to Schutz to be of the utmost importance 
to uncover just what the relationship between the two sorts of meanings 
is if one is to have an adequate sociology. He approaches this problem 
via the two notions of 'understanding' - namely 'objective' and 
'motivational$ - that Weber sees as relevant for the sociologist. 
Weber writes: 
Understanding may be of two kinds: the first is the 
direct observational understanding of the subjective 
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meaning of a 'given act as such including verbal 
utterances ...... 
Understanding may, however, be of another sort, 
namely explanatory understanding. Thus we 
understand in terms of motive the meaning an actor 
attaches to the proposition twice two equals four, 
when he states it or writes it down, in that-we 
understand what makes him do this at precisely this 
moment and in these circumstances. " (86) 
Schutz argues that this distinction will not in fact hold up. 
He shows first of all that 'direct observational understanding, cannot 
in fact grasp the subjective meaning an act has for an actor since in 
order to see it as an act of a particular kind for which it makes sense 
to posit some subjective meaning, an observer must already have placed 
the act into some meaning context - for example it is an act of 
"Woodchopping", "Knob grasping" or "taking aim" - which makes sense of 
the act for him. Beyond this, the observer never has any guarantee that 
the act has the same meaning for the actor as it has for him - for 
example the man holding the axe may be performing a religious rite, 
or doing some -form of meditation. 
The concept of motivational understanding is also subjected to 
close scrutiny. The trouble here is similar to that with observational 
understanding. As Schutz writes 
"By motive Weber understands "a complex of .... meaning 
which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an 
adequate (or meaningful) ground for the conduct in 
question'. '. " (87) 
Schutz points out that firstly, there are different kinds of motives 
that can appear to be grounds for my action subjectively. One can give 
a motive that builds on ones past experiences, (a 'because' motive) or 
one can project into the future, and say that the motive is to bring 
about some desired future state (an 'in-order-tol motive). This 
distinction is never made by Weber, and it is, for Schutz, crucial. 
Secondly, Weber has compounded here the meaning which an action has for 
an actor, and the meaning it has for the observer. Once again, these 
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two dimensions need not, by any means, -be the same - the observer may 
give a motive which takes account of the actor's past, whereas the 
actor himself may be oriented to the future. Schutz stresses that these 
distinctions must be made if the sociologist is to begin to understand 
the phenomenon of meaning. 
Schutz's conclusions here are dtated thus: 
"Indeed, Weber's distinction between observational and 
motivational understanding is arbitrary and without any 
logical basis in his own theory. Both types of 
understanding start out from an objective meaning- 
context. The understanding of subjective meaning has 
no place in either. " (88) 
At this point Schutz moves on from his discussion of Weber and 
begins to unravel its implications for his own phenomenological concerns. 
He does this by pointing out that in the discussion of subjective and 
objective meaning in Weber, it became apparent that the meaning of an 
action always depended upon some 'objective' context of meaning in 
terms of which that action could be interpreted. Thus to see an action 
as Ichopping wood' it was necessary to have some idea of what 'typically' 
is involved in chopping wood - why people do it, what sort of uses the 
chopped wood could be put to and so on. These objective meaning 
contexts are 'meaningful' whether any particular person is thinking 
about them at any specific time or not. Thus 
"For instance, the expression 2x2=4 has an objective 
meaning regardless of what is in the minds of any or all 
of its users. " (89) 
This sense of 'objective' meaning is different from that which 
appears in the work of Weber in that it does not relate to the meanings 
of an observer., but is independent of any individual mind. Nonetheless 
for that, however, these objective meaning contexts are for Schutz, 
'constituted' in the processes of meaning endowing acts of consciousness. 
Thus it is true to say that they have a 'subjective' element - they are 
constituted within consciousness. Thus: 
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"when we speak of subjective meaning in the social world, 
we are referring to the constituting processes in the 
consciousness of the person who produced that which is 
objectively meaningful. " (90) 
Once again, this, use of the term'subjective meaning' is considerably 
different from the use given to it by Weber, who saw it not in terms of 
'constitution' but in terms of actual subjective meanings given to 
particular actions by specific actors. 
Clearly, what Schutz has done here is to translate the terms that 
Weber uses to express his interpretive sociology, into concepts amenable 
to his own phenomenological analyses. With subjective and objective 
meaning conceptualized in this new way, it is now possible for Schutz 
to move on to produce a 'phenomenological' analysis of the 'constituting' 
functions of consciousness whic h make the objective meaning contexts 
possible, and then to progress to an analysis of the structures of the 
meaning-context, (as an objective constituted reality) as a social 
phenomena. 
SCHUTZ AND THE "PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" 
Schutz's first task is to give an analysis of the subjective 
constitution of meaning within consciousness. In this way he can give 
substance to the concept of subjective meaning as he has transformed 
it in his critique of Weber. His starting point is to posit a 'stream 
of consciousnesst. This he describes as 'pure duration' and 
"In "pure duration" there is no "side-by-sideness", no 
mutual externality of parts, and no divisibility, but 
only a continuous flux, a stream of conscious states. " (91) 
, This continuous flux of experience is not in itself meaningful, but 
it is given meaning by the reflective glance of consciousness. The ego 
performs acts of attention which pluck aspects of our experience from 
this stream as it flows past, and in this way our experience is made 
meaningful by our acts of consciousness. These acts, however, can only 
be performed on experience that has already elapsed since while one is 
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actually living in the flow of duration one only experiences, and cannot 
reflect at the same time on the experiences actually confronting one. 
Immediate lived experience is something unreflective and always in the 
present. Thus all meaning originates in the reflective glance of 
consciousness. 
The central sociological concept, for Schutz following Weber, is 
the concept of action. Action itself is meaningful so the way in which 
the meaning of action is constituted must be accounted for. Schutz 
begins his account with behaviour. Here there is little problem, since 
ones own behaviour can simply be plucked from the stream of experiences 
(one does after all experience ones own behaviour) and 'constituted' as 
behaviour - i. e. its 'meaning' as behaviour can be constituted - in the 
same way as any other item of experience. Action, however, cannot be 
seen in this way, since what marks it off from behaviour is precisely 
that it is not seen as 'action# after the event, but is oriented towards 
certain ends and goals in the future. It would make little sense, however, 
to say that there was some special glance of consciousness that looked 
towards experience not yet elapsed in order to make it meaningful, since 
often such antitipated experiences never happen. Thus Schutz suggests 
that the meaning of action is contained in the project which the action 
is to fulfill. 
What characterizes action, then, is the fact that it is the fulfilment 
of a project. It is this project that gives 'meaning' to the action. 
Schutz tells us that this project is projected-into the future as if it 
had already been accomplished - as he puts it, it is projected in the 
'future perfect tensel. It is the carrying out of this project in a 
conscious fashion that constitutes 'action' as a subset of behaviour, 
where behaviour can be either 'action' that has already elapsed, or 
simply pure behaviour. Thus there is a radical difference between action 
that is already completed and action that is underway. 
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Schutz goes on to point out that there is an important difference 
between an 'act' and 'action'. An 'act' is a discrete entity, and can 
be either the completed act - the complete project - or specific parts 
of it. Action on the other hand is the fulfilment of a project, and 
it consists of a number of different acts. Each of these different 
acts, however, is given meaning because of its position in relation to 
the overall project. Thus the project is a 'meaning context' in terms 
of which specific acts can be and are interpreted. This concept of 
meaning context is one that Schutz develops further. 
A meaning context consists of a configuration of meaning that is 
constituted by a series of acts of consciousness. 
"We say that our lived experiences El, E2 .... En stand 
in a meaning-context if and only if, once they have been 
lived through in separate steps, they are then, 
constituted into a synthesis of a higher order, becoming 
thereby unified objects of monothetic attention. " (92) 
In other words, they are sets of individual acts of meaning grouped 
together into a single unity - in-the same way that a series of acts 
are grouped under a single project of action. These meaning contexts 
can then be grouped further under an even more comprehensive synthesis, 
and various meaning contexts can be seen to relate to one another and to 
overlap and criss cross with one another. The sum of all such meaning 
contexts makes up the 'stock of knowledge at hand'. 
The meaning contexts that are most relevant to discussion of action 
are the motivational contexts. These play an important role in Schutz's 
sociology, so I will give a brief account of them here. Basically there 
are two fundamentally different possible motivational contexts that 
action can be seen in term of. The differences revolve around whether 
the action is seen as a 'project', and thus as a still to be completed 
configuration of acts given meaning by the project, or as something that 
has been caused by certain antecedant factors either of the actor's 
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biography or of his environment. In the former case, since the action 
is meaningful because of the project, and since the project is essentially 
something that the actor himself has projected into the future in the future 
perfect tense, the motivational context is essentially "subjective", whereas 
in the latter case, the actor himself has no priviledged position in 
respect to the explanation of his action at all, since anyone could 
uncover the causal sequence into which it fits. (93) 
Schutz calls these two different kinds of motivational context the 
'in-order-to-motivel (for the subjective meaning context that is based 
on the actor's project) and the 'because motivet (for the causally 
oriented and $objective' context). Thus: 
"Interpreting the actor's "motive" as his expectations, 
we can say that the motivational context ýs by definition 
the meaning-context within which a particular action 
stands in virtue of its status as the project of an act 
for a given actor' In other words, the act thus projected 
in the future periect tense and in terms of which the 
action receives its orientation is the "in-order-to-motivell 
(Um-zu-Motiv) for the actor. " (94) 
and again 
"in every genuine because-motivation both the motivating 
and motivated lived experiences have the temporal character 
of pastness. The formulation of a genuine why-question is 
generally possible only after the motivated experience has 
occurred and when-one looks back on it as something whole 
and complete in itself. " (95) 
Thus the differences between the two are found in the direction of 
ones interest. If one wants to find out why someone did something, the 
answer can either be in terms of his project - which will be his 
subjective meanings - or in terms of causal factors. Which sort of 
answer one choses to give will determine whether one places the action 
into a meaning context in terms of the actors Tin-order-to motives' or 
in terms of his 'because motivest. 
Two remarks are in order about meaning contexts and the stock of 
knowledge at hand. Firstly, much of the stock of knowledge at hand is 
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taken for granted. One is not constantly aware of many of the 
things that one knows - things that one has learnt from experience 
and which one brings to bear on the decisions that must be made in 
the course of everyday living. Which particular aspects of the stock 
of knowledge one is aware of at any given time depends upon ones 
particular relevances - for example if one is about to bake a cake, 
knowledge about flour, ovens, eggs etc. will be of prime concern, 
and these will form the meaning context in terms of which ones activities 
will be directed. 
Secondly, these meaning contexts are the basis of ones interpretations 
of experience. once the meaning context and the stock of knowledge at 
hand have been constituted, they act as a frame, as it were, through 
which and in terms of which other elements of ones lived experience will 
be seen to be meaningful. Thus the reflective glance itself, looking 
back on the stream of experience, will tend to make that experience 
meaningful in-terms of the meanings that it has already given to past 
experience which have been configured into meaning-contexts. In this 
way a certain amount of stability is ensured in the meaning that 
experience is given from one day to the next. 
These considerations conclude the account of Schutz's analysis of 
the constitution of meaning within consciousness. The analysis is for 
Schutz a phenomenological one.. As he moves on to his discussion of 
the intersubjective, he stresses that he leaves the phenomenological 
realm, (96) since the complicated business of providing a genuinely 
phenomenological account of the constitution of the other within 
consciousness, and thus the move from transcendental subjectivity to 
transcendental intersubjectivity, is not an essential one for his 
purposes. He claims that instead, since all analyses performed within 
the reduction are equally applicable to the mundane realm, he will 
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simply carry on into the intersubjective realm, using the insights 
already gleaned from his phenomenological analyses of consciousness. (97) 
Thus Schutz simply sidesteps discussion of any difficulties that there 
might be concerning the relationship between transcendental analyses 
and the needs of an empirical scientist. The implications of this will 
be discussed later. 
Schutz moves from the study of Isubjectivet meaning to the world 
of tintersubjectivity' by assuming that the structure of the 
consciousness of the other - the tthoul - is the same as the structure 
of that of ego, with a stream of consciousness, and reflective glances 
giving meaning to aspects of it. The fundamental question is therefore 
not about the 'constitution' of others as meaningful, but about the 
'structure' of the intersubjective world as a given phenomenon. 
Intersubjectivity itself is not to be subjected to scrutiny, but is 
simply to be accepted as a fact. (98) The first question to be asked 
is thus 'what is it that makes the intersubjective world possible at all?, 
Schutz answers this by saying that it is the simultaneity of streams of 
consciousness that is at the heart of the intersubjective world. Thus 
"I see, then, my own stream of consciousness and yours 
in a single intentional act which embraces them both. 
The simultaneity involved here is not that of physical 
time, which is quantifiable, divisible, and spatial. 
For us the term "simultaneity" is rather an expression 
for the basic and necessary assumption which I make that 
your stream of consciousness has a structure analogous 
to mine. " (99) 
This "basic and necessary assumption", then, is the foundation of 
the intersubjective world. It is this that is the given. 
The second question to be asked, is 'what are the bases of 
communication within this intersubjective world? '; Schutz's account 
of the problems in this area begins with a recapitulation of the 
observation that he has already made in relation to Weber's work, that 
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"The postulate, (therefore, ) that I can observe the 
subjective experience of another person precisely as he 
does is absurd. For it presupposes that I myself have 
lived through all the conscious states and intentional 
Acts wherein this experience has been constituted. 
But this could only happen within my own experience and 
in my own Acts of attention to my experience. " (100) 
Thus communication is not a matter of getting into anothers mind 
by some kind of empathy, but rather it must depend upon my experience 
of the other being fitted into my own already constituted meaning 
contexts - or at least into a meaning context available to me as a 
constituting subjectivity. In other words, all genuine understanding 
of others is based on the explication of ones own lived experience. 
This is done via two means, firstly through observations of another's 
behaviour, and secondly through tsignst. I will take them each in 
turn. 
The case of observing another's behaviour which is done without 
communicative intent - i. e. where no 'signs' are involved - is 
straightforward enough. Here all we do is to "put ourselves in the 
place of the actor and identify our lived experiences with his". (101) 
In this way, we are able to understand what he is doing in terms of 
similar things that we have done ourselves, in terms of our own 
meaning contexts distilled from our own similar experiences. Thus we 
project an 'in-order-to motive' and a 'because motive' onto the actor 
and his observed behaviour, and it becomes understandable in terms of 
those motives. 
The case with signs, however, is less, straightforward, since it 
depends upon the prior existence of a 'sign system', which is known 
both to me and to the other. Schutz defines a 'sign system' as follows: 
"Every sign system is (therefore) a scheme of our experience. 
This is true in two different senses. First, it is an 
expressive scheme; in other words, I have at least once 
used the sign for that which it designates, used it either 
in spontaneous activity or in imagination. Second, it is 
an interpretive scheme; in other words, I have already in 
the past interpreted-ihe sign as the sign of that which it 
designates. " (102) 
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In other words, it is a scheme of experience -a meaning context - 
made up of signs which both signify or symbolize something, and which 
can be used by me (or an other) to express some item of subjective' 
experience. Each sign within the system has its meaning because its 
"significance within a given sign system is understood both for the 
person using the sign and for the person interpreting it". (103) 
Since it does not depend wholly upon my own subjectivity, but is 
intersubjectively available, it is an lobjectivet meaning context. 
The most obvious example of a 'sign systeml is a language. 
When one comes to investigate the use of sign systems in communication 
and in understanding others, it becomes'apparent that, because of their 
dual nature as both expressive and interpretive schemes, there are two 
aspects to any use of a particular sign. Firstly there is the 'kernel' 
meaning of a sign which is its essential part, and which is the same 
for everyone; secondly there is its 'fringe' meaning, which varies with 
the particular occasion of its use within some specific context. (104) 
Thus in using a sign system to understand an other, ego must not only 
relate to the sign system as a given, but must put himself in the other's 
position, as it were, and attribute to the other 'in-order-tol and I 
tbecausel motives to find out just what the other Imeans' on the particular 
occasion at hand. In this way he is seen once more to be interpreting 
and understanding the other in terms of his own - egots - schemes of 
experience. In this case, however, the process is mediated by the 
'objective' meaning context of the sign system. - 
This is all that I want to say about Schutz's account of understanding 
another and his actions for the time being, although I will return to 
it later in the context of a discussion of the relationship between 
Schutz and Husserl. Before moving on to look at Schutz's descriptions 
of the structure of the social world, however, it is worthwhile stressing 
I 
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one important aspect of his analysis of intersubjectivity. 
The important point here is that there seem to be two themes in 
Schutz's analysis which stand in an unresolved tension with one another. 
On the one hand there is an insistence upon the constitution of meaning 
within consciousness and upon subjective meaning contexts, whilst on 
the other there is the notion of objective meaning contexts as already 
constituted objectivities, and the tstock of knowledge at handt, both 
of which stand independent of consciousness. Now if the first of these 
notions were to be given the main emphasis, then the social world would 
come to be seen as a complex of subjective meanings in which any 
apparent objectivity in social or cultural phenomena could be reduced 
to these subjective meanings without remainder. If the second notion 
were developed, then there would be an aspect of the social world which 
was specifically social, and irreducible to subjective meaning contexts. 
(105) For Schutz to give an adequate account of the social world it 
would be neces7sary for him to show how these two types of phenomena are 
in fact related - how subjective and objective meaning contexts 
articulate with one another. The problem, essentially, -is the problem 
of intersubjectivity in as much as its solution would necessitate some 
account of the intersubjective constitution of meaning contexts as 
opposed to both subjective constitution and descriptions of already 
constituted objective meaning contexts. To provide this, one suspects, 
it would be necessary to have an adequate account of transcendental 
intersubjectivity, but, as became apparent above, Schutz abdicates 
responsibility for producing such an account. The result is that the 
opposition between subjective and objective meaning contexts, and 
between the constitution of meaning in consciousness and meaning contexts 
themselves, is never resolved. The importance of this fact will become 
apparent later in this chapter, and will have considerable bearing on 
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on the discussion of Garfinkel in Chapter 4. 
I want now to move on to give some idea of the ways in which 
Schutz describes the structures of the social world. He has already 
explained the processes of meaning constitution, and the way in which 
it is possible for actors to understand each other within the social 
world. He now goes on to show the implications of this for social life. 
The fundamental starting point for Schutz is the 'we' relationship. 
Thus he writes 
"The living social relationship can occur in several 
different forms. In its purity and fullness, as we 
shall show later in detail, it is tied to the bodily 
givenness of the Thou in the face-to-face situation. 
As such, it is a living face-to-face relationship or 
a pure We-relationship. From it derive their validity 
all intentional Acts of Other-orientation not belonging 
to the domain of directly experienced social reality, 
all ways of interpreting subjective meaning, and all 
possibilities of attending to the worlds of mere 
contemporaries and of predecessors. " (106) 
Thus the paradigm case, as it were, of a social relationship is 
when two actors face each other and are oriented towards each other - 
i. e. the intentional acts of both parties are directed towards the 
other, - in such a way that each tries to understand what the other 
means, what significance his bodily movements and his use of sign 
systems has for him, and thus what his 'in-order-to motives' are (what 
subjective meaning he gives to his acts of speech). The two parties 
to the interaction thus interlock, as it were, in a 'we' relationship 
in which the other's 'in-order-to motive' (i. e. what he is trying to 
express) becomes my 'because motive' (i. e. the reason for my response), 
and my in-order-to motive becomes his because motive and so on. (107) 
In this way, within the 'we' relationship, the meaning contexts of ego 
and alter are brought together such that each actor experiences the 
other in a particularly close way. 
It is not the case, however, that all relationships within the 
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social world are of this type. There are many 'others' towards whom 
ego is 'oriented'. but whom he has never met. There are others whom 
he has met but briefly, 'others who have had some effect upon his life, 
but towards whom he is not oriented at all, and so on. All of these 
other alters, occupy what Schutz calls the "world of contemporaries". 
They are my fellow men who live at the same time as me, but with whom 
I do not have a 'wet relationship. What characterizes the world of 
contemporaries is its 'ideal typical' nature. It is peopled not by 
real living individuals, but by abstract types of people such as 
tpostment, 'doctors', 1policement, 'friends', 'relatives, and so on. 
These ideal types form a structure in terms of which I interpret my 
everyday experiences of the social world. Thus, for example, when 
riding on a train, I have certain expectations of "the actions of tengine 
drivers', Iguardst, 'fellow passengers' and so on which enable me to 
predict within broad limits what will happen over' the course of the 
journey, and which will enable me to understand and interpret the 
specific actions of specific actors whom I encounter on my trip. This 
structure of ideal types, like the sign system, is an 'objective, 
meaning context, held in common by the members of a society. As Schutz 
says 
"We must be quite clear as to what is happening here. 
The subjective meaning-context has been abandoned as 
a tool of interpretation. It has been replaced by a 
series of highly complex and systematically interrelated 
objective meaning-contexts. The result is that the 
contemporary is anonymized in direct proportion to the 
number and complexity of these meaning-contexts. 
Furthermore, the synthesis of recognition does not 
apprehend the unique person as he exists within his 
living present. Instead it pictures him as always the 
same and homogeneous, leaving out of account all the 
changes and rough edges that go along with individuality. 
Therefore, no matter now many people are subsumed under 
the ideal type, it corresponds to no one in particular. 
It is just this fact that justified Weber in calling it 
"ideal". " (108) 
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Which particular abstract typý I use in any given instance to 
interpret some action or event will depend upon my interests at, the time. 
The problem of which type to choose Schutz calls the 'problem of 
relevance'. (109) 
As well as the ideal typical world of contemporaries, there are 
two further worlds that are constructed of abstract types. These are 
the world of predecessors (i. e. all those who have lived before me, and 
who have inevitably left their mark on my own world)-and the world of 
successors (i. e. those who will follow me into this world after I am 
dead). What differentiates these two worlds from the world of 
contemporaries, is the fact that there is no possibility of my ever 
meeting any of their members in a 'we' relationship. In the world of 
contemporaries this is always a possibility - indeed there is a 
gradation of abstraction from those with whom I frequently have a twel 
relationship, to those whom I meet infrequently, right through to those 
whom I never meet. It is the varying degrees of abstraction of the 
ideal types that characterizes the world of contemporaries. 
It is worth noting at this point, that the stock of knowledge at 
hand which, as I mentioned above, is the sum total of all the meaning 
contexts constituted within consciousness, is very largely made up of 
this structure of ideal types that characterizes our knowledge of the 
social world. This structure of types is $socialized' into every actor 
during the course of his education and upbringing. Thus much of what 
we take for granted is in fact social wisdom, rather than being the 
result of our own individual experiences. The same is true of language 
- as an objective meaning conte xt it contains social experience that has 
been intersubjectively constituted. The significance of this fact will 
become apparent in the following sections. 
This, then, concludes the account of Schutzis analyses of 
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subjectivity, understanding and the social world. In the next section 
I want to move on to discuss something of Schutz's view of the nature 
of social science, a discussion which will take us beyond Schutz's early 
concerns to a consideration of some of his later work. Before doing so, 
however, just two points must be made about the above discussion by way 
of emphasis and explanation. 
Firstly, it should be noticed that the 'stock of knowledge at hand' 
is to a large-extent taken for granted. This has been pointed out above 
over the course of discussion, but it is important enough to warrant 
being stressed. Gurwitsch, for example, considers this notion of a 
taken for granted stock of knowledge to be one of Schutz's most important 
contributions to social science. He writes 
"With his concept of "stock of knowledge at hand" Schutz, 
I submit, made an important contribution toward further 
elucidating our specific familiarity with the world of 
daily experience, a familiarity that Husserl distinguished 
from scientific knowledge, especially in the modern sense. 
That the world of common sense is taken for granted - not 
only its-existence but also the way in which it is 
interpreted - is a consequence and another expression of 
unquestioned acceptance of the "stock of knowledge at 
hand". " (110) 
This taken for granted nature of-social knowledge will become important 
in later chapters. 
Secondly, it is worth pointing out that in his later work, Schutz 
develops and uses the Husserlian concept of the 'Life World' to describe 
the social world. By this term he does not mean to suggest, as Husserl 
does, another stage on the route to transcendental subjectivity, but 
he means rather the taken for granted world of the natural attitude. 
In carrying out his later investigations under the rubric of an 
examination of the 'life world' he is setting himself as his subject 
matter the taken for granted structures of our stock of knowledge at 
hand - the structure of meaning contexts and typifications - which provide 
the basis for our interpretations of our familiar everyday world. Thus 
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his investigations of the 'life world' are not different in status 
from the earlier analyses of the social world. 
With these points made, I want now to turn to discuss Schutzts 
view of the nature of theory and of social science. 
THE NATURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
In his early work, specifically, in the Phenomenology of the 
Social World, Schutz claims that 
"All social sciences are objective meaning-contexts of 
subjective meaning-contexts. " (111) 
By this he intends to indicate the fact that the social scientist never 
-encounters real people when he investigates the social world, 
but only 
already constituted ideal types. It is not the sociologist's job to 
become engaged in a twel relationship with social actors, but rather 
he must examine the structure of the ideal types in terms of which those 
actors interpret their world. These types are subjective meaning 
contexts that become lobjectivet - as Schutz puts it 
"However, we saw that the nature of subjective meaning 
itself changes with the transition from direct to indirect 
social experience. In the process of ideal-typical 
construction, subjective meaning-contexts that can be 
directly experienced are successively replaced by a series 
of objective meaning-contexts. These are constructed 
gradually, each one upon its predecessor, and they 
interpenetrate one another in Chinese-box fashion, so 
that it is difficult to say where one leaves off and the 
other begins. However, it is precisely this process of 
construction which makes it possible for the social 
scientist, or indeed for any observer, to understand what 
the actor means; for it is this process alone which gives 
a dimension of objectivity to his meaning. " (112) 
Thus it is objective meanings that the sociologist is to investigate, 
but objective meanings that have been constituted subjectively, and 
which are, therefore, subjective meaning contexts. 
As his thought developed, Schutz filled out these ideas. To 
illustrate this, I want to look at two notions which emerge from his 
later work, namely 'rationality', and 'finite provinces of meaning', 
which are important both for the light they throw on Schutz's view of 
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social science, and because of the influence which they had on the 
development of Garfinkelts thought. I will deal with each notion in 
turn. 
Schutz sums up what he considers to be the view of some major 
thinkers on the status of knowledge as follows: 
"All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well 
as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i. e., a 
set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, 
idealizations specific to the respective level of thought 
organization. Strictly speaking, there are no such things 
as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset 
facts selected from a universal context by the activities of 
our mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts, 
either facts looked at as detached from their context by an 
artificial abstraction or facts considered in their particular 
setting. " (113) 
What the scientist does, therefore, is to grasp aspects of the world 
that are relevant for his purposes, collecting facts on the basis of 
his relevances, and forming them into scientific theories in accord 
with certain principles. This is as true for the social scientist as 
it is for the-natural scientist. To decide upon what social scientific 
theories are, then, one must provide the principles on the basis of which 
the 'constructs' of the social scientist are built. As became evident 
from the quotation above from the "Phenomenology of the Social World" 
these constructs are "objective meaning-contexts of subjective meaning- 
contexts" - or what Schutz elsewhere calls "second order constructs" - 
built in "Chinese box fashion" one upon the other. The question is what 
are the principles upon which these constructs are to be built? 
Schutz specifies three "postulates for scientific model constructs 
of the social world". (114) These are 1) the postulate of logical 
consistency, which states that the construct must be internally consistent, 
2) the postulate of subjective interpretation, which states that the 
model must be fashioned in such a way that it can handle the Isubjectivel 
meanings of actors, and 3) the postulate of adequacy, which states that 
the model must account for action in such a way that an actor in the 
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social world would recognize those actions as possible in terms of his 
common sense perceptions of the social world. These three can be 
summed up, Schutz tells us, in the postulate of rationality which 
states that 
"The ideal type of social action must be'-constructed in 
such a way that the actor in the living world would perform 
the typified act if he had a clear and distinct scientific 
knowledge of all the elements relevant to his choice and 
the constant tendency to choose the most appropriate means 
for the realization of the most appropriate end. " (115) 
These, then, are the postulates, or principles, on the basis of which 
the sociologist is to form up his theories of the social world. 
What it is crucial to realize here, however, is that Schutz is not 
arguing that actors in the social world actually do act rationally. As 
he puts it 
"What I wish to emphasise is only that the ideal of 
rationality is not and cannot be a peculiar feature 
of everyday thought, nor can it, therefore, be a 
methodological principle of the interpretation of 
human acts in daily life. " (116) 
People in the social world neither act according to scientific 
rationalities, nor interpret the actions of others in such terms. The 
postulate of rationality relates only to the sociologist's constructs 
and not to his actual subject matter. 
What emerges here, is that Schutz is working with a coherence notion 
of truth. He is suggesting that the criterion for the truth or adequacy 
of a particular sociological theory is not to be sought in its 
relationship with some 'reality' which stands over and against the theory 
and is described by it, but that instead it is the 'logical consistency', 
or the 'rationality' of the account, and its fit with the trelevances' 
created by sociological problems that decides on its acceptance (or 
rejection) as 'true' or 'false'. The only relationship which the theory 
is conceived to have to something outside of itself is contained in the 
1postulate of adequacy', but since this must admit that actors in the 
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social world do not in fact act rationally, then the check involved 
here is not with a 'reality' outside of the theory, but with the opinion 
of the man in the street. Since opinions tend to differ, then this 
postulate seems devoid of any real substance - the scientist could 
peddle his 'rational construct' until he found sufficient actors whose 
opinions articulated with his own for him to be satisfied that he was 
'correct'. In the final analysis it is simply the consistency of the 
account which decides its truth or falsity. Schutz himself, indeed, 
does not seem to be unduly perturbed by this "disturbing question" (117) 
concerning the relationship between theories and reality. To those not 
satisfied by the account he has given he says 
"I am afraid I do not exactly know what reality is, and 
my only comfort in this unpleasant situation is that I 
share my ignorance with the greatest philosophers of all 
time. " (118) 
Such honesty, however, does not amount to a solution to the problem. 
To sum up this discussion of Schutz's handling of rationality, it 
is perhaps worth stating in his own words what the sociologist's actor 
in fact is. He suggests that the model of the actor that is built is 
only a puppet. 
"The puppet exists and acts merely by the grace of the 
scientist; it cannot act otherwise than according to the 
purpose which the scientist's wisdom has determined it 
to carry out. Nevertheless, it is supposed to act as if 
it were not determined but could determine itself. A 
total harmony has been pre-established between the 
determined consciousness bestowed upon the puppet and the 
pre-constituted environment within which it is supposed 
to act freely, to make rational choices and decisions ... 
The scientist succeeds, indeed, in discovering within 
the universe, thus created, the perfect harmony 
established by himself. " (119) 
ýhe sociologist is thus the puppet master extraordinary. 
The second notion that I want to follow through here, is Schutz's 
conception of 'finite provinces of meaning'. By this terms he intends 
to point out that there are a number of different 'worlds' which we all 
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confront over the course of our lives, and that these tworldst each 
have-different characteristics which can be investigated. The paramount 
reality is that of the natural attitude, which is the world of our 
working life in which we act upon our environment in unproblematic 
fashion in the onward course of our daily lives. What characterizes 
this world is what Schutz calls the lepoche of the natural attitude" (120) 
which is the suspension of any doubt that the world is just as it 
appears to be, existing, solid, manipulable, meaningful etc. etc. 
There are, however, other worlds which are modifications of this and 
into which we can move, although the move from one to another is always 
accompanied by a kind of 'shock'. These experiences of shock are frequent 
in daily life, and there are innumerable different kinds. With each 
shock we move into a new 'finite province of meaningt and place the 
'accent of realityl upon features of our experience in a different way. 
Thus there is 
"the shock of falling asleep as the leap into the world of 
dreams; the inner transformation we endure if the curtain 
in the theatre rises as the transition into the world of 
the stage play; the radical change in our attitude if, 
before a painting, we permit our visual field to be limited 
by what is within the frame as the passage into the pictorial 
world; our quandary, relaxing into laughter, if, in 
listening to a joke, we are for a short time ready to 
accept the fictitious world of the jest as a reality in 
relation to which the world of our daily life takes on 
the character of foolishness; the child's turning toward 
his toy as the transition into the play-world; and so on. " (121) 
Each of these different realms is said, by Schutz, to have a distinctive 
Scognitive style' which characterizes it as a distinctive province of 
meaning. This includes such things as the specific lepochel (e. g. 
suspension of doubt, methodical doubt etc. ) and a specific "tension of 
consciousness" (e. g. Ilwide-awakeness", sleepiness etc. ). 
The most important finite province of meaning for present purposes 
is that of scientific theorizing, and specifically that of sociological 
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theorizing. This, as with other 'worlds', is a modification of the. 
natural attitude with a specific cognitive style which involves a 
'leap' into a new attitude, i. e. the attitude of the "disinterested 
observer". which is 
"based upon a peculiar attention a la vie-as the 
prerequisite of all theorizing. It consists in the 
abandoning of the system of relevances which prevails 
within the practical sphere of the natural attitude. " (122) 
The taking of this attitude means that "theoretical thought does 
not gear into the outer world" (123) but is in some sense independent 
of it, governed only by its own relevances and its own problems. 
Theoretical cogitations are not "acts of working" within the mundane 
world, and even such things as measuring, doing experiments, handling 
equipment etc. are not strictly essential to them or to the theoretical 
life. Instead 
"All these activities performed within the pertaining to 
the world of working are either conditions or consequences 
of the theorizing but do not belong to the theoretical 
attitude itself, from which they can be easily separated. " (124) 
Thus Schutz paints a picture of the scientist as disinterested observer' 
of his subject matter, removed from mundane concerns, and from actual 
'working' within the world of the natural attitude as any part of his 
enterprise. The finite province of meaning involved contains its own 
rules - where, it should be noticed, those rules are concerned, in the 
case of social science, with the Opostulatest which were listed above 
- which decide upon which scientific propositions are to be considered 
adequate and thus acceptable, and which are to be rejected. (125) 
It is perhaps apparent, that Schutz's discussion of finite provinces 
of meaning have led him to the same position as his discussion of 
'rationality'. He has effectively separated theorizing, and thence 
theories, from the mundane world of everyday life in such a way that the 
relationship of theories to anything outside of themselves becomes 
-70- 
problematic. He concludes his essay by reiterating what has already 
been said concerning the sociologist's actors as 'puppets', before 
moving on to emphasise that the finite provinces of meaning which he 
has been describing should not be taken to be ontologically distinct 
entities - "separated states of mental life" (126) with absolutely 
no connection with one another. Rather, he suggests, they should be 
seen as aspects of the same consciousness and thus as related to one 
another. Just as I suggested that the 1postulate of adequacy' is not 
a sufficient device for grounding sociological theories, however, the 
simple statement that there must be some link between finite provinces 
of meaning because they are all states of the same consciousness is not 
an adequate demonstration of what is involved in the interrelationships. 
Certainly it must be the case, if we are not to suppose that our conscious 
life is somehow a set of disjunctive and unrelated experiences, that 
finite provinces of meaning are somehow connected with one another: 
the question is how? This question Schutz does not even attempt to 
answer, except simply to state that each reality, is only a 'modification' 
of the 'paramount reality' of the natural attitude - and that only 
serves to state the problem itself since the nature of the modifications 
and their structural interrelationships is not discussed. We are, not 
told, for example, how theories are actually to be related to the world 
of the natural attitude, and one suspects that the 'disinterested 
observert, viewed more in terms of his relationship with the natural 
attitude, might come to be seen as somewhat less disinterested. 
Undoubtedly the interrelationships are highly complex, but if one wants 
to conceive of the social world in terms of finite provinces of meaning, 
then the complexities must be faced, accounted for and described. 
In sum, then, if one traces Schutz's view of social science through 
his discussions of 'rationality' and 'finite provinces of meaning, it 
becomes apparent that he conceives of sociological theories as governed 
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by coherence criteria of truth, and as somehow separated from the 
social reality which they set out to account for. Some of the 
difficulties of this position have already been indicated. 
HUSSERL AND SCHUTZ: REFLECTIONS ON IMEANINGt 
In the above discussion of Husserl, it emerged that there were 
difficulties facing the sociologist who was interested in incorporating 
Husserlian phenomenology into social theory. These problems centered 
on two aspects of his thought, namely difficulties with the notion of 
the transcendental and quite what to make out of it in terms of mundane 
scientific interests, and difficulties with the notion of intersubjectivity, 
It has perhaps become apparent over the course of the discussion of 
Schutz that his response to both problems is effectively to ignore them, 
on the one hand abandoning the notion of the transcendental, and on the 
other positing intersubjectivity as fundamental, and as something to 
which a transcendental solution is not required. Schutz pays scant 
attention to Husserl's methods - the reductions - and is not interested 
in the purpose of the Husserlian enterprise which, as I have shown, is 
to uncover the certain presuppositions of knowledge, in order to ground 
knowledge on a firm footing. The purpose of this present section is to 
uncover some of the implications of this, and to illustrate the notion 
of 'meaning' that is generated in Schutz' account as a result of his 
handling of Husserl's work. 
Schutz's use of the phenomenological methods in the 'Phenomenology 
of the Social World' is patchy. He does say that his analysis of "the 
constituting process in internal time-consciousness will be carried 
out within the "phenomenological reduction"", (127) but he then goes 
on to point out that 
"The purpose of this work, which is to analyze the phenomenon 
of meaning in ordinary (mundane) social life, does not 
require the achievement of a transcendental knowledge that 
goes beyond that sphere or a further sojourn within the area 
of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. " (128) 
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Given the difficulties pointed out above, the question arises as to 
what the relationship is conceived to be between the 'transcendental' 
analyses of internal time consciousness, and the other analyses of 
mundane meaning. Schutz's answer is straightforward 
"Once we have understood by eidetic description the 
"problem of the inner development (Zeitigung) of the 
immanent time sphere", we can apply our conclusions 
without risk of error to the phenomena of the natural 
attitude. " (129) 
Schutz has therefore supposed that there is no problem here at all: one 
just changes levels, from the transcendental to the psychological (or is 
it sociological? ) in wholly unproblematic fashion. Natanson points 
out the difficulty 
"an even deeper methodological difficulty appears when 
we seek to put into practice the Husserlian postulate of 
the correspondence of levels of phenomenological enquiry. 
Schutz accepts it as absolute that the correspondence 
holds. But that insight can be gained only from the 
vantage point of transcendental reduction. It would have 
been of enormous help to have had an account of what I have 
termed the isomorphism of levels instead of its being taken 
for granted as a principle of phenomenology. " (130) 
It is not enough for Schutz to be cavalier with differences between 
transcendental and mundane levels of analysis. Some account of the 
relationship is needed. 
Given Schutz's stated problems, which are concerned wholly with 
the mundane world of the natural attitude, one might wonder why he 
should worry about the transcendental at all. Later in his career he 
does in fact abandon the whole notion of transcendental phenomenology, 
as is shown in his two essays "Type and Eidos in HusserlIs Late 
Philosophy" and "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in 
Husserl", (131) and in remarks like "the empirical social sciences 
will find their true foundation not in transcendental phenomenology, 
but in the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude. " (132) 
So why does he flirt with transcendental notions at all? 
Schutz sets up the problem that he faces himself in terms of the 
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constitution of meaning contexts from experience. Meaning contexts 
are supposed to be constituted by experience, and yet at the same time 
experience is said to be interpreted in terms of meaning contexts. As 
Schutz puts it 
"How can the interpretive scheme be in part constituted 
through that which is to be interpreted? " (133) 
What Schutz has here is a chicken and egg problem of'some importance. 
His solution to it is stated as follows: 
"The circularity is only apparent. The appearance of 
circularity is caused by the fact that two fundamentally 
different modes of observation are confused and by the 
way in which the problem set up in one sphere is 
confronted by its mirror image in another. 
The two spheres to which we refer are formal and 
transcendental logic. When we think of the interpretive 
scheme as something ready to be applied to some datum of 
lived experience, then we are thinking of it as an already- 
constituted "logical objectification", an ideal object of 
formal logic. On the other hand, when we think of the 
interpretive scheme as itself something dependent upon a 
particular Here and Now, then we are thinking of it in 
terms of its genesis, in terms of its constitution, and 
so we are dealing with in in terms of transcendental 
logic. " (134) 
Thus Schutz's solution to the problem of an apparent circularity 
is in terms of the distinction between the transcendental and the mundane 
realms. He thus needs to maintain the distinction to avoid an internal 
inconsistency within his account. But at the same time as he affirms 
the distinction, his actual practice leads to a denial of it. It is, 
I suggest, from this point that the problems with Schutz's sociology 
stem. It is this fundamental ambiguity that results from his struggle 
to incorporate Husserl's phenomenology into his post-Weberian sociology 
that in the end marks his attempt as unsuccessful. 
There are two crucial places in Schutz's account where this 
contradiction makes itself felt, namely in the matter of the relationship 
between subjective and objective meaning contexts (a problem dealt with 
briefly above) and in regard to the 'wet relationship which is said to 
ground intersubjectivity. I shall look at these in turn. 
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To account successfully for the relationship between subjective 
and objective meaning contexts, it would first be necessary to account 
for the constitution of subjective meaning contexts. This Schutz does 
attempt to do, in the first sections of the "Phenomenology of the 
Social World". by means of a transcendental analysis. He must then 
account for the constitution of 'objective' meaning contexts on the 
same level to provide a basis for showing how the subjective and the 
objective interrelate. This, however, he fails to do. Thus, unable 
to provide an adequate account of the transcendental constitution of 
objective meaning contexts, he moves the transcendental analysis of 
the constitution of subjective meaning contexts onto the mundane level 
so that the two will be seen to be the same - both tsubjectivel and 
lobjectivet meaning contexts now are mundane notions and thus related to 
each other in that sphere. The problem is, however, that as mundane, 
the notion of tsubjectivel constitution becomes problematic because of 
the circularity that was pointed out above. How is it that that which 
is to interpret experience is itself constituted by that experience? 
One or other of them must come first, the experience or the meaning 
context. 
What Schutz-in fact does, in the final analysis, is to opt for the 
meaning context as prior, and more than that, to suggest that it is 
objective meaning contexts which largely determine the content of 
subjective meaning. contexts. Faced with the difficulty of understanding 
the relationship between the two, and unable to produce an adequate 
transcendental grounding for such an understanding, Schutz ends up 
stressing the social nature of knowledge - its social origins, and the 
fact that such knowledge is socialized into each individual actor. The 
problem of the subjective constitution of meaning contexts, which was 
originally handled in terms of the transcendental motif, becomes instead 
a problem about socialization and the transmission of social knowledge. 
In this way, the transcendental can be shown to be irrelevant for sociology 
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since all one needs is a "constitutive phenomenology of the natural 
attitude" which will unravel the mechanisms involved in such a 
transmission, and the structures of the knowledge that is transmitted. 
Precisely the problem then becomes to understand just what contribution 
subjectivities do play in the constitution of knowledge. 
The situation is similar with the notion of the twel relationship 
which is said to be the grounds of intersubjectivity. Schutz himself 
writes that 
"Since human beings are born of mothers and not concocted 
in retorts, the experience of the existence of other 
human beings and of the meaning of their actions is 
certainly the first and most original observation a man 
makes. " (135) 
The problem, however, with this apparently flawless common sense statement 
is that precisely what is at issue in any account of intersubjectivity 
is the precise nature of this relationship. How is one to conceive of 
it? Are there pre-existing meaning contexts inside the baby's skull, 
or are they somehow 'constituted' out of his experiences? What is the 
relationship between experience and meaning contexts within the 'we' 
relationship? It is this, perhaps, that Natanson is complaining of 
when he says 
"The We-relationship ... is in many respects a primordial 
given for Schutz, i. e. his starting point in accounting 
for its form and function is its indubitable and 
immediate presentation. From the standpoint of the 
transcendental attitude, it is necessary to ask, How is 
it possible that there is such a structure? Within the 
natural attitude, the We-relationship is a fact of life, 
but in the phenomenological attitude it is deeply 
problematic. " (136) 
It is not enough, in other words, to simply assume such structures, or 
to assume, as Schutz does, the intersubjective world, since to do so 
leaves many gaps in ones conceptual apparatus, especially when one comes 
to try to uncover just what is involved in the relationship between 
subjective and objective meaning contexts, and between subjectivities 
in the social world, and society. How can the social scientist 
construct an adequate model of the social world if much of what is 
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involved in his model remains unexplicated and problematic? (137) 
in short, then, the contradiction entailed in considering that 
experience both constitutes meaning contexts and is interpreted by them, 
which is resolved in Schutz's early work by reference to the 
transcendental, leads to considerable difficulties once the transcendental 
motif is abandoned. Indeed the abandonment of the notion can itself be 
seen as the result of difficulties which Schutz had in accounting for 
the constitution of 'objective' meaning contexts transcendentally -a 
task which would have involved him in an analysis of transcendental 
intersubjectivity and of the intersubjective constitution of such 
objectivities. Husserl's own failure to give a satisfactory account of 
this matter generated in Schutz a conviction that the problem could not 
in fact be solved on this level at all, but that it must simply be 
accepted as a given (138) - as grounded in the 'We-relation' and the 
fact that man is not concocted in retorts. Such, however, is no solution, 
but simply a determination to ignore problematir- features of important 
issues. 
The results of these problems for Schutz position concerning 
Imeaning? in the sense of the term outlined in the previous chapter, are 
extremely interesting. Take to begin with the questions of Schutzis 
solution to the problem of universals, and the relationship of this to 
intersubjectivity. In his essay 'Type and Eidos in Husserits Late 
Philosophyl Schutz investigates the relationship between the emF[rical 
notion of 'type' as he has developed it, and Husserl's transcendental 
notion of leidos' or 'essence'. He argues that although Husserl 
considered that the meditating philosopher could, within the reduction, 
perform variations in fantasy upon the various components that make up 
the structure of essence in order to investigate the properties of essences, 
test their limits, and so on so that a deeper understanding of the 
properties of those essences would become possible, there are in fact 
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severe limitations upon the extent to which such 'free variation' is 
possible. As he puts it 
"The freedom of variations in phantasy will not permit 
us to arrive, starting from the prototype of a colored 
object, at the eidos of sound. " (139) 
Thus the question arises as to what it is that determines the 
limits of this free variation. His answer is that it is the empirical 
ttypet that accounts for the limitations. Thus: 
"Is it possible, by means of free variations in phantasy, 
to grasp the eidos of a concrete species or genus, unless 
these variations are limited by the frame of the type in 
terms of which we have experienced, in the natural attitude, 
the object from which the process of ideation starts as a 
familiar one, as such and such an object within the life- 
world? Can these free variations in phantasy-reveal anything 
else by the limits established by such typification? If 
these questions have to be answered in the negative, then 
there is indeed merely a difference of degree between type 
and eidos. Ideation can reveal nothing that was not 
preconstituted by the type. " (140) 
In other words, the typification of the natural attitude is prior 
to the intuition of essences possible within the phenomenological 
reductions. Where for Husserl the transcendental structure of essences 
was the ultimate apriori, and the realm of the presuppositions of 
knowledge, for Schutz it becomes simply a shadow of the typification 
characteristic of the natural attitude. That this is a strong rejection 
of Husserl's program cannot be doubted and as such it counts as one 
more example of the distance that Schutz has travelled from Husserl's 
phenomenology. But its significance is greater than this. 
The concept of 'essence' is intended as a solution to the problem 
of universals. Thus for Husserl, as we have seen, once within the 
reduction the philosopher is able to "see" that phenomena are not simply 
disconnected and isolated things that float before consciousness, but 
that they are, rather, instances of 'the same' genus - for example tables 
or chairs. It is consciousness that constitutes them in this way, and 
the phenomenologist's realisation of this gives him insight into the 
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world form. For Schutz, on the other hand, the solution to the problem 
of universals is to, be found in the structure of types that makes up the 
body of our taken for granted knowledge within the natural attitude. 
Thus the reason why objects in the world are taken to be instances of 
'the same' thing is that they are subsumed under the same type within 
an objective meaning-context. The essence of things is thus contained 
neither within the things themselves nor within the constituting 
activities of consciousness but in their status as already constituted 
types within the structure of a meaning-context. Essences are thus 
social - the solution to the problem of universals lies with society. 
The interest in this becomes apparent once one considers some of 
its implications for the notion of intersubjectivity, and for what 
constitutes lagreementt about what is the case. once it is remembered 
that Schutz's notion of the 'We-relationship' is problematic, it is 
important to ask just what it is that guarantees intersubjectivity - 
intersubjective communication and interaction. Although Schutz seems 
to want to say that the 'We-relationship' as an immediate experience 
is the grounds of intersubjectivity, he leaves unexamined the whole 
question of how the 'We-relationship' itself is possible in the first 
place in as much as he ignores the problems concerning the relationship 
between experience and meaning-contexts. If one examines the tWe- 
relationship' to find out how it is that the parties to it can be said 
to be oriented to 'the same' world - to the same features of the 
environment - and thus can be said to be communicating at all, it 
becomes apparent that the only answer possible, in Schutzis own terms, 
is in terms of the 'types' within objective meaning-contexts. It is not 
possible to suggest that 'essences' are the grounds of 'agreement', or 
that 'essences' are what enable things to be 'the same' for the parties 
to the relationship, since such essences are mere shadows of the objective 
type. It thus becomes apparent that the We-relationship, which is 
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supposed to be the grounds of intersubjectivity, itself depends upon 
already constituted meaning contexts. The one conclusion possible to 
this is that in the final analysis intersubjectivity is guaranteed, as 
far as Schutz is concerned, by already constituted objective meaning- 
contexts. 
Schutz's problem, once this is realised, is once again to account 
for the role of 'subjectivity' within his model. He has not accounted 
for the intersubjective constitution of objective meaning-contexts, 
nor for the relationship between meaning contexts and experience. The 
result is a gap in his model of social reality -a lack of-articulation 
between the various elements that make it up with the largest chasm being 
between subjectivity and objectivity. Again the reasons for this seem 
to lie with the difficulties involved in incorporating Husserlian 
phenomenology into the social sciences because of the transcendental 
aspiration contained within it. 
Schutz's view of language, equally, seems dogged by the same troubles. 
On the whole it is true to say that he is not particularly concerned 
with language at all, but certainly when he does deal with it, he sees 
it in terms of 'typification'. (141) Take, for example, what he has to 
say about language in 'The Structures of the Life Worldt: 
"The language is a system of typifying schemata of 
experience, which rests on idealizations and anonymizations 
of immediate subjective experience. These typifications 
of experience detached from subjectivity are socially 
objectivated, whereby they become a component of the 
social apriori previously given to the subject. " (142) 
And 
"In short, the language can be construed as the sedimentation 
of typical experiential schemata which are typically 
relevant for a society. " (143) 
And again 
"We can thus say that the reality to which the child 
gradually awakens and grows is "filtered" and consolidated 
by means of language, in accord with the meaning- 
structures of the relative-natural world view. " (144) 
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Thus language is a sort of container, or a receptacle for 'meaning' 
conceived of as a Ithingt of some sort which stands over and against 
individual subjectivities. In the process of communication Imeaningst 
are somehow transferred from one party to another like counters in a 
game. It is the tkernall of a concept that is the essential part of 
it, and the 'fringe' meanings which vary according to the context of the 
word's use are not essential to the concept itself but are, as it were, 
necessary vaguenesses. It is not considered that in some way the 
fact that the word is 'used' might be essential to it, or that the ways 
in which a word is used might not allow for a model of language which 
sees meanings as 'things' to be transferred, or that language might be 
essentially bound up with the activities that make up everyday life. 
Such possibilities are not considered, but instead language is conceived 
of as an 'objective meaning-context', with all the difficulties which 
that term has been shown to involve, which "filters" our experience. 
The separation of language from subjectivities and from the 
activities of individual subjects which Schutz's account involves can 
be paralleled to one involved in the finite province of meaning which 
the 'disinterested observer' enters as a scientist. In both cases, 
the activities - of the language user or of the scientist - are not 
considered essential to what is being discussed, i. e. language or theory. 
Such things are conceived to have an independent status as objective 
meaning contexts over and against individual subjects, but in both cases 
the result is a separation of the subjective from the objective which 
then becomes problematic since one cannot easily conceptualize how such 
objectivities relate to the treall world. Schutz never produces the 
analyses which would have helped us to understand this. 
In sum, then, it is worth saying simply that Schutz sets up a 
distinction between 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity' which proves highly 
problematic. It is not that he has posited an 'objective' world as a 
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'real' world of objects in any positivistic sense. Rather he makes 
'objectivity' something that depends upon the social; upon objective 
meaning-contexts of ideal typifications which are socialized into the 
individual members of a society in such a way that they can 'agree' 
about what is objectively the case. Thus Isocietyl, as an objective 
reality, stands over and against the individual members of a society 
as the ultimate arbiter on all issues of importance. The similarities 
to Durkheimts notion of-'Collective representations' are remarkable 
here. (145) 
The result of all this is that Schutz's notion of what is meant by 
Isubjectivityl becomes difficult to understand. It is difficult, in 
the first place, to see what place it could possibly have within his 
system. But beyond that, even given that the notion might have some 
substance, it is hard to see how it could possibly be articulated with 
his notions of lobjectivityl in any way that did not result either in 
an unacceptable psychologism in which all social phenomena were ultimately 
reducible to individual subjectivities, (146) or an equally unacceptable 
reification of the social at the expense of subjectivities. What is 
needed, I want to suggest, is a different approach altogether which will 
enable a fresh perspective upon the question of the relationship between 
subjectivity and objectivity, and upon all of the difficult issues 
concerned with 'meaning'. In search of such an approach I want to turn 
now to look at Wittgenstein's work. 
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"If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached 
bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am included to 
say: "This is simply what I do". (1) 
In the previous chapter, a distinctive notion of tmeaning' as 
that term has been specified above - i. e. in terms of a number of 
indicators - was seen to emerge from the work of Schutz. The later 
work of Wittgenstein, with which this chapter is primarily concerned, 
stands in marked contrast to Schutz on each of the dimensions which I 
have been discussing. It thus provides another lens to the philosophical 
spectacles - another perspective upon the central issues of this thesis 
from a philosophical point of view - which, by giving a contrasting 
view, should throw matters into broader relief. More than this, however, 
the distinctive approach which Wittgenstein takes towards such questions 
as the nature of 'Language in his later work introduces an emphasis which 
will be seen to re-emerge in the work of Garfinkel and of other 
ethnomethodologists, and which, if taken seriously, will be seen to 
4: rl 
have profound implications for the practice of sofiology. In short, the 
present chapter provides both a contrast with the last, and an 
introduction to those which are to follow. 
Husserl, it will be remembered, undertook philosophy with a sense 
of destiny, believing that he could somehow transform ments consciousness 
with his phenomenology. The driving force behind Wittgenstein's work 
was his quest for truth. Malcolm gives an impression of this in his 
"Memoire": 
"Wittgenstein's severity was connected, I think, 
with his passionate love of truth. He was constantly 
fighting with the deepest philosophical problems. The 
solution of one problem led to another problem. 
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Wittgenstein was uncompromising; he had to have complete 
understanding. He drove himself fiercely. His whole 
being was under a tension. No one at the lectures could 
fail to perceive that he strained his will, as well as 
his intellect, to the utmost. This was one aspect of his 
absolute, relentless honesty. Primarily, what made him 
an awesome and even terrible person, both as a teacher and 
in personal relationships, was his ruthless integrity, which 
did not spare himself or anyone else. " (2) 
This search led him towards mysticism. In his private life, this 
tendency was apparent in periods of time which he spent away from the 
world of academic philosophy living as a recluse in Norway and Ireland. (3) 
It also makes itself visible in his writings; Russell, for example, 
wrote of the tTractatust to Lady Ottoline in 1919: 
"I had felt in his book a flavour of mysticism, but was 
astonished when I found that he has become a complete mystic. 
He reads people like Kierkegaard and Engelus Silesius, and 
he seriously contemplates becoming a monk. It all started 
from William James's Varieties of Religious Experience, and 
grew (not unnaturally) during the winter he spent alone in 
Norway before the war, when he was nearly mad. " (4) 
It was this intense man with a sense of the mystical who turned to 
philosophy for-a solution to the problemswhich he had inherited from the 
Vienna of his youth. Those problems were concerned, fundamentally, 
with language and its limits - with what can be said and what can only 
be $shown'. Toulmin and Janik argue convincingly that it was this 
problem more than any other that exercised Viennese intellectuals, 
suggesting 
"that to be a fin-de-siecle Viennese artist or intellectual, 
conscious of the social realities of Kakania, one had to 
face the problem of the nature and limits of language, expression 
and communication. " (5) 
This driving concern of Wittgensteints was widely misunderstood by 
many of his contemporaries. This is perhaps because when he turned to 
philosophy after an early training in mechanics he did so by way of the 
work in which Russell and Frege were engaged, on the foundations of 
mathematics. It was thus the essentially logical concerns which 
characterised this work that provided the framework for Wittgenstein's 
first philosophical statement, the 'Tractatus Lolico-Philosophicust 
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(hereafter the 'Tractatus'), which was completed soon after the first 
world war. Although the point of the work was to show the limits of 
language - to show what language could say, and say clearly, and what 
could only be shown - it was taken by many to be a work of logic, 
notably by the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists upon whom the book 
had a considerable influence. Russell himself wrote of Wittgensteints 
work that it 
"is concerned with the conditions for accurate symbolism, 
i. e. for symbolism in which a sentence 'mean something 
quite definite. " (6) 
Wittgenstein's response to this misreading is shown in a letter to 
Russell 
"Now I'm afraid you haven't really got hold of my main 
contention, to which the whole business of logical 
propositions is only corollary. The main point is the 
theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions 
- i. e. by language (and what comes to the same, what 
can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by 
propositions, but only shown (gezeigt); which I believe 
is the cardinal problem of philosophy. " (7) 
These concerns do not disappear in Wittgensteints later work, for as 
Harward has suggested 
"the grammar of "seeing" of "visualizing" or "having 
images" (still) appears appropriate ... (as) a result 
of what Wittgenstein noticed as a feature of many 
sensible uses of language, they show features or impress 
features on us which are not said by either the 
proposition or the proposition user. " (8) 
The propositions of language show more than can be said. The words and 
sentences of a language are not things that can be isolated from their 
context within a 'form of life', for so to isolate them is to take 
away-the context that gives them their sense it detaches them from that 
which is not Inamedt by the words of the proposition, but which is shown 
through it. For example 
"I may recognize a genuine loving look, distinguish it from 
a pretended one (and here there can, of course, be a 
1ponderablet confirmation of my judgement). But I may be 
quite incapable of describing the difference. And this not 
because the languages I know have no words for it. For why 
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not introduce new words? - If I were a very talented 
painter I might conceivably represent the genuine and 
the simulated glance in pictures ........ 
Pretending is, of course, only a special case of 
someone's producing (say) expressions of pain when he 
is not in pain. For if this is possible at all, why 
should it always be pretending that is taking place 
- this very special pattern in the weave of our lives? " (9) 
It is the weave of our lives that makes a case of pretending to be 
pretending, and the difference between pretending and not pretending is, 
equally, something that is a part of our way of life. The language of 
tpretendingl or tnot pretending' - the language games in which we speak 
of these phenomena - is a part of the Iform of life?, and to separate 
it from this is to ignore what is 'shown' but unsayable and thus to 
court redundancy and confusion. 
A picture emerges here, then, of an intense man, driven towards 
mysticism, who is concerned with problems concerning the nature and 
limits of language which he has inherited from his youth in 'Kakanial. 
It is not immediately obvious, however, that the work of such a man, 
immersed in philosophical problems, is at all relevant for sociology. 
Husserl's work, as became apparent in the previous chapter, presents 
the sociologist who is impressed with his insights but whose concerns are 
primarily empirical and not philosophical, with problems. The same is 
true of Wittgenstein. One cannot simply ignore the fact that, as will 
become apparent, some of his most important concepts are bound up with 
what can only be shown and not said - and thus cannot be empirically 
investigated. What is needed is a formulation of something of what 
Wittgenstein is attempting to say that captures the spirit of his work, 
but which is directed expressly towards an empirical investigation of 
the social world. 
In this chapter I want to give a sense of what it is that 
Wittgenstein is getting at. I will then go on in the next chapter to show 
how the work of Garfinkel can be seen to articulate in a series of ways 
with Wittgenstein's thinking, but with the important difference that it 
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explicitly aims at empirical investigation of society. I will treat 
Wittgenstein's work, then, as a pointer towards an important area of 
social reality which demands sociological investigation, rather than 
suggesting that he was, in fact, a sociologist in disguise. In line 
with this general aim, I will make a few introductory remarks before 
moving on to discuss Wittgensteints xýOrk in some detail. 
What is important about the 'Tractatust for present purposes is 
two things. Firstly, it provides the context in which Wittgenstein's 
later work is to be understood. As he himself wrote in the preface to 
his "Philosophical Investigations" 
"Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book 
(the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its 
ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I 
should publish those old thoughts and the new ones 
together: that the latter could be seen in the right 
light only by contrast with and against the background 
of my old way of thinking. " (10) 
By seeing his later work against the background of the earlier, its 
radical nature becomes more apparent. It is possible to see more clearly 
just what Wittgenstein is arguing against, and how his new conceptualizations 
transform his earlier ones. 
There is, however, another and more general importance. The 
influence of the Tractatus on the tVienna Circle' of Logical Positivists 
has already been noted above. In this thesis, I will not be dealing 
explicitly with tPositivismt as a position which contrasts with that of 
phenomenology, Wittgenstein's own thinking, or ethnomethodology, partly, 
at least, because the term is often used to cover such a variety of 
different positions that it is of limited use. There is, however, in 
the 'Tractatust doctrines a clear impression of the type of position 
taken up by positivism on some important issues. This is particularly 
apparent in, for example, the notion of 'language' taken up - i. e. the 
idea of propositions 'picturing' reality, and more generally in the 
fundamental opposition between language and the lobjectivet world. For 
this reason, then, Wittgenstein"s early work provides a sense not only 
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of the type of position against which his own later work should be 
contrasted, but also of that towards which Garfinkel's writings are 
critically directed. Together with the work of Schutz it thus provides 
a whole context of ideas against which ethnomethodology can be set. 
Wittgenstein's later work, however, - and here I will be concerned 
primarily with the 'Philosophical Investigations' since it is there 
that the crucially important'notion of a 'form of lifet is most often 
to be found - is important for entirely different reasons. It provides 
a clear sense of the lembeddedness' of meaning, in contrast to notions 
of meaning as bound up with an independent structure of some kind, 
which it is important to grasp if one is to understand ethnomethodology. 
It thus introduces, in a perspicuous fashion, a central theme of this 
thesis and begins to make explicit just what is involved in 
conceptualising tmeaningi as an embedded phenomenon. It shows the way 
in which 'language?, trulesi, Isubjectivityt, and a variety of other 
concepts must be seen if this embeddedness is to be taken seriously. It 
provides, in short, a philosophical analysis of precisely those areas 
which are the central focus of this thesis. 
With that said, then, I want now to move on to discuss Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus to set the scene for a discussion of his important later work. 
THE TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 
The main theme of the tTractatus', as I have already pointed out, is 
"the theory of what can be expressed by propositions - i. e. by language 
and what cannot be expressed by propositions. " (11) The first task of 
this section, then, is to account for what can be expressed in 
propositions before going on to discuss what can only be shown. 
Wittgenstein writes as follows: 
"Everything that can be thought at all can be thought 
clearly. Everything that can be put into words can be 
put clearly. " (12) 
The question to be answered is "what is it that accounts for this 
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fact that anything that can be expressed in a proposition can be 
said clearly? " The answer lies in the nature of what the world is 
made up of - simple objects - and in the nature of propositions themselves 
in their relationship to 'objects'. So first of all, "what are Objects? ". 
'Objectst are the mostsLmple components of reality. They are not 
the objects of everyday life such as tables and chairs, but are rather 
the metaphysical substance of the world. Klemke puts it that they are 
"peculiar metaphysical objects - objects which can never 
be apprehended by any experience, but which nevertheless 
are real, and which form the substance of the world. " (13) 
They are what makes language possible - they are the ultimate 
unalterable subsisting core of reality: 
"Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one 
and the same. " (14) 
These objects contain within themselves the possibility of being 
combined in states of affairs - they only exist in states of affairs. 
Thus to know an object is to know all of its possible combinations in 
states of affairs. 
"If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences 
in states of affairs. 
(Every one of these possibilities must be part Of the 
nature of the object). 
A new possibility cannot be discovered later. " (15) 
These states of affairs are what makes up treality'. They are the 
'facts' that make up the world. 
"The totality of existing states of affairs is the world. " (16) 
Any given state of affairs, in as much as it is the realization of 
a possible combination of objects, can either exist or not exist. Thus 
one can talk about both states of affairs that exist, and about possible 
states of affairs that do not in fact exist - that a particular 
combination of objects is not in fact the case. 
Having decided what 'reality' and 'the world' consists of, it is 
next necessary to examine the structure of propositions and their 
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relation to objects and states of affairs. It is here that the 
celebrated 'picture theory' of propositions, becomes relevant. 
Wittgenstein's argument here is that just as a picture depicts reality 
by showing the relationships between the various objects that it is a 
picture of, so a proposition states that such and such a combination of 
objects - such and such a state of affairs - either is or is not the 
case. In other words a proposition is a picture of reality and it 
stands in relation to states of affairs just as a picture does to that 
which it depicts. Like a picture, too, it can depict a state of affairs 
that either does or does not exist. 
I 
"A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility 
of existence and non-existence of states of affairs. " (17) 
To understand this fully, and to understand the definiteness of 
sense that characterizes propositions, it is necessary to examine the 
way in which a proposition is itself built up out of elementary units 
which Wittgenstein calls Inamest. Firstly one needs to be clear about 
the relationship between tobjectst as the simplest elements of reality, 
and tnames' as the simplest elements of propositions. 
"Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives, 
I can only speak about them: I cannot put them into words. 
Propositions can only say how things are not what they are. "-(18) 
Names, then, represent objects. They stand in for objects, in a 
proposition, not by some necessity, but because they are conventionally 
used to fulfill this function. The lobject' is the tmeaningt of a 
simple sign (name). (19) This being the case 
"The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds 
to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional 
sign. " (20) 
Thus Inames' represent objects, which are their meaning, in a 
particular state of affairs, "only in the nexus of a proposition does 
a name have meaning. " (21) Thus names appear within a proposition, 
representing objects in some particular state of affairs. Names have 
a 'meaning' because they 'meant the objects which they 'name' within a 
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particular state of affairs. They do not, however, define the object 
fully - there will always be other possible states of affairs within 
which the object could be configured - thus 
"So one could say that the real name of an object was 
what all symbols that signified it had in common. Thus, 
one by one all kinds of composition would prove to be 
unessential to a name. " (22) 
Names, since they name 'objects' which are not actual objects as 
we know them but metaphysical substance, are not, in fact names as we 
think of them in the real world. They are, rather, the ultimate point 
of analysis of a proposition, - the smallest part of a proposition. 
The demand that they exist at all is a purely logical one - i. e. it 
follows from the model that Wittgenstein is building of 'reality' and 
1propositions', (23) The next thing to examine, therefore, is the way 
in which these names are configured in a proposition. This is conceived 
of in terms of two stages. 
Firstly there are what Wittgenstein calls elementary propositions. 
These are defined as Iconcatenations of names'. They are, in other 
words, just groups of names, naming objects, but not yet formed in 
such a way that they represent a state of affairs. They can be neither 
true nor false, since as a string of names they do not yet picture 
reality. Again, like the concept of 'name', 'elementary propositionst 
are formal things - part of the demands of the logical model. 
Secondly one moves from elementary propositions to full blown 
propositions. Propositions are generated from elementary propositions 
by a series of truth functional operations. (24) By the application 
of logic to an elementary proposition, a concatenation of names is given 
" form - i. e., the names are set in relationships with one another in such 
" way that a picture is produced of a possible state of affairs, and 
this picture/proposition is then a picture of either an existing or a 
non-existing state of affairs, which means that it is either true or false. 
Thus from a concatenation of names that can be neither true nor false, a 
proposition is generated which is a picture of reality, and which can 
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therefore be a true or a false picture. 
It is not necessary to go into the precise mechanisms of this 
generation of propositions from a concatenation of names. (25) What 
it is, however, important to realise is that since all of the operations 
involved are truth functional, then the definiteness of sense that 
characterizes what can be said, and which is therefore common to all 
propositions, is the result of performing logical operations - truth 
functional operations - on a concatenation of names, which, in its turn, 
has a certain definiteness that is the result of the relationship 
between 'names! and tobjectsl. Thus the tsensel of a proposition - which 
is what it expresses - is something definite 
"What a proposition expresses it expresses in a 
determinate manner, which can be set out clearly: a 
proposition is articulate. " (26) 
The sense of a proposition is, in fact, a state of affairs - i. e. 
a configuration of objects. It expresses this state of affairs by 
picturing it, -either as existing or as not existing. Thus: 
"What a picture represents is its sense. " (27) 
and again 
"The sense of a proposition is its agreement and 
disagreement with possibilities of existence and 
non-existence of states of affairs. " (28) 
It represents these possibilities in a definite manner because of 
the logical nature of the generation of propositions from elementary 
propositions which are, in their turn, concatenations of names. It 
can thus be either true or false - the state of affairs which it 
represents can either exist or not exist. 
"A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. 
And it says that they do so stand. " (29) 
At this point it becomes necessary to take account of what cannot 
be said but only shown. The starting point here is the picture theory. 
If it is the case that a proposition is a picture of a state of 
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affairs, then it is important to try to account for the way in which 
it is able to picture reality. What is it that a picture must have in 
common with reality in order to be able to depict it adequately? 
Wittgenstein's answer is that 
"What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common 
with reality in order to be able to depict it - correctly 
or incorrectly - in any way at all, is logical form, i. e. 
the form of reality. " (30) 
Or another way 
"Logical pictures can depict the world. " (31) 
It is, in other words, logical form that enables a picture or a 
proposition to depict the world, since it is logical form that is common 
to both reality and to the picture. It is logical form that enables the 
relationships between objects within a state of affairs to be mirrored 
by the relationships between names within a proposition. As 
Wittgenstein puts it 
"A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so 
it must be 
, 
essentially connected with the situation. 
And the connexion is precisely that it is its 
logical picture. " (32) 
The problem thus becomes one of coming to some understanding of 
logic, since logic has now been shown to be the key to both the world 
and to propositions and thus to all language and communication. Logic 
is, if you like, the most fundamental thing there is. Grasping it is 
not, however, an easy thing. This is because of the nature of 
propositions themselves. Since propositions picture states of, affairs 
then what state of affairs could the propositions of logic possibly 
depict? The propositions of logic could not picture 'objects' in any 
sense since logical constants (i. e. landt, 'or', 
. 
'if' etc. ) are not 
'names' of objects of any kind, but are relational words. They point to 
what makes pictures of states of affairs possible, and thus cannot be 
themselves about states of affairs. 
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"My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constantst 
are not representatives; that there can be no 
representatives of the 12. Lic of facts. " (33) 
"All theories that make a proposition of logic appear to have content 
are false" (34) but that does not get one very far. The clue lies in 
the fact that there can be shown to be three types of apparent proposition, 
two of which turn out not to be propositions at all. Firstly there is 
the ordinary proposition which pictures reality, and which depends upon 
this relationship with states of affairs for its truth or falsity. 
Secondly there are apparent propositions that are necessarily true 
because of the internal relationship of its parts (e. g. "all black cats 
are black") which do not depend on any relationship with reality for 
their truth - they are ttautologically' true. Thirdly, there are apparent 
propositions that are false sLmply because of their internal relations 
(e. g. "the black cat is white") and which also do not have any 
relationship with reality. These are called 'contradictions'. As- 
Wittgenstein puts it 
"A tautology leaves open to reality the whole - the 
infinite whole - of logical space: a contradiction fills 
the whole of logical space leaving no point of it for 
reality. Thus neither of them can determine reality in 
any way. " (35) 
This being the case it now becomes p ossible to say that the 
propositions of logic, since they do not picture states of affairs but 
instead enable all picturing, are in fact Itautologiest. (36) They are 
necessarily true because of their form, and they thus do not need to 
be related to states of affairs. It is thus true that they, like 
tautologies, all "say the same thing, to wit nothing. " (37) 
Logic, then, cannot be pictured in propositions. It can, on the 
other hand, be 'shown? in as much as it is the ? form' of all propositions. 
Propositions 'say' that things stand in such and such a relationship 
to one another, and they can thus be true or false, but at the same 
time they depend upon logical form for their very existence. They thus 
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'show' what cannot be said - i. e. the logical form of the world. In 
a similar way, the propositions of logic, although they do not and 
cannot Isayt what logic is, reflect in the way in which they hang 
together to form an interlocking whole, the form of the world. Thus 
"How can logic - all-embracing logic, which mirrors the 
world - use such peculiar crotchets and contrivances? 
Only because they are all connected with one another in 
an infinitely fine network, the great mirror. " (38) 
In this way we see that what cannot be tsaidt but only 'shown' is 
the form of reality itself. It is that which makes propositions 
possible, the logical form of the world which is prior to all experience 
of the world and which is the most fundamental fact of our existence. 
"The lexperiencet that we need in order to understand 
logic is not that something or other is the state of 
things, but that something is: that, however, is not 
an experience. 
Logic is prior to every experience - that something 
is so. 
It is prior to the question 'How'?, not prior to 
the question Nhatl?. 11 (39) 
Our understanding of tlogic' is thus no earthly thing in the sense 
that our understanding of propositions is an earthly thing. We are, 
rather, confronted by the very essence of things in what can be shown 
via propositions, and in the tcrotchets and contrivancest of logical 
symbolism. 
"Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of 
the world. 
Logic is transcendental. " (40) 
Before moving on to make a few remarks about the Tractatus, as a 
prelude to the discussion in the next section of the 'Philosophical 
Investigations', itwill be useful to expand this account of the 
Tractatus doctrine of saying and showing by pointing out briefly the 
'mysticism' in the tTractatust, along with some of Wittgensteints 
observations on solipsism. 
I have already quoted above Russell's comments on the mystical 
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nature of the Tractatus. (41) Other commentators too have stressed 
this aspect of Wittgenstein's work (42) and have suggested that he 
should, indeed, be seen as a mystic. So what is it that Wittgenstein 
considers to be mystical? The short answer is that it is that the-world 
exists that is mystical rather than how things are arranged in the world. 
It is that which is 'shown' through propositions but which cannot be 
said - the what of the world as opposed to the how - that is mystical. 
The world form itself, which we cannot even think since it cannot be 
put into propositions, must always be beyond our grasp and yet at the 
same time it is the condition for our existence. It is that which is 
mystical; feeling the limits of our world - the world about which we 
can have knowledge. Wittgenstein puts it this way 
"It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, 
but that it exists. 
To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it 
as a whole -a limited whole. 
Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this 
that is mystical. 
When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can 
the question be put into words. 
The riddle does not exist. 
If a question can be framed at all, it is also 
possible to answer it. " (43) 
The lanswerl is in terms of the form of the world - of tlogict 
and that cannot be said but only shown. Thus the questions about the 
source of the world, about the nature of existence, about the ultimate 
meaning of life and so on, all of which would demand answers in terms 
of 'logic', cannot even be asked, let alone answered. One can only 
"feel(ing) the world as a limited whole", for even when "all possible 
scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain 
completely untouched". (44) This, indeed, stands as the final message 
of the Tractatus and it is one that must be grasped by means of the 
propositions of the book - seen through what the propositions 'show' 
- for it cannot be said. Once grasped, the whole work should be discarded, 
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like a ladder that enables one to climb to a higher level, and which 
then becomes of no use. Wittgenstein himself discarded the logical 
'crotchets and contrivances' and the whole language of academic philosophy 
in order to go and teach in Austria. One wonders whether any others 
followed him in spirit. 
To conclude this discussion of the'Tractatust, I want to frame a few 
remarks about Wittgenstein's notion of solipsism. It must be-remembered 
that this is not the solipsism that stands as one of philosophy's 
favourite straw men. It is not a dualistic concept but is rather, as 
Pitcher stresses (45) a statement about the nature of experience. 
Wittgenstein is claiming that 
"The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. " (46) 
Thus what cannot be said in language - in propositions (47) - is 
beyond the limits of my world. The limits of my world, however, are 
not the limits of the world, for there is also that which can be shown 
but not said. - Thus it is the case that ones own experience is limited 
and does not embrace the whole world, and thus that one is somehow 
'locked in' by the very nature of language and propositions. Therefore 
"(For) what the solipsist means is quite correct: only 
it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. " (48) 
To say what the solipsist means would involve going beyond the 
limits of language in order to draw them - which evidently-is impossible. 
Thus what the solipsist means simply manifests itself in the fact that 
there is a limit to the world. There is no 'It within the world; it 
stands only as the limits of my experience (49). one cannot experience 
that which is doing the experiencing, for if one could, then it would 
be possible-to get beyond the limits of one's world and thus beyond 
language. Only death takes us beyond our experience. (50) 
Solipsism, however, is said by Wittgenstein to coincide with pure 
realism. (51) This is because,, as Hintikka has pointed out, (52) 
language for Wittgenstein is not a private thing, but is rather an 
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entirely public affair. The implications of this are doubtless far 
reaching, but for our present purposes it is enough to notice that what 
this means is that far from solipsism being a claim about individual 
subjectivities being cut off from the rest of the world, it is a 
claim about the limitations of language itself. The nature of language 
and propositions limits our world. But, this world is precisely the 
world that the realist says is the world - and, Wittgenstein is saying, 
both are in fact right. This, is not, however a normal form of 
solipsism - as Hintikka has put it 
"What is usually taken to be the claim of solipsism is 
the impossibility of getting 'beyond the boundaries of 
myself'. Wittgenstein's solipsism is based on the exactly 
opposite claim that all the ordinary boundaries of myself 
are completely contingent and hence irrelevant tfor 
what is higher'. " (53) 
The account Wittgenstein gives does, however, fit well with his general 
thesis about the limits of language - of what can and cannot be said. 
With these remarks on solipsism I want to leave the account of 
the 'Tractatus'. Before moving on to discuss the 'Philosophical 
Investigations?, however, it will be worth while to point out some of 
the features of Wittgenstein's early work which are of particular 
interest for present purposes, emphasising in particular those aspects 
of it which undergo radical transformation in the later position. 
In the first place, it is interesting to notice some of the links 
between the type of enterprise that Wittgenstein is engaged in here, 
and that which Husserlts transcendental reductions were intended to 
enable. Both are concerned fundamentally with the a priori essences 
which provide for the possibility of our knowledge of the world. In 
Husserl's case, this possibility is stated in terms of the intentional 
nature of consciousness, whilst for Wittgenstein the 'world form' is 
uncovered in logic itself as that which enables propositions to picture 
reality, and in both men's work something of the spirit of Kant lurks 
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here. just as Husserl sought to unravel the presuppositions of knowledge 
and to show its true nature and status, so Wittgenstein sought to account 
for the presuppositions of language, its nature and limitations. In 
both cases too the search for a priori essences led, ultimately, to 
that which could not be said - to the truly immanent experience of the 
stream of consciousness or to 'logic' as the form of the world. In a 
sense the paradox of the phenomenological statement (54) which Fink 
points out, finds a parallel in the closing statements of the 'Tractatus, 
in which Wittgenstein advises those who have understood his book to 
discard it like a ladder which has served its purpose in enabling one 
to climb higher, but is no longer of any use. (55) As he puts it "What 
we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence". (56) In the end, 
certainty and the ultimate meaning of things and the world are not 
things which philosophy can discuss. 
To push the parallel still further, there is a sense in which what 
Wittgenstein was attempting to do was carried on within a transcendental 
reduction. The conceptshe uses, such as $object? and 'name' do not have 
any mundane reference, but stand apart from the everyday world. Malcolm 
relates the following anecdote. 
"I asked Wittgenstein whether, when he wrote the Tractatus, 
he had ever decided upon anything as an example of a 
'simple object'. His reply was that at that time his 
thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was 
not his business, as a logician, to try to decide whether 
this thing or that was a simple thing or a complex thing, 
that being a purely empirical matter! " (57) 
Where Wittgenstein differs from Husserl, however, is in the fact that he 
abandoned this way of thinking and attempted to forge a fresh approach 
to the problems of knowledge and language. He writes about his 
previous concerns in a passage in the 'Philosophical Investigations' 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper 
becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For 
the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result 
of investigation; it was a requirement). The conflict 
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becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger 
of becoming empty. - We have got on to slippery ice 
where there is no, friction and so in a sense the 
conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, 
we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need 
friction. Back to the rough ground! " (58) 
What one needs to do is to come back from the tidealt realm - from that 
place where 'conditions are ideal' - for the solution cannot be found 
in a situation in which there is no friction. It is of no use spinning 
theories that ultimately require for their expression an ideal language 
since such is, by its very nature, removed from our everyday concerns. 
It is here that Wittgenstein's concerns diverge from Husserl's. 
Wittgenstein's later work, then, shows a turning away from the 
search for 'essences', and the development of new concepts to handle 
the problems which they were intended to solve. Thus 'family resemblences', 
'language games', 'form of life' and so on emerge as a toolbox of 
concepts with which to handle the problems of language. The way in which 
they do so will be the subject of the next section. 
It is worth stressing too, the characteristic notion of language 
which Wittgenstein develops in the 'Tractatus'. Here it stands in 
opposition to the Irealityt it tpictures', and is able to picture 
simply because of logic as the form of the world. Contained in this 
model of language is both a correspondence notion of the truth of 
propositions, and a vision of language as an independent calculus. (59) 
I will talk briefly about each of these in turn. 
It was pointed out above that Schutz, in developing Husserl's 
notions to give them sociological relevance, espouses a 'coherencel 
theory of truth in which the truth of a proposition rests upon its 'fit, 
with other propositions within a body of knowledge. The notion that 
emerges from the 'Tractatus' stands opposed to this in that it suggests 
that the truth of a proposition rests upon its correspondence with 
'reality'. 'Names' name 'objects', and are concatenated in elementary 
-108- 
propositions which are then, by a series of truth functional operations, 
transformed into complex propositions. Thus the 'truth' of a complex 
proposition depends ultimately upon whether or not the tobjects' which 
are tnamed' do in fact exist, and whether the state of affairs (i. e. the 
arrangement of objects 'pictured' by the proposition) is in fact the 
case. It is not the relationship of a proposition to other propositions 
that is important in deciding its truth or falsity, but its relationship 
to 'objects' - to 'reality' as that which is the case. 
At the same time, the Tractatus sees language as a calculus by 
treating it as if it is a series of signs which can be joined in various 
ways in order to picture some state of affairs. It is thus independent 
of those who would use the language, standing on its own as a structure 
to be manipulated. These manipulations, as far as Wittgenstein is 
concerned, are truth functional. 
Taken together, these two aspects of Wittgensteints early view of 
language suggest that two important observations are in order about the 
'Tractatust. Firstly, there is clearly a strong sense of there being an 
'objective' world which stands over and against perceptions of it - over 
and against propositions. It is this 'objective' world which, in the end, 
guarantees the truth or decides the falsity of any proposition made 
about any matter. Secondly, - and here the above remarks on Wittgenstein's 
'solipsism' are particularly relevant - it would seem that, as an 
independent calculus, it is language that in the end guarantees 
intersubjectivity simply because it i independent. Here there is a IS 
parallel to Schutz's work which is worth noticing, but which I will not 
develop here. In other words, the whole possibility of an intersubjective 
world is being made to depend upon language as something over and against 
the people who use it. Language, as a calculus, is being reified, and 
given a vast amount of work to do. 
On each of the above points Wittgenstein's later work develops a 
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different approach. The notion of correspondence - what he calls 
the 'model of object and designation' - is pushed into the background, 
as is the idea of language as a calculus. As a result, lintersubjectivityl 
comes to be seen in a different light in relation to the nature of 
language itself. I will now move on to put more flesh on these 
introductory remarks by considering the 'Philosophical Investigations'. 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
himself gives an excellent account of the form of the book when he 
writes 
"After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results 
together into such a whole, I realized that I should never 
succeed. The best that I could write would never be more 
than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were crippled if 
I tried to force them on in any single direction against 
their natural inclination. - And this was, of course, 
connected with the very nature of the investigation. For 
this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought 
criss-cross in every direction. - The philosophical remarks 
in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of 
landscape-s which were made in the course of these long and 
involved journeyings. " (60) 
He is not, then, interested. in building a philosophical system, but 
rather he is intent upon putting together his ideas on philosophical 
matters in the form of a number of criss-crossing concepts that can be 
seen as parts of an overall picture. His purpose in doing this is to 
solve philosophical puzzles - to provide an armoury of concepts that 
will enable the philosopher to see the true nature of philosophical 
problems and their origins in ordinary language and to provide insights 
into them that can make them dissolve. The object of the exercise is 
not, strictly, to provide solutions to the problems, but to show how the 
problem itself is generated by a series of misunderstandings that more 
often than not have their origins in a misconception of the nature of 
language. Thus he writes that 
"The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the 
treatment of an illness. " (61) 
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and again 
"What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the 
way out of the fly-bottle. " (62) 
The Philosophical Investigations, then, is an illustration of some 
of these concepts in use. It is an attempt to-demonstrate that the 
concepts can be used in an interesting and fruitful way within the 
region of discourse that is philosophy. 
It is important to realize that because of the criss-cross nature 
of Wittgensteints concepts, one cannot take any one of them in isolation. 
They hang together to form a whole toolbox of concepts that is specially 
designed for the job of resolving philosophical puzzlement. Thus 'family 
resemblances' are linked to 'language games' and 'rules', and 'rules, 
themselves cannot be properly understood unless the attack on essentialism 
given substance in the notion of 'family resemblances' is taken into 
account. Most importantly, what all of these different ideas attempt to 
express is that one cannot understand 'languages' (language games), 
'rule following', or 'sameness' (and agreement) unless it is realized 
that all such phenomena depend upon and are embedded within a 'form of 
life'. It is the realization of the embeddedness of language and so on 
within a form of life that is the key to showing the fly the way out of 
the bottle. 
I will begin this account of the 'Philosophical Investigationsl 
with a description of the notions of language games and family resemblances. 
The point of these concepts is stated by Wittgenstein in the following 
fashion. 
"Here we come up against the great question that lies behind 
all these considerations. - for someone might object against 
me: "You take the easy way out! You talk of-all sorts of 
language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a 
language-game, and hence of language, is: what is common to 
all these activities, and what makes them into language or 
parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part 
of the investigation that once gave you yourself most headache, 
the part about the general form of propositions and of 
language. " 
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And this is true - Instead of producing something 
common to all that we call language, I am saying that 
these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes 
us use the same word for all, - but that they are related 
to one another in many different ways. And it is because 
of this relationship, or these relationships, that we 
call them all "language". " (63) 
What he is trying to do with these concepts, then, is to provide 
an alternative account of language to the essentialist one that he 
himself had once espoused in the 'Tractatus' and which was the one 
predominantly held by philosophers. So how is this to be done? 
First of all, 'family resemblances'. This concept is aimed 
directly at the solution to the problem of universals which is framed 
up in terms of essentialism. Wittgenstein's point here is that it is 
a mistake to presume that because various phenomena - such as games - 
are grouped under the same name and are seen as instances of the same 
thing that they must therefore have some one thing in common which 
provides the basis for seeing them all as 'the same'. The reason why 
we do presume this is that we have a craving for generality and precision 
which makes us try to find that which is common to things rather than 
looking at what presents itself to us and asking whether or not there 
is any one thing common to all instances of what we call the tsames. 
We could just as well, he suggests, look not for the common denominator 
but for the differences between things of the same genus in order to 
see whether we might be mistaken in our assumption of similarity. As 
he puts it 
"Consider for example the proceedings we call "games". I 
mean board-games, card-games, ballgames, Olympic games, and 
so on. What is common to them all? - Don't say: "there 
must be something common, or they would not all be called 
'games"' - but look and see whether there is anything common 
to all. " (64) 
If we do 'look and see' we find not essences, but 
"we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping 
and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similaritiescf detail. " (65) 
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- It is these criss-crossing relationships of similarity between 
things that Wittgenstein refers to as 'family resemblances'. (66) 
The point can perhaps be made clearer by using an example that Bamborough 
gives. (67) He suggests that one should picture a series of features 
A. B. C. D. & E. which appear in objects e. d. c. b. a. in the following way: 
edCba 
ABCD ABCE ABDE ACDE BCDE 
It is quite conceivable that all of the objects e. d. c. b. and a. 
might be called by the same name - they might all be games for example. 
It is the case, however, that there is nothing - no one feature - that 
is common to all of the objects. Rather there are a series of overlapping 
similarities present which account for our seeing them all as instances 
of the same thing. 
This does not mean that all concepts are imprecise, or that we do 
not know what we are talking about when we use them. It means, rather, 
that trying to see concepts as precise things with an essential core is 
a mistaken enterprise, and one that threatens to disguise the true nature 
of language. By seeing concepts instead as being grouped according to 
family resemblances the way is opened up for a new perspective on language 
which can, perhaps, throw new light on philosophical problems. When one 
tries to explain a concept to someone, one is not trying to get him to 
see the essential core of it - one is not, as Schutz seems to suggest, 
transferring Ikernalst of meaning to one's co-conversationalist - but 
is rather teaching him how to use it with a sense in the ordinary 
'language games' of our everyday life, and although sometimes it is 
necessary to ensure - for example within scientific discourse - that a 
concept is used with a high degree of precision, words and concepts 
are highly flexible things. They mould themselves to the uses that we 
have for them in the language games of everyday life. As Wittgenstein 
puts it 
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"One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a 
particular way. -I do not, however, mean by this that 
he is supposed to see in those examples that common 
thing which I- for some reason - was unable to express; 
but that he is now to 
, 
employ those examples in a 
particular way. Here giving examples is not an indirect 
means of explaining - in default of a better. For any 
general definition can be misunderstood too. The point 
is that this is how we play the game. (I mean the 
language-game with the word "game"). " (68) 
This brings us into the question of language games. What is a 
language game? The best way of answering this is with an example. 
Wittgenstein, in the first language game which he describes in the 
'Blue and Brown Books' (69) asks us to imagine a language whose "function 
is the communication between a builder A. and his man B. 11(70) The world 
in which these two men live is a very simple one - it consists of A. 
building something, and B. bringing him the necessary building materials. 
These materials are "cubes, bricks, slabs, beams, columns. " To 
facilitate their task they have a language. "The language consists of 
the words tcubel, 'brick', 'slab', 'column'. " This is taken to be a 
complete language. A gets B to bring him what he wants by shouting out 
'cubet or tbrickl, and B dutifully obliges. If a child is to be taught 
this language, it could be done by pointing to an item, and saying its 
word and by rewarding the child if he brought the item over to the 
builder (or punishing him if he didntt). 
This is obviously a very simple language game. It has limited 
objects, limited teaching methods, limited members - in fact it could 
hardly be more different from the complex language games that we play 
normally in our every day life. The point is, however, that it does 
illustrate, by its very simplicity, features of all languages. - It 
suggests that language is only as complex as it needs to be, for example. 
In such a simple game, words like 'bring me' (a slab) would be redundant 
- they would not have a point. To suggest that tslabl really meant 
'bring me a slab' is somehow beside the point. The language, the world 
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of objects, and the activities are, in this language game, inextricably 
linked. Language is simply a part of the activities. Thus we come to 
a definition of a Ilanguage game'. 
"We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) (71) 
as one of those games by means of which children learn 
their native language. I will call these games "language- 
games" and will sometimes speak of a primitive language 
as a language-game. 
And the processes of naming the stones and of 
repeating words after someone might also be called language- 
games. Think of much of the use of words in games like 
ring-a-ring-a-roses. 
I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and 
the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game". " (72) 
The term 'language-game', then, denotes not the clever use of puns 
that plays on words, or some property of language conceived of as a 
self-contained structure standing apart from an 'objective' world which 
it describes, but rather it attempts to stress the fact that language 
is used as a part of the activities of our everyday life, and that it is 
used with some sort of a point - to achieve something or other. It is, 
in other words, an integral part of the weave of our life. 
That this concept rests upon that of a family resemblance is perhaps 
obvious, but it bears stressing. Words and concepts, Wittgenstein is 
claiming, should not be seen as having some essential meaning. Rather 
they are used in a variety of criss-crossing ways, in a variety of language 
games - which are themselves related in the manner of family resemblances 
- in order to further the purposes that characterize our human life. In 
short, both notions point towards the fact that language and these 
meaningful things which it enables us to express, are embedded within 
our whole form of life - within the swim of what we do in the world. 
Words are like tools that we use as we go about our business; as 
Wittgenstein puts it 
"Think of the tools in a tool box: there is a hammer, 
pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, 
nails and screws. - The functions of words are as diverse 
as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases 
there are similarities). " (73) 
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It is no use trying to discover some ultimate meaning for the concepts 
that we use - their ultimate significance for; 
"When we say "every word in language signifies something" 
we have so far said nothing whatever, unless we have 
explained exactly distinction we wish to make. " (74) 
We may, of course, be making some point by saying this - for example 
we might be distinguishing words in a language from words outside it 
such as I'lilliburelo" in songs - but then we have given the language game 
in which our statement is to be understood. An example of the redundant 
use of language is to be found in Wittgenstein's own early work - 
"Thought, language, ncwappear to us as the unique correlate, 
picture, of the world. These concepts: proposition, 
language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the 
other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words 
used for now? The language game in which they are to be 
applied is missing). " (75) 
Using language in the way in which he did in the Tractatus was to 
misunderstand the true nature of language. It was to withdraw words from 
their place within language games, and hence to make them redundant. 
What must be done is to bring words back home to their proper place 
within the weave of life. 
"What we do is to bring words back from the metaphysical 
to their everyday use. " (76) 
It is useless to try to build a Tractatus type of system in order 
to understand the world, for by using words in this way one runs up 
against the limits of language. The limits of language are the limits 
of language games. (77) The philosopher cannot go beyond that limit 
without talking nonsense, and the purpose of Wittgenstein's philosophy 
is to uncover the ways in which such nonsense is generated 
"The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or 
another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the 
understanding has got by running its head up against the 
limits of language. These bumps make us see the value 
of discovery. " (78) 
Thus far, then, I have discussed the two concepts of 'family 
resemblances' and 'language gamest, trying to show the links between the 
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two. This has led, however, to a crucial point in the discussion, 
namely the distinction between what can be said - which is limited by 
Ilanguage gamesl - and that which can only be shown - i. e. that which 
goes beyond the limits of language. To unravel further this important 
distinction it is necessary to look explicidy 'at the notion of a-'form 
of life', a term which has been used above but which has not been provided 
with a firm sense. I want now to remedy this by looking in some detail 
at what is involved here. 
It is important to stress that a form of life is not the same thing 
as a language game, (79) in spite of the fact that some commentators 
do seem to treat them as the same. (80) It is, rather, that 'agreement' 
concerning what is the case - about what it is that we do as a matter of 
course - which lies behind language games and makes them possible. It 
includes such things as an agreement as to the language we use which 
makes possible language games of which 'truth' and 'falsity' are a part 
- as Wittgenstein puts it 
"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is 
true and what is false? " - It is what human beings say 
that is true and false; and they agree in the language 
they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form 
of life. " (81) 
Thus the 'form of life' lies behind language games. Van Peursen puts 
it succinctly when he writes that 
11 ... behind man's language and thought, and so behind- 
philosophy, which must be understood as a practical activity, 
there lies the history of man's forms of life. Not that it 
is hidden behind man's action and speech - it is precisely 
what is expressed by them. "Will" and "ideal', the mystical 
and the logical measure, are no longer kept in watertight 
compartments! " (82) 
In other words, it is that which can be shown but not said. It is, 
as Janik and Toulmin puts it, that which Ocontextst language games, (83) 
where language games are to be understood as the boundary of the sayable. 
It shows itself through the language games that we play in the course 
of our everyday living. It is, as Petrie puts it a 
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"Non-investigable language in use or set of accepted 
human activities which enables us to frame our. 
investigations. " (84) 
The parallel here with the earlier notion of 'logic? as the 'form' 
of reality and of language is a significant one. Just as Ilogict was 
the 'form' of the world, so the new, more secular, Wittgenstein speaks 
of that which cannot be said in terms of the Iform of lifel itself, 
rather than in terms of an ineffable presence that somehow has its 
being behind the realm of everyday existence. The 'form of lifel becomes 
the source of all necessity (85) rather than logic. It becomes the. 
mediator between language and 'objective' reality. 
Since this is such an important notion, it will be useful to put 
more flesh on the concept that this brief sketch allows. I will begin 
here with J. F. M. Hunter's excellent account of the matter. Hunter 
argues for what he calls "the organic account" of forms of life. The 
term 'organic' here is intended to point out the fact that in the course 
of living our-lives we do not, as a rule, reflect upon the highly 
complex things that we do which make up our everyday competences as 
human beings, but that we do, on the contrary, just get on with it. 
We are able to talk, calculate, interact and so on because we have 
Ilearnt' to do these things, but the fact that we have learnt them does 
not imply that we then have to consciously work back over our lessons 
in order to perform whatever task is at hand. It is as if, once learnt, 
these things simply become a part of our biological makeup - they 
become a part of what it is to be a human being. We just do act in 
this way. It is, however, difficult to see immediately the link 
between social competences and our biological makeup - as Hunter puts it 
"We do not generally include in the biological what is overt, 
what is learned, what is done at will or what is intelligent, 
but only what goes on within us, unaware and without our 
direction. Yet we can move by easy stages from automatic, 
unwilled, not-conscious processes like nutrition, through 
reflex actions, many of which are learned or at least acquired, 
and which, though not done at will, can often be resisted 
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at will; then through speaking or writing just insofar 
as it is forming the words with our mouths or drawing 
the characters on paper, where, though we may form a 
word at will, we do not (generally) will the physical 
manner of our forming it; to, finally, expressing 
ourselves in a certain way, where although it is generally 
done at will, we do not will the willing of it, and we do 
not know how just this form of wo-rds satisfies all the 
various grammatical, social, personal, and intellectual 
requirements of being something we "want to say". We 
may, by studying it afterwards find out how it satisfies 
such requirements (cf. para. 82), but the interesting thing 
is that we generally manage to say things which are just 
what we would say if we had the requirements in mind, but 
without a thought of the requirements. " (86) 
This extended quote makes clear the gist of the organic account. 
In order for language games to be possible at all, certain things must 
be given and "agreed" upon. Certain things must be Ilearnt', the 
biological organism must be set up in a certain way, and these factors 
provide the ground within which our lives as human beings have their 
roots. As Wittgenstein puts it 
"What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could 
say - forms of life. " (87) 
This ground is not, and cannot be, said in the language games that 
we play since to say it would itself-depend upon that same ground, so 
that what was being said would fail to grasp its own form fully, but 
instead it is 'shown' in the fact that one just does things in this way. 
One can justify what one does in terms of rules and causes, and indeed 
much of ones use of language does indeed consist in doing precisely 
this, In the final analysis, however, it is the case that we just do 
do things in such and such a way, and this fact grounds any justification 
that we might give of our actions - as Wittgenstein puts it 
"How am I able to obey a rule? " - if this is not a question 
about causes, then it is about the justification for my 
following the rule in the way I do. 
If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached 
bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 
"This issimply what I do. "" (88) 
It is this tbedrock' - tthe given' - that is a 'form of life'. It 
is this form of life which accounts for the fact that when we speak we 
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can say more than can be said in so many words for it provides the 
context within which language games are to be understood. As Cavell has 
put it: 
"We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then 
we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project 
them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this 
projection will take place (in particular, not the grasping 
of universals nor the grasping of books of rules), just as 
nothing insures7 that we will make, and understand, the same 
projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our 
sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, 
senses of humour and of significance and of fulfillment, of 
what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a 
rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an 
assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation - all the 
whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls "forms of life". " (89) 
With these remarks of Cavellts I will leave the question of what 
Wittgenstein meant by a form of life and move on to discuss some further 
features of the philosophy of the Philosophical Investigations. It 
must be stressed once again, however, that all of the concepts so 
far discussed - language games, family resemblances and forms of life 
- and those which I will now go on to mention - language, meaning and 
use, and rules - cannot be treated as distinct from one another. All 
of them together form an interlocking whole -a battery of concepts - 
that work towards the same end, showing the embeddedness of lianguaget 
and 'meaning' within a 'form of life', and thus seeking to clear up 
confusion and puzzlement in philosophy. Thus the status and nature of 
language, which I will speak about next, must be seen against the 
background created by the above discussion of. a form of life. 
Language is learnt, according to Wittgenstein, not by the learner 
intuiting the essences of concepts, or guessing the true core of the 
concept or word which lies behind the actual examples that the teacher 
might give in the process of teaching someone how to use it, but rather, 
as Pitkin puts it 
"The kind of training that is necessary to the acquisition 
of a natural language, Wittgenstein says, required "inducing 
the child to go on" in the same way, in new and different 
cases. " (90) 
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I have already shown how the concept of family resemblances 
breaks down the notion that concepts must have essences. Rather, words 
are used in language games with a sense. Thus language cannot be a 
calculus, as it was seen to be in the Tractatus, and it cannot be 
learnt or used as a calculus would be. It must, rather, be learnt by 
us and incorporated into our makeup as, human beings in such a way that 
we can use it without having to think, as a-flexible tool that responds 
to the various purposes of our human conditions. In a sense one could 
say that one learns a 'rule' which directs the speaker to use words in 
such and such a way, and that the rule transcends the particular occasions 
of its use - but to say that is to risk falling back into a form of 
essentialism that makes not an intuited essence but a rule the core of 
a concept. 
The word 'rule$ is just a way of pointing out, here, that we do in 
fact go on in the same way in our use of words and concepts. It is a 
description of the way things are with language, and not an intuition 
of the essence of language use. As Wittgenstein puts it 
""All the steps are really already taken" means: I no 
longer have any choice. The rule, once stamped with a 
particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is 
to be followed through the whole of space. - But if 
something of this sort really were the case, how would 
it help? 
No; my description only made sense if it was to be 
understood symbolically. -I should have to have said: 
This is how it strikes me. 
When I obey a rule, I do not choose. 
I obey the rule blindly. " (91) 
Thus language is just something that we do - it is an integral part 
of our form of life. Hunter, once again, puts the point I want to make 
here clearly whilst talking about the language game used by the builder 
and his mate that I mentioned above. 
"Why should I not say: 'When he says "slab! " he means "Slab"! '? " 
He is saying something about what I have called the "self- 
sufficiency" of language: that it stands by itself, and needs 
no further explication. A person in this situation could not 
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say what he means by "Slab! " and yet in the ordinary 
sense of that expression he knows what it means. How 
does he know? Well, encouragement, reproof, practice, 
and examples have brought it about that its use is simply 
part of the way he functions. A living. being now 
functions that way, as immediately and naturally as he 
walks or swims, and being simply part of the way a living 
being functions could be what is meant by being a form of 
life. " (92) 
It is no longer the case, then, that to understand language one must 
investigate that which it pictures - must try to understand the concepts 
and propositions of language in relation to that reality which they 
stand over and against. (93) Instead, in order to get to grips with 
language at all, one must look at the ways in which it is used within 
the context of all the other activities that human beings engage in. 
It is a practical activity. As Van Peursen puts it "Language does 
something, creates new insight and new paths for action. " (94) 
It is not simply a self contained structure that can be analyzed in 
abstraction from the language games which embody it. 
"we see that what we call "sentence" and "language" has 
not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family 
of structures more or less related to one another. " (95) 
and elsewhere 
"if the words "language", "experience", "world", have a 
use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words "table", 
"lamp", "door". " (96) 
The words "language" and so on do have a use, but to presume that 
they denote some 'thing' that must have an essence is to make a 
fundamental mistake. The philosopher must look and see the ways in 
which "language" as a concept, and language as a human activity manifest 
themselves, within both language games and within our form of life. 
The status of language in Wittgensteints theory may perhaps become 
clearer if I can clarify what is meant in the Philosophical Investigations, 
by the concept of rule. There is, after all, a sense in which it could 
be said that learning a language is like following a rule - even if the 
use of the word 'rule' here is to be taken "symbolically". (97) So how 
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is the concept 'rule' to be understood? 
The danger, when talking about Irulesl is that one immediately 
tries to make them that 'thing' which the word 1rulet refers to. In 
other words, one searches round for an essentialist definition of 'rule'. 
The problem with doing this is that things do not always go according 
to the rules that we lay down. 
"The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a 
technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the 
rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That 
we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules. 
This entanglement in our own rules is what we want 
to understand (i. e. get a clear view of)". (98) 
Thus, for example, philosophies become trapped in contradiction, 
and we are reduced to saying "I didn't mean it like that. " Our own 
rules have gone wrong. The problem for the philosopher is to come to 
understand why this should be the case - what is it about 'rules' and 
about our use of the concept trulel that can lead us into such 
difficulties? 
The first thing that must be remembered is that 'rule', as a concept, 
is itself a part of our language and that as such, it is used for various 
purposes in a variety of language games. For example 
"The rule may be an aid in teaching the game. The learner 
is told it and given practice in applying it. - Or it is 
an instrument of the game itself. - Or a rule is employed 
neither in the teaching nor in the game itself; nor is it 
set down in a list of rules. One learns the game by 
watching how others play. But we say that it is played 
according to such-and-such rules because an observer can 
read these rules off from the practice of the game - like a 
natural law governing the play. " (99) 
All of these different cases, where we might say that a Irulel applies 
to what ever is going on, denotes some use of the concept rule. The 
concept Itself is a set of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing 
in family resemblance fashion. It is something used. 
Wittgenstein himself uses the concept rule in order to point out 
thatsevere difficulties result from treating rules as Ithingst that need 
-123- 
to be interpreted, and that a view of language that sees 'rules, as 
the 'essence' of linguistic practice will inevitably run into trouble. 
Take, for example, a case where someone (e. g. a sociologist) says that 
action A is the result of an agent X interpreting rule R. Now suppose 
that another actor, Y, comes along and that he also'performs action A 
but that it is evident that he did so as a result of interpreting rule 
Rl. At some other time, actor Y does interpret rule R, but the result 
in this case is not A but some other action - call it Al. Now the 
puzzle here is that it seems that rule R does not lead to any one action 
- and one can in theory imagine any action being seen as an instance 
of following it - and action A cannot be seen as the result of following 
or interpreting any one rule. This being the case, it begins to look 
as though the concept trule', if it is taken to denote some 'thing' 
-a rule - is in danger of becoming vacuous. It certainly could not, 
for example, solve the problem of order, unless problematic notions 
such as conseffsus are introduced to explain why most people do interpret 
rules in similar ways, and it would be of little use to the ordinary 
conversationalist who generally wants to use the concepts trulet and 
'rule followingl to denote a certain regularity in the'behaviour being 
discussed. Wittgenstein puts it thus: 
"This was our paradox: no course of action could be 
determined by a rule, because every course of action can 
be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if 
everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then 
it can also be made to conflict with itý And so there 
would be neither accord nor conflict here. 
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here ... 11 (100) 
So how is the misunderstanding to be cleared up? The first step 
is to realize that rules are not things that need to be interpreted. 
They are neither essences themselves, nor things with their own essence. 
What must be realized is that 
"there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation but is exhibited in what we call "obeying 
the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. " (101) 
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We must be careful when we use the word 'interpretation' for by 
thinking of rules solely in terms of interpretation we run the risk of 
misunderstanding them, "we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" 
to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another. " It is 
not something that people necessarily do to the tthing' rule. 
Thus People just do obey rules, and whether or not they 'intend' 
to obey or follow a rule is often not to the point when one speaks about 
rules and rule following. I just do follow rules, just as I just do 
use language. I grasp rules by being taught them, not as lists in a 
rule book, but by way of examples, ostensions, by being told things, 
encouraged in what I do, having things explained to me and so on. (102) 
Finally I just do understand the rule -I know how to go on. (103) 
An example here is to try to think of the rule we would use to teach 
someone how to use the concept "exactness". 
"No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not 
know what we should be supposed to imagine under this head 
- unless you yourself lay down what is to be so called. But 
you will find it difficult to hit upon such a convention; at 
least any that satisfies you. " (104) 
We (English speakers) all know what lexactt means - we know how to 
use it with a sense - and we could say that its use follows a rule. The 
fact that it is difficult to "hit upon such a convention", or to put it 
another way, to give an account of the rules for the term's use, does 
not mean that it is incorrect to speak of following a rule here. How 
could we ever use the word at all if there were no rules for its use? 
To think that rule is the wrong word here is to misunderstand the 
grammar of the word/concept 'rule'. Obeying and following rules is just 
a part of the tweave of life', is part of our-Iform of life' - i. e. it 
is part of that which makes language games possible. It 'exhibits' 
itself in our everyday lives. 
"When I obey a rule I do not choose. 
I obey the rule blindly. " (105) 
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The message that emerges from Wittgensteints account is fundamentally 
a simple enough one - the concept trulet is used, and it is used for a 
variety of different purposes. We use it to account for how people learn, 
how orderly behaviour is possible, how a game is structured etc. etc. 
It is a part, too, of the language of justification and moral explanation. 
(106) As Wittgenstein says 
""How am I able to obey a rule? " If this is not a question 
about causes then it is about the justification for my 
following the rule in the way I do. 
If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached 
bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to 
say: "this is simply what I do". " (107) 
What is being pointed out here is that there is an end to the 
infinite regress of justifying my rule following behaviour in terms of 
further rules e. g. "why did you do that? " "Because of rule a". "But 
why interpret it that way? " "Because of rule b" "Yes but rule b can be 
interpreted in this way" "yes, but consider rule cII .... and so on. We 
do use 'rules' to justify what we do, but'in the final'analysis what we 
are doing. Ls Justifying and not providing some casual explanation, of our 
action in terms of essential 'rules' that exist, thinglike, as the frame 
around which we group our actions. "This is simply what I do", and l- 
am prepared to justify my doing it. The language games of justification 
which use trulest are, like all language games, grounded in my form of- 
life. 
The implications of this for 'language' are perhaps obvious enough. 
We learn language by learning rules that enable us to project a concept 
from the context within which it was learnt to other unfamiliar contexts. 
But, rules - the rules that we learn - are not thinglike; they do not 
constitute the 'essence' of language. As Cavell puts it, arguing strongly 
against Pole's reification of ? rules', "Language has no essence. " (108) 
Rules are what is "exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going 
against it" in actual cases", (109)' they are a part of our form of life 
just as language is. We just do speak and we just do follow rules. . 
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In sum, then, there is a sense of 'rule' that does not imply 
'interpretation' and which is tied up with 'what we do' - with the way 
in which we blindly go about our daily round. 'Rule', in this sense, 
is crucially bound up with the notion of a 'form of life' - i. e. with 
that 'bedrock' within which language, meaning and the rest are embedded. 
In this sense, 'rules' are 'shown# (manifest) in particular instances 
of obeying or going against rules. They are 'shown' as part of our 'form 
of life'. The concept 'rule' must be understood not as referring to 
things (rules) in the world, but as a concept that can be lused' with a 
sense to justify, explain, etc. etc. - and the possibility of using the 
concept at all rests upon our form of life itself, i. e. upon what we do, 
as a matter of course, in various regular ways. 'Rule', like all concepts 
that have some meaning for us, is embedded within a form of life. Another 
concept that Wittgenstein discusses and which is very much to the point 
for present purposes is the concept of 'meaning' itself. The dangers 
of this notiorr precisely parallel those which we saw in relation to 
rules - namely that we presume that there must be a 'something' to which 
the concept tmeaning' refers. In the Tractatus, for example, the meaning 
of a #name# was held to be the 'object' which that name signified. The 
same problems are present with the verb 'to meant. Here it is thought 
that when we say that we 'meant to say something or other,, we are 
referring to some inner event that goes on when we perform an act of 
Imeaning something'. Thus tmeaning' is taken to be what is 'meant' when 
we say something and 'mean' something by it. It is that central core 
which is grasped in any act of meaning. 
Wittgenstein's argument here is that once again we have allowed 
ourselves to be misled by the grammar of the words 'meaning' and tto meant. 
There is, he says, no reason why these words should refer to anything at 
all, and to suppose that they do is to become trapped by one image of 
the way that language works - perhaps the picture theory 
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"A main cause of philosophical disease -a one-sided diet: 
one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example. " (110) 
One must instead cast around - must look at the uses that the word 
is put to - and in doing so one finds that 'meaning', too is a concept 
that is used for a variety of purposes with a point. Pitkin puts this 
well 
"In short, a verb like "to mean" is not simply a label for 
some recognizable inner process; it is a complex, composite 
tool put together out of a variety of heterogeneous parts 
- the various contexts and language games in which the word 
is used. These include feelings and actions and circumstances, 
phenomena to which the word can refer, but also phenomena which 
characterize the occasions for its use as a signal. " (111) 
It is important, however, not to imagine that Wittgensteints claim 
here is that the meaning of a concept is in fact its use- i. e. that 'use' 
is being substituted for 'meaning'. If this were the case, then - 
evidently Wittgenstein would have fallen back into the trap that he is 
constantly warning others of, namely the tendency to find just one 
essential thing that is common to all cases. I will illustrate this 
by making two points. 
Firstly, it seems that the picture theory does not die out completely 
in the work of the later Wittgenstein. Harward notices this and writes 
that 
"it is not an error ... but is only misleading to focus on 
the picturing relation of shared logical form; the error, 
I think, is in isolating any one relation shared by 
language and reality, and not on isolating the wrong 
relation. " (112) 
and later on the same page 
"The range and variety of activities we call language, and 
the range and the variety of uses to which we put language 
are so extensive as to forbid any general account of how 
meaningful discourse is related to reality. This is not 
to rule out, however, that for some set of sensible uses 
of language, an account of meaningfulness which is exclusively 
that of sharing pictorial form might not be in order. " (113) 
Wittgenstein himself does use the image of a 2picturel in the 
Philosophical Investigations to explain something of the relationship 
between language and reality, but it is always in such a way that the 
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most important question is always 'how is the picture used? ' or 
twhat is it that brings the picture to life in actual situations of 
the concepts use? '. Thus 
"The picture is there; and I do not dispute its correctness. 
But what is its application? Think of the picture of 
blindness as a darkness in the soul or in the head of the 
blind man. " (114) 
and again 
"Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? 
- In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? 
- Or is the use its life? " (115) 
This does not, however, mean that the whole idea of a picture has 
been disgarded in favour of some idea of 'use'. Rather it says that 
sometimes it is appropriate to see propositions as pictures, but that 
one must not forget that they only come to life when they are used with 
a purpose. They are, in short, dependent upon a form of life, and to 
remember this is to lessen the danger that one will be carried away 
by the idea that one image - of propositions picturing - could account 
for the general form of all propositions. 
The importance of this is that it does demonstrate a distinction 
between meaning and use. What is being said is that tmeaning' is complex, 
and that it cannot be captured in a single image - like that of a 
picture - but that one must always remember that pictures are used, 
including the picture of 'meaning' that is gained by seeing meaning 2. s 
a picture. The picture theory does give us some idea about meaning 
- it does picture certain of the relationships between language and 
reality which make an utterance meaningful - but it cannot be the whole 
story because pictures rely on being used so that they can come alive, 
in some language game or other. (116) The whole point of stressing the 
'use' of concepts is not to substitute $use' for 'meaning', but to insist 
that concepts, including the concept 'meaning', depend upon - are 
embedded within -a 'form of lifet. To understand 'meaning, one must 
recognize this embeddedness. 
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The second point to be made draws outý some of the implications of 
this. Pitcher, in his commentary on Wittgenstein, does in fact daim 
that Wittgenstein conflates meaning and use in the Philosophical 
Investigations. (117) As a result of this, when he comes to discuss 
Wittgenstein's views on private language, and the relationship between 
sensation statements and sensations, like tpain', he claims that since 
Wittgenstein is only interested in use, and ignores meaning as something 
that could possibly be different from use, he is trapped into saying 
that; since ostensive definitions of 'pains' etc. are not possible and 
since sensation words cannot be Inamest, then the sensations themselves 
drop out of consideration. In other words, the language games in which 
words like Opaint, 'love', 1grieft etc. occur, do not have any place 
in them for actual sensations. All there is is certain pain behaviour 
which ties up with certain linguistic uses, and we have no need to 
know, and no means of-knowing, what the other person feels when he uses 
sensation words. If, indeed, meaning were the same as use, then Pitcher 
would be correct here, for evidently the meaning of. 1pain' need never 
refer to any sensation since the process of teaching someone how to use 
the concept would always be in terms of ostensions, of showing them 
how to go on in the right way, and that would always be in terms of 
observable pain behaviour, and not in terms of private sensations. Using 
the concept does not demand that any sensations exist at all. 
The point is, however, that Wittgenstein does not want to equate 
meaning and use in this way, but only to warn that using only one image 
of the relationship between language and reality - i. e. one that sees 
the 'meaning' of concepts in terms of 'pictures' - will mislead the 
philosopher. 
This can be made clearer by considering the following passage from 
the Philosophical Investigations. 
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"Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from 
his own case! - Suppose everyone had a box with something 
in it; we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone 
else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is 
only by looking at his beetle. - Here it would be quite 
possible for everyone to have something different in his 
box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. 
- But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's 
language? - if so it would not be used as the name of a 
thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language- 
game at all; not even as a something; for the box might even 
be empty. - No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in 
the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. 
That is to say: if we construe the graumar of the 
expression of sensation on the model of 'object and 
designation' the object drops out of consideration as 
irrelevant. " (118) 
Now Pitcher only quotes the first paragraph, here, and leaves out 
the crucial last phrases. He can thus say that Wittgenstein's view is 
that sensations do indeed drop out of consideration in the language 
games of which sensation statements are a part. Since it is only the 
'use' of such statements that is important, then there is no place left 
for sensations as somehow part of the meaning of sensation terms. Cook 
makes it clear why Pitcher is mistaken here, when he writes that 
"But so far from this being Wittgenstein's actual view, 
it is what he calls a "paradox" (P. I. 304). It is not our 
actual use of sensation words that yields this paradox, 
but rather the philosophical picture of that use. The 
intention of the passage is clearly shown in the final 
sentence, which Pitcher does not quote: .... The "if" here 
is crucial, for it is not Wittgenstein's view but the one 
he opposes that construes the grammar of the expression of 
sensation on the model of "object and name", and therefore 
it is not Wittgenstein, as Pitcher thinks, who is committed 
to the paradoxical consequence that in the use of the word 
"pain", for example, the sensation drops out as irrelevant. 
The point of the passage, then, is quite the opposite of 
what Pitcher supposes. " (119) 
In other words, what has happened here is that Wittgenstein is 
arguing that one particular picture of the meaning of sensation words 
- the "object designation" model - leads to a paradox, since it implies 
that when we use sensation words the sensations are not important. 
Pitcher interprets this, in lines with his conflation of meaning and 
use, to mean that indeed only the use of such terms is important. By 
doing this, he too takes just one picture of what it is to 'mean' something, 
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and himself complies with (or rather claims that Wittgenstein complies_ 
with) the paradox. He becomes trapped in a picture where meaning is 
use. Thus Pitcher himself becomes an example of, exactly what Wittgenstein 
is arguing against, which is the tendancy to be trapped by a picture - 
it is worth quoting again 
"A main cause of philosophical disease -a one-sided diet: 
one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example. " (120) 
tMeaning' is complex. It is wrong to imagine that the whole gamut 
of what is meant by the concept, or of what we mean when we use the verb 
'to mean', can be distilled into a clear and precise logical formulation. 
What must be remembered is the embeddedness of meaning - of the concept 
Imeaningf, and of the 'meaning of all concepts - within a form of life. 
The complexity of 'meaning' is bound up with what we do, with that sense 
of 'rule' that does not imply interpretation, with our 'use' of language 
in family resemblance fashion within 'language games?, indeed with the 
whole 'whirl of organism' that is our tform of life'. We become caught 
in paradoxes if we forget this and try to uncover essentialist definitions 
of concept, of language, of rules and the rest, and 
"The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with 
the idea that language always functions in one way, always 
serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts - which may be 
about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you 
please. " (121) 
and again 
"What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives 
us the correct idea of the use of the word "to remember". " (122) 
I. e. that is not a denial that pictures sometimes help in some cases. 
This discussion of meaning and use concludes the account of the 
Philosophical Investigations for present purposes. Hopefully it has 
become clear the way in which the concepts - 'family resemblancesl, 
'language games', 'rules', 'meaning' and lusel, 'language' and so on all 
interlock within a framework of concepts that indicate the embeddedness 
of all concepts - including those discussed - within a 'form of life'. 
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What is produced, by Wittgenstein, is not a systematic philosophical 
treatise but a network of concepts woven together to make a point. That 
point adds up to an insistence that all Imeaningl is embedded within a 
form of life - that to understand 'language', 'concepts' and all other 
meaningful phenomena, it is necessary to see them in the context of what 
we do. In the next section I will discuss some of the issues that this 
later work of Wittgenstein raises for the arguments of this thesis. 
WITTGENSTEIN ANDýSCHUTZ: THE CONTRAST 
I have already pointed out above some of the ways in which the 
enterprise which Wittgenstein undertakes in the 'Tractatus' can be seen 
as similar to that which exercised Husserl. In this present section I 
want to suggest some of the ways in which the position that Schutz's 
adjustments of transcendental phenomenology for sociological ends leads 
him into; contrasts in decisive respects with the philosophy of the later 
Wittgenstein which, in parallel fashion, stands as a rejection of the 
'Tractatust doctrines. 
Perhaps one of the most obvious points of contrast lies in the 
different solutions which the two thinkers provide to the problem of 
universals. Schutz, as I have argued above, seems to suggest that in 
the final analysis it is 'ideal types' that should be seen as providing 
the 'essence' of a concept. Wittgenstein's solution, on the other hand, 
stresses instead the family resemblance nature of all concepts, this 
notion going side by side with the idea that words are used in a variety 
of different language games with a point, which in its turn relates to 
the form of life which enables language games in the first place. Thus, 
where Schutz can be seen as maintaining that the possibility of 'agreement' 
about what is the case. rests upon the objective meaning structure of 
pre-constituted types, Wittgenstein conceives of that same possibility 
in terms of what people do - of the ways in which they use words and 
concepts in a family resemblance fashion within a form of life. Where 
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Schutz's solution is in terms of a structure of 'meanings' conceived 
of as tthinglikel, Wittgensteints is in terms of what people do - their 
practices as they go about the business of living as human beings. ' In 
both cases there is a rejection, here, of the notion of apriori essences, 
so that both have moved a step beyond their initial starting points - 
Schutz from the Husserlian'notion of leidost and Wittgenstein from the 
notions of logic and tobjectst. Their final positions on the matter, 
however, could not be more different. 
A similar contrast emerges when one considers the different views 
that the two men hold on the nature of language. Here, Schutz's views 
with stresses that language is an objective meaning context standing over 
and against those who use it, has more in common with Wittgensteints 
early view of the matter than with his later work. Where the tTractatus' 
treats language as if it were a calculus, Schutz treats it as a structure 
of meanings. Similarly in both cases there is some notion of 'kernel' 
and 'fringe' meanings, with the kernel being the essential meaning of 
the concept whilst the fringes are the result of particular occasions 
of its use. Compare, for example, these remarks of Wittgenstein's 
from the Tractatus to Schutz's notion as it was described above (123) 
"A proposition possesses essential and accidental features. 
Accidental features are those that result from the 
particular way in which the propositional sign is produced. 
Essential features are those without which the proposition 
could not express its sense. 
So what is essential in a proposition is what all 
propositions that can express the same sense have in common. " (124) 
The parallel here is evidently not at all exact, since Schutz's 
notion of what is essential is tied up with issues concerning 'coherence' 
criteria, whilst Wittgenstein's is bound to a 'correspondence' idea. 
Nonetheless in each case the point that is being made is that language 
is in some sense a 'structure' -a 'calculus' - with essential 'meanings, 
contained in it, these meanings being passed between conversationalists 
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over the course of their interactions with one another. 
In his later work, as I have shown, Wittgenstein explicitly 
rejects this model of the nature of language, preferring instead to think 
of it in terms of its uses within language games. Concepts become like 
the tools in a tool box rather than recepticles for 'meanings'. They 
have uses over a wide variety of different language games and it is 
this that is important about them and not some hypothesised 'essence' which 
can be abstracted from occasions of the use of language. Language is 
bound up with the activities of life. It is used in various contexts in 
family resemblance fashion. Once again, the contrast with Schutz, here, 
could not be more stark. 
As a result of this view of language, something interesting happens 
in Wittgenstein's later work, to the distinction between subjectivity 
and the objective world. Whereas in Schutz's work, there is some idea 
of there being a crucial distinction to be made between subjective 
perceptions and something that is more lobjectivel - i. e. tobjectivet 
meaning contexts stand opposed to Isubjectivel meaning contexts - in 
the Philosophical Investigations, this distinction is very much 
secondary. In the case of language, the lobjectand designation' model 
is found to be inadequate if it is generalised into becoming the correct 
view of language, and instead the notion of 'language games' is developed 
to stress the way in which language is bound up with activities and 
purposes within a form of life. By the same token, it becomes clear 
that the distinction between subject and object -a distinction made by 
the use of language - should not be considered to be fundamental, as 
some sort of a priori in any talk about 'knowledge' or 'reality*. 
Instead, the 'given' is to'be seen as a 'form of life'. It is not the 
case that one should conceive of man as a creature locked into his own 
subjective world and confronted by an objective reality which he must 
somehow get to know, any more than it is the case that language stands 
as a calculus, a structure of meanings, over and against - picturing - 
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something which is essentially not subjective, and which can never 
be fully comprehended. Instead, man should be seen as engaged with 
the world, as doing things which include using language, within a form 
of life. It is that which is the 'groundl - the lbedrockt - and not 
an hypothesised 'real' world. Once again, the contrast with Schutz 
is obvious enough. 
What this implies for the notion of intersubjectivity is that the 
problem itself is not to be conceived of in terms of the relationship 
between different tsubjectivel meanings, as far as Wittgenstein is 
concerned., but in terms of a 'form of life'. Where Schutz seems forced 
to admit that the possibility of mediation between subjectivities lies 
in 'objective meaning contexts', Wittgenstein suggests instead that the 
lintersubjectivel world as we know it is grounded in our form of life. 
It is the fact that we 'do' certain things, ýand 'follow rules, (in that 
sense of the word that does not imply interpretation) within an 
lintersubjectivel (if that word is usable here, given the lack of priority 
of the notion of tsubjectivity? ) environment that is crucially important 
- that-is the 'given'. In a sense, where Schutz attempts to posit 
intersubjectivity as fundamental and fails, Wittgenstein succeeds by 
reconceptualising what is meant by 'subjectivity' - and thus lintersubject- 
ivityl - in the first place. His is once again a radical move which 
stands in contrast to Schutzls position. Wittgenstein, by positing a 
'form of life', avoids the problems with the 'life world' concept, 
which contains so many notions that are incompatible with a thoroughgoing 
lintersubjectivityl such as 'subjectivity', lintersubjectivity', 
'objectivity' etc. and provides fresh insight into precisely what the 
notion of lintersubjectivityl is attempting to say. 
The notion of 'meaning' that emerges from Wittgenstein's later work 
is evidently considerably different from that which is to be found either 
in his own early work, or in the writings of Schutz. In, terms of each 
of the indicators which I have suggested are crucial to an identification 
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of particular conceptualizations of ? meaning', Wittgenstein can be seen 
as providing a radically different perspective from that of both 
Schutz and many other writers. He is insistent that meaning is not 
some thing which is to be seen as contained in language, but that 
rather it is incarnate - that it is crucially bound up with the activities 
of life, with the things which we do as human beings. Meaning is not 
something to be handed from subjectivity to subjectivity, each time with 
an essential 'core' which is given by the concepts used but also with an 
'accidental' subjective extra provided by the particular occasion of 
the words use. Thus language and meaning cannot be treated as though 
they were some thiaa or other - as though they were bound up with a 
calculus which could be analysed independently of its manifestation 
within a form of life. Things in the world are meaningful because of 
our form of life and not because something has been added to them - not 
because 'meaning', as some independent thing contained, perhaps, in 
language has been bestowed upon them by calling them this or that, or 
because tmeaningt is somehow an intrinsic part of that tthing' itself. 
Thus to understand Imeaningt is to understand a form of life, is to 
understand that which makes meaningful language games possible - language 
games that mean something. 
What Wittgenstein's notion suggests is that the sociologist who is 
interested in 'meaning' in the social world must somehow come to grips 
with a 'form of life'. It is not sufficient for him to formulate his 
subject matter in terms of tsubjectivel and lobjectivet meanings, since 
this poses as fundamental a distinction - between subject and object - 
which is in fact secondary to the notion of a 'form of life'. The problem, 
however, is how on earth is one to study a form of life? In Wittgenstein's 
own work it has an air of ineffability about it that should, strictly 
speaking, make it unsuitable for use by the sociologist. It is the 
$context' for language games, (125) it stands behind man's language and 
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thought, (126) and is a "non-investigable language in use or set of 
accepted human activities which enables us to frame our investigations". (127) 
This point is made by Hunter with regard to the "organic theory" which 
I dealt with above: 
"This is important because of a possible misunderstanding 
which might arise from this talk about organic theory: ("this", 
here, refers to P. I. page 185 P. M. ) one might suppose that it 
was'being suggested that it would be appropriate to inquire 
into the detail of the organic processes, and thereby explain 
the use of language. But there is a cut-off point here. 
Language use may be said to be an organic process, but the 
interesting thing to us about organic processes is that they 
work, and hence to us they are simple. To describe what goes 
on in me when I wiggle my toes is not to further explain how 
I wiggle them, what I do in order to bring it about that they 
wiggle. That cannot be further explained. I just wiggle them. " (128) 
Put in slightly different fashion the point is this. A form of life 
is simply what I do. If I set about investigating what I do, then I 
will be doing something and it is what I am doing that is, strictly, 
manifesting my form of life, rather than the results of my investigations. 
The form of life itself shows itself as the foundation for my justifications, 
as the bedrock beyond which I cannot go, but it cannot be directly 
revealed by scientific (or any other) enquiry. just as rules are just 
what I do - there is a sense of trulet that does not imply ? interpretation, 
- and are not 'things', so a form of life is not a Ithingt. It simply 
is that which grounds my life. It is not, as Hunter points out, correct 
to delve further into its workings to find the 'explanation' of language 
or of our everyday life. That would be beside the point. 
It is worth stressing that this ineffability is not something that 
one can just disregard without doing grave damage to the whole of 
Wittgenstein's theory. If one were to argue simply that of course one 
could investigate a 'form of life', then at once several problems open 
up. Firstly a form of life then becomes a 'thing', and things have 
boundaries which can be drawn more or less precisely. Thus problems 
open up as to how many forms of life there are, what their boundaries 
are, how one mediates between them and so on. Problems such as these 
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are wholly alien to Wittgenstein's use of the term, and threaten to 
turn him into a cultural relativist where he himself would want to say 
that such relativism was the result of being trapped by a picture. (129) 
Forms of life are not things. Secondly, if a form of life is investigable, 
then there ceases to be any ground to Wittgenstein's own theory. He 
becomes trapped into saying that the form of life is not the furthest 
point that one can go, for there is one stage further, namely the 
investigation of a form of life, which will explain what was thought to 
be the ground. This would make not lactivity' and what is done the 
ground, but some form of knowledge - scientific knowledge perhaps - whereas 
in fact such knowledge appears to be itself grounded in a form of life 
as far as Wittgenstein is concerned. 
By itself, then, the concept of a form of life cannot be the name 
for the proper subject matter of sociology. It is neither designed for 
that by Wittgenstein himself, nor is it directly adaptable for sociological 
purposes. The-case is similar here to the situation faced by Schutz 
when he attempted to bring Husserl's transcendental meditations to bear 
upon the empirical study of society. Sociology is inevitably concerned 
with the study of society as an empirical concern. It must therefore 
be the case that its primary interests cannot remain in the realm of the 
purely philosophical or of the transcendental. Philosophical insights 
must be adapted, in some way, to be 'scientific' concerns of sociologists. 
The concept of the 'life-world', as it is handled by Schutz, is 
already an empirical concept - i. e. it is taken to bear directly on the 
social world as the object of sociological enquiry. Its origins too, 
however, like the concept 'form of life', are not fundamentally 
sociological. For Husserl, as I have stressed above, the life-world was 
taken to be different from the world of the tnatural attitudet of every 
day life, and to be yet another mode of entry into the transcendental 
realm for the meditating philosopher, this time via transcendental 
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intersubjectivity. Schutz's actual handling of the concept, as he 
transforms it from its transcendental to its mundane sense, is fraught 
with difficulties, that threaten to make it internally contradictary. 
Nonetheless for that the concept holds promise in that it suggests that 
society can be conceived of in terms of a set of taken for granted 
assumptions --a stock of knowledge at hand - that makes it possible as 
an intersubjective phenomenon. 
Simmel once asked the question 'How is society possible? ' in a 
famous essay of the same name. (130) The traditional problem for 
sociology is to find ways in which to frame up answers to the question, 
which in turn involves restating the question in ways that open up 
clear avenues into the study of society. Thus for Durkheim and Parsons, 
the problem is the problem of order and the solution in terms of 
collective representations and central value systems. For Weber, on 
the other hand, the problem can be seen as that of-Icontrolt (131) and 
the solution irr terms of 'meaning', authority and so on. What I want 
to suggest here is that the two philosophical concepts of 'form of life' 
and 'life-world' can be seen as clues that together suggest another, and 
potentially fruitful approach to this fundamental sociological question 
of the possibility of meaning and of society. 
Wittgenstein, in effect, claims that what has to be accepted - the 
given - can be seen as the fact'that people do things in certain ways. 
People just do follow 'rules'. - Schutz, following on from Husserl, claims 
that the reason why people can function adequately is that they know 
certain things. Both the doing and the knowing are, for the actors on 
the stage of everyday life, unproblematic. They are the given, and must 
remain the given for any enquiry whether scientific, sociological, 
literary, artistic or any other into any aspect of the physical or 
social environment. This much is itself given by the philosophical 
positions which have been the subject of the above discussion. 
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There is no reason, however, why using this notion of the 'given' 
as a clue, the sociologist should not attempt to examine that which is 
'taken for granted'. The doings and knowings that are taken for 
granted are not themselves the 'given', but the notion of that which is 
'given' - that which grounds all knowledge, experience, necessity and 
so on - can be used as a clue to the empirical, social scientific notion 
of that which is taken for granted. Thus the notion of a form of life 
becomes an indication for the sociologist of a possible area of enquiry 
- indicates a possible language game, whose concern is an aspect of 
the social world. This language game itself will manifest its roots 
within a form of life and will not be investigating a form of life in 
Wittgenstein's sense of the term. It will, however, be following through 
a clue provided by the philosopher's insights. In this sense, Schutz can 
be seen as a pioneer who attempted to adapt transcendental insights for 
empirical ends, and whose reworking of the notion of the 'life-world' 
does itself provide significant indications into an important area of 
sociological enquiry. 
The danger in all this, however, is that the move from the philosophical 
to the empirical level will result in the sorts of cdntradiction that 
bedevilled Schutz. In the next chapter I will suggest that the work 
of Garfinkel, which is an attempt to investigate taken for granted 
aspects of the social world, can be seen as pioneering empirical work 
into just the sorts of areas that are indicated in the work of 
Wittgenstein. ' I will argue that examining that work in terms of a 
framework which owes more to Wittgenstein than to Schutz throws a fresh 
light upon it, and shows it as a highly productive attempt to suggest 
directions for sociological research which offer possibilities of genuine 
insights into social phenomena. I will suggest that although Garfinkel 
begins his enquiries under the rubric of a Schutzian phenomenological 
sociology, many of the adaptations which he makes to that position take 
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him away from these roots and that this enables him to avoid the 
fundamental ambiguity in Schutz's work which is the result of his 
adaptation of the transcendental motif for empirical'ends. It is the 
extent of this move beyond the work of Schutz that justifies interpreting 
Garfinkelts work in relation to a theoretical framework other than a 
phenomenological one. 
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CHAPTER 3- WITTGENSTEIN 
Note: All references to the Tractatus and the Philosophical 
Investigations (Wittgenstein 1961 and 1974) will be referred as "T" 
or 11P. I. 11 plus a paragraph number, unless otherwise stated. 
1. P. I. 217. 
2. Malcolm, 1958, p. 27. 
3. Cf. Von Wright's Biographical Sketch in Malcolm, 1958. 
4. Wittgenstein, 1974, (b) p. 82. 
5. A. Janik & S. Toulmin, 1973, p. 117. This concern with language is, 
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term "Kakania" was coined by Robert Musil. It is derived at 
one level from the initials "K. K. " which stand for "Imperial and 
Royalland refers to the Institutions of the Hapsberg Empire, and 
on another level to German nursery language which gives it the 
sense of "Excrementia" or "Shitland" (cf. footnote, Janik & Toulmin, 
1973, p. 13). 
6. Russell's introduction to the Tractatus p. x. 
7. Letter to Russell. Quoted Anscombe, 1959, p. 161. 
8. Harward, 1976, p. 48. 
9. PJ. pages 228e - 229e. 
10. Preface to P. I. page viii. 
11. Cf. note 7 above. 
12. T. 4.116. 
13. Klemke, 1971, (b) p. 117. 
14. T. 2.027. 
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notion of objects defining all possibilities can be seen to 
relate to notions of "rule" which consider that rules can somehow 
specify precisely all of their future applications (cf. quotation 
from Hart in Heritage 1978 (a)) Wittgenstein's own discussion of 
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rules in his later work, as will become apparent, argues 
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16. T. 2.04. 
17. T. 2.201. 
18. T. 3.221. 
19. T. 3.203. 
20. T. 3.21. 
21. T. 3.3. 
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between a "real name" and a "name" or "simple sign". 
23. T. 3.23. 
24. T. 5. 
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27. T. 2.221, ý- 
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39. T. 5.552. 
40. T. 6.13. 
41. Cf. note 4 above. 
42. Van reursen (1969, p. 110. ), for example calls Wittgenstein a 
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"Logician and a Mystic". He claims that this element never 
leaves Wittgensteints work, and that it is still visible in his 
later writings. 
43. T. 6.44 - 6.5. 
44. T. 6.52. 
45. Pitcher, 1964, p. 145. 
46. T. 5.6. 
47. T. 4.001. 
48. T. 5.62. 
49. T. 5.632. 
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51. T. 5.64. 
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53. Ibid 
54. Cf. above Ch. 2. p. 25. 
55. T. 6.54. - 
56. T. 7. 
57. Malcolm, 1958, p. 86. 
58. P. I. 107. 
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of Wittgenstein's position. 
60. P. I. vii. 
61. P. I. 255. 
62. P. I. 309. 
63. P. I. 65. 
64. P. I. 66. 
65. P. I. 66. 
66. P. I. 67. 
67. Bambrough, 1970. 
68. P. I. 71. 
69. Wittgenstein gives examples of some 73 language games in the Blue 
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and Brown Books (Wittgenstein, 1969 (a)), some of which are 
repeated in the Philosophical Investigations. They are meant 
as means of coming to understand the ways in which language 
works. 
70. Wittgenstein, 1969 (a) p. 77. 
71. (2) signifies a language game similar to that given above. 
72. P. I. 7. 
73. P. I. 11. 
74. P. I. 13. 
75. Pa. 96. 
76. P. I. 116. 
77. janik & Toulmin, 1973, p. 225 make this point. 
78. P. I. 119. 
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of a language game, or form of life, plays in Wittgensteints 
later writings enables him to overcome this difficulty", thus 
equating language games with forms of life. 
81. P. I. 241. 
82. Van Peursen, 1969, p. 107. 
83. Cf. note 77 above. 
84. Petrie, 1971, p. 150. 
85. Wittgenstein's notion of necessity is not to the point here, but 
two excellent discussions of this are to be found in Pears, 1974, 
Ch. 7., and Stroud, 1970. 
86. Hunter, 1971 (a) pp. 278-9. 
87. P. J. 226. 
88. P. I. 217. 
89. Cavell, 1970, p. 160-61. 
90. Pitkin, 1972, p. 45. 
91. P. I. 219. 
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94. Van Peursen, 1969, p. 110. 
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100. P. I. 201. 
101. P. I. 201. 
102. P. I. 208 gives an excellent account of the teaching process. 
103. P. I. 151. 
104. P. I. 88. 
105. P. I. 218. 
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115. P. I. 432. 
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125. Janik and Toulmin, 1973, p. 225. 
126. Van Peursen, 1969, p. 107. 
127. Petrie, 1971, p. 150. 
128. Hunter, 1971 (a) p. 285. 
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Phillips, 1977, Chapter 4 who stresses that Wittgenstein is 
not a relativist or conventionalist. 
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In this chapter, I will suggest a reading of Garfinkel's work, 
against the background of the last two chapters, which documents the 
extent to which that work has moved away from the phenomenological 
sociology of Schutz and towards a position that has strong affinities 
with the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein. It would of course be 
absurd to deny that Garfinkel's roots are indeed in phenomenology, and 
that he was considerably influenced by the work of Husserl, Schutz and 
Gurwitsch - he in fact states as much explicitly on several occasions. (1) 
It is, however, one thing to be influenced by a school of ideas, and 
another to do nothing but reproduce or elaborate its established 
doctrines. The burden of this chapter will be to argue that it is more 
fruitful for an understanding of Garfinkelts work to concentrate upon 
the ways in which he has modified the Schutzian position rather than to 
emphasise the similarities and risk the danger of missing important 
innovatory ideas by conflating fundamentally different concepts. (2) 
Before beginning to trace through some of the connections between 
Garfinkel's writing and its roots in the work of Parsons, Schutz, 
Gurwitsch and Kaufmann, it is worth saying something in very general 
terms about Garfinkel's ideas of what ethnomethodology actually is. 
These comments are to be considered as introductory signposts to the 
remainder of the chapter rather than as definitions of lethnomethodologyt. 
The precise import of them will, hopefully, become apparent over the 
course of the discussion. 
Garfinkel writes in the introduction to "Studies in Ethnomethodology" 
(hereafter "Studies") that ethnomethodological study 
"is directed to the tasks of learning how members' actual, 
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ordinary activities consist of methods to make practical 
actions, practical circumstances, common sense knowledge 
of social structures, and practical sociological reasoning 
analyzeable; and of discovering the formal properties of 
commonplace, practical common sense actions, "from within" 
actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of those 
settings. The formal properties obtain their guarantees 
from no other source, and in no other way. " (3) 
It is worth stressing just three things about these remarks of 
Garfinkells. Firstly, there is a concern with tmembers' methods'. It 
is what members of a society do that is important to Garfinkel - their 
practices and procedures. Secondly, this concern with what members do, 
is focused upon the 'formal properties' of members' practices. It is 
not a concern with everyday activities which concentrates upon the 
specific 'meaningful' things that people do as such - for example 
"talking about the weather" or "discussing golf" - but about the formal 
properties of such activities. Thirdly, it should be noted that such 
properties should be studied ""from within" actual settings". As will 
become apparent later, Garfinkel is crucially concerned with the ways 
in which settings are forganizedt by the practices and procedures which 
members of a society use in a routine way. Settings are locally organized, 
and contain their own logic, as it were, being self maintaining, self 
organizing, and thus orderly and able to be talked about (accounted) in 
an orderly fashion. The aim of ethnomethodological studies, as Garfinkel 
sees them, is to unravel this 'logic' of settings which makes them 
orderly - i. e. the formal properties of actions. 
Secondly, it is worth stressing that Garfinkel is adamant that 
ethnomethodology is not something peculiar 
"our work is not a mysterious enterprise and we are not 
peddling remedies. You may not believe it now, but it is 
not a cult. It is not an enterprise directed to the 
solution of whatever it is that we think ails sociology. 
Last of all, is it any such pretentious thing! It is not 
declaring war and, even while it disturbs you, it is not 
even a position although that is probably the most head- 
scratching thing of them all. " (4) 
It seems, rather, to be an attempt to chase through certain insights 
that emerge from Garfinkel's reading of Phenomenology and sociology, and 
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to see just how far he can go with them, what the implications of them 
are for sociology and the study of society in general, and what light 
they throw on intransigent social phenomena. It is very much 'work 
in progress' (5) rather than a fully subscribed to Ischoolt of 
sociology, or a carefully worked out body of sociological theory after 
the fashion of that of Weber or Durkheim. It may well be the case that 
these insights have a profound significance for sociology more generally 
conceived, but it is a mistake to see ethnomethodology as first and 
foremost a critique of 1conventionall or 'constructivistl sociology. 
For this reason I have chosen, in this chapter, not to discuss 
'conventional' or 'positivist' sociology as something over and against 
the work of Garfinkel - although there are undoubtedly fundamental 
differences - prefering instead to unravel the ways in which Garfinkel's 
thought emerges from the work of Parsons and Schutz. 
That said, however, it is important not to underestimate either 
the distance between Garfinkel's work and that of many other sociologists, 
(6) or the extreme puzzlement that is felt by some sociologists in the 
face of what seems an entirely alien enterprise. Gold sums up some of 
this puzzlement when he says, addressing Garfinkel, 
"I have a terrible sense of hopelessness when I think of 
the problems that most sociologists are concerned with and 
how far removed those problems are from what you are doing. 
I do not really see the link. When I say far removed, I am 
not precisely sure in what dimension I am thinking except 
that I know that what you are doing is a hell of a long way 
from'what I am doing and the kind of question I am concerned 
with. I would like to know how in the hell an ethnomethodologist 
addresses himself to problem like those I have. Am I supposed 
to stop and wait? Is it that ethnomethodologistssimply would 
not raise these problems? Is it that you would not ask these 
kinds of questions. " (7) 
Garfinkel simply does not address many of the traditional sociological 
problems, such as 'deviance', or the structure of organizations, and still 
less is he attempting to give a Icausalt explanation of social phenomena. 
His concerns are with what he sees as the fundamental problems of 
sociological theorizing - with the problem of social order primarily - 
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which must be tackled prior to investigations such as those of conventional 
sociologists into social phenomena. As a result, there arises what 
looks, at times, like an unbridgeable gulf between his concerns and 
those of other sociologists. Whether or not it is unbridgeable, only 
time and debate can tell. 
With these points in mind, I want to move on to discuss Garfinkel's 
work in relation to that of Parsons, Schutz, Kaufmann, and Gurwitsch. 
My warrant for doing this lies in Garfinkel's saying of the 'Studies in 
Ethnomethodology' that 
"The articles originated from my studies of the writings 
of Talcott Parsons, Alfred Schutz, Aron Gurwitsch, and Edmund 
Husserl. For twenty years their writings have provided me 
with inexhaustible directives into the world of everyday 
activities. " (8) 
Kaufmann is included mainly because he is footnoted so often 
throughout Garfinkel's work, and because in many of the places where he 
is mentioned his work is evidently being considered of some significance. 
That he is indeed significant to Garfinkel should become apparent during 
the course of the following discussion. I will attempt to show some of 
the ways in which Garfinkel adapts and synthesises from a range of 
different perspectives, both specifically sociological and primarily 
philosophical, and brings the considerations that emerge to bear upon the 
sociological problem or order. I will not, in the early sections, 
concentrate upon many of what could be considered the central concepts 
of Garfinkel's position - such as 'accounting practices', lindexicalityl, 
and so on. Instead, I will sketch in the historical context of his 
position with reference to other thinkers, in order to provide some 
perspective upon Garfinkel's work, and to present the background for 
later discussions of these other, important aspects of Garfinkells thought. 
THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 
Garfinkel, like Parsons, (and indeed as his student) is concerned 
fundamentalli with the problem of order. This concern emerges most 
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clearly in Garfinkel's discussions of the work of Hobbes, and of 
Parson's discussion of that work, so I will begin this section with 
an account of Parsonts criticisms of Hobbes, and of his solution to 
the problems which he unravels. 
Parsonst concern in "The Structure of Social Action" is to illustrate 
"the process of emergence of a particular theoretical system, that of 
the "voluntaristic theory of action". " (9) This he does by isolating 
what he considers to be the essential components of lactiont, and then 
tracing the ways in which these are treated in the classical sociological 
tradition by Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber. His investigation 
attempts to show that there is a gradual development of the theme of 
action, and that an important convergence is observable in the work of 
these men, particularly in the work of Weber and Durkheim, which can 
provide a powerful sociological perspective upon society and social 
action. This perspective is the "voluntaristic theory of action". The 
whole substance of this impressive work is not to the point for present 
purposes. What is important is Parsonsl introduction of the problems 
that he is dealing with, by way of the work of Hobbes as a representative 
of utilitarianism, and it is this that I want to go on to discuss now, 
via the central conceptual component of Parsons' thesis, "Action". 
The basic unit of the conceptual scheme which Parsons is concerned 
with - i. e. the "theory of action" - is the "unit act". This involves, 
logically, four different elements, namely 
"(1) It implies an agent, an "actor". (2) For purposes 
of definition the act must have an "end". a future state 
of affairs toward which the process of action is oriented. 
(3) It must be initiated in a "situation" of which the 
trends of development differ in one or more important 
respects from the state of affairs to which the action is 
oriented, the end .... (4) there is ... a certain mode 
of relationship between these elements. That is .... there is a "normative orientation" of action. " (10) 
These different elements can be combined in a variety of ways and with 
different emphases. Parsons starting point is with the particular 
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combination that characterizes utilitarian thought. 
The two crucial characteristics of the utilitarian system of 
thought, according to Parsons, are "atomism" and "rationality". The 
former of these, points to the utilitarian tendency to treat "unit 
acts" as isolated entities "and to infer the properties of systems of 
action only by a process of "direct" generalization from these. " (11) 
The latter concerns "the character of the normative element of the 
means-end relationship in the unit act. " (12) Parsons argument here 
is that the tendency towards "individualism" in theorizing about pan 
and society which emerges with the renaissance and develops over the 
course of the reformation and the industrial revolution, places a stress 
on rational action in the choice of means towards chosen ends, and that 
this is at the expense of any investigation of alternative relationships 
between means and ends - such as, for example, the role of ritual actions. 
(13) The implications of these two characteristics of utilitarian 
thought lead to two further points. The first is that, since science is 
the most highly developed "rational achievement", investigation of 
action will be modelled after the fashion of natural science - Parsons 
calls this "naive emliricism". The second implication is that, because 
unit acts are treated empirically as isolated units, there will not be, 
on a utilitarian model, any investigation of the relationship between 
ends - i. e. an investigation of the possibility that there might be 
some systematic relationship between the ends of different unit acts. 
The relevance of this to the study of society becomes apparent as 
Parsons moves on to discuss Hobbes. For Hobbes, man is essentially a 
selfish individual who is driven by his "passions" to seek what is best 
for himself. To achieve this end he must gain power over others so 
that his will is satisfied - as Peters puts it 
"Hobbes presented a vivid picture of life as a race in 
which 'we must suppose to have no other goal, nor other 
garland, but being foremost'. " (14) 
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The natural state of man is thus the situation in which, there is a war 
of all against all, and in which life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish 
and short. " (15) For Parsons, this picture that Hobbes paints is 
almost a pure case of utilitarianism. 
"The basis of human action lies in the "passions". These 
are discrete, randomly variant ends of action, "There is no 
common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of 
the objects themselves". In the pursuit of these ends men 
act rationally, choosing, within the limitations of the 
situation, the most efficient means, but this rationality 
is strictly limited, reason is the "servant of the passions", 
it is concerned only with questions of ways and means. " (16) 
WhatHobbes' work illustrates for Parsons, is a problem; namely 
the problem of order. Given this particular, utilitarian, account of the 
nature of 'action', how can it be that there is order in society? Hobbes, 
own solution to this problem is not satisfactory, and involves him in 
saying that 
"the dispositions of men are naturally such, that except 
they be restrained through fear of some coercive power, 
every man will distrust and dread each other. " (17) 
It thus becomes "rational" for men to form a type of social contract 
which gives sovereignty to some absolute power for the good of all. 
There is a need for an all powerful state - the "Leviathan" - to which 
men rationally give allegiance. But, as Parsons puts it, such a 
conception stretches the notion of "rationality' "beyond its scope in 
the rest of the theory" (18) and as Locke points out, power corruptst 
so must one suppose that 
"men (are) so foolish that they take care to avoid what 
mischiefs may be done them by polecats or foxes, but are 
content, nay think it safety, to be devoured by lions? " (19) 
Parsons' solution to the problem involves him in abandoning the 
utilitarian notion of action altogether so that he can reorganize the 
basic elements of action in a different, and, he claims, more satisfactory 
manner. This solution, which is abstracted from the work of the authors 
he discusses over the course of the book, involves the suggestion that 
Vendsl are systematically related to one another within society, and 
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that the relationship between means and ends (i. e. the *normative' 
component of action) should be seen not in terms of trationalityl, but 
in terms of common 'values# and tnormst. This provides a solution to 
the problem of order in that it enables the theorist to posit that 
because actors act in terms of a set of common values and norms, they 
will therefore be oriented towards common goals, and at the same time 
will use socially legitimated means for the attainment of those goals, 
thus obviating the need for fLeviathant as a strong central source of 
power as the guarantor of orderly conduct. What is involved in Parsons, 
notion here needs a brief explication, since it is important for an 
understanding of the position against which Garfinkel is arguing. 
What Parsons has done is to reject the notion that trationall 
action within a utilitarian framework of tatomic' acts can satisfactorily 
account for social order. Instead, he has suggested that if one 
conceives of ends as being in some sense given by social values, and 
thus as systematically related to one another - i. e. there is a systematic 
relationship between the individual ends which individual actors pursue 
because such ends are given by social values - and ýf one realises that 
there are social norms and values which provide socially acceptable means 
for attaining those ends, then social order becomes explicable in terms 
of these norms and values. The system of norms and values within a 
society are, Parsons' suggests, 'legitimate', in the sense that they are 
regarded as Isacredt by the members of a society. It is this 'sacredness' 
which ensures compliance with the norms, rather than the threat of some 
coercive state. The system of norms and values is effective upon 
individual actors because, over the course of socialization, they are 
$internalized' by each actor and thus become, in a sense, a part of his 
own makeup. Thus what are essentially social norms and values become 
socialized into individual actors, and social order is guaranteed, 
ultimately, by the fact that these internalized norms are regarded as 
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sacred by actors. Parsons sums this up as follows: 
"it has-been seen that the solution of the power question, 
as well as of a plurality of other complex features of 
social action systems, involves a common reference to the 
fact of integration of individuals with reference to a 
common value system, manifested in the legitimacy of 
institutional norms, in the common ultimate ends of action, 
in ritual and in various modes of expression. All these 
phenomena may be referred back to a single general emergent 
property of social action systems which may be called 
"common-value integration"". (20) 
Thus Parsons formulates the "voluntaristic theory of action". 
This brief discussion of Parsons, Hobbes, and the problem of order 
provides the basic material for understanding the point of departure 
for Garfinkells own reflections on the problems in this area. These 
concerns are, fundamentally, with on the one hand rationality and the 
problem of order, and on the other hand, norms and the problem of order. 
They become explicit in two works of Garfinkelts. The first is his 
doctoral dissertation, the second is an unpublished manuscript which 
is entitled "Parsons Primer". I will follow the strategy here of using 
these two manuscripts to draw out and illustrate the core of Garfinkel's 
own solution to the problem. This I will do in two stages. Firstly, I 
will look at the way in which Garfinkel analyses the work of Hobbes in 
order to demonstrate the type of solution which Garfinkel is aiming at, 
and to suggest the level at which he considers the solution can be found. 
I will then go on to look, in the second stage, at the problems which 
Garfinkel finds with Parsons' solution, showing how he uses Kaufmann's 
work as a resource for his critique and how he turns to phenomenological 
writings as a source of ideas for his own solution to the problems. In 
this way, the second stage of this discussion will return to the same 
place that was reached by the first - i. e. to the-type and level of 
Garfinkelts solution - but from a different angle which, hopefully, will 
clarify Garfinkells concern with social order in a perspicuous fashion. 
I will then move on to illustrate some of the ways in which Garfinkel's 
-157- 
published work attempts to investigate empirically the theoretical 
solution to the problem which his reading of Kaufmann, Phenomenology 
and Parsons has led him to. 
1. RATIONALITY AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER, 
Garfinkelts discussion of Hobbes sets out to show both that Hobbes 
himself gives an inadequate account, of social action and that Parsons' 
assessment of Hobbes account is itself wide of the mark. Parsons, 
Garfinkel suggests, considered that Hobbes had worked out what man, 
acting rationally in a utilitarian world, would actually look like. It 
is on this basis that Parsons is able to suggest that Hobbes' account is 
inadequate - it does not take account of tritual action' or of other 
alternative aspects of the Inormativet component of action, but concentrates 
only on 'rational' action, and it ignores systematic interrelationships 
between ends. Garfinkel, on the other hand, insists that what Hobbes 
theory actually provides for is nothing at all - it paints an impossible 
world which is-inadequate even for-the narrow illustrative purposes that 
Parsons gives it. The reasons for this are that Hobbes fails to fill in 
the relevant experiential materials that an adequate theory of rationality 
would require, and is misled into supposing that 'scientific' rationality 
can justifiably be posited of actors living their everyday lives in the 
social world. There is, Garfinkel claims, a world of difference between 
the rationality of science, and the rationality of the 'natural attitude', 
so that in examining the social world 
"if the norm of scientific rationality is employed, the 
resulting social system is not chaos but inactivity - 
i. e. a system of uncommunicating monads. 11 (21) 
One cannot, Garfinkel points out, even haveawar of all against all if 
the fundamental elements of action are taken to be 'rationality' and the 
'passions', because actors would have no framework in terms of which to 
war against one another rationally. There would be nothing for them to 
turn their rational attention towards such that they trationallyl knew 
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that what they must do to gain whatever end they desired was to gain 
power over others in order to ensure that ones own passions were given 
precedence. If, for example, men were to act rationally in terms of 
different perceived worlds, then they would only incidentally conflict, 
or communicate with one another - if indeed such contact as would come 
about on such a model could be termed 'conflictt or Ocommunicationt. 
What Garfinkel is getting at in these comments is that there must 
be some tagreement' about what is the case - some 'normative order' - 
before it makes sense to talk about rational action in the first place. 
Men must first of all agree about the framework in terms of which they 
act rationally-before they can war with one another in the rational 
pursuit of various ends. As Garfinkel puts it 
"the possibility that action will exhibit the features of 
rationality depends on the condition of this normative order. 
Conversely, to take away the normative order takes away the 
possibility of rational features of action leaving a 
condition in which the actors are driven by the "unloosed" 
passions. The system of action in its ultimate state would 
not be a war of each against all but a state of confusion 
in which each actor strove to satisfy the passions by 
casting about here and there until by chance the attachment 
was made. " (22) 
Garfinkel is insistent that the problems that are involved here 
cannot be settled straightforwardly by reference to some 'real' world 
that is known in common. To do this is to ignore the well known problems 
of illusion, perspective, error and so on. And again, it is not adequate 
to overcome problems of 'illusion' etc. in terms of tscientifict 
knowledge, since such knowledge is itself the result of 'rational' 
activity, and the problem is precisely that to act rationally, and hence 
to have rational knowledge, demands that some normative order exist. 
The obvious implication of all this is that any attempt to ground 
social order on rational action, as Hobbes does with his notion of the 
rational acceptance of some absolute power, is bound to be inadequate, 
since it ignores a more fundamental question, namely how does the world 
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come to be known in common in the first place? The problem of order 
in the world is prior to the problem of trationalt action if the notion 
of 'rational' that is involved here is tscientifict rationality, since 
the rational assessment of means and ends depends upon a prior normative 
order. If the notion of 'rationality' is not that of tscientific' 
rationality, (contrary to the usage of Hobbes and Parsons) but something 
else, then it cannot be presupposed in an account of social order but 
must be investigated to see just what it involves. Either way, the 
central task in any attempt to account for social order must be to 
investigate the ways in which lagreementt about a world held in common 
is actually possible - how such agreement comes about. 
What Garfinkel has done in this discussion of Hobbes, then, is to 
emphasise the fact that 'rational action', I communication' , wars of all 
against all, and so on, presuppose a normative order - they presuppose 
some agreement about what is the case- and thus that to understand 
social order i-t is necessary to investigate the mechanisms of agreement, 
the mechanisms of that normative order. Such an investigation is 
directed at the cognitive dimension of social action in the sense that 
1cognitiont is precisely concerned with the ways in which the world comes 
to be known in the way that it is - i. e. as a world known in common 
that exhibits for us a particular order. It must be stressed, however, 
that this concern with cognition is not a concern with psychological 
elements within subjectivity, or a concern with philosophical problems 
concerning tknowledgel if such problems are conceived of in terms of 
some relationship between a knowing subject and an objective world. It 
is, rather, a concern which is focused squarely upon the social mechanisms 
that provide for 'agreement', and which underlie the normative order. 
It is a concern, in other words, that is bound up with the problems of 
social order which have been introduced above. It is important, 
therefore, to remember that when the concept 'cognition' is used in 
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the following discussion it is to be understood in relation to questions 
concerning the mechanisms which enable social order. To give it any 
'subjective' reference is to entirely miss the point. (23) 
This, then, is the type of solution that Garfinkel is looking 
for to the Hobbesian problem, and the level at which his investigations 
are aimed. It is the level of that agreement which is presupposed by 
rational action and which enables communication. That this level is a 
level of presuppositions indicates something of Garfinkelts debt to 
Husserl. It should not, however., be supposed that he is'looking for 
? essences' in the Husserlian sense. His enterprise is not concerned 
with the presuppositions of 'knowledget a philosophical problem - but 
with the presuppositions of social order a sociological problem. 
Consequently, although his programme is formulated in terms that might 
look as though they can be equated straightforwardly with Husserlian 
phenomenology, closer examination shows radical differences, and these 
will become more and more apparent as the discussion progresses. 
Garfinkelts interest lies in practices and procedures, not in essences, 
with the result that, as I shall show, the notion of 'presupposition! 
he develops has more in common with Wittgensteints tform of life' than 
with Husserl's transcendental structure of essences. 
I want now to move on to the second stage of this discussion, and 
to look at the ways in which Garfinkel analyses Parsons' work. Over the 
course of this discussion more substance will be given to the account 
of Garfinkel's fundamental concerns. 
2. PARSONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 
An initial task for Garfinkel was to find an account of the nature 
of "theory" and of "truth" and "adequacy" that would provide him with 
the necessary resources both for his reading of the work of Parsons, 
and for the development of his own approach towards the social world. 
Here Kaufmann's book "Methodology of the Social Sciences" provides a key 
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to darfinkel's position, so I will give a brief account of it before 
moving on to show its significance for Garfinkel's treatment of Parsons' 
work. 
Spiegelberg writes of Kaufmann that he was 
"The only member of the Vienna Circle who also had a live 
interest in Husserlts phenomenology. " (24) * 
Kaufmann states his own motivating problem by saying that he found 
that he could not accept Dewey's theory of meaning and that 
"This led to a reconsideration of the problem how the 
logical analysis of scientific procedure (methodology) 
is related to deductive logic. I came to the conclusion 
that methodology must be clearly distinguished from 
deductive logic and recognized as an autonomous discipline. " (25) 
It is a stress on tscientific procedure# - on methodology - that 
characterises Kaufmann's work, and it is this that Garfinkel makes the 
most use of. The way in which Kaufmann unravel's the importance of 
methodology in relation to questions of the nature of scientific theory 
and of truth is the central consideration here. 
Kaufmann's starting point is to state quite categorically that any 
attempt to base an account of empirical science on some notion of ultimate 
grounds, conceived of in terms of self evident truth, will inevitably be 
inadequate. (26) He, therefore, is looking for an account of the 
matter that grounds Itruthl elsewhere than in the absolute. He finds it 
in terms of 'rules of proceduret. (27) He writes that 
"a specific science, say physics, should be defined 
in terms of rules of procedure rather than as a system 
of propositions representing our knowledge at a given 
time. " (28) 
It is thus necessary, he says, to distinguish between 
"the structure of a science as defined in terms of 
rules of procedure and the corpus of a science at a 
given time. " (29) 
It must not be forgotten, however that 
"since the corpus of a science is selected in accordance 
with these rules, it cannot be taken to determine a 
science without reference to them. " (30) 
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Thus what Kaufmann is recommending is that any body of knowledge be 
viewed not in terms of either its correspondence with some hypothesised 
'real world' that stands over and against the theory as the criterion 
of its 'correctnessf, or in terms of its internal consistency, but 
rather in terms of the rules of procedure that-have led to the 'corpus, 
of knowledge being what it is. In this way it becomes unnecessary to 
- posit some absolute truth - some absolute standard - against which any 
body of knowledge must be measured, and instead becomes possible to 
realise that 
"concepts such as "correct", "grounded", "control", 
"confirmation", are relational concepts presupposing a 
system of procedural rules ... 11 (31) 
The question arises as to what these rules are - what their nature 
is. Kaufmann considers two kinds which he calls tbasic rules' and 
'preference rules' respectively. The first of these - basic rules - are 
the rules which define correct empirical procedure. It is in terms of 
these rules that truth and falsity, correctness and error, objectivity 
and subjectivity are to be understood. Thus 
"every complete question regarding the correctness of a 
scientific decision d has the following form: is d correct 
in terms of a svstem of rules Rl R2 .... Rn in a aiven 
scientific situation? If so, a proposition P verified by 
j may be called 'objectively valid'. " (32) 
The second set of rules, - preference rules - concern the path 
toward the solution of some scientific problem. They specify which 
procedures are relevant to the solution of some problem or other, and 
which are not. For example 
"Today, a scientist would be criticized as having chosen 
an inappropriate approach toward solving the problem of 
explaining the origin of infantile paralysis if he 
collected statistical data concerning the relation 
between variations of temperature and the incidence of 
this disease because he wanted material in support of 
the hypothesis that infantile paralysis is caused by 
fluctuations in temperature. " (33) 
It is not that such-a scientist has violated basic procedural rules, since 
he is collecting data in the correct fashion, but rather that the data 
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he is collecting is considered not relevant in the light of certain ,, 
preference rules. "The criteria of presumably relevance are preference 
rules of scientific procedure". (34) Basic and prefereance rules 
together, then, provide the grounds of the scientific perspective and 
its procedures. Before moving on to discuss Garfinkells analysis of 
Parsons' work, it is worth making a few more detailed points concerning 
Kaufmann's discussion of Itruthl, since, as will become apparent, 
Garfinkel refers to this specifically. 
Kaufmann considers two theories concerning criteria 'for Itruthl. 
The first, the 'correspondence theory of truth' simply cannot, he claims, 
be adequate. He states his case thus: I 
"if a correspondence theory proposes as a criterion of 
the truth of a synthetic proposition its agreement with 
things as they are in themselves, then it offers a 
criterion devoid of procedural significance. If, however, 
agreement between synthetic propositions and percepts is 
taken to be the criterion, then it is not clear how truth 
can be regarded as objective. " (35) 
The second theory, however, the tcoherence theory of truth', fares 
somewhat better. The coherence theory states, briefly, that the 
criterion for the truth of a proposition lies not in its supposed 
correspondence with some hypothesised external reality, but in its 
relationship to other already accepted propositions. -It is its fit 
within the general structure of 'true' propositions which determines 
a propositions acceptance as 'true'. (36) Kaufmann, however, gives 
this notion a twist of his own. This body of knowledge - the structure 
of true propositions must be seen not as somehow self contained, with 
no relationship to, anything beyond themselves, but should instead be 
, seen as a 'corpus' which has been constructed according to rules of 
procedure. Thus 
"Explication of the meanings of 'coherence' or warranted 
assertability leads to the formulation of the rules of 
empirical procedure discussed in previous chapters. This 
has been almost generally disregarded because of the still 
prevailing erroneous view that truth and falsity are 
somehow 'contained in' the propositional meanings. " (37) 
Truth itself must be seen in terms of rules of procedure, and of 
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methodological considerations rather than as something over and against 
the things that scientists - or anyone else for that matter - actually 
do. A body of knowledge should be seen as a 'corpus'. 
Garfinkel turns to Parsons' work, I want to suggest, with notions 
of the nature of ttheory' and of ttruthl which owe much to Kaufmann. 
He does not see 'theory' as, for example, Schutz does in terms of an 
'objective meaning context', but rather as a 'corpus' of knowledge 
which must be understood in terms of rules of procedure. Thus, in 
critisizing Parsons' general theoretical position, and in particular 
his solution to the problem of order, Garfinkel's concern is focused on 
the 'rules' for doing sociology which Parsons' can be seen as recommending 
to the sociologist and the implications of those rules for such questions 
as the nature of sociological description, rather than upon the specific 
Ifindingst of his work. With this in mind, then, I want to turn now 
to Garfinkelts discussion of Parsons. 
Garfinkel-writes that "the concept of the problem of social order 
is equivalent in all respects to the procedural concept, structural 
analysis". (38) Given a conceptualization of social science in terms 
of rules and procedures it thus becomes the case that 
"Procedurally speaking, therefore, any theorist by 
putting forward his theory presents the inquirer a 
conception of "correct structural analysis". It is 
the investigator's task in electing one solution as 
compared with the next to learn what its actual rules of 
procedure consist of and what its consequences consist 
of for the depiction of a possible society and the ways 
in which actors by their actions assemble that society. " (39) 
There are two important parts to this statement of intent which 
heralds Garfinkel's discussion of Parsons. The first is that "any 
theorist ... presents the inquirer a conception of "correct structural 
analysis" which must be investigated by someone interested in the theory 
proposed. This much can be seen as derived directly from Kaufmann's 
work. The second part is a peculiarly sociological one in that it 
specifies that the implications of the theorist's rules must be 
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investigated as they have bearing upon "the depiction. of a possible 
society and the ways in which actors by their actions assemble that society". 
Now what Garfinkel is suggesting here is that, just as the scientific 
theorist should be seen as following rules in order to construct a 
Icorpust of knowledge, so the lactort should be_seen as following rules in 
"assembling" society. This point is crucially important, and I will expand 
upon it briefly. 
Garfinkel mentions many times that he has been profoundly influenced by 
two essays in particular of Schutz, namely an essay "on Multiple Realities", 
(40) and another on "Rationality". (41) Taken together, these two papers 
suggest that the "reality" of scientific theorizing is not something special, 
in the sense that it might be conceived of as giving extraordinary access to 
"truth", but that rather it is aýparticular modification of the attitude of 
everyday. life - the 'natural attitudet - which is characterized by rigorous 
standards of 'scientific' rationality. I have already mentioned above in the 
discussion of Garfinkel's critique of Hobbes that Garfinkel considers that, 
in investigating social life and the action of members of a society, one 
cannot presuppose that they act in terms of 'scientific' rationality, but must 
investigate that 'agreement' which makes rationality possible in the first 
place. Now given that scientific theorizing is a particular modification of 
the natural attitude -a particular "reality", or "finite province of meaning" 
as Schutz calls it - and that it is a particular set of basic and preference 
rules which enable that reality to be what it is (this follows from Kaufmann), 
then it is a short step to suggesting that all realities, including the 
reality of the natural attitude, are in some way bound up with characteristic 
sets of basic and preference rules. Therefore, in order to investigate the 
world of everyday life - the everyday social world - which is characterized by 
the natural attitude, and in order to unravel the nature of the lagreementt 
which underlies rational action, communication etc., it becomes necessary 
to investigate the rules and procedures on the basis of which members of 
society assemble the 'corpus' of their everyday knowledge about society. 
In other words, not only does the theorist work in terms of rules and 
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procedures, but also the actors in the social world do. 
Thus what Garfinkel. must do is to investigate not only the rul es 
and procedures which Parsons is recommending to the sociologist, but 
he must also examine the implications of them for the notion of actorst 
rules and procedures, and thus for the "depiction of a possible society" 
which results. Garfinkel's discussion of Parsons can thus be seen as 
a two pronged approach which comes at both the level of theoretical 
procedures and the level of the actorls rules and procedures. I will 
deal with each of these aspects in turn. 
At the level of the theorist's procedures, Garfinkel has the 
following to say: 
"Parsons' entire theory of action as well as the 
particular parts of it - as the social system is a part 
of it - consists of a set of procedures for idealizing, 
abstracting, selecting, relating those features of a 
social world that is to begin with known in any manner 
and that has any status of warranted knowledge about the 
society that sociologists might be expected to subscribe 
to as matters of fact and of producing a description of 
the society as a product of the transformation performed 
upon this knowledge. " (42) 
Put another way, Parsons' theory of action is seen as a series of 
rules for sense transformation which allow the sociologist to transform 
descriptions of society (as opposed to, for example, raw sense impressions) 
supplied from either sociological or non-sociological sources, into 
'correct' sociological descriptions of society. These rules both allow 
the theory - as the transformed description - to be subjected to 
empirical test, and involve the rule user/theorist in a set of rigorous 
procedures which must be carried out if his account is to be considered 
adequate. 
It is important to realise that a crucial aspect of these rules for 
sense transformation that Parsons proposes is that they are formulated 
in terms of scientific rationality. Garfinkel has already argued against 
Hobbes that it is not adequate to posit rationality of actors in the 
social world, and he now goes on, with his discussion of Parsonst work, 
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to extend this critique of the use of scientific rationality in social 
science to include its use as a theoristts device. If it is not 
possible to say that actors act 'rationally' in the strong sense, then 
for the theorist to produce descriptions of their actions in terms of 
'rationality', as a standard, will inevitably result in a distortion 
of the actorts actual actions. Thus, because of this imposition of 
scientific rationality upon social action - because of the attempt to 
see all action as translatable into the terms of trationall action by 
the social theorist - the sociological Idescriptionst which Parsons' 
theory would be able to produce could not describe action as it is actually 
carried on in the social world. Instead, by bringing a standard from 
outside of the settings of everyday life - the standard of scientific 
rationality - it inevitably distorts actually observable social action. 
Be that as it may, Parsons' solution to the problem of order is to 
be read, according to Garfinkel, as a series of rules for sense 
transformation-, the whole purpose of which is to enable the sociologist 
to produce 'correct' sociological descriptions of society, and these 
descriptions are in terms of social structures. This last - that the 
descriptions will be in terms of social structures - follows from the 
fact that the problem of social order is concerned entirely with 
structural analysis. 
What is the nature of these social structures on Parsons' account? 
Garfinkel answers 
"a) The social structures consist of institutionalized 
patterns of normative culture; b) the stable features 
of the social structures as assemblies of concerted 
actions are guaranteed by motivated compliance with a 
legitimate order. " (43) 
The social structures are the result of sense transforming operations by 
the sociologist, they are the sociologists' description of the social 
world, and they consist of institutionalized patteuLs of normative 
culture, the stable features of which are guaranteed by "motivated 
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compliance with, a legitimate order". Put in slightly different fashion, 
this means that the sociologist's description of the social world 
maintains that social order is guaranteed by the fact that social norms 
are regarded, by the social actor, as tsacred'. This 'sacredness' of 
norms and the relationship of this to social order on Parsons' account, 
has been discussed above in relation to Hobbes. 
At this point, then, the question of the rules and procedures which 
the actor is conceived to follow emerges as central. Using game theory 
as an illustration, Garfinkel suggests that Parsonsl actor can be seen 
as confronted, within the social system, by a set of basic and preferred 
rules of play. It is the rule followfng behaviour of the actor that 
results in the patterns of normative culture that are social structures. 
By performing sense transforming operations, the sociologist produces a 
description of social actors following Isacredt rules in such a way 
that patterns of normative culture result. At this point, difficulties 
begin to become apparent with Parsonst account as Garfinkel has described 
it, and they concern the relationship between the sociologistst description, 
and the social world that it is intended to describe. 
Garfinkel argues that on Parsonst account, in order to describe 
something that happened in the social world the theorist would have to 
assume that the actors acted the way they did, and made the choices that 
they did because the choices made available to them by the theorist were 
available. The theorist is limited to saying that the player played 
as he did because the basic and preferred rules provided the players with 
a set of legally possible moves. (44) It is, mutual orientation to 
these rules that accounts for actual play. Now the problem is this: 
there are many contingencies that are not covered by the rules of the 
game, not the least of these being the commitment of the players to play 
by the rules. Other contingencies might include how hard one plays, the 
degree of concentration used, an agreement not to distract ones opponent 
and so on. However full these rules are made, they will never be able 
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to cover all contingencies - for example, how often may one scratch 
ones head during a game of chess? 
What these considerations suggest is that what is supposed to be 
a description of order in the social world, begins to look more like a 
normative account. Rather than describing what it is that actors do in 
producing social order, i. e. how social order is possible - it suggests 
what they ought to do if social order is to persist. The sociologist's 
account thus produces a set of prescriptions instead of descriptions. 
Parsons' solution to this problem as we have seen, is to posit 
"motivated compliance to a legitimate order". In other words, the actors 
do follow the rules because they are in some way sacredly regarded. 
This, however, is nothing but a formal solution to the problem. It does 
nothing to ensure that the sociologist, in transforming his data to 
produce sociological descriptions, will not in fact be producing only 
#normative' descriptions. It fails to account, for example, for the 
actor who in some way "sees through" the system and refuses to accept 
its legitimacy, or who manipulates the 'legitimate norms' in Goffmanesque 
fashion in pursuit of various ends. The result is that the sociological 
descriptions stand in a problematic relation to what it is that is being 
described. Because what is produced is a Inormativel account, then 
the question of the choice between competing theories or descriptions of 
the socialworld cannot be answered on the basis of empirical data, but 
must be premised on some other grounds, and these grounds are never 
specified. In short, the claim which Garfinkel suggests Parsons is making 
to provide rules and procedures for transforming sociological data to 
produce sociological descriptions of the social world'cannot be maintained 
because the ways in which the actor is conceived to act, in terms of 
'sacred' rules, can only result in 'normative' accounts which stand in 
a problematic relation to the social world being described. 
It is this situation that provides Garfinkel's problem. What he 
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wants to do is to find some way of describing the social world, and 
of accounting for social order, which does not, on the one hand . 
import standards of rationality from outside of the settings of social 
life, and on the other hand does not provide the possibility of only 
'normative' accounts, since both of these aspects of Parsonst account 
result in distortions of social life which remove the 'descriptions' 
from that which they are intended to describe. The. solution which 
Garfinkel is aiming for is at the level of tagreement' which precedes 
rational action - it is that Icognitivet level which has already been 
mentioned above. By concentrating upon this particular level of social 
reality, it becomes possible to see 'norms' as not the explanation of 
social order, in the way that Parsons suggests, but as manifestations 
of it which themselves depend upon a more fundamental set of 'rules 
and procedurest which enable all social order. Norms become recognizable 
regularities of social life rather than the necessary presupposition of 
it. The question becomes: how is one to gain some purchase, both 
theoretically and empirically, on this particular aspect of social 
reality? The answer-lies with the work of Schutz and Gurwitsch. 
SCHUTZ AND GURWITSCH: TOWARDS A SOLUTION 
Garfinkel writes that the 
"Researches of analytical philosophy, most particularly 
those of Alfred Schutz, have furnished researchers a 
clarification of the meanings and uses of the critical 
conceptions of sociological theorizing that are relevant 
to Parsons' argument. " (45) 
Garfinkel does not, however, take over the whole of Schutzts 
position lock, stock and barrel, but rather he is interested in it 
because he sees potential there for some sort of solution to his own 
problems. His reading of Schutz, like his reading of Parsons, owes 
much to Kaufmannts work, and the picture of Schutz that emerges from 
Garfinkel's writing seems at times to rest more upon what Garfinkel 
needed Schutz to say rather than on what actually is-to be found in 
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his work. Schutz, in other words, seems to have provided Garfinkel 
with material to think with - with directives - rather than with a 
set of ready formulated theoretical solutions to his problems. The 
task here, then, is to unravel the ways in which Garfinkel considered 
that Schutz could help him. 
The best way to procede will be to look at some of the fundamental 
differences which Garfinkel perceived to exist between the approaches 
of Schutz and Parsons towards social phenomena. I will base the 
discussion on two sources. Firstly an unpublished paper entitled 
"A comparison of decisions made on four "pre-theoretical" problems by 
Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz", and secondly a slightly fuller 
treatment of the same materials which makes up chapter five of Garfinkel's 
thesis. (46) 
Garfinkel compares the work of these two men on a number of 
different counts. The most significant one for the purposes of the 
present discus-sion is the "theory of objects" that they espouse. Their 
positions on this are stated in Kaufmannian terms. Parsons is considered 
to hold to a correspondence theory of reality (47) whilst Schutz is 
said to espouse a "congruence theory", by which Garfinkel means (as he 
says in a footnote) Kaufmannts adequate coherence theory which sees the 
truth of propositions not as somehow contained within the proposition 
themselves, or in the relationships between proposition, but which 
emphasises the role of rules and procedures in forming up a 'corpus' 
of knowledge. For Parsons, therefore, the theorist is conceived to 
stand over and against some 'real world' of objects, building his ideal 
types-in order to approximate that 'reality' which he glimpses through 
perspectival appearance. As Garfinkel puts it 
"The correspondence theory makes a separation between the 
real world and the subjective interpretation of the real 
world. The separation is such that there are on the one 
hand the concrete objects in all their fullness and on the 
other hand the conceptual representations of these objects. 
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Such representations in abstracting as they do certain 
features from the concrete object present the scientist 
with a faded reproduction. " (48) 
Schutz, on the other hand, sees the "perceived object" and the "concrete 
object" as the same. As Garfinkel puts it 
"Rather than there being a world of concrete objects 
which a theory cuts this way and that, the view holds 
that the cake is constituted in the very act of cutting. 
No cutting, no cake, there being no reality out there 
that is approximated since the world in this view is 
just as it appears. " (49) 
The consequence of these different conceptualizations of the nature 
of reality are several. The status of "ideal types", for example, must 
be different on the two accounts: for Parsons they are a way of grasping 
some aspect of perspectival appearance of an actually existing reality 
over and against the theorist, whilst for Schutz they are what is meant 
by 'the world' and 'reality'. There is nothing that an ideal type could 
'correspond' to - it is what is the case. Again, the relationship between 
the sociological observer and the social world of lactorst is different. 
For Parsons, a theory must be constructed that will provide a standard 
- in terms, as we have seen, of 'scientific rationalityt - in terms of 
which the social world is to be seen and assessed. In the light of this 
theory and its standards an actor's perceptions of his situation, of 
his actions, and so on are judged and found to be either adequate or in 
error. For Schutz, on the other hand, no standard needs to be brought 
from outside. The sociological observer does not stand in the type of 
relationship to the actor in society which would require this, but 
instead must examine the social world as he finds it to uncover its own 
standards and its own logic. 
In other words, Garfinkel is claiming that Parsons' theory of objects 
results in his presupposing the nature of the object of social science 
- i. e. the social world - in such a way that theories about it are 
conceived of as faded reproductions of a real world. This enables him 
to ignore the problem of the nature of the object itself. Schutz, on 
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the other hand, leaves himself with the problem of describing the' 
structures of the object itself without benefit of standards that are 
presupposed and which are external to the object itself. Garfinkel puts 
this point thus: 
"In Parsons? usage, the empirical construct stands to the 
object as a set of specifications abstracted from the 
concrete object in accordance with the actorts interests. 
Schutz' usage provides that the object is itself 
constituted according to the actorts interests, with nothing 
left over .... There is therefore a problem involved for 
Schutz in describing the object that is not a problem for 
Parsons. This problem is that of describing the structural 
organization of the object, i. e. its organizational 
properties as a unity of meanings. " (50) 
What Garfinkel has done here is to claim that Schutz has broken 
down the distinction between "subject" and "object". The world that the 
actor faces is the world that he perceives with nothing left over, just 
as the world that a theory describes should not be conceived of as 
standing over and against the theory itself, but as bound up with the 
rules and procedures which enable the construction of a 'corpus, of 
knowledge. It is not the case, however, that Garfinkel is claiming on 
Schutz' behalf that all reality is somehow "subjective" that all there 
is is subjective perceptions. The claim is more radical than that and 
has affinities with what I have suggested in the previous chapter 
should be seen as Wittgenstein's position. His suggestion is that man, 
as actor or sociologist, just is in the world and that that is what must 
be accepted as the given. It is mants situation in the world of everyday 
life - in the world of the natural attitude - that is fundamental, and 
not some notion of "subjectivity" in relation to an "objective" world. 
As Garfinkel puts it 
"In a word, then, the congruence theory puts both actor 
and observer into a setting as the organizers of that 
setting and keeps them there. " (51) 
It is the setting, within everyday life, which is fundamental, and not 
'subjectivity'. It is this that Garfinkel sees as the crucial contribution 
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of Schutz to social science, to the problems which he has uncovered in 
Parsons' work, and to his own attempt at finding some solution to the 
problems. 
It is, however, doubtful whether Schutz in fact intended to propose 
the type of position which Garfinkel paints for him. It is significant 
that Garfinkel concentrates upon only a few of Schutz's essays for the 
purposes of his account - for example the essay on multiple realities 
which has been mentioned above. Much, however, is left out. There is 
no mention, for example, of Schutz's distinction between the 'subjective,, 
constituting aspect of consciousness on the one hand, and tobjective 
meaning contextst on the other. Whilst it is certain true that this 
distinction does not involve Schutz in positing a Oreall world in the 
sense that Parsons does, it is still the case that tsubjectivityl is 
being opposed to something other - to a structure of 'objective meaning' 
- which stands over and against it and, as I showed in chapter two, in 
a problematic relationship to it. It is these objective meaning 
contexts that solve, for Schutz, the problem of universals, and which 
account for the possibility of intersubjectivity - two jobs which 
indicate their importance to Schutz's position, and which suggest that 
an assessment of his thought which ignores them will not adequately 
characterize his conception of sociology and society. There is, indeed, 
evidence to suggest that Schutz himself was somewhat wary of the 
interpretation which Garfinkel gives of his work, and remarks that he 
makes seem to indicate that he did not in fact see his writing as 
proposing a position fundamentally different from that of Parsons. He 
seems to have preferred instead to see the contrast in terms of a shift 
in emphasis, or a change of levels of analysis. (52) His writing 
itself, as I have already pointed out, leads one to suspect that Schutz 
espoused what Kaufmann (and of course Garfinkel) considered to be the 
erroneous version of the coherence theory. He is much more concerned 
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with objective meaning contexts than with rules and procedures, and it is 
Garfinkells own concerns, informed as they are by'Kaufmann's work, that 
seeks to emphasise 'rules and procedures'. 
I will have more to say about the relationship between Schutz and 
Garfinkel in a later section. For'the time being it is important to 
understand just what Garfinkel is getting at with this account of Schutz, 
and why. The clue lies in the work of Gurwitsch and gestalt psychology. 
Gurwitsch's influence on Garfinkel is particularly apparent in 
Garfinkel's thesis. Garfinkel's discussion of Husserl's notion of 
intentionality, (53) and of the noetic/noematic structures of 
consciousness, both references Gurwitsch and shows the distinctive 
structural and perceptual slant of his interpretation of Husserl's 
concepts. (54) To make this influence more explicit I will examine 
briefly, the thrust of Gurwitsch's position. 
The important point here concerns the question of the relationship 
between subjec-t and object. In his essay 'Some aspects and developments 
of gestalt psychology' (55) Gurwitsch recounts the history of the 
development of gestalt psychology. He sees this in terms of a gradual 
abandonment of a sensationalist position, where different perceptions 
are considered the result of different sense data, in favour of a 
position that dissolves the distinction between reality and appearance 
altogether, prefering instead to treat only the lphenomenal themselves 
and to try to find out what the structural relationships are between them. 
This shift of position, Gurwitsch suggests, is the result of difficulties 
caused for the sensationalist position by optical phenomena such as the 
Neckar cube, which is a picture of a cube in which the lines are drawn 
in such a way that at one moment one surface will appear to be at the 
front of the picture, whilst at the next another surface will seem to be 
in front, depending upon how one looks at it. A similar situation occurs 
with Wittgenstein's duckrabbit, which can look like a duck or a rabbit 
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depending upon how one looks at it. (56) The point of this is that 
although one Iseest something different, the actual shape one is looking 
at - the arrangement of the lines - and thus the 'sense data' remain 
exactly the same. Thus to try to account for such visual phenomena in 
terms of a distinction between the real object-and the perceived object 
seems bound to be inadequate. Instead, gestalt psychology prefers to 
say that the two different things that one sees - the duck and the rabbit 
are tboroughgingly different i. e. they are different phenomena, just as 
the different perspectives that one has of, say, a table (it is small 
from a distance, large when seen close up) are also different. Thus 
"In the domain of consciousness no distinction between 
reality and appearance can be admitted; it is even the 
essential characteristic of this domain that the 
distinction mentioned is utterly alien to it. " (57) 
This means that the job of the psychologist then becomes that of 
uncovering the relationships between the different distinct perceptions 
- of discovering the laws on the basis of which we see the world as it is. 
"Accordingly, the task arises of specifying the conditions in 
which a certain perception occurs and of establishing the 
laws which govern the transformations of one kind of 
perception into another - especially if these transformations 
ensue from the variation of internal conditions alone. " (58) 
Gurwitsch's essay is designed to point out the similarities between 
phenomenology and gestalt psychology. Phenomenology, for Gurwitsch, 
does dissolve the distinction between the subject and an object world, 
and it is because of this that it can contribute to an empirical 
psychological discipline. Reality should be conceived not in terms of 
a subject perceiving objects, but in terms of 'gestalt contextures' which 
are the structural relationships between perceptions on the basis of 
which we differentiate freal objects' in the 'real world' from one another. 
There is no Schutz like 'objective meaning context' doing duty as 
longstop. There just are these structures. Zaner, for example, has the 
following to say about 'embodiment', arguing that mind body dualism and 
the problems involved with it, can be re-conceptualized in terms of 
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'gestalt contextures'. Thus 
"As Gurwitsch shows, the most elementary phenomena 
apprehended by sensory perception are such contextures, 
(i. e. gestalt contextures P. M. ) and only subsequent 
analysis introduces divisions, separations, etc. To 
the extent that perception is this way, however, so must 
the animate organism itself be a contextual phenomenon. " (59) 
The thrust of Gurwits-ch's position for present purposes, then, lies in 
his insistence that one cannot allow of a distinction between subject 
and objective world, and that the important subject matter for psychology 
is the structure of the 'gestalt contextures' which form the basis of 
all perception. The given, so one might say, is tgestalt contextures'. 
Given this, it seems reasonable to suggest that Garfinkel's account 
of Schutz as holding to the 'congruencet theory of trealityt has 
superimposed notions that are gleaned from Gurwitsch onto a limited 
selection of Schutz's work. Since Gurwitsch was interested primarily 
in psychology, his work was not directly relevant to Garfinkel's 
purposes which were focused upon problems concerned with social order 
and with social structures of some sort rather than with 'gestalt 
contexturest as the subject matter of psychology. Schutz's essay on 
multiple realities, for example, provides Garfinkel with insights into 
the structures of the natural attitude and suggests that modifications 
of that attitude - for example the modification which enables tscientific 
theorizing', or the modification involved in entering the tworld' of 
imagination - are possible. It provides some idea that the 'structure' 
of the natural attitude - just like the Istructuret of a gestalt 
contexture - is modified, and that this structure can be conceived of 
in terms of rules and procedures, just as Kaufmann conceives of the 
scientific realm as characterized by rules and procedures. In short, 
Garfinkelts account of Schutz as holding to a congruence theory of 
reality as opposed to Parsons version of the correspondence theory is 
an expression of Garfinkelts own position rather than being a faithful 
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representation of Schutz's work, and it is a position which has 
gathered from a variety of sources, and which is aimed fundamentally 
at resolving problems that result from Parsons' handling of social 
order. 
What emerges here, then, is that Garfinkel is suggesting as a 
solution to Parsons# problems that the sociologist must investigate 
the structures of the rules and procedures within the world of the 
natural attitude which enable objects in the social world to be what 
they are. In other words, he must investigate the structures which, 
at the 'cognitive' level, provide for agreement about what is the case, 
and which therefore stand as the presuppositions of 'rational action', 
1communicationt, 'wars of all against allt and indeed of any form of 
Imeaningfult interaction whatsoever. Such structures are conceptualized 
as the presupposition of all meaning, and as holding the key to social 
order. The crucial question for the sociologist, thus becomes: What are. 
the structural conditions on the basis of which actors, identify aspects 
of their social environment, and perceive social objects, within the 
natural attitude? 
At this point, then, that same level of structure has been identified 
which emerged from the earlier discussion of Hobbes and the problem of 
order. It is a level which is both structural and non-normative in 
the sense that it provides the presupposition for the normative ' 
orientation of action, and that as such it offers the possibility of 
being described in a way thatýdoes not result in only normative accounts. 
To describe such structures it should not be necessary to specify how 
actors should act to maintain social order. Instead it should be possible 
to describe the structural mechanisms which are prior to 'meaning' in 
the social world, which provide for 'agreement'-, and which ground social 
order. This is not, of course, to claim that some direct access to the 
'facts' can somehow be achieved, or that the place of 'theory' in 
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description can somehow be eliminated - as I will show in the'next 
section, the contextedness of any description, including an ethnomethod- 
ological one, is an essential tenet ofýGarfinkel! s position. Rather, 
the claim concerns the type of description that sociology can and 
ought to be engaged in, and this depends upon the contrast between 
#normative' descriptions of social interaction which Parsons provides, 
and the 'non-normativet descriptions of a particular level of social 
structure which Garfinkel is pointing towards. The problem for 
Garfinkel thus becomes how to gain some empirical purchase upon the level 
of social structure that he has identified at a theoretical level. 
THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF SOCIAL ORDER 
Garfinkel's chief problem is that it is of no use to ask members 
of society what the structure of their rules and procedures at the 
cognitive level is, since this structure is the presupposition of 
'meaning' and of all discourse. The answers to such a question would 
almost certainly produce tnormativet accounts about the 'meaningful' 
rules that were lactuallyt followed in the daily round - i. e. tsacred' 
normative rules of the type specified in Parsons' theory. As 
presuppositions, such rules as Garfinkel is interested in will be hidden 
and taken for granted - they will be, in Schutz's sense, part of the taken 
for granted stock of knowledge at hand. Garfinkelts well known 
'experiments' can be seen as an attempt to find some way of gaining 
access to the phenomena that he is interested in. I want now to move 
on to discuss some of Garfinkel's empirical work in order to try to 
show how it is directed towards gaining insight into the phenomena that 
interest him. I will begin with a brief account of some of his early 
papers and his thesis, before going on to look at his paper on "Trust"' 
as a good illustration of the way in which his thought develops and of 
the directions he takes. This will provide a useful background to a 
discussion in the next section of his more recent work, and of his 
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conception of "The formal structures of practical actions" which seems 
to articulate in a perspicuous fashion just what it is that the earlier 
work has been attempting to unravel. As a prelude to this account of 
the empirical work, I want to make one or two comments of a theoretical 
nature as pointers to the discussion. 
It is quite clear that Garfinkel's early work is generated from 
phenomenological concerns. The influence of Schutz, Gurwitsch and 
Kaufmann all point in some way or another to the work of Husserl, and 
it is clear from Garfinkel's discussion of Husserl in his thesis that 
he considered his stress upon the level of presuppositions to be a 
valuable contribution to modern thinking. At the same time, however, 
it must not be forgotten that there are concerns of Garfinkells which 
are not at all phenomenological in origin. The concentration upon the 
problem of social order, his concern with the precise nature of 
sociological description, and his determination to investigate social 
phenomena in an empirical fashion are all inputs into the phenomenological 
aspect of his thought which provide significant potential for the 
transformation of his early concerns. I have already suggested that his 
concerns with Parsonst work lead him to modify Schutzts position. This 
process in fact continues over the course of his work and, as will 
become apparent in the next section, gradually evolves towards a stance 
which has more in common with the work of Wittgenstein than with that of 
Husserl or Schutz. In assessing Garfinkells emFirical work, then, it 
must be remembered that it represents an attempt to come to grips with 
a particular level of social reality, identified theoretically but not 
yet specified in such a manner that rigorous'empirical work is possible. 
It could well be that the attempt to provide empirical evidence for 
his claims played a major part in changing Garfinkel's position, 
suggesting complexities in the phenomena he investigates which were, 
perhaps,.. unforseeable on the purely theoretical level. With this in 
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mind I will look at some of Garfinkelts early work. 
The reasoning which seems to lie behind the early essays and 
experiments can be seen as follows: the structures which provide for 
$agreement' as to the nature of social objects are structures of rules 
and procedures. Normally they operate in an unproblematic way and are 
thus effectively invisible. To study such procedures it is necessary 
either(l) to make them visible, or (2) to find situations in which they 
are observably being used - i. e. situations in which tagreementt is in 
some way or other problematic. Thus, ways must be found of making them 
visible, and situations found where some sort of transformation is 
apparent in the agreement as to what some social object consists of. 
(1) In order to make the structures visible, Garfinkel performs 
experiments such as those in his thesis. I will give a brief account 
of this. Garfinkel takes as his subjects a group of medical school 
applicants, and attempts to assess their changes in attitude towards a 
(fake) interview for medical school (which he plays to them on a, record) 
when he provides them with further information about the interviewee. 
After a first listen to an aggressive and boorish applicant, the subjects 
were asked their opinion of the man, and of the way he had handled the 
interview situation. They all agreed that he was an unpleasant character, 
and should not be accepted-for a place at medical school. Garfinkel then 
fed them the, false information about the interviewee which was said to 
come from a group of professional assessors of candidates - such as'that 
he had excellent grades, and had been accepted and was doing well etc., 
etc. - before playing them through the recording a second time. The 
result was'that on the second hearing, the majority of the subjects 
entirely revised their opinions about the interviewee, and about the 
interview itself, and aligned their opinions with the groups of 
professional assessors. Thus Garfinkel was able to produce, experimentally, 
a change in attitude, towards a 'social object? amongst a group of people. 
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What interested Garfinkel about this. was not the actual substance of 
the attitude change, but the structural conditions which made it 
possible. As he puts it, his experiment revealed an important problem, 
and that is 
"What are the conditions under which one can effect the 
change in the actor's perceptions of the same temporal 
patterning of signal material? Or, put otherwise, what 
are the things that condition hypothesis formation and 
the nature of the tests that the perceiver will effect 
upon his judgements of the other person when he, the 
perceiver, operates according to the rules of the natural 
attitude? And what are the rules that govern these 
tests? " (60) 
Garfinkel's analysis of these 'conditions', trules' and Itestst in his 
thesis does little more than to'suggest directions for his own future 
research. He gives'an impression of what it is that he is trying to do, 
but without providing any substantive sense of the precise structures 
that are involved. 
(2) The 'situations' in which 'agreement' about the nature of a 
social object is in some sense problematic include, in early papers, 
discussions of inter and intra-racial homicides (61) - the ways in 
which juries assess and constitute the crime and the offender - and 
degradation ceremonies. (62) What is at issue here is a situation in 
which a social identity is being transformed by sets of procedures which 
not only ensure that a change is accomplished from, for example, an 
'ordinary citizeng to a tcriminall, but also that the change is made 
smoothly and in an orderly fashion such that the 'normal', 'orderly', 
nature of the events involved is unquestioned and thus 'social ordert 
at this level is maintained. What is at issue, in other words, are the 
tcognitivet mechanisms - structures - which enable social order to 
persist in the face of the threat to it which transformations of social 
identities - i. e. changes concerning Vagreement' as to what is the 
case - can be seen as exposing it to. I will mention briefly something 
of what Garfinkel has to say about tmotivel in his paper on degradation 
ceremonies. 
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In line with Kaufmannis discussion of trules and procedures', 
Garfinkel points out that there are "socially valid and institutionally 
recommended standards of "preference"" on the basis of which, as 
grounds, an actor decides upon distinctions between "appearances and 
reality, truth and falsity, triviality and importance, accident and 
essence, coincidence and cause". (63) Such grounds can be used in 
order to effect a change of identity in a person. What must be done is 
to provide a different motivational scheme, as a different set of 
"standards of preference", in which to fit that person's conduct. To 
effect a status degradation over the course of a degradation ceremony 
one substitutes a new motivational context. Thus 
"It is with reference to this substituted, socially validated 
motivational scheme as the essential grounds, i. e. the 
first principles, that his performances, past, present, and 
prospective, according to the witnesses, are to be properly 
and necessarily understood. Through the interpretive work 
that respects this rule, the denounced person becomes in 
the eyes of the witnesses a different person. " (64) 
By investigating degradation ceremonied, then, as situations in which 
identity transformations take place, Garfinkel is able to suggest 
that part of what is involved in maintaining the normal, orderly 
character of the social is sets of rules and procedures, bound up with 
alternative motivational contexts, which enable, at a structural level, 
the smooth transition from one social identity to another. But, just 
as his experiment with medical school interviewees is more suggestive 
than substantive, so his investigations of specific situations - court 
rooms and ceremonies - remains only as a pointer to future promise. 
It is important to notice here the way in which Garfinkel's 
treatment of these matters has transformed Parsons' notion of a 'norm'. 
Where for Parsons norms explain social order, in that they are internalized 
and account for the orientations of actors, Garfinkel is suggesting that 
the Inormall is to be conceptualized as both the result of and the 
condition for orderly social practices. INormst are the standards in tenns o- 
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which actors assess each others actions and behaviour - i. e. there 
are Inormalt motivational schemes available - but at the same time, 
that there are such 'normal' schemes rests upon the rules and procedures 
which enable social order in the first place. What is thus important 
about 'norms' in this sense which implies Inormalityl as the 
achievement of actors, is that they are used as standards. It is the 
practices and procedures that are conceived to be fundamental, and not 
Inormst as such. This point will become clearer in relation to 
accounting practices which will be discussed below. 
The development of Garfinkel's concerns leads him to consider more 
and more what is involved in the taken for granted stock of knowledge 
at hand, and the structure of the natural attitude as he has taken that 
notion over from Schutz. As the work with these concepts progresses, 
the thrust of Garfinkelts intentions becomes more apparent whilst at 
the same time a clear picture emerges of the way in which his position 
is being articulated in contrast to the work of Parsons. I will 
illustrate this by reference to an important paper "A Conception of, 
and Experiments with, "Trust" as a Condition of Stable Concerted 
Actions", (65) hereafter referred to as the "Trust" paper. 
Garfinkel begins his discussion with a consideration of the rules 
of games. He takes games because in a game 
"the basic rules of play serve each player as a scheme for 
recognizing and interpreting the other players' as well 
as his own behavioural displays as events of game conduct. 
The basic rules of a game define the situations and normal 
events of play for persons who seek to act in compliance 
with them (a player). " (66) 
The first thing that needs to be known about the rules of a game is 
how does one identify those that are the 'basic rulest as opposed to, 
for example, those that are merely 'preferred rulest of play? What is 
it that makes a basic rule basic? Garfinkel's answer here is that 
such rules have specific properties which set them off from all others, 
namely the 'constitutive expectancies'. These are given as 
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111) From the standpoint of a player, out of alternative 
territories of play, numbers of players, sequences of 
moves, and the like, they frame a set that the player 
expects to choose regardless of his desires, circumstances, 
plans, interests or consequences of choice either to 
himself or to others. 
2) The player expects that the same set of required 
alternatives are binding upon the other player as are 
binding upon him. 
3) The player expects that, as he expects the above of 
the other person, the other person expects it of him. " (67) 
Garfinkel talks about these expectancies, as they are attached to 
sequences of moves, players, etc. as giving the 'constitutive accent' 
to such moves or players. If this 'constitutive accent' is moved from 
one set of rules to another, then the game changes - the expectancies 
are attached to different rules, so that a different set of 'basic 
rules' defines the 'situations and normal events of playl, 
In the case of a game, then, it is not tsacredness' that 
characterizes the basic rules, but the tconstitutive expectancies'. These 
give to the game a 'constitutive structurel - i. e. a structure of 
basic rules that defines the events that are 'relevant' in the game and 
provides an exclusion principle for irrelevant events such as head 
scratching. The significance of this is stated by Garfinkel thus 
"The conception that constitutive structures are integral 
to all game events differs from currently used sociological 
conceptions of the rules of action. According to current 
sociological usage, the rules of action classify actions as 
disjunctive sets. For example, the events of conduct 
depicted in the incest rule are members of the "mores". The, 
rules that prescribe allocations of duties in the household 
are members of the "folkways". The instructions that 
accompany a radio kit are technical rules. Emily Post has 
written the rules of etiquette. 
As a consequence of such usage, current conceptions of 
the conditions of social order stress in common as a critical 
condition of a stable social order the extent to which rules 
are sacredly regarded. But should it turn out that the 
constitutive properties of events are not copfined to games, 
one would then have to suppose that the uniformities of 
events depicted in the mores, the folkways, and the like are 
constituted through a set of "more fundamental" presuppositions 
in terms of which behavioral instances are attended by actors 
as instances of intended actions that a group member assumes 
"anyone can see". " (68) 
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The reference here to'Parsonst conception of rules as sacred as 
Garfinkel has described them is unmistakeable, as too is the 
determination to develop an account of social order that does not 
depend upon such a conceptualisation, but which unravels the set of 
"more fundamental" presuppositions underlying social order. It remains 
for him now to show how such a revised sense of the concept 'rule' can 
actually generate a theory about the social world. 
Garfinkel notes at some length that games are not to be directly 
paralleled to the social world. As he puts it "Came events are not 
structurally homologous with events of yesterday life". (69) Nonetheless 
for that, Garfinkel proposes that 
"the three properties that are definitive of the basic 
rules of a game are not particular to games but are found 
as features of the "assumptions" that Alfred Schutz, in 
his work on the constitutive phenomenology of situations 
of everyday life (1945,1951), has called the "attitude 
of daily life". " (70) 
Just as there are 'constitutive expectancies' that stand as properties 
of the basic rules of a game which define what is a game event and what 
isn't, so the assumptions that underlie our everyday life - which are 
the attitude of everyday life have these same expectancies as 
Ifeaturest of them. just as the basic rules, by virtue of the 
constitutive accent, enable recognition of what is 'normal' or I typical' 
play, so in daily life it is the constitutive expectancies, as features 
of the $attitude of daily life', that define what is Inormall and 
'typical' - i. e. that which is 'orderly?. For example, one expects 
that ones assumption that 'objects' in the w6rld are as they seem to be, 
or ones assumption that ones actions can effect another, both holds 
for others (i. e. one expects that the other will also so assume) at 
the same time as the other expects it to hold for you ( i. e. one expects 
that the other will expect you also to so assume). 
- By integrating Schutz's "assumptions" with the constitutive 
expectancies, Garfinkel produces a list of eleven features which he 
says are definitive of events which are members of the commonsense 
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environment. In other words, if these features are assigned to an 
actual event, then it will be an event in the common sense environment. 
It is not "what an event exhibits as its distinctive determinations" (71) 
that makes it a member of the commonsense environment, but whether or 
not it is assigned these 'constitutive features'. Thus if "All Jews 
are rich" or "If you jump in the water you*11 get wet" are members of 
the common sense environment, then this is because they exhibit the 
eleven features. I will list these eleven features to illustrate the 
way in which Garfinkel conceives of the structures which he is 
investigating at this time. 
"l. The determinations assigned to the event by the user 
are, from his point of view, assignments that he is required 
to make; the other person is required to make the same 
assignments; and just as the user requires the same 
assignments to hold for the other persons, he assumes that 
the other person requires the same of him. 
2. From the userls point of view, a relationship of 
undoubted correspondence is the sanctioned relationship 
between tte-presented-appearance-of-the-intended-object and 
the-intended-object-that-appears-in-this-presented-appearance. 
3. From the user's point of view, the event that is known, 
in the manner that it is known, can actually and potentially 
affect the knower's actions and circumstances and can be 
affected by his actions and circumstances. 
4. From the user's point of view, the meanings of events are 
the products of a standardized process of naming, reification, 
and idealization of the userts stream of experiences, i. e. the 
products of the same language. 
5. From the user's point of view, the present determinations 
of the events, whatever these may be, are determinations that 
were intended on previous occasions and that may be again 
intended in identical fashion on an indefinite number of future 
occasions. 
6. From the userls point of view, the intended event is retained 
as the temporally identical event throughout the stream of 
experience. 
7. From the user's point of view, the event has as its contexts 
of interpretation: 
(a) a commonly entertained scheme of communication 
consisting of a standardized system of signals 
and coding rules, 
and 
(b) "What anyone knows", i. e. a pre-established corpus 
of socially warranted knowledge. 
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8. From the user's point of view " the actual determinations 
that-the event exhibits for him are the potential 
determinations that it would exhibit for the other person 
were they to exchange positions. 
9. From the user's point of view, to each event there 
corresponds its determinations that originate in the user's 
and in the other person's particular biography. From the 
user's point of view, such determinations are irrelevant 
for the purposes at hand of either, and from the userts point 
of view both have selected and interpreted the actual and 
potential determinations of the event in an empirically 
identical manner that is sufficient for all their practical 
purposes. 
10. From the user's point of view, there is a characteristic 
disparity between the publicly acknowledged determinations 
and the personal, withheld determinations of events, with this 
private knowledge held in reserve. From the userts point of 
view, the event means for both the user and the other more 
than the user can say. 
11. From the user's point of view, alterations of this 
characteristic disparity remain within his own autonomous 
control. " (72) 
In this way, then, Garfinkel attempts to demonstrate that just as 
the basic rules define game events, so the assumptions of everyday 
life define events that are members of the common sense environment. 
What this means is that if the sociologist is to understand and describe 
the agreement about the object world that is the presupposition of 
social life and the grounds of social order - and thus avoid ? normative 
description' - then he must describe these assumptions. Thus he will 
be able to avoid positing that the Orulest or Inormst that actors act 
in terms of are 'sacred', in favour of a more rigorously descriptive 
approach. 
It is worth noticing at this point that although Garfinkel seems 
to have considered these 'assumptions' and 'expectancies' to be specific 
enough to be Ibreached', so that he considers that it is a worth while 
enterprise to set up experiments - which I will give an account of in 
a moment - which will breach them, and thus make them visible, there is 
nonetheless a tension in his approach to them. On the one hand they 
are intended to be empirically identifiable and describable as structural 
features of settings whilst on the other hand his only means of actually 
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identifying them is by specifying them on a purely theoretical level 
and then claiming that the empirically observable confusion which he is 
able to introduce into a setting is the result of his having breached 
these presupposed assumptions. In other words, what he is able to 
describe in fact is confusion, and this is taken to illustrate that 
there are indeed the assumptions which he claims to be avilable for 
description in the setting. What he is unable to do, however, is to 
describe the assumptions themselves in an empirical fashion. (73) 
That Garfinkel himself was not unaware of this problem is perhaps suggested 
in his insistance that his experiments should be taken not as levidencel 
for his theory in the usual sense of the word, but that they are simply 
"aids to the sluggish imagination". (74) Thus, in spite of the fact 
that this paper represents a more clearly defined approach towards the 
level of structure which he seems to have been aiming at, it is still 
the case that, like his early papers, it is more programmatic and 
suggestive than it is substantive. Again, the level of structure which 
he is aiming at is given further elaboration, but its precise nature 
remains somewhat mysterious from the point of view of empirical 
investigation. That said, I want now to look at the way in which 
Garfinkelts experiments in the "Trust" paper build on the Schutzian 
notion of 'taken for grantedness' in an attempt to unravel the complexities 
of social order at the 1cognitivel level. 
Garfinkel writes during the "Trust" paper that 
"If these constitutive properties extend to everyday events, 
then with respect to the problematic relationship between 
the normative regulation of action and the stability of 
concerted action, the critical phenomenon is not the 
"intensity of affect" with which the "rule" is "invested", 
or the respected or sacred or moral status of the rule, 
but the perceived normality of environmental events as this 
normality is a function of the presuppositions that define 
the possible events. " (75) 
This "normality of environmental events" is such that the presuppositions 
on the basis of which they are seen as normal remains entirely unnoticed. 
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Just as in a game the rules are not, as a rule, 'before ones mind' as 
it were, but only lie there as the necessary presupposition for ones, 
seeing the game events in the way that one does, so with the 
presuppositional assumptions of everyday life: 
"These attributions to the field of event's inform the 
ticktacktoe player about any particular event of play 
but without being a conscious part of his deliberations. 
Similarly for the person in everyday environments. And 
just as it holds for the game of ticktacktoe that such 
attributions are demonstrably relevant to the player's 
judgements but are rarely problematical, so does it 
hold for the events of everyday life. Such attributions 
are features of witnessed events that are "seen without 
being noticed". " (76) 
That they are "seen without being noticed" means that it would be of 
no use to ask some member of society what these assumptions were - and 
any way, as I pointed out above, to do so would be likely to result in 
normative description. Instead, some way must be found of making what 
is taken for granted visible, and thus amenable to investigation. If a 
way could be found to do this, then perhaps a way would be found of 
describing the foundations of social order without resorting to purely 
'normative' accounts, 
Garfinkel's solution to the problem of making such assumptions 
visible at this time, is to breach them, and thus to force people to 
reassess the 'normality' of their everyday social world. The trick, as 
far as he is concerned, is to breach these assumptions in such a way 
that the person whose expectancies have not been fulfilled is not able 
to 'leave the field' - i. e. leave the world of the 'natural attitude' 
whose assumptions are being breached and move into the world of tplay', 
or 'Joke', or 'imagination' etc. In other words, the subject must not 
be allowed to move the constitutive accent. If, for example, one were 
to attempt to breach someone's assumption that the table which he can 
see is also seen by you by saying "What table? " when, in the midst of a 
conversation, he referred to the coffee table upon which both of you had 
had been placing glasses over the course of an evening, the only result 
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would be a laugh, or a joke, or a questioning of your eyesight etc. 
The breach would not result in making anything visible, since the other 
person would simply 'leave the field', abandoning the natural attitude 
for some other trealityt. 
It is this - the intention of making visible the assumptions and 
constitutive expectancies of the natural attitude by breaching them - 
that underlies the experiments at the end of the essay on "Trust", and 
which is the motivation for many of the demonstrations that appear in 
"Studies in Ethnomethodology". Since tnormalityl of events, and 'taken 
for grantedness' are the trademarks of such assumptions, then it is 
those aspects of the perceived environment that must be manipulated if 
the grounds of 'agreement', the 'rules' of the natural attitude, the 
procedures for ensuring that, in the normal course of events, 'normality' 
remains unproblematically visible and order is maintained, are to be 
investigated. By multiplying "the anomic features of a person's 
situation", confusion is produced, and the ways in which that confusion 
is managed can be studied, at the same time that the procedures used to 
produce confusion suggest what aspects of a person's environment take the 
constitutive accent. , 
The actual experiments that Garfinkel uses to produce confusion - 
to breach the assumptions that characterise the attitude of daily life - 
are well known. They include such things as getting his students to act 
as borders in their own homes, getting students to treat fellow customers 
in a store as though they were store clerks, and the fake medical 
interview which I have already described briefly above. In each case 
what was observable was confusion, anxiety, annoyance, bad feeling, 
awkwardness and so on, along with attempts to normalise the situation in 
some way in the face of blatent contradiction, breach of expectancies 
etc. Alongside these lbreaching' experiments, in "Studies", there are 
several other investigations which, although not directly parallel to 
the confusion producing demonstrations, are nonetheless directed towards 
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the same end. Thus, for example, the study of Agnes, (77) who was 
born male, but who, over the course of adolescence developed breasts 
as well as a normal penis, and who felt herself to be a girl, is 
directed towards uncovering the ways in which a person in such a non- 
normal situation is able to establish herself as normal. Agnes had to 
learn how to "pass" as a girl, which involved "the work of achieving and 
making secure her rights to live as a normal, natural female while 
having continually to provide for the possibility of detection and ruin, 
carried on within socially structured conditions". (78) In other words, 
in this instance, the assumptions of the natural attitude about "sex", 
and about the position of "male" and "female" in society cannot be 
simply taken for granted, but must be "managed" in a conscious way and 
because of this they become visible. Similarly with the activities of 
jurors. (79) Here it is the case that the juror finds himself in an 
unknown environment where different Irulest apply. He must make his 
decision on the basis of legal precedent, and not simply on the grounds 
of his usual assumptions in daily life. It is the strangeness of his 
situation, and the fact that he must manipulate it in a more conscious 
way than usual that makes the juror of interest to Garfinkel. 
In the last few sections I have tried to give some idea of the 
underlying problems which generate Garfinkelts work as they emerge from 
Parsons' account of the problem of order. I have tried to show how 
Garfinkel approaches the problems both theoretically and empirically, 
how he conceives of the solution to them in terms of a particular level 
of structure which is the presupposition of Orational actionl, 
tcommunication'. etc., etc., and how this approach has been influenced 
by a variety of different thinkers. In the next section, I will turn 
to discuss the way in which these early formulations of the problem and 
its intended solution generate an interest in 'language' which provides 
the distinctive features of Garfinkelts more recent work, and which - as 
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will become apparent in a later chapter - links Garfinkel's work to 
that of the conversational analysts such as Harvey Sacks. 
THE CONCERN WITH LANGUAGE 
I suggested above that the 'experiments' which Garfinkel performs 
in an effort to laid the sluggish imagination' can be seen, as one of 
the contributory factors in the development of his own thoughts about 
social order. They provide a sense of the complexities of the phenomena 
with which he is dealing which generates fresh insights into the types' 
of procedures which members of a society use in order to make the settings 
in which they find themselves 'orderly's Inormall affairs. Not only do 
members of a society ? assume' that the settings of every day life will 
be orderly in the way that Garfinkel suggests in the "Trust" paper, but 
acting upon that assumption they bring a barrage of procedures to bear 
upon what happens in some particular setting in order to Iseet it as 
orderly, and to ensure that its orderly properties are maintained. It 
has already been shown above that over the course of a degradation 
ceremony there are ways of ensuring that the person being degraded is 
processed, as it were, in such a manner that the threat to social order 
which a change of social identity - ofýagreementl - could present is 
minimised and the torderly's 'normal', status of the everyday world 
can go on undisturbed. But the procedures involved in maintaining order 
are more complex than that, and it is this that becomes apparent through 
Garfinkel's experiments. The most significant complications in the 
structure of order maintaining procedures are the direct result of 
considering the role of language. As will become apparent, language 
both organizes settings and depends for its sense upon the orderly 
character of the setting itself. It is the complexities concerned in 
the relationship between language and the settings of everyday life 
that I want now to discuss. 
The connection between language and social order can best be 
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introduced by considering an 'experiment' that Garfinkel presents as 
an illustration of the $documentary method'. (80) In this experiment, 
a series of subjects were told by the experimenter that they were to be 
given a new type of student counselling. They were sat in a room alone 
with a loud speaker and a tape recorder, and told to ask the tcounsellort 
questions about matters upon which they wanted advice. They had to form 
up the questions in such a way that a one word answer - either tyest or 
#not - could be given. Having asked the question, and having received 
an $answer' to it from the loudspeaker, they were then told to turn on 
the tape-recorder and to comment on what they thought of the 'answer' 
that they had been given. 
There was, however, a catch. The tanswerst that they were given 
were in fact nothing but a random sequence of Iyeses' andInotst which 
bore no relation to what they had asked the counsellor. Thus the 
'environment' or 'setting? in which they found themselves, and in which 
they thought that they were receiving ladvicel in the form of answers, 
in a real sense lacked tordert. What was interesting, however, was 
that in spite of what were often contradictory 'answers', the subjects 
continued to search around for some pattern underlying them. In the 
face of potential disorder, they struggled to see what was being 'said' 
as tnormall and 'orderly' - i. e. as tanswers' to their questions. As 
Garfinkel puts it 
"Through the work of documenting - i. e. by searching for 
and determining pattern, by treating the adviserts answers 
as motivated by the intended sense of the question, by 
waiting for later answers to clarify the sense of previous 
ones, by finding answers to unasked questions - the 
perceivedly normal values of what was being advised were 
established, tested, reviewed, retained, restored; in a 
word, managed. " (81) 
In other words, the subjects just would not allow the normality and 
typicality of the setting in which they found themselves to slip away. 
They actively managed the situation in order to keep it coherent, 
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sensible and orderly. 
Garfinkel calls this method of maintaining order in events the 
'documentary method of interpretation', following the usage of Mannheim. 
He defines it in the latters words as 
"the search for "... an identical homologous pattern 
underlying a vast variety of totally different realizations 
of meaning". 
The method consists of treating an actual appearance 
as "the document of" as "pointing to", as "standing on 
behalf of" a presupposed underlying pattern. " (82) 
Thus the documentary method involves presupposing a pattern in the events 
being observed, and then treating the events themselves as evidence for 
the supposed pattern. The events themselves thus 'prove' that their 
own explanation lies in their underlying pattern, Parsons' tnormqtivel 
theory is a sociological example of the use of this method. 
This 'experiment' of Garfinkells, and the formulation of the 
'documentary method' which it illustrates, is important for the present 
purposes for the following reasons. Firstly, it is evidently a 'method'. 
or a 'procedure', which is used by members of a society living in the 
natural attitude to find that a particular setting, or set of events, is 
indeed orderly. In the normal run of events, we do search the words 
spoken by another for their 'orderly' character and it is that searching 
which enables us to find Isensel in what has been said. Similarly, we 
seek out the 'orderly' character of another's actions to make sense of 
whatever it is that he is doing. Sometimes, it is true, we are wrong: 
we misunderstand what someone is saying, or misunderstand what they are, 
doing. Nonetheless, our mistakes are the result of our searching for 
some order - we just end up with the wrong order on this occasion. 
Secondly, this use of the documentary method rests on our lassumptiont 
that others are also orienting towards the setting as an orderly set of 
events, and that they too are attempting to make that setting orderly. 
Thus in a situation where there are 'questions' and 'answers' we assume 
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that what sound like 'answers' to our questions have in fact been 
produced as the result of someone's treating our question as torderly, 
- i. e. by their use of the documentary method - and that we can thus 
treat their 'answer' as orderly in relation to a setting in which questions 
and answers are being formulated as part of the same orderly sequence of 
events. In other words, we assume that there is lagreementt about the 
nature of the setting (i. e. that it is an orderly sequence of questions 
and answers), and that 'agreement', plus the assumption that it exists, 
is the precondition for 'communicationg between the parties in the 
setting. 
Thirdly, from the above two points, it should be clear that the 
structure of practices at the Icognitivel level (which is concerned 
with tagreement') which is the presupposition of 'meaning', is now 
being approached from the point of view of lassumptionst and 'procedures' 
which include, as a part of them, a dimension concerned with language. 
Order in a setting is being connected to the ways in which language is 
used and understood by parties to conversations. The level at which 
the enquiry is being aimed has not changed, but an added dimension has 
been made apparent - the role of language. To illustrate this further 
I want to look at what Garfinkel has to say about 'glossing practices'. 
The term "glossing practice" refers to the fact that in the course 
of speaking, members of a society are able to say more than can actually 
be said in so many words. The best illustration of this point is 
provided by an 'experiment' that Garfinkel recounts in which he asks his 
students to write down the actual words of a conversation which they have 
had with someone. They then have to write down next to it exactly 
what they meant by the phrases they used such that anyone not familiar 
with the indexical particulars referred to would be able to understand 
what was being talked about. Garfinkel puts the results of the experiment 
thus 
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"Students filled out the left side of the sheet quickly 
and easily, but found the right side incomparably more 
difficult. (Note: the left side is the actual 
conversation, the right is "what they were talking about" 
P. M. ) When the assignment was made, many asked how much 
I wanted them to write. As I progressively imposed 
accuracy, clarity and distinctness, the task became 
increasingly laborious. Finally, when I required that they 
assume I would know what they had actually talked about 
only from reading literally what they wrote literally, 
they gave up with the complaint that the task was 
impossible. " (83) 
It was, in other words, impossible for them to eliminate their 
dependance in what they were saying upon certain tacitly understood 
features of the environment that they shared with their co-conversationalist. 
Whatever they actually said, they were always saying more than they were 
actually putting into words. They were using "glossing practices" in 
order to make sense to their co-conversationalist, and there was no 
way in which they could avoid doing this. Thus the speaker means 
something different from what he says in so many words. However 
"The idea of "meaning differently than he can say in so many 
words" requires comment. It is not so much "differently than 
what he says" as that whatever he says provides the very 
materials to be used in making out what he says. " (84) 
In other words, once again, just as with the 'yes' and Ono' answers, 
hearers of some piece of conversation are using certain procedures - 
bringing to bear some sets of competences and methods - in order to 
make out of what is said some sort of 'orderly', Isensiblet, conversation. 
At the same time, the person producing the 'gloss' is doing so in 
such a way that what is said can be inspected for its 'orderliness' 
and thus be seen to make sense. 
Besides these two, a clutch of further practices and procedures 
emerges from Garfinkel's studies of the U. C. L. A. Outpatients Clinic. In 
this study he attempts to glean from the official clinical records an 
answer to the question "By what criteria are its applicants selected for 
treatment? " (85) Here it becomes clear that the graduate coders, in 
order to extract the necessary information from the files, were having 
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to rely on background knowledge of the workings of the clinic to make 
sense out of what was written there. They were not able to simply 
read off from the folders the necessary information, but were having to 
use unexplicated procedures of some sort in order to translate what 
was in the records into the information that was required by the 
sociological study. The question is "Via what practices had actual 
folder contents been assigned the status of answers to the researcher's 
questions? " (86) Garfinkel's reply to this is that 
"We soon found the essential relevance to the coders, in 
their work of interrogating folder contents for answers to 
their questions, of such considerations as 'let cetera", 
"unless". "let it pass", and "factum valet" (i. e. an action 
that is otherwise prohibited by a rule is counted correct 
once it is done). For convenience let me call these 
"ad hoc" considerations, and call their practice "ad hocing". 11 (87) 
Thus, a further set of practices is identified, which enable sense to 
be made out of what is written in the official records - which make 
of them something torderly'. 
Leading on from this, Garfinkel is able to suggest that what one 
is dealing with in the clinical records is not some set of words that 
somehow 'correspond' to the 'realities' which they report - i. e. the 
'realities' of doctor client interactions or some such - but that 
rather the records themselves are a part of the ongoing flow of clinic 
life. They are the result of practical concerns, and are meant to be 
read by someone with similar orientations. What is interesting about 
them thus becomes the ways in which they are produced on the one hand, 
and used on the other, where that production and use is conceived of 
in terms of sets of taken for granted practices and procedures which 
provide the records with their 'normal', $orderly' character - i. e. 
'glossing', $documentary interpretation' and so on. The document itself, 
to stress the point, is thus conceived to be embedded within a context 
of practical concerns and taken for granted practices and procedures, 
and not as a set of words in correspondence with some reality outside 
of themselves. 
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To sum up, then, language as it is used in conversation, and as 
it appears in written texts, can be seen to depend upon practices and 
procedures which relate it to the general problem of social order at 
the cognitive level. To trace through this connection to its full 
extent in Garfinkel's work, it is necessary to consider three important 
areas that are of central concern to him. The first relates to the 
nature of language itself: here the question is "what is the nature of 
language that it exhibits these properties when looked at in relation 
to this level of social order? " The second, is concerned with sociological 
description: here the question is "if language is this type of thing, then 
what does this imply for description and for the sociological enterprise? ". 
The third provides a collecting of Garfinkells conclusions concerning 
the nature of language, the nature of description, and the relation 
of these to social order in terms of "accounting practices": here the 
question is "how can the relationship between language and the 
organization of a setting be expressed shortly and perspicuously? ". I 
want to deal with each of these three points in turn. 
The first question, concerning the nature of language, is handled 
by Garfinkel in terms of the notion of lindexicalityl. This concept is 
developed from Bar-Hillelts now famous article on indexical expressions (88) 
in which he made the relatively simple point that there is a class of 
expressions which only have a reference within a 'pragmatic context,. 
In the case of an utterance such as "I am hungry", for example, (Bar-Hillel 
calls this a tsentance token') one cannot do without the context of 
the utterance 
"the pragmatic context is essential and its ommission leaves 
the token without reference, (and thus) we have before us an 
essentially triadic relation between token, context, and 
proposition. " (89) 
Bar-Hillells point in writing the article seems to be to point 
out that the properties of such expressions have never been examined, 
since most philosophy is concerned solely with objective expressions 
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and thus feels free to ignore indexicality and "pragmatic context" - 
a term which remains vague throughout the paper (90) - and that this 
state of affairs ought to be remedied. 
Garfinkel, in a sense, takes up the challenge but, as with many 
other concepts, transforms the sense of indexicality in the process. (91. ) 
The sense of the transformation, however, can be seen as the result of 
a more thorough concept of 'pragmatic context' than that used by 
Bar-Hillel rather than as some mischievious adaptation. 
What Garfinkel does is to take the notion of 'pragmatic contextt 
and to fill it in with the notions of 'taken for granted assumptions' 
and 'taken for granted procedures' in such a way that indexical expressions 
become apparent in any conversation, any description - indeed anywhere 
where language is being used. He puts it thus 
"A sign correctly corresponds to a referent in terms of the 
assumed constitutive order that itself defines "correct 
correspondencdl. " (92) 
To understand-what is involved in lindexical expressions', he is 
claiming, it is necessary to understand the basic assumptions, rules 
and procedures - which will include 'glossing practices? and 'the 
documentary method' - which enable sense to be made in the various 
settings in which co-conversationalists find themselves. It is a general 
property of language, as it is used, that there are sets of assumptions, 
rules and procedures which enable sense to be made with it, and these 
assumptions, rules and procedures provide for the 'pragmatic context' 
in which lindexical expressions' are to be understood. They provide, 
through glossing practices, that aspects of the held in common 
environment that are 'agreed upon' by the conversationalists will be 
taken as given over the course of some conversation such that 'what is 
meant' in the use of indexical expressions will be Imade out' by the 
hearer - will be heard as orderly and thus as making sense. 
In other words, lindexicalityl is used, by Garfinkel, as a term 
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which refers to a general property of language - that it is used - 
rather than to refer to the contextedness of the 'reference' or 'meaning' 
of expressions as such. Where Bar-Hillel intends only to point out that 
the context of the use of certain expressions is needed for their 
reference to be apparent, Garfinkel is saying that the 'context' of 
the use of any expression is one in which taken for granted procedures, 
methods, and assumptions play an essential part in providing that 
expression with sense. The organization and order of the setting is 
necessary for the sense of expressions i. e. an "assumed constitutive 
order" defines "correct correspondence" and this order is the result 
of the practices and procedures'used by members of a society in the 
settings of everyday life. 
It is perhaps worth noticing briefly at this point, the affinities 
between this notion of Garfinkel's which maintains indexicality as an 
essential property of language as it is used within the settings of 
everyday life, -and Wittgensteints concentration upon the fact that 
language is used within language games. I will return to this in more 
detail in a later section; my present purpose is simply to alert the 
reader to an obvious point of similarity between the two thinkers. 
The second important point that I want to investigate here concerns 
the nature of description. As I have shown above, Garfinkel considers 
'description' to be a question of fundamental concern to sociologists (93) 
and it is problems in this area which he finds most problematic in 
Parsonsl theory of the social world. It is important, therefore, to 
consider the way in which his notion of the nature of language relates 
to his conceptualization of the nature of description. 
The first thing that must be noticed about the way in which 
Garfinkel uses terms like 'description' and 'literal observation' is 
that they always feature as 'contrast' terms. In the Parsons' Primer, 
for example, as I have shown above, 'description' is opposed to 
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'normative' accounts. In "Studies" it is contrasted with the 
'documentary method of interpretationt, and it is this contrast that 
I will use here to illustrate what Garfinkel means by tdescriptiont. 
In spite of misapprehensions to the contrary (94) Garfinkel's 
concern with description is not one that leads--him to claim for himself 
some sort of privileged access to social phenomena, or some exemption 
from the indexicality of language. He does not see the solution to 
Parsons' problems, as he has described them, in terms of the possibility 
of the substitution of some neutral observation language for the 
essentially indexical and context bound accounts that everyone else 
produces. The nature of language is such that indexical expressions, 
glossing practices, etc. are an essential part of it and thus any 
description will contain indexical features. It is nonetheless the 
case that in any actual sociological account there are parts that one 
could say are descriptive in that they are not normative or documentary 
- for example, there can be "literal description of physical and 
biological properties of sociological events". (95) There is, in 
other words, a useful distinction to be made here within our sociological 
language games. The fact is that in choosing to 'literally describe' 
such features, sociological relevance is often lost and what one is left 
with is a set of statements about, for example, somebody's height or 
weight, that can stand as 'literal descriptionst in some sense, but 
which need to be fitted back into the framework of a normative 
sociological theory (as, for example, an explanation of actions of some 
sort) to be sociologically relevant. The problem, as Garfinkel sees 
it, concerns the "choice" that must be made between being 'descriptive' 
and not sociologically relevant, or using the documentary method to 
attain relevance. As he puts it 
"The choice has to do with the question of the conditions 
under which literal observation and documentary work 
necessarily occur. This involves the formulation of, and 
solution to, the problem of sociological evidence in terms 
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that permit a descriptive solution. Undoubtedly, 
scientific sociology is a "fact" but in Felix Kaufmann's 
sense of fact, i. e. in terms of a set of procedural 
rules that actually govern the use of sociologistsf 
reco=ended methods and asserted findings as grounds of 
further inference and inquiries. The problem of evidence 
consists of the tasks of making this fact intelligible. " (96) 
To understand that "choice", it is necessary to come to some understanding 
of the "conditions" under which "literal observation" on the one hand, 
and "documentary interpretation" on the other actually occur, and to 
understand that, it is necessary to investigate practices and 
procedures. 
Garfinkel himself looks for the solution of these problems to the 
work of Schutz, Gurwitsch and Kaufmann, as I have shown above. His 
suggestion is that by investigating that level of social structure which 
he has indicated and which is concerned with 'agreement' rather than 
with the Imeanings' of everyday life, or the Imeaningfull rules that 
actors are conceived to follow, it is possible to avoid producing only 
Inormativel accounts of the social world. Not only that, but by 
investigating the social world at this level a "descriptive solution" 
to the problem of "the conditions under which literal observation and 
documentary work necessarily occur" becomes a possibility because of 
the fact that what is being investigated is the practices and procedures 
which enable language to be used descriptively, or to produce 'normative 
accounts', and so on. most sociology simply takes for granted 'agreement, 
about the social world, and ignores the ways in which such agreement is 
reached - as Garfinkel puts it 
"textbook and journal discussions of sociological methods 
rarely give recognition to the fact that sociological 
inquiries are carried out under common sensealspices at the 
points wheEe decisions about the correspondence between 
observed appearances and intended events are being made. " (97) 
What must be investigated is the structural mechanisms underlying 
lagre; ment' - underlying "decisions about the correspondence between 
observed appearances and intended events". In this way something of 
what is involved in "description" will perhaps be made visible. 
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Before leaving the question of sociological description to talk about 
"accounting practices", it is worth stressing again that Garfinkel 
does not consider that he can in some way avoid lindexicalityl, or 
can forget that language is fusedt and claim for his own descriptions 
some special 'correspondence' with the phenomena. It is the case for 
his descriptions, as for anyone elses, that an "etc. device" is 
appended to them. What the "etc. device" says is that the words used 
in the description do not, and cannot, formulate 'literally' what the 
producer of the description is saying, but must be used by the hearer/reader 
to make out what has been said. The etc. device, in other words, simply 
states that for any description, the describer is saying more than he 
can say in so many words, and that this must be accepted by the 
recipient of the description. In Garfinkel's case there is a whole 
barrage of theoretical background which has to be acknowledged if his 
descriptions are to be understood, and the 'etc. device' appended to 
those descriptions signposts this fact. In a sense, what this thesis 
attempts to do is to fill in something of what is involved in that 
'etc'. The whole point of Garfinkel's contrast is directed towards 
differentiating Inormativel descriptions, or 'documentary interpretations, 
from something else which he calls 'literal description'. Both sides 
of the contrast involve practices and procedures, but at the same time 
Garfinkel does want to assert that there is a crucial distinction to be 
made here. The problem is to understand the nature of that distinction, 
and that, he claims, is an empirical matter. 
I want now to move on to discuss 'accounting practices'. What is 
contained in this central concept of Garfinkel's is a collecting, in 
one phrase, of the relationship between language, settings, and the 
problem of order. It is thus important to try to grasp just what is 
involved in the notion. 
The best way of tackling what is involved in "accounting" is to 
consider these remarks of Garfinkel's on the purposes of ethnomenodology, 
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found in "Studies". 
"the activities whereby members produce and manage 
settings of organized everyday affairs are identical 
with members' procedures for making those settings 
"account-able". The "reflexive" or "incarnate" character 
of accounting practices and accounts makes up the crux 
of that recommendation. " (98) 
It is not easy, at first gasp, to see precisely what Garfinkel has 
in mind here. The following considerations should make it somewhat 
clearer. 
Garfinkel's central thesis, as I have shown, is that to understand 
the order that is observable i+ocial reality, one must look at the 
constitutive structure - at taken for granted procedures and assumptions, 
on the basis of which members of a society organize the everyday 
settings in which they find themselves. In other words, there are 
recognizable members methods for making settings exhibit order. Now 
once a setting in everyday life is an ordered one, it becomes possible 
1) to recognize that order and 2) to talk about the setting as an 
organized, 'rational' affair. Without that order, there would be 
nothing but chaos such that the setting would not be recognizable as 
a setting, and thus the setting itself would not be 'account-able' 
i. e. able to be accounted. It thus follows that in the process of making 
a setting orderly, members also make it an accountable phenomenon - 
something that can be recognized as orderly and talked about. 
At the same time, however, "accounting practices" themselves, as 
practices, are devices for making a setting orderly. In other words, 
one of the tasks to which language is put is that of naming, categorizing, 
ordering, and in general organizing aspects of the environment. Thus 
as account is not only, as it were, a reflection of the order in a 
setting, but, as an integral part of the setting itself, it helps to 
do the ordering which it accounts. In this way it can be seen that 
accounting practices are embedded in the settings that they account. 
They are, in Garfinkel's terminology, 'reflexive# and 'incarnate'. 
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. What this formulation of accounting practices effectively does, 
is to emphasise the essential indexicality of language by stressing 
the embededness of any account, be it a description, theory, poem or 
anything else. Garfinkel sums up in this way 
"In short, recognizable sense, or fact, or methodic character, 
or impersonality, or objectivity of accounts are not 
independent of the socially organized occasions of their 
use. Their rational features consist of what members do 
with, what they "make of" the accounts in the socially 
organized actual occasions of their use. Members' accounts 
are reflexively and essentially tied for their rational 
features to the socially organized occasions of their use 
for they are features of the socially organized occasions 
of their use. " (99) 
Thus 'rationality' for example, is something that is recognizable 
by members within an actual setting whilst at the same time being 
something that is the result of their own practices and procedures 
for organizing the setting and making it accountable. Rational action 
is an "accountable" feature of a setting - it is a part of the 
organization of a setting - and not some absolute standard that stands 
over and against all settings, and which needs to be imported into them, 
as an analytical tool, by the theorist. Garfinkel's own paper on 
rationality (100) lists fourteen different senses of the term 
frationalityl as it appears in different settings within the social 
world. 'Rationality' and 'rational action', in other words, are terms 
that people use, in settings, to account for features of them, as well 
as being a recognizable property of a setting and, as reflexively related 
to the setting within an account, a way of organizing the setting itself. 
Some of the connections between this notion of accounting practices 
and their incarnate character, and Wittgenstein's notion of language 
as a tool that is used in actual contexts - within-language games - 
are once again apparent. Again, however, I will make no attempt to 
follow through these links, preferring to leave this task for a later 
section of this chapter. It is a point worth noting, however, that 
'languaget used in this sense is a long way from Schutz's objective 
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meaning context of Itypifications'. (101) 
In sum, then, to understand what Garfinkel means by terms like 
lindexicalityl, 'description', and taccounting', it is necessary to 
recognize that they are used in the context of the relationship between 
'language', conceptualized not as an 'objective meaning context' but 
as something $used', and the order and organization of the settings of 
everyday life. This relationship in its turn, as I have stressed 
throughout this section, is itself tied up with the procedures and 
assumptions which, at the structural level of tcognition', enable 
lagreementl about what is the case in the social world. To try to, 
separate out aspects of Garfinkel's overall framework of thought and 
treat it in isolation is to take it out of context and to risk severe 
misunderstanding. Thus, for example, to see lindexicalityl on Garfinkel's 
account as concerned with the 'correspondence' theory of 'reality', 
or to see 'literal observationt as concerned with a 'neutral observation 
language' is to ignore the ways in which these terms are actually being 
used. 
With these points in mind, I want now to move on to suggest what 
status ethnomethodological accounts should be seen as having on 
Garfinkel's account of the matter, and to show how the formulation of 
'formal structures of practical actions' which appears in a paper by 
Garfinkel and Sacks, provides a statement of both the level and type 
of structural account that Garfinkel is aiming at, and of the status 
of ethnomethodological accounts. 
THE STATUS OF ACCOUNTS, AND FORMAL STRUCTURES 
Garfinkel, when asked what the rules of procedure were for 
ethnomethodology replied 
"What you are asking is, "what is the nature of your own 
concern for the character of an adequate demonstration? " 
If you want me to answer in twenty minutes, I will. I 
guarantee that such an answer will not satisfy you. " (102) 
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Harvey Sacks, in similar vein, when asked "Could you tell us without 
reference to the subject matter what the structure of a demonstration 
would be? " replied 
"Do you know what that is asking? You are asking, "Could 
you tell me, without knowing what kind of world we are in, 
what a theory would look like? " (103) 
In each case the question asked for a reply in terms of abstract, 
theoretical criteria for the adequacy of an ethnomethodological 
description, stated in the terms of more well known forms of sociological 
theorizing. Had they answered, for example, that it was the consistency 
of the account, or its correspondence with reality, or its relationship 
with the meanings of actors in the everyday world, then the inquisitors 
would perhaps have been content with the reply. As it was, however, 
the questioners demonstrate considerable dissatisfaction with the replies. 
They felt that the question had not been answered and that something 
must be up for such evasive answers to be given. 
Reflection on the ethnomethodological concept of 'accounting 
practices', however, might help to clear up just what is going on here. 
As I have shown, accounts are "incarnate" - i. e. they are embedded 
within the context of their production such that they both organize the 
setting and depend upon it for their sense. This must be as true of 
sociological accounts as it is of anyone elses. The fact is, however, 
that the task of much sociology is seen as being to create accounts of 
social phenomena that are peculiarly 'sociological' in that context 
bound descriptions of the social world can be translated into a series 
of 'objective' expressions. In Carfinkelts terms, it attempts to 
91remedy" the indexicality of naturally produced accounts. (104) 
The production of supposedly context independent criteria of adequacy, and 
indeed of the whole of the generalizing and abstract theory of sociology, 
is directed towards this end of producing context independent sociological 
descriptions of the social world. What Garfinkel and Sacks attempt to 
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do by replying to the questions put to them as they do, is to refuse 
to go along with this generalizing enterprise in favour of keeping the 
whole of the concept formation, description, and so on of their chosen 
sociological task, tied firmly to both the data being investigated and 
to the ways in which it is analyzed. 
To put this another way, Garfinkel is saying that he just does get 
on with the work he does, analyzing the data and providing description 
of the practices and procedures underlying social order, and that as he 
begins to understand more the subject matter he is studying, so he 
comes to understand better what it is that he is doing. As he begins 
to uncover what is involved in describing some social phenomena, he 
comes to understand how it is that he himself describes the social 
world and he feels no need to specify before the task is completed what 
it is that he is doing in abstract terms. If he were able to do this, 
then either he would preempt his own investigation - he would know in 
advance what he would find out about the practice of describing - or 
else he would be in a fools paradise in which all he could possibly 
find out would be what he had already decided to be the case by theoretical 
fiat. Either way, when investigating the structures of practical 
actions, it can make no sense to decide on what it is that you are 
doing in abstract theoretical terms beforehand. 
This "work in progress" aspect of the ethnomethodological enterprise, 
and the highly "reflexive" nature of the investigations and descriotions 
that are produced, can be made clearer, perhaps, with a quotation from 
Garfinkel and Sacks where they are trying to describe the omni- 
prevalence of indexical expressions. 
"Any actual occasion may be searched for indexical terms, 
and will furnish indexical terms. Whatever is the number 
of terms in an actual text, that text will furnish members. 
An actual occasion with no text will furnish members. Any 
member of the list of in-dexical terms can be used as a 
prescription to locate replicas. Listing any replica of a 
member of the list is an adequate procedure for locating 
another member. Any procedure for finding a member is 
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adequate for finding for all terms of a language that 
they are members, which includes "all" - which is to say 
that in finding for all terms of a language that they are 
members we are exploring and using the members' use of 
"all". "A one". "any one", and "all" lists of indexical 
terms exhibit the same properties as the particular members 
of "a one", and "all" lists. " (105) 
This is not just a complex way of saying -that all the terms in a 
language are in fact indexical, but it is rather a way of pointing out 
the reflexivity of their own enterprise. A concept like "all" is itself 
an indexical term, and it is a term that members of a society use all 
the time to make certain points with. The object of the ethnomethodological 
studies is to study the formal properties of indexical expressions - the 
ways in which members of a society actually use such expressions, and 
manage to make sense with them for all practical purposes, in spite of 
(or perhaps because of) the constant necessity of the 'etc! assumption 
tagged on to any utterance. In studying these properties, 
ethnomethodologists themselves make use of indexical terms like 'all't 
and thus they must, necessarily, be investigating their own use of the 
term alongside its use by the members of society. In fact they do not 
even want to say that "all" the terms in a language are indexical, in 
a sense, since it is enough to have a method (in common with other members) 
for identifying indexical expressions in order to furnish themselves 
with their subject matter. They do not need to make abstract claims 
about the totality of expressions. 
This very real reflexivity of ethnomethodological accounts is the 
direct result of the position that the ethnomethodologist takes up in 
relation to his subject matter. The possibility of his being able to 
do the studies that he does depends entirely on the fact that he is 
himself a member who uses the rules and practices that he is studying. 
As Garfinkel puts it 
"We, in fact, are intellectual persons doing the work of 
categorization from inside the group. That is the change. 
That is the claim as well. That is the problem as well. 
That, we think, is the phenomenon. " (106) 
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By studying the practices and rules of any member of a society, 
they are studying their own, and the warrant for studying such rules 
and practices is that they are their own. It is that fact that enables 
them to recognize such practices for what they are, and that thus 
provides the data for study, and there is no attempt to pretend that they 
can transcend the wurld of the ordinary member of society and transform 
ordinary everyday accounts into "correct" sociological descriptions. 
Garfinkel, when asked "whether (his) concern is that of an outsider 
studying folk wisdom" replied 
"No! Once and for all, no! We are not studying folk wisdom 
in an ironic way. I am not saying that I know better. I am 
not armed with resources that would permit me to say, no 
matter how discreetly, "look, does the botanist believe there 
are salt water fish in a fresh water lake? Get that! " Nor 
am I saying things like, "The Catholics believe that whatever 
it is; the Jews have the inside track on that one". There is 
no irony. " (107) 
To study folk wisdom "ironically" would be to bring some standard 
from outside such as rationality for example - in order to see what is 
"really" going on. it would involve rules for sense transformation of 
the type that Garfinkel claims Parsons puts forward in his theory of 
action which result in "normative descriptions" which enable the 
sociologist to over-ride the ordinary members accounts of what he is 
doing in terms of social scientific knowledge of the situation. He 
could, for example, take the action of a voter who claims that he votes 
Labour because he prefers their policies, and show that in fact what 
he is doing is demonstrating his class position. In this way the 
voters account of the matter is 11ironized" in favour of the 
sociologist's greater wisdom on social matters. Garfinkel is not 
involved in tironizingg 'folk wisdom' - indeed he is not interested in' 
'folk wisdom' as a source of raw data to be transformed into 
#Sociologically adequate' accounts at all, but in the practices and 
procedures which provide the possibility of folk wisdom, as well as its 
stability and effectiveness, in the first place. 
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Put in slightly different fashion, what Garfinkel is claiming is 
that the sociologist ought to investigate social practices as the 
'topic' of enquiry, rather than simply using them as an unexaimined 
'resource'. As he puts it 
"What we are proposing the vague programmatic recommendation, 
is that the whole damn thing is not to be taken as common- 
sense knowledge of practical reasoning being available as 
both a topic and a resource of professional sociological 
inquiry. What we are engaged in is trying to deal with 
common-sense knowledge, practical reasoning, and the rest 
as exclusively, only, and entirely a topic of inquiry. The 
big question is, "If you try it, what in the hell does it 
look like? ". " (108) 
Garfinkel is trying to avoid producing only Inormativet accounts of 
social phenomena - to avoid using tpractical reasoningl about 'sacred' 
rules and social structures in order to solve the sociological problem 
of social order in such a way that all that is produced inthe sociological 
account of the social world is built upon the unexamined procedures which 
enable that order. His problem, as I have shown, is to find a way to 
unravel the structure of such procedures. 
Perhaps the clearest formulation of Garfinkel's notion of this 
structure to date is contained in a paper which he wrote with Sacks 
entitled "On the Formal Structures of Practical Actions". What is 
most interesting about this notion of 'formal structurest is that it 
incorporates both a sense of the status of the ethnomethodological 
enterprise which I have just been discussing, as well as attempting to 
identify the important level of social structure involved in Garfinkel's 
solution to the problem of order. 
Consider the definition: 
"by formal structures we understand everyday activities 
(a) in that they exhibit upon analysis the properties'of 
uniformity, reproducibility, repetitiveness, standardization, 
typicality, and so on; (b) in that these properties are 
independent of particular production cohorts; (c) in that 
particular-cohort independence is a phenomenon for members' 
recognition; and (d) in that the phenomena (a), (b) and (c) 
are every particular cohort's practical, situated 
accomplishment. " (109) 
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The sense of this is perhaps already apparent, but it is worth 
emphasising. In the first place, formal structures are everyday 
activities that exhibit upon analysis the property of order. Here 
the "upon analysis" emphasises both that the orderly nature of social 
settings is ava-flable as an accountable matter for members of a society 
within those settings, and that because of that fact it is also 
available, upon analysis, to the sociological analyst who is himself 
a member of society. Following on from this, the properties of this 
order must not be seen as dependent upon any particular production 
cohort - some particular group of members of society - but should be 
seen, rather, in terms of the 'cognitive mechanisms' which enable 
'agreement' about what is the case in the social world. It is not the 
case that a group of people get together to define what the social world 
looks like, but rather that there are various taken for granted 
practices and procedures which ensure thatthe social world is. and remains 
an 'orderly' place with the properties of "uniformity,,, reproducibility, 
repetitiveness, standardixation, typicality, - and so on". Thus, the 
Inormalityl and 'order' in the social world is recognized, by members 
of a society, to be something that is 'independent' of them. It is 
just Ow hat is the case' in the world - i. e. the social world for them 
is 'taken for granted' as an orderly place. At the same time, however, 
that they orient their activities to the torderlinesst of things - to 
the assumption that there is order, and that it is readily perceivable 
- the members of a society do have a whole barrage of procedures and 
practices which ensure that that order is maintained. They use "accounting 
practices", "documentary method" and so on to ensure social order. Thus 
order in society, its independence from particular groups of members, 
and the fact that the order is recognizable, is the "accomplishment" of 
the memberts of society themselves within the settings of everyday life. 
Contained in this notion of 'formal structures', then, is a concise 
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statement of the position that Garfinkel has developed over the course 
of his investigations of daily life. In it is the concern with social 
order, and the concern with the practices and procedures which make 
that order possible, including accounting practices, glossing, etc., 
let iý pass, and so on. It thus incorporates the more recent concerns 
with language as well as stating, in a more precise form, just what it 
was that his earlier work was attempting to say. 'Formal structures', 
as a concept, identifies that level of structure, which is concerned 
with the cognitive mechanisms underlying agreement, that has been the 
constant focus of all Garfinkel's work. With this statement of 
Iformal structures' standing as a summary of Garfinkelts position, then, 
I want to move on now to consider the way in which that position relates 
to the work of Schutz and Wittgenstein. 
GARFINKEL IN A CONTEXT 
Over the course of the above discussion various points of similarity 
have been poin-ted out between the work of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein 
and sormof the points of contrast indicated with that of Schutz. In 
this section I want to make these points of similarity and contrast 
more explicit in a systematic fashion in terms of the various indicators 
of an approach towards 'meaning' that have provided a focal point for 
the discussions of the last three chapters. In this way, the extent 
of Garfinkel's move away from his phenomenological roots will become 
apparent and some of its implications drawn out. 
In the first place it is evident that Garfinkel's work does not 
contain the type of solution to the problem of universals that characterises 
Schutz's position. Where Schutz, as I have shown, rejects Husserl's notion 
of leidost - of apriori essences - and claims instead that the empirical 
'type' within the objective meaning structure is prior to essence, 
Garfinkel conceives of the matter in terms of practices and procedures. 
He has the following to say about the nature of 'agreement': 
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""Shared agreement" refers to various social methods for 
accomplishing the member's recognition that something was 
said-according-to-a-rule and not the demonstrable matching 
of substantive matters. The appropriate image of a common 
understanding is therefore an operation rather than a 
common intersection of overlapping sets. " (110) 
Thus what provides for the possibility of 'agreement' about what something 
or other is, is neither an essence contained in language or in the 
thing itself or an empirical ideal type, but "various social methods". 
Just as Wittgenstein argued that it is a mistake to look for what is 
common to all 'games' or indeed to all instances of anything collected 
under the same concept but that rather one must look at the ways in 
which a particular concept is fused' in family resemblance fashion to 
make sense in various language games, so Garfinkel is suggesting that 
it is not what things have in common - "a common intersection of 
overlapping sets" - that enables "agreement" but various methods people 
use. The point being made here by both men is the same, and it stands 
in contrast with Schutz's position. Both are insisting that a search 
for essences cannot solve the problem of universals but that what must 
be looked at is the ways in which people actually do solve the problem 
in particular instances, within particular language games, using 
particular methods, using language in a family resemblances fashion and 
so on. The emphasis, in other words, is on what people do. 
It follows from this that the notion of language that Garfinkel 
is using also contrasts with that of Schutz. Where the latter conceives 
of it in terms of "the sedimentation of typical experiential schemata" 
(111) and suggests that it is "The typifying medium par excellence by 
which socially derived knowledge is transmitted", (112) Garfinkel 
insists that 
"Characteristically, formal investigations have been 
concerned either with devising normative theories of 
symbollic usages or, while seeking descriptive theories, 
have settled for normative ones. In either case it is 
necessary to instruct the construing member to act in 
accordance with the investigator's instructions in order 
to guarantee that the investigator will be able to study 
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their usages as instances of the usages the investigator 
has in mind. But, following Wittgenstein, person's actual 
usages are rational usages in some "language game". What 
is their game? As long as this programmatic question is 
neglected, it is inevitable that person's usages will fall 
short. The more will this be so the more are subjects' 
interests in usages dictated by different practical 
considerations from those of investigators. " (113) 
Language, in other words, is not to be seen as a structure of meanings 
or a calculus, but as something that is used with a sense within the 
language games ofeveryday life. In other words, language is essentially 
an indexical phenomenon. The connection with Wittgenstein is made 
quite explicitly by Garfinkel himself in the above quotation, and the 
contrast with Schutz is obvious. Language is to be conceived of as 
an embedded phenomenon - as part of the flow of daily life - and not 
as something that stands over and against what people do, and against 
the treall world. Meanings are not to be seen as 'things' that are 
handed from one party to another over the course of communication, but 
as a part of our 'form of life', and as tied up with what people do. 
The point can be made stronger here by considering that just as 
Wittgenstein drops the model of 'object and designationt (the picture 
theory) in his discussion of language, so Garfinkel suggests that the 
notion of "sign" and "referent" can be dropped: 
"Although it may at first appear strange to do so, suppose 
we drop the assumption that in order to describe a usage 
as a feature of a community of understandings we must at 
the outset know what the substantive common understandings 
consist of. With it, drop the assumptionts accompanying 
theory of signs, according to which a "sign" and "referent" 
are respectively properties of something said and something 
talked about, and which in this fashion proposes sign and 
referent to be related as corresponding contents. By 
dropping such a theory of signs we drop as well, thereby, 
the possibility that an invoked shared agreement on substantive 
matters explains a usage. 
If these notions are dropped, then what the parties 
talked about could not be distinguished from how the parties 
were speaking. " (114) 
Once again, the emphasis is on what people do with language, with their 
linguistic practices and procedures which will include $accounting 
practices', rather than with language as a structure or calculus. Once 
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again the emphasis is in line with Wittgenstein and contrary to Schutz. 
If language is being described in such a way that it becomes a 
mistake to see it as somehow opposed to an lobjectivel world to which 
it refers - i. e. if a correspondence notion is being rejected - then 
one would expect that the parallel distinction between subject and object 
would also be reconsidered. This is, indeed, precisely what we do find. 
Garfinkel does not refer at all to 'subjective meanings' in the way 
that Schutz does, or to anything other than subjectivity which might 
be called a 'real', or 'objective$ world. The distinction which Schutz 
makes, and which, as I have shown, gets him into considerable difficulties, 
between subjective and objective meaning contexts is alien to Garfinkel's 
position in that what is fundamental for him is what people do - 
structures of practices and procedures - and not either an objective 
world or subjective perceptions of it. Just as for Wittgenstein it is 
a 'form of life' that is fundamental, and thus prior to any distinction 
between subject and object -a form of life is the given - so for 
Garfinkel it is the methods used by members of a society during their 
daily round that is central. The 'congruence theory of reality', as he 
understands it in relation to Kaufman's work, "puts both actor and 
observer into a setting as the organizers of that setting and keeps 
them there, " (115) and it is this theory that he wants to maintain. 
In the process he once again comes close to Wittgenstein and moves away 
from Schutz. 
As with Wittgenstein, Garfinkel can be seen to have transformed 
the sense of what is meant by tintersubjectivityl by refusing to accept 
the subject object distinction as primary. What is meant by the 
'problem of intersubjectivityl - what that problem is getting at - 
does not concern the mediation between different subjectivities as 
Schutz considered that it did, and thus it does not demand a solution 
in terms of 'objective meaning contexts' or 'ideal types'. Rather, 
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the-problem concerns the practices and procedures - what it is that 
we do in Wittgenstein's sense- which enable 'agreement' about what is 
the case in the social world; which is a concern not with mediation, 
between subjectivities but with the structural mechanisms which enable 
the organiiation of the settings of everyday life. The problem for the 
sociologist, as far as Garfinkel is concerned, thus becomes to 
understand how it is that social life is an orderly affair. The problem 
of social order is not the same thing at all as the problem of 
intersubjectivity - it requires the investigation of practices and 
procedures and not of 'essences', 'ideal types', 'meanings', 'internalized 
norms', etc., etc. What is meant by the problem stated in terms of 
intersubjectivity is in fact a concern with the structural mechanisms 
which enable meaningful interaction within the social world, which in 
its turn is a concern with the ways in which the settings of social 
life are able to exhibit order. None of this demands that the 
sociologist engage himself with subjectivities as such, and thus to 
state the problem as one of lintersubjectivityl is to misrepresent it. 
It is clear, then, that on this point, as on all of the others 
raised above, Garfinkel has moved away from the position espoused by 
Schutz, and towards that which Wittgenstein's later work develops. It 
is clear too that the approach towards the nature of 'meaning' which 
emerges from Garfinkel's work is equally far removed from that of 
Schutz, in that it refuses to accept that 'meaning' can somehow be 
abstracted from the 'form of life' within which it is embedded, and 
treated as that 'thing' which is passed between conversationalists 
over the course of interaction, or which is attached to objects in the 
social world. There are not 'subjective' or tobjectivet meanings 
which are somehow contained in 'language', or in tideal types' independently 
of the things that people do with words and concepts during the daily 
round, or independently of the practices and procedures which enable 
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words to be used and understood as meaningful, or which enable action 
to be recognized as action rather than mere behaviour. People actually 
use words and concepts within language games over the course of daily 
life, and it is this that is important and that must be grasped if 
'meaning' is to be understood. As Garfinkel puts it 
"Persons cannot be nonconsequentially, nonmethodically, 
nonalternatively involved in doing (saying in so many words 
what we are doing). They cannot be engaged in 
nonconsequentially, nonmethodically, nonalternatively saying, 
for example, "This is after all a group therapy session", or 
"With respect to managerial roles, the size and complexity 
of organizations is increasing and hence the requirements 
necessary for their successful management also. " (116) 
The meaning of such phrases simply does not exist in a vaccuum, but is 
bound up with the whole context in which they were uttered, and to 
ignore that fact - to ignore the language games within which they occur 
- is to distort what was said, and to misunderstand the whole nature 
of language and 'meaning'. 
That being the case, the problem at once arises of how to get to 
grips with Imeaningt. How is one to understand it? Whilst discussing 
Wittgenstein it became apparent that to gain some traction on the 
phenomenon of 'meaning' it would be necessary to unravel the 'form of 
life' which enables it, and of which it is a part. The problem, however, 
is that as the 'given', a form of life is not itself investigable, but 
can only stand as a 'clue' to the sociologist, pointing towards a 
possible subject matter - to a possible object of resea rch - but not 
itself being that object. What I want to suggest here is that if one 
examines Garfinkel's notion of 'formal structures of practical actions, 
one will find interesting and useful parallels with Wittgenstein's 
notion of a 'form of life', whilst at the same time the notion is 
formulated in such a way that it invites empirical research rather than 
discouraging it. 
Consider the way in which Wittgenstein's notion of 'rule' in the 
sense that does not imply 'interpretation' articulates with Garfinkelts 
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statement that "formal structures" are "everyday activities (a) in 
that they exhibit upon analysis the properties of uniformity, 
reproducibility, repetitiveness, standardization, typicality, and so 
on; ". (117) With this notion of trulet, I suggested, Wittgenstein 
indicated that the bedrock is simply what people do. It is stated in 
terms of 'rules' to indicate that it is "exhibited in what we call 
"obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. ". (118) 
Now 'rule' in this sense, does not indicate some reified tthing' in 
the world, but instead suggests what it is that makes our talk of 
'rules' and of 'rule followingt possible in the first place. It is 
the fact that people do things in certain ways that makes it possible to 
speak about them following a rule on some particular occasion. Now 
precisely the same is true of Garfinkel's notion as it is expressed 
in terms of 'formal structures'. They simply are the orderly ways 
that people do things and which upon analysis are recognizable as orderly. 
It is this orderly way of doing things that provides for the possibility 
of faccountingl - which makes the settings of daily life 'accountable', 
lanalysablet and so on. It is not the case that, at this level,, it 
makes sense to talk about actors as 'following rules' if that is taken 
to imply that they consciously 'interpret' some given rule, since the 
observable order is "independent of particular production cohorts" - it 
is dependent, in other words, upon taken for granted practices, procedures 
and assumptions, or, in slightly different terminology, upon the 
cognitive mechanisms that enable $agreement', 'rational action', 
'meaningful interactiont, and so on. The bedrock, to say it again, is 
simply what people do. 
The parallel between the two notions of 'form of life' and 'formal 
structures' is important because it suggests that in order to gain some 
empirical leverage upon 'meaning' as it is conceptualised by Wittgenstein 
and Garfinkel, the place to start is with 'formal structures$. Meaning 
is embedded in the activities of our daily lives, and is made possible 
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by what we do - by our various practices and procedures. To understand 
how it is possible that we do in fact mean things by the words we use, 
and how it is possible that the furniture of our daily lives is 
'meaningful', what must be investigated is the structures of practices 
that enable us to 'meant anything at all, and that provide us with an 
'orderly', Imeaningfulg environment. Thus, problems: about the 
transformations of social objects - as for example in a court room 
where a man becomes a Icriminall - andýabout the practices which enable 
description, or enable meaning to be gleaned from a description, and 
so on become crucial to our understanding of what it is that is involved 
in the phenomenon of 'meaning' itself. If such practices are ignored, 
then meaning becomes, once again, a 'thing' of some sort, with all the 
difficulties which this implies in terms of Ocorrespondencel, Isubjectivet 
and lobjectivel meanings, and the rest which have emerged over previous 
discussion of Schutz and of Wittgenstein's early work. - 
In shorn, then, the notion. of 'formal structures' can be seen as 
recommending an investigation of the structures of practices and 
procedures which enable 'meaning' and tmeaningfull'interaction and 
discourse within the organised settings of everyday life. Only in that 
way will it be possible to grasp the embeddedness of meaning within 
the activities of the daily round. Precisely the problem, however, is 
to find some way of doing this - as Garfinkel graphically puts it, "If 
you try it, what in the hell does it look like? ". (119) Garfinkel's 
own work gives all sorts of pointers, and his experiments are indeed 
useful as laids'to the sluggish imaginationt, but in the end one is left 
with a sense of not knowing quite what to make of what he has said. 
He insists that empirical work is important, but how does one set about 
doing it? It is all very well suggesting that there are Iglossing 
practices', $etc. assumptionst, #ad hoccing practices', the 'documentary 
methodt and so on, but where does one go from there? Is that all that 
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can be said, or are there further routes to be travelled which will 
unravel 'formal structurest in a more perspicuous fashion? 'It is 
interesting that the work of other ethnomethodologists that has drawn 
upon Garfinkel's insights has not at all moved in a single direction. 
The work of Cicourel, Weider and Zimmerman, Blum and Mchugh, Sacks 
and Schegl&ff, Pollner and Coulter and so on has persued a variety of 
different possible lines of enquiry which have led them to produce 
significantly different kinds of analyses. In the remaining chapters, - 
I want to trace through some of the ways in which Garfinkells work 
has been used, at the same time showing how it has been adapted, pointing 
out areas of comparison and contrast, and thus both highlighting aspects 
of Garfinkel's own work and showing some of its promise., In the process, 
ways of carrying on a sociological investigation of the social world 
which accepts the account of the nature of 'meaning' which has emerged 
from the work of Wittgenstein and Garfinkel will become apparent. 
Before moving on one more point needs to be made by way of 
conclusion to the present chapter and introduction to those that follow, 
concerning, once again, the status of ethnomethodological investigations. 
Given the links which I have suggested can be seen between Wittgenstein 
and Garfinkel, it is useful to conceptualise the whole ethnomethodological 
enterprise in terms of 'language games'. This can be illustrated as 
follows. 
The object of ethnomethodological studies is to describe , the 
'formal structures of practical actions#, whatever that might turn out 
to mean in concrete terms. Now given the necessity of, the 'etc. ', which 
is appended to any description and, the need for 'glossing practices', 
'let is pass', Ifactum valet' and so on, it could make no sense to suppose 
that one could somehow positivistically identify such structures and 
unequivocally categorize them. That there is orderliness in the 
activities of daily life suggests that there is an tobject' for study 
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that is worth sociological investigation and description, but at the 
same time what is involved in tdescriptiont is not the production of 
a set of descriptive propositions that stand, somehow, in a relationship 
of tcorrespondencel with that which is described. There are sets of 
practices which enable description, and which-enable descriptions to 
be understood once they have been formulated, and an investigation of 
tformal structures' would hope to make visible in some way what those 
practices were. That process of making visible, however, is possible 
only because of those same descriptive practices, which are themselves 
part of the mechanisms for making the settings of everyday life 
'orderly'. Thus, 'describing', $identifying', tmaking visiblel and so 
on these tformal structurest, is something done, and done so as to make 
the tobject' of study exhibit orderly features. In other words, the 
investigation of the formal structures of practical action is itself 
a tianguage gamel with all that that concept implies about the 
interrelationship of words, concepts and activities. 
To suppose that ethnomethodologists think that they can somehow 
avoid using indexical expressions, or can avoid the practices which 
enable description and so on is, I think, to miss the 'language game' 
nature of any enterprise whether scientific or some other, which 
follows from Garfinkel's insistence, following Kaufmann, that 'knowledge, 
should be seen in terms of the rules and procedures which produce it and 
make it possible. A body of knowledge, in other words, is a 'corpus' in 
Kaufmann's sense of the term. I stress this here both to highlight 
another link between Garfinkel and Wittgenstein, and because in the 
next two chapters, especially when discussing conversational analysis, 
it may clarify the nature of the work under discussion to think of it 
in terms of language games, rather than seeing it in positivistic terms 
as an attempt to produce descriptions that 'correspond' to the 'real 
world'. The one exception to this is, as will be seen, Cicourel whose 
work represents a move away from Garfinkel and back towards Schutz 
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with the result that his handling of questions of 'meaning' suffers 
from many of the defects of Schutz's work. With this point made, I 
want now to turn to look at some of the work that has been influenced 
by Garfinkel. 
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CHAPTER 4- GARFINKEL 
1. See, for example, the preface to Garfinkel, 1967, p. IX. 
2. Filmer, for example, in Filmer et al, 1972, Chapter 9, seems 
to presume that Garfinkel and Schutz are merely sides of the 
same coin with the result that Garfinkelts notion of language 
(among other things) is misrepresented. 
3. Garfinkel, 1967, p. VII - VIII. 
4. Hill and Crittenden, 1968., p. 3. 
5. Hill and Crittenden (1968) stress the "work-in progress" aspect 
of ethnomethodology in their conclusion to the symposium. 
6. Cf. for example, Garfinkel and Sacks, 1969, p. 340. 
7. Hill and Crittenden, 1968, p. 96. 
8. Garfinkel, 1967, p. IX. 
9. Parsons, 1968, p. 12. 
10. Ibid, p. 44. 
11. Ibid, p. 52. 
12. Ibid, p. 56. 
13. Ibid, p. 57. 
14. Peters, 1967, P. 142. 
15. Hobbes, "The Leviathan" quoted by Parsons, 1968, p. 90. 
16. Parsons, 1968, p. 90-91. 
17. Hobbes, "Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and 
Society" XIV, XV, quoted in Peters 1967, p. 194. 
18. Parsons, 1968, p. 93. 
19. John Locke - "Second Treatise of Civil Government", p. 46, quoted 
in Peters, 1967, p. 195. 
20. Parsons, 1968, p. 768 (volume 2). 
21. Garfinkel, 1952, p. 43. 
22. Ibid, p. 75. 
23. These remarks do not hold for all ethnomethodologists. Cicourel, 
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for example, does use the concept "cognition" in a way that 
implies subjectivity, and, as I will show in the next chapter, 
lands himself in difficulties. 
24. Spiegelberg, 1968, (b) p. 249. 
25. Kaufmann, 19582- p. vII. 
26. Ibid, p. l. 
27. It is interesting to notice, here, the links between Kaufmann 
and versions bf logical positivism that emphasise rules. He 
exploits the notion of Irulel, in his attempt to synthesise 
Positivism and Phenomenology, cf. here Kaufmann, 1968. 
28. Kaufmann, 1958, p. 42. 
29. Ibids p. 42. 
30. Ibid, p. 42. 
31. Ibid, p. 50. 
32. Ibid, p. 55. 
33. Ibid, p. 70. 
34. Ibid, p. 71. 
35. Ibid, p. 97. 
36. This, as we have seen, is the account of truth which Schutz 
appears to hold. 
37. Kaufmann, 1958,, p. 97. 
38. Garfinkel, (D), p. 76. 
39. Ibid, p. 76. 
40. In Schutz, 1971. 
41. In Schutz, 1964. 
42. Garfinkel, (D), p. 23. 
43. Garfinkel, 1962, p. 189. This definition Occurs throughout the 
Parsons Primer. 
44. Garfinkel, (D), p. 151-2. 
45. Garfinkel, (D), Chapter on Values, p. 112. 
46. Garfinkel, (C), and 1952. 
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47. Garfinkel does talk about theories of "reality" here, and not 
"truth", presumably because his discussion is about a theory 
of objects and not of knowledge. This shift in terminology 
is the root of some of the confusions between Coldthrope (1973 
& 1974) and Benson (19741 
48. Garfinkel, 1952, p. 95. 
49. Ibid, p. 95-6. 
50. Ibid, p. 105. 
51. Ibid, p. 98. 
52. Garfinkel (and Schutz) (B). 
53. Garfinkel, 1952, Ch. 14. It is interesting to notice, in this 
context, that Baumants suggestion (1978, p. 174) that Garfinkel 
has never read Husserl is mistaken. Garfinkel references 
Husserl's "Ideas" extensively, (and also other works are 
mentioned) in his thesis. 
54. For a contrast between Gurwitschts interpretation of Husserl and 
that of some other Husserlian scholars, cf. Solomon, 1977. 
55. Gurwit_, r-h, 1966. This essay was published after Garfinkel's 
examination of Parsons & Schutz, and hence, obviously, could 
not have directly influenced Garfinkel. However it does give 
us an insight into a crucial feature of Gurwitsch's thinking, 
and it is his orientation that, I am suggesting, influenced 
Garfinkel, rather than specific essays. 
56. Wittgenstein, P. I., p. 194e. 
57. Gurwitsch, 1966, p. 23. 
58. Ibid, p. 23-4. 
59. Zaner, 1975, p. 182. 
60. Garfinkel, 1952, p. 592. 
61. Garfinkel, 1949. 
62. Garfinkel, 1956. 
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63. Ibid, p. 420. 
64. Ibid, p. 422. 
65. Garfinkel, 1962. 
66. Ibid, p. 190. 
67. Ibid, p. 190. 
68. Ibid, p. 198. 
69. Ibid, p. 206. 
70. Ibid, p. 209. 
71. Ibid, p. 215-6. 
72. Ibid, p. 214-5. 
73. It is interesting to notice that this tension in Garfinkells 
account seems to have caused difficulties for Cicourel. In 
Cicourel, 1973, this paper on "Trust" is referenced several 
times, but its message is translated into notions of "surface" 
and "Interpretive" rules - which, I will argue in the next 
chapter, leads Cicourel into difficulty. 
74. Garfinkel, 1967, p. 38. 
75. Garfinkel, 1962, p. 198. 
76. Ibid, p. 217. 
77. Garfinkel, 1967, Ch. 5. 
78. Ibid, p. 137. 
79. Ibid, Ch. 4. 
80. Garfinkel, 1967, Ch. 3. 
81. Ibid$ p. 94. 
82. Ibid, p. 78. 
83. Ibid, p. 26. 
84. Garfinkel, 1969, p. 344. 
85. Garfinkel, 1967, p. 18. 
86. Ibid, p. 20. 
87. Ibid, p. 20-21. 
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88. Bar-Hillel, 1954., 
89. Ibid, p. 364. 
90. Ibid, p. 371. 
91. Heap, 1975, notes this transformation, although his account of 
its nature differs from mine. 
92. Garfinkel, 1962, p. 195. 
93. Cf., for example, Garfinkel (A). 
94. For example, Phillips, 1977, p. 201 considers that ethnomethodologists 
claim for themselves some privileged access to the social world. 
95. Garfinkel, 1967, p. 103. 
96. Ibid, p. 103. 
97. Ibid, p. 100. 
98. Ibid, p. l. 
99. Ibid, p. 3-4. 
100. Garfinkel, 1960, reproduced in Garfinkel, 1967, Chapter 8. It 
is interesting to notice some of the differences between the 
original article. and its version in "Studies" where several 
changes are made. The changes seem to add up to a shift away 
from an explicit dependence on Schutz. 
101. It thus seems wrong to presume, as Filmer (1972) does, that 
Garfinkel sees language as an interpretive scheme of 
interpretations. 
102. Hill and Crittenden, 1968, p. 28. 
103. Ibid, p. 41. 
104. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1969, p. 339. 
105, Ibid, p. 358. 
106. Hill and Crittenden, 1968, p. 111. 
107. Ibid, p. 28. 
108. Ibid, p. 120. Further discussion of the topic resource issue can 
be found in Zimmerman and Pollner, 1971. 
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109. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1969, p. 346. 
110. Garfinkel, 1967, p. 30. 
111. Schutz, 1974, p. 234. 
112. Schutz, 1971, p. 14. 
113. Garfinkel, 1967, p. 70. 
114. Ibid, p. 28. 
115. Garfinkel, 1952, p. 98. 
116. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1969, p. 359. 
117. Cf. note 109 above (p. 58) for full quotation. 
118. Wittgenstein, P. I. 201. Stress is added. 
119. Cf. note 108 above. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SOME COMPARATIVE AND CONTRASTIVE APPROACHES 
In this chapter I want to look at the work of sociologists who 
have, in one way or another, been influenced by the phenomenological 
tradition (chiefly in the form of Schutz), Garfinkel, Wittgenstein, or 
some combination of these three. The object of the discussion is 
twofold. Firstly, I want to illustrate that it is not the case that all 
of those writers who term themselves lethnomethodologicall (or who 
are foisted with that label in spite of protests, such as Blum and Mlgh) 
or 'Wittgensteinian' can be treated unreflexively together. To treat 
Cicourel, for example, as though he were Garfinkel's shadow, is to do 
both men an injustice, and to miss the point of what is is that both are 
trying to do. A second purpose is to illustrate, by using contrast, 
some of the points that were made in the previous chapter with regard 
to Garfinkel. Thus the particular level at which Garfinkel's notion of 
'structure' as it emerges in 'formal structures' is aimed, can be seen 
in relation to the different ways in which Weider, Winch and Cicourel 
conceptualise 'rules'. Similarly, the way in which 'meaning' is dealt 
with by Cicourel throws into relief both the extent to which Garfinkel 
has rejected a Schutzian notion, and the way in which his approach to 
language, essentialism and subjectivity and objectivity, shapes his 
approach to the study of society. 
I will divide the chapter into two main sections, each with sub- 
sections. In the first section the focus will be on writers who have 
been influenced chiefly by Garfinkel and Schutz. The work of Cicourel 
and Weider will be discussed in this context, with occasional references 
to the adjacent concerns of Douglas, Zimmerman, and Sudnow. The second 
section will look at the work of thinkers influenced by Wittgenstein, 
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or Wittgenstein and Garfinkel. Here the interest will be chiefly in 
the work of Winch, Louch, Blum and Mchugh, Pollner and Coulter. I 
have, of necessity, limited the scope of the discussion in line with 
the general aims of the chapter. Thus 'reflexive' sociologists, 
such as O'Neill (1), and Mehan and Wood (2) have not been considered, 
and no attempt has been made to cover the whole literature of either 
Wittgensteinian approaches to the social sciences - for example the 
work of Pitkin (3), Von Wright (4), and Phillips (5) come immediately 
to mind under this heading - or phenomenological sociology - here the 
most notable absence is the work of Berger and Luckmann (6). 1 have 
not ventured, either, into existential sociology (7) which is why the 
work of Douglas for example has not been looked at in any depth. (8) 
Instead I have adopted, as a strategy, the policy of looking, in a 
degree of depth, at the writings of theorists whose work can be seen 
as contrasting in illuminating ways with that of Garfinkel. The hope is 
that in that way the core of Garfinkelts position, and of its relationship 
to concerns that share something with it, will be illustrated more , 
persuasively than would be possible if the net of the chapter were cast 
wider. 
1. GARFINKEL AND SCHUTZ AS INFLUENCES. a) THE PROBLEM OF NEASUREMENT 
Concerns with problems of 'measurement' derivedfrom a broadly 
ethnomethodological perspective have taken the form of an attack on 
the use of official statistics as the raw data of sociological accounts 
of the social world. The argument, in very broad terms, is that these 
statistics cannot be taken unproblematically as representations of 
social trends, social phenomena, social facts, etc. This is because 
1. They are themselves meaningful social data that have been collected 
by members of a society who recognise that meaningfulness, 2. that 
they are the result of considerable interactional work on the part of 
both those to whom the statistics refer, and of those who have assembled 
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them as statistics, and 3. that therefore, such statistics cannot be 
understood unless this assembled and meaningful aspect of-them is taken 
into account. Sudnow's account of 'normal crimes' (9), for example, 
documents the way in which 'criminals' are assigned to some particular 
category of offenceon the basis of considerable negotiation between 
lawyers and the offender, in such a way that someone relying on the' 
penal code categories for an understanding of rates of'crimes of various 
sorts would not get at all an accurate picture of what'was going on. 
Similarly the study of suicide by Douglas (10) casts doubt upon the 
usefulness of officially compiled statistics of self inflicted death, 
while Cicourel's classic study of juvenile crime (11) casts statistics 
concerning young offenders in a completely new light. 
The purpose of this section, however, is not to follow through the 
substance of these critiques in detail, but rather, in line with the 
general aims of the chapter, to look at the ways in which the'studies 
generated by a-concern with measurement have differed in significant 
and highly instructive ways from the work and perspective of Garfinkel. 
I will concentrate chiefly on the work of Cicourel, but many of the 
remarks that will be made will also be relevant to Douglas's book, and 
I will try to indicate when this is the case. 
Cicourel states his driving concerns. and problems in his first 
major solo work, "Method and Measurement in Sociology". Here he makes 
it clear that 
"measurement presupposes a bounded network of shared 
meanings, i. e. a theory of culture. The physical scientist 
alone defines his observational field, but in social science 
the arena of discourse usually begins with the subjects 
pre-selected and pre-interpreted cultural meanings. " (12) 
This means that the social scientist who wants to measure social 
phenomena has a particular problem in that he must design techniques for 
investigating and measuring social phenomena that take account of the 
"subjects preselected and pre-interpreted cultural meanings", otherwise 
he will end up forcing the social world into inadequate categories with 
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the result that he will misunderstand his subject matter. It is 
inevitable, Cicourel claims, that "Measurement in sociology - or more 
appropriately, observation, classification and labelling - is rooted 
in the "common body of understanding" and "common understanding of the 
language" in everyday life", (13) but this does not mean that such 
common understandings should, therefore, be simply, taken for granted 
and left unexamined, as is so often the case in sociology. - To do so 
results in an unwarranted reification of the events under study and 
a consequent distortion of social life - the sociologist ends up , 
achieving only "measurement by fiat" (14) rather than providing an 
adequate picture of the social world. Cicourel suggests that, in the 
light of this, 
"The problems of measurement, therefore, can be viewed from 
the perspective of the sociology of knowledge: the world of 
observables is not simply "out there" to be described and 
measured with the measurement systems of modern science, but 
the course of historical events and the ideolologies of a, 
given era can influence what is "out there" and how these objects 
and events are to be perceived, evaluated, described and 
measured. " (15) 
The problem for the sociologist becomes one of finding ways of 
producing sociological accounts of social phenomena that takes account 
of the effect of 'meanings' upon his observations and measurements of 
the social world. Somehow, he must confront these difficulties so that 
I 
his studies do not simply produce "measurement by fiat". The question 
is, how? 
The difficulties which Cicourel faces are considerable. Not only 
is it the case that actors in the social world all have different 
Imeaningst, but also the sociological observer himself has his own 
perspective on things, which will inevitably colour and modify the 
description which he gives of social phenomena. At the same time, the 
particular era in which the sociologist happens to be born adds a further 
dimension of difficulties in terms of ideologies and historically 
specific 'meanings'. Cicourel has formulated his problem in such a way 
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that all of these different, factors must somehow be taken into account. 
It is perhaps evident already, that the strong concern with 
'subjective' meanings is not at all compatible with Garfinkel's stress 
on the mechanisms that enable social order at the cognitive level. 
Cicourel himself recognises that he may diverge from Garfinkel in the 
following remark in the preface to "Method and Measurement" 
"The present work began after my association with Garfinkel 
and may depart significantly from his ideas about the same 
or similar topics. " (16) 
At the same time, however, the association with Garfinkel is reflected 
in Cicourel's concern for everyday life. His concern with 'meaning' 
leads him to consider that the only possibility of going beyond 
'normative' accounts of social phenomena such as those that structural 
functionalism tries to pass off as science under the guise of statistics, 
is to look at the way in which members of a society order and organize 
their world by means of practices and procedures. Just as Garfinkel is 
looking for the. formal structures that enable sense to be made out of 
indexical expressions, so Cicourel turns to study the ways in which 
statistical data come to be assembled, such that they give some order. to 
the disparate elements of everyday life; how it is. that such figures 
are interpreted by members of a society and sociologists alike in terms 
of background assumptions. Both Garfinkel and Cicourel, in other words, 
are interested in the fact that what appears to be unproblematically 
order in the social world, whether as calculated statistical regularities 
or as the observable regularities of behaviour in the social world, is 
treated by sociologists as if it had an independent ontological status 
of its own over and against the actors involved, who become simply 
'cultural dopes'. In contrast they seek to understand such orderly 
properties by investigating the practices and procedures that maintain 
them over the course of everyday interactions. It is the concern for 
the everyday that unites the work of the two men more than any other factor. 
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That said, however, the considerable differences between their 
approaches are important, and they stem, I want to suggest, from the 
different notions of 'meaning' espoused by the two men. Where Garfinkel 
insists on the lembeddedness' of 'meaning' within the practices, procedures, 
rules, etc. of daily life, Cicourel insists on maintaining a Schutzian 
notion in which 'meaning' is somehow 'contained' in meaning structures 
within the social world. To make this fact apparent, I want first of all, 
with the aid of remarks by Hindess, to pinpoint a fundamental source of 
tension within Cicourel's programme. With this as a base, I will then 
discuss "The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice" to'show how Cicourel 
goes about investigating the social world empirically and to illustrate 
something of the way in which he treats 'meaning', before going on to unravel 
in some detail the specific differences between Garfinkel's and Cicourel's 
conceptualizations of 'meaning', indicating how this effects the sense of 
various of the terms which they use - for example lindexicalityl. 
Hindess Indicates the area of difficulty when he points out that both 
Cicourel and Douglas seem to hold to a correspondence theory of truth. He 
argues that their approach to official statistics suggests that what is 
really at issue for them is the amount of correspondence between the 
statistics and the real world that they are taken to represent. Thus he 
writes: 
"It would seem that what is at stake in these arguments is the 
failure of the tabulations given in official statistics to 
correspond to observable differences and distinctions between 
'real-world$ objects. " (17) 
The reasons why this would create problems for Cicourel is simply that 
if his central thesis is that there are always, in any measurement of 
social phenomena, biases present that are the result of the 'meanings' 
of actors or observers, and if it is never possible for any sociologist 
to transcend such meanings in principle - and this is indeed what Cicourel 
does seem to be saying - then problems about the relationship 
between sociological measurements and the real world will always be 
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pres'ent whatever one does, and no amount of e thnome thodo logical study 
could help the situation. Studies by the ethnomethodologist, just as 
much as those by other sociologists, will be subject to the same biases 
and problems that beset any observer of social phenomena, It could not, 
in principle, be possible to solve the problems of the reference of 
sociological measurements and observations by further supposedly more 
adequate (although in reality just different) sociological observations 
and measurements. The problem, here, is a serious one. Hindess sums 
up 
"Unless the sociologist is to be accorded the capacity denied 
to ordinary mortals, to describe objects and events without 
the intervention of background expectancies or of tacit 
knowledge, then his accounts must be subject to precisely the 
same type of limitation as those of other observers. In that 
case his remarks cannot be 'taken on faith as an accurate 
portrayal of "what happened"' ('Social Organization of Juvenile 
Justice" p. 6. ). For every sociologistst account we require 
a second account of how his background expectancies affect 
his account. This second account requires a third, and so 
on. The circularity of the prescribed procedure is obvious. 
We are faced with an infinite regression at no stage of which 
is it poss-ible to escape the determination of seen but 
unnoticed background expectancies. These positions, therefore, 
lead to a complete relativism and to a necessary agnosticism 
with respect to the possibility of an objective knowledge of 
the world. " (18) 
Thus, Hindess claims, Cicourel, since he 'really' wants to talk about a 
'real world', is caught in a vicious circularity. 
Whilst it is undoubtedly true that Cicourel does speak about the 
'reference$ of statistical data, as I shall illustrate in discussing 
"The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice",, it is not clear that this 
is his fundamental concern or that it should be read in terms of 
'correspondencel. His central interest lies in the phenomenon of 
'meaning' itself. Thus what one would expect is that what looks like a 
problem of correspondence will turn out to be a problem concerned with 
meaning in some way or another. What I want to show is that this is 
indeed the case, and that it is the extent to which Cicourel remains 
interested in Schutz's notion of meaning which creates his most serious 
problems. 
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In his classic study of "The Social Organization of Juvenile 
Justice", then, Cicourel sets about an empirical investigation which 
will not take social meanings as 'given', but will treat them, as well 
as official statistics, as the object of study. To this end he 
examines the set of relationship between juveniles who, for some reason, 
come into contact with the police, the police themselves, the 
probation officers, the courts, and the statistics which were produced 
by the different official bodies. Rather than simply take delinquency 
as given - as something to which statistics on delinquency are taken to 
refer - he is interested in the processes of negotiation that go into 
deciding what is the 'Just' thing to do for some particular offender. 
How is it, in other words, that someone becomes 'delinquent' rather 
than 'high spirited', and what part do background assumptions taken 
for granted 'meanings' - play inthe process? 
His study is of two cities in California. In city A., Cicourel 
claims, there is very little corruption, whilst in city B. it is rife. 
It is not only the level of corrupt ion that is different between the 
two cities, however, and Cicourel goes on to give an impressionistic account 
of the law enforcement agencies of them both as a prelude to an 
examination of the statistics of juvenile delinquency that they have 
generated. City A. has a "professionally oriented" police force, that 
has a well defined bureaucratic structure for promotion, that is not 
closely tied to the political side of the city's life, that does not 
encourage policemen to take other work during non-duty hours, and so on. 
City B., on the other hand, has a police-force that is closely tied to 
political considerations. The police chief is appointed in terms of 
patronage. Many policemen are politically involved in one way or 
another, and many of them take other work out of hours - security work 
for example. In sum 
"The two departments studied provided both a professionally 
oriented organization (city A) and one more or less patterned 
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after the model of the corrupt big city force (city B), 
intimately associated with political and criminal 
graft and corruption, vividly illustrating the conflicting 
orientations the police employ. " (19) 
There are, however, similarities between the two cities in the ways 
in which juveniles were dealt with. Cicourel lists several important 
considerations (20) which include the observations that "the procedures 
of criminal law (; ) (adult arrest, and search and seizure rules) are 
seldom followed", that suspects were seldom advised of their 
constitutional rights, that the family are often involved in the case by 
the police and probation officers, that the right to counsel is seldom 
considered seriously, and that the court procedures are often more like 
a ritual ceremony than a genuine trial , since "the probation officer, 
his supervisor, the offender and his family, and the court referee or 
judge" have generally sorted things out beforehand. The general 
impression Cicourel gives is that the treatment of juveniles is intended 
to 'help' the offender, so that the procedures governing the handling 
of adults would be out of place in a juvenile setting. 
Cicourel next goes on to examine statistics concerning the 
delinquency rates in the two cities in the light of the above. These 
figures have been collected using standard sociological procedures, but, 
and this is the main point that Cicourel wants to make 
"I want to underscore how their interpretation necessarily 
presumes a knowledge of the impressionistic descriptions 
given in this section. Yet it is common for social scientists 
to utilize delinquency rates from local, state, or national 
sources and construct inferences that never clarify what is 
presumed about community and law-enforcement organizations. " (21) 
In other words, in order to interpret the lists of figures that are 
given of the rates of delinquency in the two cities, one must presume 
considerable background knowledge about the way the police departments 
in them are run, and about the ways in which juveniles are handled. To 
take just one example, the figures are given for the age at which young 
offenders first come into contact with the police in the two cities. They 
suggest, on the face of it, that delinquency starts earlier in city A. 
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Cicourel suggests, rather, that 
"The number of offenders making first contact with the police 
in elementary school is not trivial in City A, suggesting, 
(once again, ) that efficiency in police operations would 
reveal a more general problem of delinquency or juvenile 
"problems" as a routine feature of community life. " (22) 
Cicourells main point here is not that the latýfirst sightt 
interpretation is wrong whereas his is right, but rather he wants simply 
to point out that to make any sense out of the figures at all demands 
considerable background knowledge. The figures just do not and cannot 
speak for themselves, and to suppose that they somehow reference in 
unproblematic fashion some objective fact of social life, is to 
misunderstand the extent to which taken for granted knowledge plays a 
part in any statistics. 
Not only is this the case, but at the same time there are all sorts 
of problems with the way particular happenings are 1. placed into some 
specific category in the first place - e. g. the policeman must make a 
choice between-calling an event 'grand theft auto' or 'joy ridingt, and 
which of these he choses effects whether it is a 'serious' crime or not, 
and 2. recoded by the statistician in such a way that what he wants to 
find out from the material becomes available to him. On this second 
point, Cicourel goes into some detail concerning the difficulties which 
his graduate coders had in analysing the police files to unravel whatever 
they had to offer. (23) Constantly they were having to make decisions 
as to which category to fit some particular piece of information into, 
and often they were forced to make entirely arbitrary decisions on the 
matter, or to invent a new category altogether. All of this is usually 
covered over in standard statistical studies with the-result that quite 
what they refer to becomes problematic: 
"the "findings" obtainable from police records become the 
basis for posing questions about structural and attitudinal 
conditions that can be cross-tabulated conveniently, but 
the referents for such findings remain obscure. " (24) 
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At t his point Cicourel's concern with 'reference' becomes apparent. - 
What this concern seems to amount to, however, is not to do with the 
relationship between 'findings' and the 'real world', but rather a more 
general epistemological issue is being raised concerning the relationship 
between 'findings' and"background assumptions' - Imeanings1-- and 
between 'findings' and 'procedures for assembling findings'. Atfkinson 
makes the point I am after here in relation to Douglas's work: 
"critics have been'able to respond by confusing the, problems 
of accuracy and reliability with the broader problems of 
epistemology (which)- can be seen as a consequency of the way 
Douglas presents his case on official statistics. That is 
to say, there is an important sense in which Douglas himself 
fails to make a clear distinction between the two sets of 
issues he deals with. " (25) 
just as Douglas fails to separate out questionsof epistemology from 
those of reliability, so that at one moment he seems to be talking about 
the 'real world' that statistics-ought to measure, whilst at the next he 
is making sophisticated points about the 'meaning' of the concept ý 
$suicide#, so Cicourel does not make it clear that his primary concern 
is with Imeanings' and their relationship to statistics and not with 
some ontological presupposed 9deviancy? which statistics ought to 
measure. As will become apparent later, this is the result of the way 
in which he conceptualizes 'meaning' itself. 
Cicourel attempts to handle the problems which he has outlined, 
concerning the relationship between meanings, statistics and procedures, 
by carrying out an ethnomethodological study designed to uncover the 
ways in which members of a society, who in this instance are the police 
and probation officers, actually make the system (of juvenile justice) 
work over the course of their'everyday activities. How is the information 
produced that goes into an official file on the'delinquent? What are 
the rules and theories involved in the officials, stock of knowledge at 
hand? What are the everyday categories onýthe basis of which something 
is recognised as an instance of such and such a thing, or is seen as being 
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strange or out of place? It is these questions that Cicourel wants 
to answer in hisstudy, for in that way a clearer picture will emerge 
as to what is involved in the statistics that are given of juvenile 
delinquency. 
I could not hope to capture the host of detailed ethnographic 
material that Cicourel gives over the course of the last 200 or so pages 
in pursuit of his study. He documents the negotiation which goes on 
between police officer and offender and points out the fact that none of 
this ever goes on to the official record of what was said at some 
particular interview. (26) He shows the ways in which some offenders, 
who on the face of it have committed similar offences, are treated in 
entirely different ways by police and probation officer, (27) and how 
the juveniles 'attitude' is such an important factor in the treatment 
he recýeves. He shows how different people involved in the case, 
including the juvenile, all have different points of view about the 
matters concerned, and that 
"there is no objectifiable common set of referents from which 
the different perspectival views are generated in the different 
community agencies and the juveniles family or neighbours. 11 (28) 
He shows, too, the ways in which political power or influence applied 
by the parents, even in a case as serious as one in, which the victim was 
beaten to death, can result in the offender being treated very leniently; (29) 
In short, what Cicourel does is to document the incredible variety 
in the everyday life of law enforcement agencies, with all its 
negotiation, preqjudice, taken for granted knowledge, points of view and 
so on, that has to be condensed into a few lines of the official report. 
He shows how much of what goes on just could not possibly be included 
in files, and that anyway many of such matters are so much a part of 
everyday routine for those writing the report that they are unnoticed, 
and virtually unnoticable, background features. In sum 
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"The P. O. (and the police) employ theories in their 
practical reasoning about the particulars of how events 
occur, or how members accomplish tasks or general activities, 
but to terminate cases they must utilize organizational 
criteria and legal propositions to provide truncated and 
idealized or general policies and rules about the nature 
of behaviour. " (30) 
What Cicourel has done, then, over the'course of his study of 
police and probation officers, is to give substance to his more 
theoretical claims about the difficulties with statistical data by 
describing in considerable detail the actual practices of law enforcement 
agencies. He sums up his case by saying that 
"Organizational policies and their articulation with actual cases, 
via the background expectancies of officers differentially 
authorized to deal with juveniles, directly changed the aize 
of the "law-enforcement net" for recognizing and processing 
juveniles viewed as delinquent, and determined the size and 
conception of the "social problem". The sociologist, therefore, 
cannot take community or law-enforcement definitions of 
deviance and their routine organizational processing, as 
"obvious" in his description and analysis of "social problems". " (31) 
It is not, the case that there is some ontological 'deviancy' to 
which statistics compiled by the police refer, but on the contrary, how 
the label 'deviant' comes to be ascribed is a complex process involving 
police and probation procedures, background knowledge etc., etc. If 
sociology is ever to come to terms with the-social world in some 
'objective# way, then it must recognise all of these aspects of statistical 
data. 
This concludes the present discussion of Cicourel's work on 
juvenile Justice, which has given a sense of the type of work that he 
is engaged in. Against this background, and with the remarks that have 
been made about Cicourel's concerns with Imeaningi in mind, I want now 
to go on to talk in more detail about the ways in which this notion of 
'meaning' can be seen as'the underlying reason for the tension'in his 
work which Hindess identified in terms of correspondence. I will do this 
by focusing on three areas of concern which will both highlight Cicourells 
problems and illustrate fundamental differences between his work and that 
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of Garfinkel. These will be concerned with questions of 'meaning' 
and 'use? in relation to language, the distinction between subjective 
and objective meaning, and finally the notion of 'rule'. Against this 
background I will suggest that the ways in which Cicourel uses such 
concepts as tindexicalityl are fundamentally different - have a different 
import - from the ways in which Garfinkel uses them. 
1. Meaning and Use. The clue to Cicourel's view of language lies 
in his "Method and Measurement". In this work, he discusses Wittgenstein, 
and it is worthwhile pointing out three things about this discussion 
that suggest that Cicourelts reading of the 'Philosophical Investigations, 
differs from that given in chapter 3 above in that it does not place 
stress on the fact that language is used, but remains wedded to a notion 
of 'meaning' as somehow contained in the structure of Ila languel - 
as he writes 
"Langue, as a system, can be studied for its structural 
Ceatures and its potentialities for discourse. It is a 
repository governed by rules that can be highly formalised. 11 (32) 
Cicourel is insistent throughout that this structural aspect of language 
must be allowed for. 
The first point of interest is that when Wittgenstein's work is 
introduced, it is with the idea that "the meaning of a word is to be 
understood through its use, where meaning is use. " (33) The idea is 
immediately qualified, however, with the remark that "Ziff's analysis 
provides balance in this discussion .... (he) stresses the importance 
of both syntactic structures and situational conditions which alter 
meaning". In other words, Cicourel is making it clear that, he thinks 
that the equation which he considers Wittgenstein to be making between 
meaning and use must be tempered with some notion of the structural 
aspect of language. 
The second point is concerned with the interpretation that Cicourel 
gives to a remark that he quotes from Wittgenstein. I will give the 
quotation: 
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"If we'look at the example in Sl, we may perhaps, get an 
inkling how much this general notion of the meaning of a word 
surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes 
clear vision impossible. It disperses the fog to study the 
phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application in which 
one can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the 
words. " (34) 
If the interpretation of Wittgenstein's work that was given above in 
Chapter 3 is to the point, then what this short quotation is about is 
the fact that a particular notion of meaning - i. e. the object and 
designation model - which is espoused by St. Augustine (this quotation 
comes at the end of a discussion of Augustiness view of language) leads 
to confusion about just how language does work. Thus, Wittgenstein 
is suggesting, it helps to examine primitive language games - such as 
the one in which the builder calls to his mate for Islabst, 'beamst, etc, 
- to start to understand the way in which language is used within the 
context of all sorts of actions and purposes. 
What Cicourel says about this passage, however, is far from this, 
and it is highly revealing. For him it is an example of the fact that 
Wittgenstein claimed that one should study everyday life if one is to 
understand language. Thus: 
"The "rules" governing everyday life are discussed in much 
of Wittgenstein's work and his discussion of them underlines 
Schutz's insistence that the study of categories employed 
by the man in the street should be the first task of 
sociology. " (35) 
In other words, the whole thrust of Wittgenstein's point about a 
particular model of the 'meaning' of concepts is lost in Cicourel's 
interpretation of this piece. Instead he finds Wittgenstein urging us 
to examine the everyday categories of the man in the street, which 
presumably implies theýneaningsl, or Itypifications' that make up the 
"real" substance of the words. 
Finally, it is interesting to note the way in which Cicourel 
equates the work of Wittgenstein and Schutz. I have already suggested 
the extent of the differences between the two men and will not labour 
the argument further at this juncture. What Cicourells conflation here 
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here suggests, once again, is that he considers language to be a 
structure of meaning that is used, but where the use is always subsidiary 
to, and must be balanced by, some notion along Schutzian lines of a 
structure of ideal types - an objective meaning structure of some kind. 
The contrast with Garfinkel on this point-is perhaps obvious enough. 
Where Garfinkel's concern is with the ways in which language is used in 
accounting practices as part of the machinery for bringing order to 
everyday life, Cicourel is concerned not to relinquish the notiori that 
there is a structure of meaning contained in language. The contrast will 
become more apparent as the discussion progresses. 
2. Subjective and objective meaning. That Cicourel has a notion 
of subjective meaning becomes evident fairly quickly over the course of 
a reading of any of his work. The concept of subjectivity that he seems 
to hold, owes much to Schutz, and is often stated in terms of 'subjective 
meaning structuresl - for example 
"The researcher cannot assume that he and the actor enjoy 
the same community of subjective meaning structures for 
assigning cultural significance to an event or object. " (36) 
Thus, opposed to the structure of meaning that is to be found in language, 
(37) is the subjective meanings of the people actually living in the 
everyday life-vorld. What it is important to notice is that it is 
the omni-prevalence of subjective meanings that Cicourel sees as one 
of the chief problems for an adequate social science, and it is to the 
solution of this problem that his work is addressed. 
The contrast here with Garfinkel is once again evident. Where 
Garfinkel considers "subjectivity" to be a secondary phenomenon, for 
Cicourel it is a central concern. The fact that different people perceive 
things in different ways in the social world, and that thus there is never 
any guarantee that either the actors, or the actor and the researcher, 
will 'meant the same thing, or will give the same meaning to some social 
or physical phenomenon, is what gives the sociologist most of his headaches. 
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3. Rules and interpretive procedures. It is at this point that the 
nub of Cicourel's position becomes apparent. Cicourel introduces the 
way in which he is interested in the notion of rule in "Method and 
Measurement" in the context of a discussion of meaning. The social 
scientist, if he is to go beyond folk sociology to make more scientific 
pronouncements, must first of all recognize the differences (or potential 
differences) between the actors' perceptions and meanings, and his own, 
He goes on 
"The next step requires some specification of the "rules" 
which orient the actor's perception and interpretation of 
his environment. " (38) 
In other words, the differences in meaning - in subjective meaning- are 
the result of differential perception and interpretation of the social 
scene, and what must be done is to uncover the "rules" that govern the 
ways in which these meanings are assigned to things. These rules are 
conceived to be *invariant'. Thus 
"My discussion is concerned not with the assignment of 
meanings to specific events or objects in particular situations 
but rather with the general or invariant properties which can 
be said to characterize the "rules" or "standards" whereby 
meanings are assigned to events or objects. " (39) 
This idea, as Cicourel makes clear, (40) owes a lot to Garfinkel's 
paper on trust where what is asserted is that what the sociologist 
should look for is not the tsacred rules# of the game of social life 
- i. e. the structure of norms and values - but the $constitutive 
structure$ which grounds such rules. As I stressed in the previous 
chapter, however, the precise import of Garfinkells notion of rule as 
developed in this paper is not wholly unambiguous and it is necessary for 
Cicourel to interpret the concept in some way that clarifies it. This 
interpretation is based on the work of Schutz (41) and is perhaps most 
clearly worked out in the collection of essays "Cognitive Sociology". 
In an essay on the concept of $role' Cicourel draws a sharp 
distinction between what he calls 'surface rules' on the one hand, and 
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'interpretive rules' on the other. 'Surface rules' are what the 
sociologist usually thinks of as 'norms', and they provide a sense of 
'consensus' in the social world, whilst the interpretive rules allow 
for the possibility of differential interpretation of norms by actors 
in society. Thus 
"The distinction between interpretive procedures and norms 
is tied to the difference between consensus or shared 
agreement and a sense of social structure. Interpretive 
procedures provide the actor with a developmentally changing 
sense of social structure that enables him to assign meaning 
or relevance to an environment of objects. " (42) 
Thus Garfinkells constitutive structure' has become a set of 'interpretive 
procedurest, conceived of as invariant, that provide the actor with a 
$sense of social structure' in that they enable him to interpret 
social norms and values and to act in a manner that is socially acceptable. 
At the same time they are the rules on the basis of which he assigns 
meaning to the objects in his environment - i. e. they are the rules 
that determine the ways in which he will perceive his world - and as 
such they underlie the phenomenon of 'subjective meaningt in society. 
The actual interpretive procedures that Cicourel specifies - and 
he does not consider this list to be exhaustive - are based on Schutz's 
"Phenomenology of the Social World". They are: 
1. The reciprocity of perspectives 
The etc. procedure 
3. The idea of normal form typifications. (43) 
These interpretive procedures interact with the surface norms, and the 
result is the social world which we observe. 
With this notion of linterpretive procedures' is reached the heart 
of the difficulties with Cicourel's work. What it is designed to do is 
to allow room for both 'objective' (kernal) meanings in Schutzts sense, 
that are contained, somehow, in language and social norms and values, 
and 'subjective' meanings which each individual has, and which cause so 
much difficulty for the sociologist on Cicourells account. He has not 
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taken the route which Garfinkel takes, towards seeing Imeanings as 
embedded in practices and procedures, but instead insists that it is 
a 'thing' of some sort which it makes sense to think of as being 
contained in language. Thus agreement is not seen in terms of sets of 
practices, as it is by Garfinkel, but in terms of 'norms' or 'surface 
rules' which are 'meaningful' aspects of the social environment. Unlike 
Parsons, however, he does not consider that it is the internalization 
of these 'legitimate' norms which accounts for social order, but the 
linvariancel of the interpretive procedures on the basis of which 
'subjective meaningsl are assigned in the social world. Thus, all the 
different subjective meanings have something in common - i. e. they are 
all the result of the same interpretive procedures - and therefore 
total anarchy does not result in spite of some differences in 
perceptions of the social world. With this model, Cicourel thinks, it 
is possible to allow for'both consensual norms, and differential 
interpretation-s of them - for $objective' meanings and 'subjective' 
meanings in Schutz's sense -'and to explain how it is that people can 
communicate. He thus defines lethnomethodology' in terms of these 
'interpretive rules': I 
"By ethnomethodology I mean the study of interpretive ' 
procedures and surface rules in everyday social practices 
and scientific activities. " (44) 
It is here that the sense of a possibility of definite lobjectivet 
knowledge, which Hindess interprets in terms of a 'correspondence' 
theory of truth, has its roots. What Cicourel is suggesting, however, 
is not that it would ever be possible to produce correspondence-between 
sociological measurements and observations, and some Ireal world'. but 
rather that by identifying the invariant interpretive procedures and 
surface norms, it would be possible to understand the phenomenon of 
'subjective meaning', and thus to understand what is involved in 
'objectivity' and 'reference' - i. e. to know just what lobjectivityl 
and 'reference' actually is, in relation to 'subjectivity'. The problem 
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is, however, that it turns out that this is not possible any more than 
it is possible to produce statistics that correspond to social reality. 
In the first place, any attempt to identify 'invariant procedures' 
will be subject to the constraints that 'subjective meanings, impose 
on any investigation. In order to know whether or not one's findings 
with regard to such procedures were 'objective' or not, one would need 
to know what 'objectivity' was in the first place - which would require 
knowledge of the very interpretive procedures that are being investigated. 
Thus, to gain the 'objective knowledge' of interpretive procedures which 
it is necessary to have in order to understand 'subjective meanings' 
and thus the principles of 'objective knowledge', one needs already to 
know what the interpretive procedures are - which evidently is circular 
and impossible. Thus on a purely theoretical level Cicourells 
programme is impossible. It is worth stressing, here, that Garfinkel 
is not caught in the same circularity at all. His interest is not tied 
up with subjectivity in this way, but is directed towards investigation 
of social mechanisms. The status of his accounts should be seen in 
terms of language games, as I have suggested, and not in terms of 
subjectivities confronted by an 'objective' world however tobjective, 
might be interpreted. Meaning is to be seen as embedded within a, lform 
of life#, and not as the result of surface rules, or interpretations of 
rules. It is the concern with 'subjectivity' that creates Cicourel's 
problems here. 
Secondly, on an empirical level, it is unclear how, precisely, one 
is to go about the business of studying interpretive rules.. Crucially, 
they are tied to the notion of 'norm' or 'surface rulel, and yet it is 
not clear how these are to be discovered either. If the action that is 
observed is the result of actors using these interpretive procedures 
to activate, as it were, some item in the surface rules, then it would 
be necessary to identify both in order to trace the interaction between 
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them. The problem is,. that Cicourel himself does not want to suggest 
that surface rules are to be seen as reified 'things' of some sort, 
so that he stresses that it is not possible to identify 11rules", in any 
very definite way, but that they must remain "fuzzy" round the edges. (45) 
This indefinite state of "rules" - and he places the world in inverted 
commas to stress just this - means for him that it is not possible to, 
measure the social world using two valued logic, and that one should 
not try to force the social into narrow boxes by using an analysis 
that looks only to Idenotativet (kernal) meanings, and ignores the 
fringes. (46) The problem is, however, that by setting up both surface 
rules and interpretive procedures as mutually dependent in the way that 
he does, and then by stressing the difficulty of identifying "rules" at 
all, it bec'omes difficult to see what the sociologist is left with. 
The actual studies that Cicourel has done himself, (beside the 
work on ? delinquency'), which are involved with class-room interaction 
and with deaf-and dumb sign language, (47) tend to add little to the 
theoretical observations that he has already made without the benefit 
of empirical work. Thus, for example, he reports that if one takes a 
video tape of a classroom setting and then asks the, teacher and the 
children to say what it was that they considered to. be going on when they 
were actually living through the situation captured on film, they will 
often give very different accounts from one another. Not only this, 
but if one shows the same film some time later, the interpretations by 
the same persons will often change. Thus, Cicourel argues, one can 
demonstrate the ways in which the world is continually being formulated 
and reformulated - how different meanings are being imposed on the same, 
data. He calls the method for gaining this information lindefinite 
triangulation', and sees this as a useful source of data. (48) 
The problem is that like Garfinkel's experiments, such methods 
do not actually prove anything. They simply illustrate something that 
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is already contained in the theoretical position that generated the 
research in the first place. Like Garfinkel's early attempts at formulating 
a notion of rule in terms of constitutive structures, Cicourel's notions 
seem to lack direction. There is no precise handle on quite what an 
interpretive procedure could look like empirically. The same is also 
true of his study of probation officers and police where he attempts to 
uncover their procedures. Certainly amidst the welter of ethnographic 
data there is a sense that comes across that there are invariances in 
the procedures they use to draw up their official reports, but quite 
what they are, and how one can formulate them remains elusive. 
For the purposes of this thesis, however, the main interest in 
Cicourel's work lies not primarily in its shortcomings, but in the ways 
in which it highlights aspects of Garfinkel's thought by contrasting 
with it. In the final analysis, the contrast is the direct result of 
an attempt to maintain a Schutzian notion of 'meaning' side by side with 
some of Garfinkel's thoughts on practices and procedures, and it is , 
this that creates many of the difficulties. To conclude this discussion 
of Cicourel, then, I want to draw out more of the meat of the contrast 
between the work of the two men. 
The social world, as far as Cicourel is concerned, is made up of 
a number of actors, all of whom have subjective meanings - i. e. they 
all have subjective meaning structures after the Schutzian model - so 
that in studying them in the social world the sociologist must always 
take account of the fact that they differentially perceive and interpret 
phenomena. This comes across quite clearly in the "Social Organization 
of Juvenile Justice" where he spends much time stressing the ways in 
which different background assumptions result in different interpretations 
of statistical data, and how different officers and agencies perceive 
delinquents in different-ways such that there is no sense in which one 
could speak of a common referent for all of the different 'meanings' 
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'deviancy' and 'deviants' generate. The world is thus a place in which 
difficulties of communication, differences of meanings, misunderstandings, 
and the threat of solipsistic isolation are constantly present, 'and must 
be accepted as the rule rather than the exception. 
For Garfinkel, on the other hand, the social world is fundamentally 
intersubjective. As a matter of fact people do make sense to each other. 
over the course of a conversation, and it is actually an accountable 
matter - "you don1t understand? Oh sorry I'll try to make that clearer 
for you" - when misunderstanding does take place. For example 
Garfinkellslexperiment' in which he asked people to write down 'what 
they really meant' in a particular conversation, demonstrated that they 
simply meant what they were saying - i. e. they were unable to specify 
in any more satisfactory form what they meant, because they had said 
what they meant in the first instance, and 'for all practical purposes' 
that was good enough. (49) It is not the-case, for either Garfinkel or 
Wittgenstein, that words and concepts convey some essential *meaning' 
which is somehow the misty 'hazel which must be grasped by a hearer 
and which will often remain ellusive behind the words. Language is not 
like that. 
Cicourel's problem is to account for the different subjective 
meanings in the social world in such a way that it becomes understandable 
that people do communicate. Like Schutz he insists on there being some 
structure of common meanings which give an element of 1consensus' to 
the social world. This structure is seen to consist in both the Ikernall 
meanings of concepts, and in the 'norms# of society. It is not the case, 
however, that these norms and meanings are just internalised over the 
course of socialisation as Parsons would like, and as Schutz seems to 
suggest, for to suppose that this is the case would be to ignore the 
role of subjective meanings and to become unable to account for the 




suggests, what is needed is some notion of invariant interpretive 
procedures. They are 'interpretive procedures' to account for differential 
interpretation and perception, and 'invariant' to account for the fact 
that thereis not total anarchy in the social world. 
Garfinkel, however, is not interested in the particular problem 
of the mediation between subjectivities, but in the general problem of 
how meaning is possible at all. He is not interested in the ways in 
which people interpret the social world and thus generate subjective 
meanings, but in the structures of the social world that make any 
interpretation possible. He is not interested in how Imeanings', 
conceived of as that which concepts convey, are passed from one person 
to another, but in how it is that what we call tmeaning' can actually 
be an accountable phenomenon in the social world. He is not interested 
in the difficulties of objectivity and reference which questions about 
the nature of 'meaning' generate, bu't in the ways in which language is 
used within the ongoing flow of'daily life to make sense of what is 
going on. 
The upshot of these significant differences between Garfinkel and 
Cicourel is that concepts that appear to be used by the two men in the 
same way, and which give an appearance of similarity to their work, 
turn out in fact to be performing an entirely different sort of function. 
The notion of lindexicalityl for example, is used by Cicourel to illustrate 
thatthere is a problem of reference caused by the fact that phrases lindext 
a whole host of past experiences for some particular speaker, and that 
therefore they "require the attribution of meaning beyond the surface 
form", (50) if they are to be understood. For Garfinkel, on the 
other hand, lindexicalityl is a feature of language that suggests that 
there is no problem of reference, because''it leads one to abandon the 
model of 'sign' and $referent' (51) which sees it as a problem, in 
favour of a view of language as lusedt. For'Garfinkel it is evident 
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that people use language perfectly well - the question is Ihow? I. 
A similar disjunction becomes evident if one looks at the way in 
which the two men treat $-separate realities'. Once again Cicourel's 
interest in Schutz's notion is in the way in which it illustrates 
problems of reference and subjectivity, (52)whilst for Garfinkel, as 
I illustrated in the last chapter, the interest is in the possibilities 
it offers for digging behind Imeaningl to the structures of 
transformations of social objects and thus to an understanding of how, 
meaning is generated - the mechanisms involved in organizing the social 
world. 
Cicourel's concern with measurement, then, is a concern with 
Imeaningl. It is a concern with the fact that there are a multitude of 
different subjective meanings in the social world, and that somehow a 
sociological study of statistics must illustrate the way in which 
subjective perceptions have influenced both the compilation and the 
interpretation of the data. People 'interpret' what they experience in 
different ways, and this fact must be incorporated into an understanding 
of the social. His hope is that by uncovering linvariantl,, procedures 
for interpretation, he will be able to cast light upon the complex 
problems of objectivity and $reference' that the omnipresence of 
subjective meanings results in. In this way, the measurement of social 
phenomena will be founded on a more adequate theoretical base than is at 
present the case in studies that ignore ? meaning' and 'interpretation'. 
Garfinkel's concern with measurement, on the other hand, is not 
fuelled by such interests, but by a desire to examine the structure of 
practices and procedures involved in a 'corpus' in Kaufmann's sense. 
Such an examination is not directed towards problems of objectivity and 
$reference', but to uncovering something about the 'formal structures 
of practical actions', and thus it constitutes an attempt to understand 
what is involved in the phenomenon of 'order' in society. 
In sum it would appear that there'are considerable differences 
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between Cicourel and Garfinkel which Centre on the way in which 
'meaning' is dealt with. For Cicourel, following on from Schutz, 
language is a structure that somehow contains consensual meanings 
which are given variety within ! Avidual subjectivities so that 
'subjective meaning' becomes a central focus for sociological analysis, 
whilst for Garfinkel language is 'used', so that the problem of 'meaning' 
is to find the mechanisms that enable it to be used with a sense. In 
the final analysis, it would seem that Cicourel's position is dogged by 
the fact that he is caught ambiguously between Schutz and his notion 
of meaning on the one hand, and Garfinkel and his notion of procedures 
and rules on the other. The result is that, as I have suggested, the 
social world becomes a highly tenuous thing, barely strung together 
by invariant interpretive procedures and norms, and the sociologistO 
entre into the midst of this world is seriously hampered by on the 
one hand a difficulty with quite how to identify either the procedures 
or the norms, -and on the other by the fact that, theoretically, he is 
confronted by severe problems of objectivity, reference and subjective 
bias. Whether these problems are soluble seems doubtful, and, perhaps 
the only possibility of any solution to them lies in the abandonment 
of one of the positions which is at the root of the ambiguity that caused 
them. 
REFLEXIVITY AND EMBEDDEDNESS 
Where Cicourel, in trying to make. out of Garfinkel's thoughts 
something that would provide him with leverage upon social phenomena, 
thus formulating his concerns in terms of 'meaning' and linterpretive 
procedures', Weider and Zimmerman concentrate instead on providing 
ethnographic illustrations of some of Garfinkel's main points concerning 
the lembeddedness' and 'reflexivity' of accounting practices and Irulest. 
Their chief interest centres on the ways in which 'rules' are formulated 
in the settings of everyday life to organize them - i. e. their focus is 
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upon the ways in which $social order' is maintained in daily life. 
Thus their handling of the concept 'rule' stands in contrast with that 
of most sociologists, and, in line with the general theoretical position 
that Garfinkel has outlined. The following remarks make this clear: 
"the actual practices of using rules do not permit an 
analyst to account for regular patterns of behaviour by 
invoking the notion that these patternsoccur because 
members of a society or some organization are following 
rules. Instead, (these studies show that) the ways that 
members employ rules requires that they continually develop 
what a rule means when they come to treat actual cases and 
when they find that they must defend the rationality of 
their choices. By invoking rules and elaborating their 
sense for specific cases, members are able to describe their 
own courses of action as rational, coherent precedented, and 
the like "for all practical purposes". The work of making 
and accepting such descriptions of conduct makes social 
settings appear as orderly for the participants, and it is 
this sense and appearance of order that rules in use, in 
fact, provide and that ethnomethodologists in fact, study. " (53) 
Rules should not be seen as 'things' of some sort that people follow, 
but rather the ways in which 'rules' are used, within the settings of 
everyday life, to account for, describe, and maintain social order must 
be made an object of sociological investigation. 
The effect of treating rules in this way is that actual studies of 
rule use take on the feel of one of Garfinkel's 'experiments' ("aids 
to a sluggish imagination"). Rather than overcoming the difficulties 
involved in the normative 'description' of social phenomena Weider and 
Zimmerman's analyses of social life stand as clear and convincing 
documentation of why it must be that a sociological account of social 
order in terms of 'rules' is necessarily a 'normative account'. The way 
in which rules are embedded within the situations in which they are 
invoked is shown in detail, and the ways in which this provides a sense 
of order to the situations described - the ways in which by using the 
language of 'rule' people show that what they did was the 'rational' or 
the 'right' thing to do - comes across strongly over the course of their 
descriptions. To illustrate the way in which their approach generates 
a picture of the social world, I will look at Weider's study of the 
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telling of the 'convict code', "Language and Social Reality". 
Weider's study is of a 'half way housel in which former drug 
offenders who had spent a period of time in prison, could stay for a 
few months to help them to rehabilitate to living in civilian life. 
The inmates were expected to find work, to attend therapy sessions, ý, 
help with the general running of the house, and to demonstrate that they 
were 'reformed' by not taking drugs or indulging in excessive consumption 
of alcohol. The official goal of the house was to ease the shock of 
a sudden return to freall life after the more artificial environment of 
prison life, since this shock was considered to predispose previous 
offenders to a return to drug taking. By providing a semi-structured 
environment for offenders which gave some security and provided support 
in conjunction with that given by the parole officer, it was hoped that 
the high rate of recidivism would be reduced. 
In fact, the official goals and hopes were not fulfilled. It was 
still the case that a high number of the inmates continued to use drugs, 
that they displayed no interest in the official goals of the house and 
refused to co-operate unless coerced, and that many of them were 
committed to prison again and again. Weider went into this situation 
as an ethnographer with, a "considerable intellectual debt to Professor 
Harold Garfinkel". (54) 
His chief interest as expressed in his book, was in the Iconvict 
code' which is' 
"the classical or traditional explanation of those forms 
of deviant behaviour engaged in by inmates, convicts, or 
residents of rehabilitative organizations. 'In traditional 
analyses of deviant behaviour, some subversive or contra- 
culture normative order is searched out by the analyst and 
utilized by him as an explanation for the behaviour patterns 
he has observed. In the case of prisons and related 
organizations, the 'convict code' is typically encountered 
by the researcher and employed as such an explanation. " (55) 
-259- 
Thus, traditionally, 'the convict code is seen as the 'cause, of 
the deviant behaviour encountered in institutions, the reasoning being 
that the deviance exhibits orderly properties, order is the result of 
shared norms and values which are internalised and acted in terms of, 
and so therefore the order in the observed behaviour must be the result 
of a system of norms and values. This system is identified as the 
'convict code', and so, it is claimed, this code explains the behaviour 
and is the Icausel of it. 
Weider, as a student of Garfinkel, sees the code through different 
eyes. Social order is not the result of internalised norms and values, 
but is accomplished by members of a society over the course of-their 
interaction with one another. Thus the code cannot be simply the 
indicator of a normative order which can be seen as causally effective 
in establishing the orderly character of the deviant activity. Although 
he is able to identify the code operating within the halfway house - 
and indeed his identifying it was considerably facilitated by the fact 
that it was pointed out to him by inmates and staff alike - his 
interest focuses upon it not as a normative order, but as an accounting 
practice. In other words what interested him was the fact that the 
code was used by inmates and staff at the halfway house to explain their 
own behaviour, so that had he produced a sociological account in terms 
of the code, as other researchers had done, he would have been doing 
nothing more than was being done by the people he was studying. What 
he wanted to do instead was to look at the ways in which the code was 
actually used by those connected with the halfway house, in order to see 
how order and trationalityl were attributed to actions and events in 
terms of it. As he puts it 
"the convict code could be examined as something like a 
language event that inmates or residents, staff and 
researchers employ to interpret conduct. " (56) 
Essential to this task of investigation was the fact that the code 
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was told within the context of the ongoing life of the halfway house. 
Its telling was firmly embedded within this setting and was reflexively 
tied to it. Thus 
"The code was not encountered *outside' the scene it was 
purportedly describing, but was told within that scene as 
a continuous, connected part of that scene by being 
manifested as an active consequential act within it. " (57) 
This meant that it could not be somehow abstracted from its setting 
in the house and used as an exaplanation of what was going on, since to 
treat it in that way would have been to have missed the point. The 
accounts given of behaviour in terms of the code were seen as what they 
were because of the use of the code, and the code was what it was 
because of the behaviour, and both worked together to display order 
in the everyday activities of the halfway house. An example of the 
precepts which the code embodied and of the ways in which it was used 
may perhaps help to make these points clear. 
Weider identified a set of eight maxims which were suggested to 
him on various occasions by inmates and staff at the halfway house. 
These were 
1. Above all else, do not snitch. 
2. Do not cop out. 
3. Do not take advantage of other residents. 
4. share what you have. 
5. Help other residents. 
6. Do not mess with other residents' interests. 
7. Do not trust staff - staff is heat. 
8. Show your loyalty to the residents. 
It is fairly easy to see how this could be treated as a set of 
normative prescriptions within a cultural sub-system and Weider shows 
what such an account of the matter would look like. (58) Weider's 
interests, however, lie elsewhere, and he is able to show convincingly 
the ways in which the precepts are used. Thus, 
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"In group and in . private encounters, staff was told by 
residents that, for example, "I can't tell you that; that 
would be snitching". And, for example, when one resident 
was asked to find another (his friend) who was absent 
from the house, he replied, "It's not safe for me to 
interfere with someone's life; I can't be my brotherts 
keeper". When a staff member suggested that a resident 
organize a pool tournament, the resident answered, "You know 
I can't organize the pool tournament, because it would look 
like I'm kissing asg'. " (59) 
In this way, telling the code re-established and formulated the 
relationships between inmates and staff, and did so in such a way that 
the orderly character of those relationships was made apparent. The 
code was used by inmates to get out of difficult situations, or to 
avoid answering the staffts questions. It was a device for legitimately 
declining an order, changing the topic of conversation, urging or 
defeating some suggested course of action and so on. (60) In other 
words, it was a consequential and persuasive part of everyday life. 
Not only was the code used in this manipulative sort of fashion, 
however, but it was also used as a guide to the perception of the events 
that took place at the halfway house. Weider was able to understand 
uhat was going on at the house only because he had gleaned, over the 
course of his stay there, the substance of the convict code. As he 
points out, (61) had he been deprived of either the talk (the telling 
of the code) or the behaviour at the house, he would not have understood 
what it was that was going on in the events that he observed. He gives 
as an example the case of a group meeting at which a member of staff 
asked a resident to organize a baseball game. The response from the 
resident was simply "You know I can't organize the baseball tead', at 
which the staff member nodded agreement. This remark by the resident, 
Weider suggests, should be read in the context of the underlying rule 
$show your loyalty to the residentsi - i. e. the resident is 'telling 
the code'. Out of context, however, the remark could mean any number 
of things; perhaps it could relate to some physical deformity known 
only to the resident and member of staff involved, or perhaps it could 
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refer to the fact that the resident knew his own limitations, and that 
he couldn't organize anything. As it was, however, Weider - and other 
spectators to that snippet of interaction - were able to perceive what 
was going on in terms of the code. The actual event itself depended 
for its status as an event of the sort that it was upon the whole 
context of the house and upon the telling of the code that was an 
integral and essential part of that context. What Weider had done was 
to transform the resident's remark into a statement of a rule, thus 
making it understandable, and his ability to perform that transformation 
depended upon the whole complex of language and behaviour that he had 
observed at the halfway house. 
In sum, then, Weider shows that the convict code is an integral part 
of the onwardoing life within the halfway house, and not something that 
can meaningfully be abstracted from it or used to explain it. As he 
puts it 
"Each utterance upon which my analysis of the code was 
based was meaningful in the ways that it was said-socially- 
in-a-context. Each utterance gave sense to the context and 
obtained sense from its place in that context in exactly 
the same way that a part of a gestalt-contexture (e. g. the 
left-hand member of a pair of dots) obtains its sense 
(e. g. as a left-hand member rather than as an isolated dot) 
by its perceived relationship to the other parts of the 
contexture (e. g. the right-hand member) while giving those 
other members their sense through their perceived relation 
to it. " (62) 
The convict code is a set of rules, It is embedded in the context 
in which it is used. It makes that setting/context understandable. It 
exhibits the orderly character of actions within that context. It is 
used for a variety of purposes within the setting: to formulate, 
describe, explain, assess, recognise, understand, etc., etc. All of 
these things Weider's account demonstrates, and all of these things fit 
well with Garfinkel's notion of 'accounting practices'. One also gets 
the sense that Weider has added something, to Garfinkel's notion by 
showing how such practices can generate what could, almost be called an 
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ideology, and one that is, to an extent, enforced upon the various 
occupants of the halfway house, staff and residentsalike, by the 
community as a whole. Thus the code is tied up with Opowert in some 
way and ought not to be seen in terms of internalized norms. Be that 
as it may, this aspect of the code is not explicitly examined by Weider, 
and is not of central concern to the present discussion, so rather than 
dwell on it I want now to make a series of three points which illustrate 
some of the ways in which Weider's work articulates with Garfinkelts 
thinking. 
1. It is certainly the case that Weider's stress on the fact that 
rules cannot be seen as 'things' which are usable as explanatory devices 
for the purposes of a sociological solution to the problem Of order, 
articulates well with Garfinkel's insistence that standards imported 
from outside a setting cannot be used to account for the order within 
it. Weider demonstrates just'why it is that an account of social order 
in terms of 'rules', such as that of Winch for example, is beside the 
point when he shows that people themselves, acting within the everyday 
world, do account for what they do in terms of rules. The way in which 
they use rules to organise what they do, to make it taccountablel and 
'rational', shows that they themselves Itheorisel about the social world 
in just the same terms as the sociologist, and yet their accounts of 
the matter are not considered to have $scientific' status, but are 
seen to be what they are - ways or organising, their social environment. 
The sociologist himself, as Weider discovered, needs some working 
knowledge of the trulesw if he is to understand what it is that is going 
on - what it is that he is looking at. For him to then reproduce these 
rules, and to claim that they somehow 'explain' the action he observed 
would be to misunderstand the way in which the rules were used. 'Rules' 
are not 'things' that are abstractable from the context in which they 
are embedded and upon which they reflexively rely. 
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2. It is worth noting too, that by carrying out the sort of 
analysis that, he does, Weider demonstrates that the concept I rule, 
is one that can be used for a variety of purposes. He demonstrates 
that there is no-$thing' to which the concept 'refers', and thus in a 
roundabout way, makes a Wittgensteinian point about the 'use' of language, 
and one which fits well with Garfinkel's rejection of the 'sign and 
referent' model of language. 'Rule' and 'code' are ways of talking 
about that which is seen to order the world, and should not be taken to 
point to some 'existing' causally efficacious entity in the world which 
can provide the raw material for a general social theory. To suppose 
that 'rule' is that sort of concept - to suppose that there must be 
something to which it refers - is to miss the point. 'Rule' is a way 
of identifying 'order$. 
3. Weider accepts that what he did over the course of formulating 
for himself the substance of 'the convict code' was to, engage in the 
'documentary method of interpretation'. (63) This involved piecing 
together bits and pieces of information - the code, the behaviour, 
background knowledge - in order to form a pattern that made sense ofý 
what was going on. His account of the convict code is thus an excellent 
example of the workings of that method self consciously employed. Because 
of this it provides considerable illustrative material for making out 
what Garfinkel was getting at in his discussion of that method in the 
'Studies'. To this extent, as I mentioned before, it is rather like 
an extended version of one of Garfinkel's experiments. It also self 
consciously accepts that it is itself nothing but another telling of 
the code, and not a 'scientific' account of behaviour in the halfway 
house. Thus 
"What sociologists describe as the convict code in their 
writings is one further instance of the product which results 
from the practices of 'telling the code'. " (64) 
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Weider's account thus accepts its own Inormativel status. It 
accepts that it is not literal description in the sense necessary for 
a deductive theory of society. In this sense too, then, the account 
stands chiefly as an illustration of Garfinkel's position. 
There are, however, aspects of this work that lead one to feel 
somewhat uneasy. In the first place, Garfinkel's experiments, as 
Garfinkel himself seems to acknowledge by calling them aids to the 
sluggish imagination, do not prove anything. They do provide a- 
different perspective on the ethnographic detail of the social world 
from that which is given by other sociological positions by showing 
how 'rules', for example, are used in the settings of everyday life. 
They also provide a sense of what the social world looks like once the 
solution to the problem of order which Garfinkel proposes is accepted 
as reasonable. They do not, however, either prove that the solution 
is correct, or provide the definitive account of what the settings 
investigated-have to offer by way of sociologically interesting material 
- and indeed Weider would not suggest that they did. There is thus a 
sense in which the type of study which Weider's investigation illustrates, 
fails to generate interesting results - it simply colours in details 
in a picture which Garfinkel's writings have already sketched out, 
rather like painting by numbers. 
Secondly, and allied to this point, is a feeling that if this is 
all that can be done with Garfinkel's insights, then they do not hold 
out as much promise for continuing sociological investigations as one 
might at first have imagined. One or two studies of the type that 
Weider undertakes can, it is true, provide useful new angles from which 
to view social phenomena, and stimulate further thought. But to simply 
carry out more and more of that type of study would, in a very short 
while, cease to be productive of new insights. There seems to be no 
way in which such work could develop or accumulate. 
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What these two considerations seem to suggest is that the type 
of study which "Language and Social Reality" illustrates does not 
provide a solution to the problem of what to make out of Garfinkel's 
work or of what directions should be taken in following through his 
insights. If there are important insights contained within Garfinkel's 
work, and it is difficult to ignore the fact that he does deal with 
important problems concerning, for example, the indexicality of 
expressions, which are not treated by the majority of soc'iologists, 
then it would seem that for them to be developed something more must 
be made of them than is done by Weider. The question is, '"What? ". In 
the next section, I will examine two further directions in which 
Garfinkel's work has been taken, this time with the added influence of 
Wittgenstein's later work as a dimension. The work of Blum and Mchugh 
in particular, can be seen as an attempt to give substance to Garfinkel's 
insights which does not simply reproduce his 'experiments' in the way 
that Weider's-seem to do. 
2. GARFINKEL AND WITTGENSTEIN AS INFLUENCES. a) THE POST WITTGENSTEINIANS 
In the previous chapter, several parallels were pointed out between 
the work of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein which, it was suggested, 
provided potentially fruitful grounds for research into social 
phenomena that looked to both thinkers for clues. In this present 
section I want to look at the work of writers who have been influenced 
by both Garfinkel and Wittgenstein and who have self-consciously drawn 
parallels between the work of the two men. By way of a prelude to this, 
I will discuss the work of Winch and Louch which tries to show some of 
the ways in which Wittgenstein's later philosophy can be seen as 
relevant to the social sciences. At the same time as this will provide 
a perspective within which to view the work of Blum and Mchugh on the 
one hand, and Pollner and Coulter on the other, it will also serve some 
purpose in the general theme of the chapter in that parallels and 
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differences between their approaches to the social world and that of 
Garfinkel, can be seen to highlight the latter's concerns. 
Karl-Otto Apel writes of Winch that it must be remembered that his 
"interpretation of Wittgenstein, which is inspired by 
Collingwood and M. Weber, strongly differs from the 
Wittgensteinian philosophy as pursued in Oxford and 
Cambridge today. We could call Winchts interpretation 
a thinking with Wittgenstein against Wittgenstein. 11 (65) 
That these remarks are to the point becomes clear if one considers 
the way in which Winch treats the concept 'rule'. The purpose of the 
present discussion is to illustrate the ways in which Winch's notion 
of 'rule' differs from the one which I have suggested that Wittgenstein 
is holding, and which, in the sense of 'rule' that does not imply 
interpretation, can be seen as related to formal structures of practical 
action. 
Winch's central focus upon Wittgenstein's work is upon the notions 
of language game and form of life, terms which he uses as though they 
were equivalent. He uses these notions to convey what he considers to 
be a very close relationship between a complex interweaving of - 
language and concepts on the one hand, and the relations between men on 
the other. As he puts it 
"A man's social relations with his fellows are permeated 
with his ideas about reality. Indeed, 'permeated' is 
hardly a strong enough word: social relations are expressions 
of his ideas about reality. " (66) 
whilst at the same time: 
"Our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given 
for us in the language that we use. The concepts we have 
settle for us the form of the experience we have of the 
world. " (67) 
In line with the spirit of Wittgenstein's later work, then, Winch 
places man, language and concepts, and the swim of the relationships 
between men, firmly in the same world. He is not interested in 
distinctions between subjectivities and the objective world, or in 
attempts at uncovering criteria on the basis of which objective 'truth', 
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in some transcendent sense of the term, can be divined. The crucial 
thing about the world is that it is made up of language games or forms 
of life which are a complex mix of activities, concepts, and socialý 
relations. If one is to see the world aright, then it is necessary 
to analyse it as a set of language games - and this holds whether one 
is a philosopher interested fundamentally in epistemological questions, 
or a social scientist with interests directed towards social 
phenomena. Either way, the crucial thing to remember is the interweave 
between language and activities - between concepts and reality, ideas 
and social relations. He states the matter thus 
"the social relations between men and the ideas which men's 
actions embody are really the same thing considered from 
different points of view. " (68) 
and again 
"Our language and our social relations are just two 
different sides of the same coin. " (69) 
This emphasis evidently places Winch's work in a close relationship 
to that of Garfinkel on important dimensions along the grid of 
Imeaning'. Both men stress the fact that language is used, that the 
distinction between subject and object is not to be considered a 
fundamental one, that therefore the problem of mediation between 
subjectivities is not fundamental, and that language and activity are 
closely interwoven. The differences, as I suggested above, begin to 
become apparent once the notion of trulel is examined in Winch's work. 
'Rules' do a lot of work within Winch's theory - indeed they appear 
as the most fundamental part of the world, cementing together both 
'ideas' and 'reality', and the social relations between men. They 
provide, in fact, all of the crucial links between the various 
components of the world - men, reality, ideas, relations, language, etc. 
- and can thus be seen, in a very real sense, as the 'essence' of 
reality. Winch establishes this position by arguing that in order to 
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understand the fact that a concept can be used to refer to 'the same' 
object on different occasions of its use, it is-necessary to unravel 
precisely what is involved in the concept of 'the same'. What is it 
that establishes the fact that the word or concept is used in 'the 
same' way? Winch answers that 
"It is only in terms of a given rule that we can attach 
a specific sense to the words 'the same'. " (70) 
Thus the problem of adequate reference is really a problem about what 
is involved in following a rule. In this way the link between 'ideas' 
and 'reality' is established. 
This, in turn, leads one to speculate about rules. It is necessary 
to uncover whatever it is that characterises a 'rule'. Winchis answer 
here is that 
"the notion of following a rule is logically inseparable 
from the notion of making a mistake. " (71) 
Thus the defining characteristic of a rule is that behaviour that is 
intendedly in-accord with it must, in principle, be able to be shown 
as Imistakenly' following the rule. It must be possible that a rule 
follower, whilst intending to follow the rule, does not in fact do so. 
This leads on to a consideration of what is involved in the notion of 
'making a mistake'. Winch's point here is that 
"if I make a mistake in, say, my use of a word, other 
people must be able to point it out to me. If this is 
not so, I can do what I like and there is no external 
check on what I do; that is, nothing is established. 
Establishing a standard is not an activity which it makes 
sense to ascribe to any individual in complete isolation 
from other individuals. " (72) 
What Winch is trying to demonstrate here is that the whole notion 
of making a mistake, which is in turn critical in understanding the 
nature of rules, is dependent upon the social relations between men. 
Rules, he is saying, are essentially social phenomena - they cannot be 
conceived of apart from a context within society. It is thus the case 
that the social relations between men account for the ideas which we 
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have about reality in as much as 'concepts' depend upon 'rules' of 
correct use in order that they be used in the *same'-way, and those 
rules, in their turn, depend upon the social relations between men. 
At the same time, the social relations between men depend upon the ideas 
that men have about reality - indeed-"social relations are expressions 
of his ideas about reality". (73) The whole-that Winch is suggesting 
the world should be seen as, is thus'a neatly interlocking circle of 
elements knitted together by rules. 
The first point of interest for the present discussion is one made, 
in a different context, by Apel. (74) He points out that for Winch, 
rules are the a priori presupposition of meaning and understanding in 
the social world. He quotes the following passage to make the point 
"The behaviour of Chaucer's Troilus towards Cressida is 
intelligible only in the context of the conventions of 
courtly love. Understanding Troilus presupposes 
understanding those conventions, for it is from them 
that his acts derive their meaning. " (75) 
Thus the presbpposition of $meaning' is to be conceived of in terms 
of $rules'. This. becomes more clearly evident if one considers the 
relationship between concepts and reality in terms of rules - 1.6. the 
meaning of the concept itself depends upon the rules of its use. 
It should not be thought, however, that the sense of presupposition 
that is involved here is the same as that which characterizes Garfinkel's 
work. For Garfinkel the presupposition of 'meaning', of 'rationality', 
and so on is conceptualised in terms of the assumptions, ' practices and 
procedures which enable social order. His notion of 'formal structuresl 
is directed towards that level of social structure which enables 
$agreement' about what is the case, and this is to be seen as prior to 
the 'normative', Imeaningfull rules which we encounter within our 
social environment and which Parsons suggests should be seen as 
providing a solution to the problem of social order. Winch, on the 
other hand, sees trulest as the presupposition of Imeaningl because they 
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directly determine what is to be considered 'correct$ or 'incorrect', 
'meaningful' or ? non-meaningful' behaviour or action, for actors in 
the social world. Such rules are themselves 'meaningful' objects 
within the social world, and it is this that enables them to be the 
presupposition of 'meaning'. The level of social structure which 
Garfinkel's concept is directed towards is not considered, and, indeed, 
that level is the presupposition of the 'meaningful' rules that Winch 
does consider. This point can be made more precise by looking in more 
detail at Winch's concept of trulet. 
In spite of the fact that Winch's rules do so much work within his 
system, he makes no attempt to differentiate different senses of the 
concept. Social conventions, rules for deciding adequate reference, the 
rules of science, the rules of religious practice and so on are all 
essentially similar in as much as their defining characteristic is that 
one can be mistaken in following them. It is their social character 
that makes them rules. 
It is at this point that Winch's conflation of Ilanguage game' and 
'form of life' becomes significant. According to Winch, there are a 
lot of different forms of life -a religion, for example, is a form 
of life - and these each have their own language games. The two 
concepts are the same in, as much as both should be seen in terms of 
'rules', and such rules are all of the same type. What the precise 
relationship between language games and forms of life is, is not 
discussed, one presumes, because of the identity between them. - 
What these two points add up to - the conflation of language game 
and form of life, and the sameness of all rules - is that the sense 
of 'rules' that does not imply interpretation, which Wittgenstein 
speaks about, is not examined. Wittgenstein's remarks are worth 
reproducing again here 
"This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined 
by a rule, because every course of action can be made out 
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to accord with the rule ..... What this shews is 
that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not 
an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we 
call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in 
actual cases. " (76) 
This sense of rule, I have argued, is connected with Wittgenstein's 
notion of bedrock which in turn is related to a 'form of lifet as 
that point at which justification stops and the spade is turned. It 
is related to that stage of justification at which we simply say "this 
is what we do". 
That Winch is not interested in this sense of Orulesl becomes 
apparent when he insists that there must always be the-possibility of 
$reflection' upon a rule since 
"Without this possibility we are dealing not with 
meaningful behaviour but with something which is either 
mere response to stimuli or the manifestation of a 
habit which is really blind. " (77) 
That this possibility Of Ireflectiont means that the rule must be able 
to be interpreted is demonstrated when he says of people who, in times 
of intense social change or who find themselves in foreign environments, 
that 
"questions of interpretation and consistency, that is, 
matters for reflection, are bound to arise for anyone 
who has to deal with a situation foreign to his previous 
experience. " (78) 1 
In other words, the whole notion of 'making a mistake' in following a 
rule which is the defining characteristic of 'rule' is at the same 
time bound up with the fact that 'rules' are Ifollowedl,, or at'least 
can be followed, intentionally. This, means that rules can be, and 
must be, interpreted in some way by an actor if that actor is to 
behavelmeaningfullyl., The Imeaningfulnesst of the behaviour depends 
upon the fact that the actor is following/interpreting trulest., and 
in terms of the rules thatheis following/interpreting his behaviour can 
be understood as meaningful by an observer. The trick, for the sociologist 
or for anyone else who would understand'someone's actions, is to grasp 
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the rules in terms of which an actor is acting. 
The fact that Winch chooses to treat rules in this way means 
that he is involved in denying the sense of Orulet that does not 
involve 'interpretation'. The result of this is, as Wittgenstein 
pointed out, that since all behaviour can be-shown to be in accord with 
several different rules, and since the same rule can be 'correctly' 
interpreted such as to yield entirely different actions , the notion 
of 'rule' itself, as a key to understanding and explaining action, 
becomes of dubious value. An account of human action at this level 
can only be - as Garfinkel points out at length in relation to Parsons 
-a 'normative' account, a point which, as I will go on to show in a 
moment, Louch takes up and develops. 
If this notion of rule is translated back, for a moment, into 
the terms of Garfinkel's concerns as they emerged in the previous 
chapter, it becomes apparent that if Winch were to attempt to account 
for social order in terms of his notion of 'rule', he would be committed 
to saying that such order is the result of actors following trulest - 
which are social conventions etc. - in "the samd1way, Presumably 
they would do this either because the rules were 'sacredly regardedl, 
or because 'making a mistake$ was a sanctionable matter. The probelm 
of "agreement" about objects, which Garfinkel sees as the most 
fundamental problem, is also handled in terms of these 'rules, in as 
much as the problem of the adequate reference of a concept is treated 
with reference to 'rules' and to social relations between men. The 
level of structure that Garfinkel aimed at, characterised as it is by 
concerns with taken for grantedness, normality, constitutive expectancies 
and so on, is just not present, and could not be present given the notion 
of 'rule' that Winch is working with, and the fact that 'forms of life$ 
have become synonomous with 'language game'. There is no room for a 
notion of 'rule' that does not involve $interpretation'. 
From this it becomes clear just what the difference is between the 
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sense in which Winch's rules are the presupposition of meaning, and 
the sense in which Garfinkel's constitutive structure is. For Winch 
they are the presupposition of meaning because they are themselves 
'meaningful' in the sense that they can in principle become the object 
of reflection, and thus can be interpreted either rightly or wrongly. 
They are, as it were, meaningful Ithings' that sit within a culture 
and provide the focal points on which actors can hand their understandings 
of behaviour and in terms of which they orient their actions. For 
Garfinkel, on the other hand, the constitutive structure is the 
presupposition of meaning and of rational action because some agreement 
about 'objects', and some degree of tnormalityl is a necessary precondition 
for any meaningful action, including the following and interpretation 
of rules. At the level of structure at which Garfinkel is aiming, it 
makes no sense to say that the rules are, even in principle, 
interpretable. Rather, the sense of rule with which he is engaged is 
that which does not involve interpretation - which is simply 'what we 
do', i. e. the bedrock. 
Although there is no space to go into the question here, it would 
seem that many of the difficulties concerning "relativism" that have 
been pointed out in Winch's position stem from precisely his failure 
to consider a sense of rule that does not involve 'interpretation'. 
For example, the possibility of mediation between language games or 
forms of life, as Winch uses the terms, becomes problematic precisely 
because what grounds those gamesis never considered. (79) If, for 
example, constitutive expectancies are common to all games, as Garfinkel 
claims, and if some way could be found to describe the constitutive 
structures or formal structures of practical actions, then an insight 
might be possible into the relationships between language games, 
cultural groups, and even cultures. Whether or not this proves 
possible or not is, evidently, an empirical matter. On a theoretical 
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level, however, the acceptance of 'form of life' as distinct from 
'language games', and the positing of a sense of 'rule' that-does not 
involve 'interpretation', can be seen as not ruling out the possibility 
for mediation between cultures on apriori grounds, but, on the contrary, 
as inviting the possibility of an empirical investigation into what 
is involved in it. ' Formal structures, in a much as they are the 
presupposition of meaning, are not necessarily tied to the specific 
meanings of any particular culture, (although some of them may turn out 
to be). The challenge is to find a way of making such formal 
properties of interaction visible in different cultural settings 
independently of specific meanings, and to see to what extent 
similarities and differences obtain. (80) The result could well be 
insight into both the possibility of cross cultural communication and into 
some of the reasons for its breakdown in specific instances. 
With these remarks I want now to leave the work of Winch and move 
on to look at Louch's writing. His work has far more in common with 
the interpretation of Wittgenstein put forward in chapter three above 
than does that of Winch. Nonetheless for that his vision of sociology, 
and the premises upon which that vision are based, differs in'important 
and revealing ways from that of Garfinkel. 
Louch puts forward his thesis thus: 
"The thesis I shall advance ... is simply this: when we 
offer explanations of human behaviour, we are seeing that 
behaviour as justified by the circumstances in which it 
occurs. Explanation of human action is moral explanation". (81) 
The thrust of his argument is aimed against the craving for generality 
which leads one to believe that human behaviour can be explahed in 
terms of general laws and theories. Such a model of explanation, he 
claims, imported as it is from theories of explanation in physics and 
natural science, is quite inappropriate when applied to the study of 
human action, where what is being studied is inherently meaningful. 
The very fact of identifying an action as an action means that we have 
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already begun to engage in 'moral explanation' since to see behaviour 
as action involves placing it within some context -a moral context of 
intentions, motives, etc. - in order to make sense of it. The social 
scientist is not confronted by inert, atomistic data, and to suppose 
that he is, is to mistake the whole thrust of social life and the 
moral texture which makes it what it is. Thus to try to treat social 
action in terms of general laws - to give in to the craving for generality 
- is to miss the fact that any explanation of human action, whether by 
a member of society or by a professional social scientist, is a matter 
of presenting "features of the background as justifying or providing 
grounds for the action. " (82) 
Louch reaches this position by emphasising the anti-essentialist 
tfamily resemblancest notion in Wittgenstein's work without getting 
caught up in the sorts of concerns with language games and forms of 
life which characterise Winch's work. That is not to say, however, 
that the notion of 'language game' is not important to Louch, since 
it does indeed hold a central position in as much as his interest 
focuses upon the ways in which concepts are used within different 
contexts. Nonetheless his concern with such Igamest is with the way in 
which they illustrate the immense variety of uses a concept or word 
can be put to, rather than with suggesting that the social scientist 
should be engaged in investigating the 'rules', embedded within 
language games/forms of life, which provide the lessencel, as it were, 
of the social world. Where Winch seeks out the rules that cement ideas, 
reality, social relations, language etc., together, Louch sets-out to 
question any such cement: the concept trulet does not refer to 'things, 
in the social world, but it is a word that is used with a sense within 
different contexts. Just as Wittgenstein argues that it is of no use 
to look for the essence of the concept tgamel since the word is used 
with a sense in a variety of ways, so Louch is suggesting that the social 
scientists! search for the essence of human action in terms of general 
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laws, rules, motives, desires, intentions, causes and the rest, is 
a misbegotten enterprise. Action is always explained within some 
context or other, he claims, and the form of the explanation is 
Imorall - i. e. a process of providing grounds that can be seen as 
justifying the action, and which 'entitle' the actor to act as he did. 
There are neither causal nor logical stories to be'told about actions. 
What is of interest about Louch's position here, for our purposes, 
is not any ý'f the host of things which Gellner found so offensive, (83) 
but the ways in which his view of social science articulates with 
Garfinkelts views on the Inormativel nature of most sociology. This 
can be shown by looking at Louchts account of Ifunctionalismt. 
Louch claims that just as Wittgenstein recommended that the 
philosopher should ask not for the meaning but for the use of a concept, 
so the anthropologist (and by implication sociologist (84)) should 
look at the uses of social institutions. This, he suggests, would 
generate a so-tt of functionalist analysis within sociology which, like 
the functionalism of Malinowski, placed social institutions within 
the context of the whole culture and which did not, therefore, make the 
mistake of unwarrentedly treating social phenomena as isolated from 
one another. Admittedly, he says, functional analysis is a Inormativel 
enterprise in the sense that it is bound up with particular perspectives 
upon the society or institution being studied, but then "anthropology 
is a normative discipline! '(as he puts it), 
"in the sense that its inquiries are shaped by concepts 
like conventiOtL and procedures like the tracing of 
grounds for action. " (85) 
There will be more than one way to trace grounds for action, and 
more than one convention that explains the function of an institution, 
and which ones one uses to describe a given society will depend upon 
many factors. But these are just things that the anthropologist must 
learn to live with. It is inevitable in examining human action and 
institutions, which are already meaningful before the sociologist comes 
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along to study them, that one will use moral terms over the course of 
describing them. "Talk about human institutions and. practices is already 
a moral cutting of the empirical cake" as Louch puts it. (86) This, 
however, is no problem in itself. It only becomes a difficulty once the 
social scientist tries to pretend that his Iscientificl ways of dealing 
with social phenomena somehow overcome the necessarily moral nature of 
his description of society, since at that point he becomes involved in 
self deception. 
What is most interesting here is that Louch has reached, from a 
Wittgensteinian position, the same conclusions about social science as 
it is practiced, as Garfinkel, does in the Parsons Primer starting from 
more or less phenomenological background. Both are insistant upon the 
essentially normative status of any description of meaningful social 
action or of meaningful social institutions. The directions in which 
the two writers go from there, however, are radically different. Where 
Garfinkel, as a working social scientist, sees this as a fundamental 
problem for sociology which precludes the possibility of ever finding 
an adequate descriptive solution to the problem of social order unless 
or until someone comes up with an alternative way of handling social 
phenomena, Louch, as a philosopher, is content to provide an account 
of the status of sociological explanation as he sees it and as it already 
is. Where Garfinkel is interested in unravelling just what the 
implications of these problems of description are for the empirically 
oriented social scientist, Louch seeks to prevent sociologists from 
attempting to program people into becoming fit material for Walden Two 
(87) since they will realise that social scientific knowledge is not 
of the kind that will enable this to be done. (88) Put in another 
way, what Louch does is to provide an excellent account of some of what 
Garfinkel sees as being the matter with contemporary sociology. 
Louch, then, focuses his attention on problems, oftmeaning' in. the 
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social sciences, and provides a model of explanation of action at that 
level which he considers to be adequate for social phenomena. The 
possibilities contained in the notion of a 'form-of lifel remain 
unconsidered on his account so that the area which Garfinkel sees as 
potentially useful in the study of society is not investigated at all. 
It is here that the fundamental difference between Louch and Garfinkel 
becomes apparent. 
That said, however, there are undoubtedly strong affinities 
between the two writers. Garfinkel's insistence upon the work in 
progress nature of ethnomethodology, his stress upon the indexicality 
of expressions, of the situated character of talk, of the essential 
reflexivity of accounts and so on are all reflections of his view of 
the nature of language - as something used with a point - and that 
view, as I have shown above, squares well with the aspects of 
Wittgensteints thinking which Louch gives the most weighti The way in 
which*both Garfinkel and Louch conceptualise 'meaning' and 'language$ 
are fundamentally the same - the difference comes once the implications 
of this are drawn for the study of social life. 
In this section I have examined the work of two philosophers 
who have drawn upon the work of Wittgenstein in one way or another. I 
have tried to show how the ways in which they interpret that work 
results in very different conceptualisations of sociology with Winch's 
concentration upon $language games' as Iforms of life* generating a 
focus upon 'rules', whilst Louch's radical attack upon the 'craving 
for generality$ leads him to suggest that functionalist explanation is 
the most appropriate one for the social sciences. Whilst they differ 
from each other, they also diverge in interesting and illuminating ways 
from the position that Garfinkel takes up. At least in part this 
divergence should be seen as the result of philosophical concerns 
taking precedence over more specifically social scientific interests 
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which focus more upon the possibility of empirical investigations 
of social phenomena. The influence of Wittgenstein's work is not, 
however, confined to philosophers of the social sciences, and I want 
now to move on to examine some of the work that has been done by 
sociologists that builds upon the work of both Wittgenstein and 
Garfinkel in an attempt to come to grips with the social world. I will 
look first at the work of Blum and Mchugh. 
b) CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
The interest of the work of Blum and Mchugh for present purposes 
is two fold. In the first place, they can be seen as attempting to 
develop a form of sociology which builds upon Garfinkel's insights, 
but which does not leave itself as impotent as the type of work which 
Weider and Zimmerman have engaged in. Rather than simply reproduce 
Garfinkelian conceptualizations in ethnographic studies, they, develop 
other aspects of Garfinkel's thought, particularly the notion that 
the fundamental consideration when thinking about society is to give 
due weight to presuppositional practices and procedures, and develop 
them into a moral critique of 'positivism' and the suciety which makes 
positivism possible as a way of life. Thus, in a sense, their work 
is a reaction against a particular version of what to do with 
Garfinkel's thoughts, and one which seeks to enableýthe sociologist 
to commit himself to a critique of society rather, than simply describing 
aspects of it as it already is. 
This work is also interesting, in that it develops Garfinkel's 
notions in a direction which articulates them with Wittgenstein's 
notion of a $form of life'. Garfinkel's practices and procedures 
are conceptualised directly in terms of a form of life, thus making 
explicit a link between the work of the two men that has been suggested 
above. The way in which this link is exploited, however, seems to lead 
to a position which Garfinkel himself would not want to espouse, in 
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which empirical work becomes a subsidiary enterprise within the 
overall conceptualisation of sociology as 'theorizing' rather than as 
a fundamental task of the sociologist. I will suggest that to develop 
Carfinkel's ideas in this direction results, ultimately, in an 
unsatisfactory position. 
The early work of Blum and Mchugh is characterised by a dual 
focus. On the one hand there is a concentration upon some of the themes 
that exercise Garfinkel - namely an analysis of social phenomena from 
a point of view that looks for the ways, in which they are related to 
taken for granted background knowledge, and to the practices, procedures 
and activities that make up everyday life. On the other hand there is 
a concern with 'theorizing', as an activity engaged inby members of a 
society, which seeks to investigate what makes it possible as a practice. 
It is the interpenetration of these two concerns that leads towards 
the distinctive form of theorising that characterises some of their most 
recent work. -I will illustrate each of the two themes in turn before 
directing attention towards the approach to social phenomena that emerges 
from "On the Beginhing of Social Inquiry", (hereafter "Beginnings") a 
characteristic recent work. 
The concern with practices and procedures, and with the rules-in 
terms of which these are oriented, is readily visible in the studies 
which Blum and Mchugh carry out into-deviancy. Here they argue against 
a view of deviancy that sees it as some Ithingg which can be studied 
in isolation from the way in which the label 'deviant' is attached to 
some particular person. It is not, for example, the fact that deviancy 
hasteffects' in the world - it'may cost a lot - that accounts for it 
being 'deviance'. As Mchugh points out 
"criminality as deviance does not depend on costing a 
fortune; it could occur and be so designated whether it 
cost much or little. Members do not treat deviance 
pragmatically, according to what are thought to be its 
consequences. In this regard deviance is typically a 
moral matter. " (89) 
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Neither is it the case that there is some set of isolable criteria 
that could be listed as the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the identification of some deviant act. With 'mental illness', for 
example, behaviour that is perfectly acceptable in one situation - for 
example graving hysterically' at the news that ones family has just 
been killed in a car accident - may in another context be considered a 
symptom of illness - for example $raving hysterically' in phone boxes 
outside of Columbia University. (90) If one is to come to some 
understanding of deviance, then what must be investigated is not 
some 'thing', but the ways in which deviance as a label, is actually 
ascribed to some person or act. It is the ways in which members of a 
society 'constitute' an act as deviant that is important - as Blum puts 
it in the case of mental illness 
"mental illness is possible because members, in very small 
and ordinary ways, trqat certain behaviour as "mentally ill" 
and collaboratively develop systematic ways of recognizing, 
categorizing, and acting upon such behaviour. Mental 
illness -is also possible because those who produce such 
behaviour learn methodically to produce treatments of 
themselves and others that confirm such categorizations. 
As sociologists, our task is not to accept such actions as 
"givens", but rather to describe how they are possible. " (91) 
The object of the study of deviance, therl, is. to describe those 
practices of recognizing, categorizing, and so on, which make, for 
example, mental illness possible rather than simply accepting that there 
is some 'thing' which is deviance, which would yield to investigation, 
if only one could develop criteria of recognition and methods for 
studying it. 
It should be noticed that at this early stage, the possibility of 
empirical investigation of Imemberst methods' is considered to be 
important. Blum, for example, stresses that the questions he is 
raising concerned with Imental illness' should not be seen as purely 
theoretical issues. 
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"These are not philosophic questions; rather, answers 
to them can be achieved only through research. " (92) 
Mchugh, similarly, in his earliest published book "Defining the Situation" 
is involved in trying to give empirical descriptions of the practices 
and procedures that members of a society use when they define a 
situation such that it comes to have some 'meaning'. As with 
Garfinkel's work, he is interested not in the specific meanings that 
some particular member of society may give to some particular event or 
set of events, but rather in the ways in which they manage to give 
meaning to a situation at all. Thus he sums up what he has tried to 
do in the book by saying: 
"I have attempted to show that although different actors 
may construct substantively different particular definitions, 
they proceed by invoking the same devices, mechanisms, and 
so on, and this leads to recognizable contours of definition 
even among subjects who are talking about grossly different 
things. " (93) 
It was an attempt to show just this that motivated the -complex 
laboratory experiment - which, by the way, is the same one which Garfinkel 
reports in Chapter 3 of "Studies" in relation to his remarks on the 
documentary method of interpretation - that provides the main substance 
of the book, as well as the material for detailed and insightful 
descriptions of members' practices and procedures. 
In spite of the focus upon member's practices and procedures, 
however, the work of Blum and Mchugh does not simply copy Garfinkel's 
orientation towards social phenomena. Where Garfinkel's concern is 
with describing the constitutive expectancies and assumptions that 
make up the natural attitude, conceiving of practices and procedures 
in the light of this concern, Blum and Mchugh move instead to 
Wittgenstein and to the concept of 'form of life' to provide the 
framework for their work. Thus, where Garfinkel describes his own 
enterprise in terms of 'breaching assumptions' or in terms of 
'familiarity', 'normality', 'typicality' and so on - Blum and Mchugh 
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consider themselves to be describing or investigating a 'form of lifA 
There is a quite conscious use of Wittgensteints work which merges it 
with some of Garfinkel's ideas about'social life. Take, for example, 
the following quotation from Mchughts "Defining the Situation", where 
he is setting out his purpose in the study in-terms of describing a 
form of life, or the 'bedrock'. 
"This is not so metaphysical as it seems if by bedrock 
we mean some content which helps solve the problem of a 
discipline - in sociology if it connects with the problem 
of social order. it is then not to be explained by some 
other notion, but rather only to be described because it 
is an element of social order and requires no further justification. 
It is in this sense a form of life, a rendering of an event 
that needs no further grounds. To explain a form of life in 
terms of something else is to revise the question it was 
intended to answer, with the result that the description is 
not the same answer either. One is playing a different game. " (94) 
Thus, the practices that are to be described should be conceived of in 
terms of forms of life, where 'form of life' refers to the 'grounds, 
or 'bedrock'. The concern is not with lassumptions' or with the natural 
attitude, but with Igroundsl - with that which is the bedrock, and 
which cannot be explained in terms of something else. To solve the 
sociological problem of order, which, in common with Garfinkel, they 
see as of central importance, these grounds must be described. 
That this difference in emphasis is not inconsequential can be 
illustrated by looking at Blum's discussion of 'mental illness' - which 
also, it must be emphasised, uses the concept of 'form of life' 
extensively. The section which is most interesting here, is one in 
which he is attempting to investigate the ascription of 'mental 
illness' by looking at the ways in which verdicts of 'not guilty by 
reason of insanity, are reached by jurors in court room situations. 
His argument, which draws on Cavell, is that when someone makes a 
statement to the effect that someone is tnot guilty by reason of 
insanity', it is not the case that such a statement stands on its own, 
without anything else being implied. By saying that someone is tinsanel 
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one implies a host of 'things about the social organization which 
enables certain people to be so labelled. Each frulet that one 
uncovers on the basis of which a 'not guilty by reason of insanity' 
verdict is reached, ramifies out, having implications for the rest of 
society. As Blum puts it 
"Each rule that we locate specifies a different set of 
implications of saying that the defendent is NGI: such 
implications are not consequences or results, but rather, 
each constitutes a different culturally accredited set 
of grounds for producing such a statement. The quasi- 
necessary relation between grounds and designation is 
described in a rule (like a rule of usage) which says: you 
cannot legitimately call the defendant NGI without 
implying that you conceive of him in such and such a way. " (95) 
Where Garfinkel's concentration upon assumptions, expectancies, rules 
and practices leads him eventually to formulate the notion of the 
'formal structures of practical action', which seeks to abstract formal 
elements from typical, normal everyday orderlylife, in order to solve- 
the problem of order, Blum's attention turns instead to the fact that, 
any rule that is uncovered, however abstract and forma 1, has implications 
for the whole organization of society. Any statement, any rule, any 
practice is possible only because of the 'form of life' of which it is 
a part, and thus those statements, rules, and practices, imply that 
form of life, and in turn are made possible by it. 
In this the first of the two themes that can be found in Blum and 
Mchughts early work, the, the notion of practices, procedures and rules 
which owes much to Garfinkel's influence, is set against a different 
backdrop with the Wittgensteinian notion of a form of life. The effect 
of this is to direct attention towards 'grounds' and 'bedrock', and 
to the interconnectedness and mutual dependence between grounds and 
whatever those grounds make possible - for example deviancy. Thus what 
it is that they consider themselves to be investigating is, in the 
final analysis, a form of life. The object of sociology is to describe 
that. Where Garfinkel's interest focused by a concern with assumptions, 
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expectations and the problem of order, moves towards seeing practices 
and procedures in abstraction, Blum and Mchugh insist upon the 
connectedness between all social phenomena. 
The second concern of the two men is with 'theory' and Itheorising'. 
Here the central considerations are generated from their insistance 
that 1. knowledge is socially organised, and 2. that there are no 
context independent criteria for 'truth'. I will deal with these points 
briefly in turn. 
A focus on the 'social organisation of knowledge$ is a way of 
stressing the fact that all knowledge depends upon the rule-sand 
procedures on the basis of which it is constituted as a body of knowledge. 
The point is the same as Kaufmann's - knowledge, in the sense of a body 
of knowledge, is to be considered a 'corpust, and not as a set of more 
or less independent propositions, each of which gains its validity from 
the fact of its correspondence with some hypothesised 'reality'. Blum 
puts the point thus 
"We intend "social organization of knowledge" in this sense: 
that knowledge is organized and assembled methodically by 
actors acting under the auspices of some conception of an 
adequate corpus of knowledge as a maxim of conduct. " (96) 
What would normally be considered 'criteria' of 'adequate knowledge, - 
for example 'correspondencel, or 'consistency' - are nothing more than 
$maxims of conduct'. The 'objectivity' of knowledge cannot be 
guaranteed by such criteria since a 'corpus' is not some 'thing' 
that stands in relation to some other 'thing' - reality - but is the 
result of methods-and procedures, and should be seen as such. Knowledge 
is something that is done. 
The second point - that there are no independent criteria for 
truth - is well brought out in Mchugh's discussion of positivism. Here 
he looks at various accounts of what 'truth' is in terms of 
correspondence and coherence theories of truth. His point is made thus: 
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"We must accept that there are no adequate grounds for 
establishing criteria of truth except the grounds that 
are employed to grant or concede it - truth is 
conceivable only as a socially organized upshot of contingent 
courses of linguistic, conceptual, and social courses of 
behaviour. " (97) 
Truth is not something 'substantive' -a 'something' which one strives 
for - but rather it is "an institutional grammar" (98) where "grammar" 
is intended to highlight the fact that "an event is transformed into 
the truth only by the application of a canon of procedure, a canon that 
truth-seekers use and analysts must formulate as providing the 
possibility of agreement". (99) Truth, as with 'knowledge', is thus 
'socially organizedt and not an independent 'something'. 
The thrust of this view of 'truth' and 'knowledge' is not far from 
that which characterises Garfinkel's work. Like Garfinkel, for example, 
Blum and Mchugh at this stage consider that a sociological theory should 
be seen as a sense transforming operation. Thus 
"The possible society is a procedure for imposing a 
sense upon the materials available to us; the 
"possible" character of the society consists in the 
fact that it is the product of a sense-transforming 
operation. " (100) 
The way in which the implications of this are drawn out in relation to 
theorizing, however, departs once again from Garfinkel's position, 
and again because of the relationship of 'theorizing' to a 'form of life'. 
Blum states the "main thrust" of his essay of "Theorizing" by 
saying that it is 
"directed to proposing that an understanding of theorizing 
is an understanding of a, form of life, and thatthis form 
of life constitutes a particular method for treating and 
reconstructing one's biography as a practically conceived 
corpus of knowledge. " (101) 
There are two aspects to this notion of theorizing. On the one hand, 
there is the assertion that theorizing is crucially tied to a 'form 
of life' in as much as the kind of theorizing one engages in 'displays' 
ones form of life. In the same way that it was noted above that a state- 
ment that ascribes $insanity', for example, implies that which grounds 
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and makes possible that statement, so with theorizing - any actual 
theorizing displays and is dependent upon the form of life which grounds 
it. On the other hand, a second aspect of theorizing is that it 
provides a perspective for $seeing' whatever it is that is being theorized. 
For example, if one is theorizing about 'society' then the 'possible 
societies' that one delimits with ones theorizing provide possible ways 
forl'seeing" what is experienced as 'society'. There are no criteria 
for the Itruthl of ones vision - theorizing, Knowledge and truth are not 
the kind of tthings' for which that would be possible. 
There is, then, a dual nature to 'theorizing'. It both displays 
the form of life which makes it possible, whilst at the same time 
providing a perspective upon that same form of life which enables it in 
the first place. It both 'expresses' the form of life, and at the same 
time 'organizes' it. It is, crucially, grounded in the form of life, 
which makes it possible. Once again, this view of theory has moved 
away from that of Garfinkel, whose central concerns are with the rules, 
practices and procedures which, in relation to the problem of order, 
generate a theory, rather than with the 'form of life' as a whole of 
which those practices and procedures are considered, by Blum and Mchugh, 
to be a part. Once again, Blum and Mchugh have gone one stage further 
than Garfinkel by using the form of life concept to point out the 
interdependence between practices, grounds, rules, theories, statements 
and so on. Where Garfinkel wants to uncover the 'rules' that underlie 
theories, treating such rules, practices and procedures as more or less 
identifiable and discrete in the sense that 'formal structures' can be 
analysed empirically by the social scientist, Blum and Mchugh emphasise 
that what grounds theories cannot be treated in this way, but that the 
complexity of the tforms of life' is in the interpenetration of theorizing 
and form of life; that is an inescapable feature of all theorizing. 
This, then, is the position that characterizes Blum and Mchughts 
-289- 
early work, and it provides the conditions for the development of 
their perspective. The motivation behind this development can be seen, 
I think, in terms of the following considerations. 
Firstly, it is evident that on their own account, all theorizing, 
and all speech is grounded in some form of life. This form of life 
is a unity, in the sense that any particular statement or ascription - 
of deviancy or mental illness for example - implies a gamut of social 
organization and practices. Thus any speech, theory, theory about 
theory, statement etc., etc. is made possible by the unity which is 
the form of life which grounds it. Thus, in order to investigate some 
particular version of theorizing, for example the "Positivist" version, 
it is necessary to examine the form of life, as a unity, which grounds 
it, and which is displayed in that theorizing. Their concern with 
'grounds' is reflected in the following remarks alout their new 
position 
"In contrast, we are currently interested in grounds of 
clarity or language as they become disclosed through any 
method or speech, whereas these grounds themselves are not 
the end (as if a determinant solution) but the beginning 
which authorises the very problem of motive, or method, 
or whatever. " (102) 
Not only are the solutions to a theoretical problem, as theories, 
grounded in a form of life, but the concern with just these problems, 
as opposed to some other possible problems, is also so grounded. In 
other words, the whole possibility of speech is grounded in a form of 
life. 
Two further points flow from this. In the first place, it is 
evident that their own speech is itself grounded in some form of life, 
which makes it possible. This means that their own form of theorizing 
displays their form of life, in the same way that positivist theorizing 
displays the form of life which makes it possible. Thus, to be true to 
their own position, they must use speech reflexively, in the sense that 
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they must be aware of displaying their own grounds and must constantly 
question their own 'auspices'. They express this in relation to their 
earlier paper on 'motive' thus 
"In that paper we exempt our own talk from the same 
consideration - as speech requiring some relation to 
language - by absorbing it under notions of rule, 
grammar etc. Rule, grammar, theoreticity, and other 
dimensions used in the paper are descriptive versions of 
auspices, whereas the question we might now ask is what 
kind of world would make motive talk intelligible and 
interesting? That question would require that we address 
our own interest in motive talk, that we address the fact 
that we find such talk interesting. " (103) 
This dialectical element to the kind of theorizing they are interested 
in -a form of theorizing which is aware of its own gm unds - is central 
to their book "Beginnings". 
The second point which is generated from their concern with grounds, 
concerns the relationship between different forms of life. In their 
earlier work, as I have pointed out, they are crucially concerned with 
the social organization of both knowledge and truth. The upshot of 
these concerns is that it makes no sense to think in terms of knowledge 
or truth as somehow distinct from the practices and procedures which 
provide for it. This, evidently, means that the form of life which they 
display in their theorizing cannot be held up as somehow containing 
a 'truth' which alternative modes of theorizing have not grasped. 
'Truth' is internal to some particular form of life. At the same time, 
however, their early concern with the fact that 'deviance' is constituted 
by rules and practices, within society, and that these rules and practices 
themselves implicate the whole of a form of life, means that any attempt 
to solve problems such as deviance must involve changing the form of life 
which makes them possible. A concern with deviance, or with any other 
aspect of society which is in some way undesirable, is transformed by 
the concern with grounds into a question about the form of life which 
makes it possible at, all. Thus, in spite of the fact that a critique of 
the 'positivist' form of life which makes these things possible cannot 
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be held up as 'truth' in some transcendent sense of the word, such a 
critique is nonetheless necessary and desirable simply because it is 
a way of providing an alternative to the existing form of life. Heritage 
has made this point well when he writes that 
"the work of Mchugh and his collaborators implies a timeless 
moral critique which must penetrate to the very foundations 
of social life, and which must ask such questions as: Is a 
society which is capable of creating deviance worth living 
in? Or: Is a society which does not create deviance 
possible? It is thus no surprise to find that analysis 
and moral questions are inextricably interwined in the studies 
under review. " (104) 
What Blum and Mchugh do, then, is to set up the relationship between 
their own form of theorizing and that of the 'positivist' form of life 
which makes, among other things, Ideviancet possible, in terms of a 
'commitment' to a form of life. Anyone who speaks must be committed 
to some form of life - there is some grounds for the way he speaks and 
theorizes - and their intention is to display an alternative form of 
life as alternative grounds, and to recommend committment to thatas 
an alternative to positivism. 
It is important to emphasise the extent to which these new 
conceptions have moved away from lethnomethodology'. Their concern 
with 'grounds' as opposed to members' practices and procedures have 
taken them a long way from the sorts of studies that Garfinkel, for 
example, is engaged in. They state the position themselves thus: 
"Ethnomethodology seeks to 'rigorously describe' ordinary 
usage, and despite its significant transformations of 
standards for conceiving of and describing such usage, it 
still conducts its inquiries under the auspices of a 
concrete, positivistic conception of adequacy. , 
Ethnomethodology conceives of such descriptions of usage 
as analytic Isolutionst to their tasks, whereas our 
interest is in the production of the idea which makes any 
conception of relevant usage itself possible. " (105) 
Blum and Mchugh have thus abandoned their earlier concern with 
description, and at the same time have come to see empirical research 
of any kind as nothing but a reflection of positivist grounds. To carry 
out empirical work is to display ones commitment to positivist auspices - 
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to be committed to analysis is to reject such commitment. 
I want now to turn to their book "On the Beginning Of Social 
Inquiry" to illustrate the way in which they actually go about analyzing 
the positivist form of life. By way of an introduction to this 
discussion it is worth while to consider the way in which the book was 
written. 
In order to ensure that the reflexivity and awareness of grounds 
which their form of dialectical theorizing demands is actually realized, 
the book is written as a collaborative enterprise. In order to speak at 
all (or in this case to write) it is necessary to forget the grounds 
which make it possible. Those grounds are displayed in the speech, but 
are not, and cannot be, captured by it. What is written is thus, in 
their terms, an 'inadequate' representation of its grounds, and since 
it is grounds that they are interested in, their speech must always 
fail to reach that which it is aimed at - i. e. its own grounds. 
Therefore, a second paper is written about the first which shows the 
way in which the first paper misses its own point - as they put it, 
the collaborators 
"serve to formulate for us the inadequacy of our speech 
by showing how it is a surface reflection of pur auspices. 
By formulating our speech they allow us to be committed 
both to speaking and to the reflexive character of analysis. 
Collaborators remind us of that which we have to forget in 
order to speak. " (106) 
Without such collaborators they would not be able to say anything at all, 
since what they were trying to say would be 'forgotten' in the writing 
of it. 
As well as being a collaborative enterprise, the book is not 
considered to be a statement as such. Because any statement is, for them, 
a display of its own grounds, then for them to treat their work as a 
statement would be to 'forget' that it is a 'display' and would thus 
negate the reflexive character of their theorizing, and loose the point 
of their speech. Thus the reader is asked to treat the work as a 
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display of the auspices which made it possible - i. e. their form of 
life. This means that the reader himself is a 'collaborator' in their 
enterprise in the sense that just as those who collaborated over the 
writing of the book were engaged in uncovering the grounds of whoever 
wrote the first paper, so the reader is to engage himself with uncovering 
the grounds of the result of the collaborative enterprise. They put it 
thus 
"The papers in this book should be conceived of as displays 
which require alters. This is where readers come in. Readers 
are asked to treat our papers reflexively. They are asked to 
become our collaborators. This is our version of how to 
read. " (107) 
The book should not be treated as a dead 'thing', then, but must be 
participated in so that that which it attempts to display can be 
grasped. To give some idea of the feel of the sort of analyses that 
the book contains, I will give an account of their analysis of the 
"deep structure" of 'bias'. 
They set-out their own purpose in writing about bias as follows 
"A central question will be: what form of life can we 
formulate such that it generates for social scientists 
their organisation of intelligible and concerted speech 
about bias? Further, how do the resonances of bias alert 
us to that which social scientific use shares with all use? 
Finally how does this examination itself generate as a 
possibility the image of a dialectical engagement in the 
question of grounds, and how does such an image make 
reference to our conception of analysis? " (108) 
Their analysis is thus seen to have, essentially, a dual focus. On 
the one hand it is aimed at uncovering the grounds which make 'bias' 
possible - i. e. the positivist form of life - whilst on the other hand 
it seeks to display the grounds of their own version of dialectical 
theorizing, which is an alternativt form of life. Thus the first 
question is 'what is the form of life which makes bias possible? f. They 
answer 
"This is a form of life where the speech which you concretely 
perform is analytically a speech of any man, so when bias is 
charged, you are being accused of identifying the concrete 
(your own speech) with the analytic (any man's speech). " (109) 
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What does this mean? Their point is that positivist speech is held to 
be authored by nature. It is not the concrete individual who speaks 
- the scientist is not considered to be an individual - but rather it 
is nature who speaks through him. Positivist speech is the speech of 
lanymant since nature can speak through anyman; anyman can be nature's 
mouthpiece. Thus bias is a charge that can be brought against anyone 
who fails to take a back seat to nature, as it were. The true positivist 
is the man who is committed, along with the community of positivists, 
to speaking only as a mouthpiece of nature. He considers that the 
'groundst of his speech are in fact 'nature' - nature authors his speech. 
It is perhaps best to look at what is wrong with this, the positivistts 
version of what grounds his speech, in two stages. Firstly, it becomes 
apparent through Blum and Mchugh's analysis that although the idea of 
'bias' rests upon some notion of 'nature' speaking through the scientist, 
- i. e. upon the possibility of anonymous,, anyman speech - it at the 
same time affirms the contrary. That is, it sets up the idea that 
there is some 'thing' called tnaturel on the one hand, and another 
'thing' called 'man' on the other, and the former 'speaks through' the 
latter. There is, however, a natural tension between these two 'things', 
a tension which is recognized in the very notion of 'bias' itself - i. e. 
the charge of 'bias' is the charge that the 'thing' 'nature' did not in 
fact author the "biased" speech, but rather the 'thing' 'man' did. 
Because of this, it becomes necessary for the positivist community to 
find ways of ensuring that nature has indeed been. allowed to speak, 
and this it does by means of 'methods', which,. if properly followed,, 
guarantee that the speech is the speech of nature. Thus, in order to 
avoid the charge of 'bias', the good positivist must be 'committed' to 
the methods which ensure that nature has been allowed to speak. The. good 
positivist is a committed positivist, and his commitment is to himself 
remain the anonymous mouthpiece of nature. However 
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"The recognition of the omnipresence of bias is a 
symptom of the uneasy recognition that the very standard 
of anonymous speech can be seen to deny itself on any 
occasion of its accomplishment because of the essential 
humanity of language. " (110) 
On the one hand stands the positivist ideal of anonymity, and on the 
other the reality of language, which is spoken by men. The positivist. 
program is self defeating because the commitment that it demands is 
to a forgetting of the "human parameter" - to forgetti6g that it is 
man that is doing the science. It tries to do the impossible and pretend 
that 'no-one' does science. The positivist must "show commitment to 
non-commitment and this commitment is unquestionable", (111) and one 
of the mechanisms for ensuring this commitment is the charge of 'bias, 
against all who should question it. The problem is, however, that 
such a commitment threatens to deny its own possibility. 
The same point can be reached from another direction by a 
consideration of 'grounds' and what is involved in them. Blum and 
Mchughts analysis has attempted to show that the grounds of positivism 
as a way of life are in fact bound up with a central paradox, caused 
by a tension between the speech of 'man' and 'nature'. Positivism 
itself, however, is not concerned with grounds, considering that it simply 
does speak for nature - for 'nature$ as a 'thing' over and against the 
speech of men - and thus it hides its own grounds and the paradox 
within them. The way in which it does this is by the use of concepts 
such as 'bias' which enforce the demand for commitment to non-commitment 
in an unquestioning fashion by ensuring that any speech that does not 
conform with the methods that guarantee a 'non-biased account' will be 
disregarded - it will be called 'biased' and thus will not be Igood' 
work that is the speech of nature and worthy of serious consideration. 
Thus 'bias' is a way of covering up the grounds of positivist speech and 
ensuring commitment to those grounds. In this way the tension that lies 
in those grounds remains unexamined, and the body of positivist knowledge 
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soldiers on unchallenged by any threat that commitment might be moved 
elsewhere, that the 'human parameter' might be rediscovered, or that 
moral considerations might become significant to the scientific 
enterprise. 
A commitment to analysis, on the other hand, and to the enterprise 
of investigating grounds, would show people that 'grounds' are not 
'things' in the way that nature is considered to be a 'thing' on the 
positivist account of the matter. As they put it 
"The grounds of speech - whether bias speech or any other - 
are not a thing (are no-thing) because grounds are not 
things. Commitment to grounds is an attachment to no-thing 
(but not to nothing). It is a commitment to something that 
is not a thing, to the foundation of Reason which is not 
itself another thing. " (112) 
The fundamental mistake that positivism makes is to become attached to 
some specific image of what grounds their speech - i. e. nature as a 
'thing' - for the result is that the reification distorts speech. Speech 
itself becomes seen as a Ithingt that exists other than man - as something 
in relation to the 'thing' nature - and hides its true nature from man. 
Speech hides man's grounds from him by seeing itself and its grounds 
as 'things' other than man. 
Put in slightly different fashion, the point that is being made 
here is that a 'form of life' can only be 'displayed' in the speech of 
which it is the grounds. This means that any attempt to 'define', in 
some way, what it is that 'grounds' some particular form of speech in 
reified terms is to treat grounds as what they are not. It is to pretend 
that 'grounds' or a 'form of life' can be defined as a 'thing' of some 
sort, which is to lose the whole essence of grounds - i. e. they are the 
possibility of speech which is displayed in the speaking rather than 
some thing that stands over and against 'speech' itself. If a form of 
life is identified with some concrete image, then ossification and 
reification set in, and the result is that man forgets his true 
position in the wheel of things. To treat grounds as some-tthing' is to 
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participate in a lie. 
The authors sum up their chapter on bias with a statement of what 
it is that they have done. It is an excellent summary of their 
intentions, and is worth reproducing in full. They-have, they say, 
I 
analysed bias, and shown the possibility of an alternative form of 
life "which enabled our analysis of their usage". They go on 
"In this way, the attention of others is re-directed from 
a concern with the facts and details to which their talk is 
oriented - the question of practical decisions and constraints 
- to a concern with the commitments underlying all speech and 
with their rational and moral status. We have tried to make 
the commitment underlying bias speech show itself intelligibly 
as a concern to protect this very question (the question of 
commitment) from being explored. In this sense, we have asked 
whether such a life is worth living, whether such a world is 
worth our commitment, and we have brought an alternative world 
to view. " (113) 
The pattern of analysis which I have attempted to give the feel of 
here, is repeated over the course of the book, using different themes 
- evaluation, snubs, travel etc. - as the occasions for theorizing and 
for analysing the grounds of positivism. At each investigation, 
positivism is shown to be grounded on a paradox, and the alternative 
form of life which Mchugh et al display, is offered for the readers 
acceptance. This alternative is, ultimately, a Icommunityl in which 
the disjunctions that characterize the positivist form of life are 
transcended by an awareness of the fact that 'speech? is grounded in 
ones form of life, thus presenting the possibility that life will be 
lived in a reflexive awareness of its own origins - of the communally 
generated nature of all the realised possibilities that consitutute our 
everyday world. Precisely this same theme provides the thrust of their 
other most recent work. (114) 
What is most interesting about the work of Blum and Mchugh for 
present purposes, is the way in which their concern with the socially 
constituted nature of social phenomena such as 'deviance', and an initial 
concern with the practices and rules on the basis of which such constitutioll 
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is effected, has led them in a radically different direction from 
Garfinkel's work. Where Garfinkel's thinking has led him to a position 
where. 1formal structures of practical actions' can be formulated as 
some sort of solution to the sociological problem of social order. - and 
where such structures are, at least in principle, describable and 
empirically investigable, Blum and Mchugh have concentrated upon the, 
connectedness of any such more or less discrete practices with the rest 
of the 'form of life' of which they are a part. It is of no use, they 
effectively argue, to attempt to investigate such practices in an 
empirical 'positivist' fashion, since the grounds which enable that 
investigation can never be approached in that way. The description of 
discrete practices can only ever be part of the story, and one must 
attempt to uncover the whole - the form of life as grounds - of which they 
are a-part. It is not just discrete practices that account for-the 
socially constituted meaningful social world. Meaning is grounded in 
a form of life as a whole, and to understand the meanings that a society 
gives to phenomena it is necessary to make visible the grounds which 
are displayed in those meanings. By making such grounds visible, one 
opens up the possibility of a moral. choice as to whether ones commitment 
to those grounds is indeed worthwhile, or whether, perhaps, one ought, to 
look to some alternative way of life. 
The problems that result from such an approach, however, seem to 
be serious if one is interested in an 'empirical' social science. The 
'grounds' which are to be investigated by analysis, are conceived of 
as ineffable in the sense that they are only ever able to be displayed 
and can never be defined by speech. Blum and Mchugh's analysis of the 
grounds of, positivism is only possible as an attempt to make explicit 
what is covered up by positivist speech, but such an attempt cannot be 
a description. It cannot in fact be anything else than a display of 
their own auspices. What is displayed is their own moral commitment 
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to a form of life other than that of positivism$ and such a 
commitment is manifest in the moral stance which they take up towards 
the attitudes, practices, procedures and so on which are the outward 
manifestations and only means of entry to the positivist 'grounds' 
which such practices, procedures', etc., display. In spite of being ' 
the only means of entry to such'grounds, however, they are not , themselves 
considered important but stand only as images or symbols of the 
ineffable form of life which they display. The art of analysis is to 
uncover that which such symbols stand as symbols for. The symbols 
themselves, as mere surface'-representations, are not interesting in 
their own right, and any empirical descriptions of them, such as'those 
of ethnomethodologists which seek to describe membersilpractices and, 
procedures, must inevitably miss the point. 
To the extent that the world is made up of people doing things, 
and to the extent that we only know what it is that people are committed 
to by seeing what it is that they do, it seems, hard to accept that an 
investigation of what it is that they do is unimportant to an understanding 
of their commitments. To treat what they do as"meret symbols of their 
grounds, whilst it opens up the possibility of a consideration of the 
moral question of commitment, seems at the same time to close down the 
possibility of debate about the relationship between grounds and 
commitment, and what people actually do in the world, which is, in part, 
an empirical question. Put another way: byý treating factualities' in 
the social world assimply an occasion for investigating 'possibility' - 
the grounds of the actual - the relationship between possibility and 
its realisations-(where those realisations are empirically investigable 
matters) remains unconsidered. The result of this is that anyýempirical 
matter that might be cited in a discussion of Blum and Mchugh's position 
can only be relevant to the extent that it reveals that which makes it 
possible, and not as something worthy of comment in its own right, or 
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as something worthy of linvestigationl in a sense that is not 'analysis' 
The effect that this irrelevance of empirical matters has is to 
turn the type of analysis that Blum and Mchugh engage in-into an 
inpregnable, self enclosed fortress of concepts. Instead of using 
'bias' as a device to ensure commitment to their 'form of life' in the 
way that they show positivism does, they use the notion of 1commitment' 
itself, along with all its moral implications, to direct attention 
away from the empirical world which could provide for the Opossibilityl 
that their own 'grounds' could be questioned. The grounds of lanalysist 
cover themselves over by denying the empirical world which is the 
realisation of all grounds. Thus Blum and Mchugh ensure commitment to 
their grounds, as a way of life worth living, by relegating the status 
of all that could possibly count against it to that of Imeret symbols 
of the grounds which they display. (115) Just as Blum and Mchugh ý 
argue that Positivism makes itself immune from any questioning of what 
makes it possible, so 'analysis' too cuts off any line of attack on 
itself, and thus any questioning of commitment to its grounds, by 
directing attention away from any empirical matter which could serve as 
ammunition for the attack. The only possible recourse for those who 
consider the empirical world to be a place worth living in and investigating 
is to remain silent in the face of lanalysist and to refuse to live the 
life which it offers - refuse commitment to its grounds. Perhaps one 
reason for refusing such a commitment could be a determination not to 
remain silent about empirical concerns. 
C) MIND AND SUBJECTIVITY 
This final section of the chapter differs from the majority of those 
above in as much as in it I will not try to illustrate Garfinkel's 
position by way of contrast with some alternative to it, but rather 
will seek to show the way in which the work of Coulter and Pollner 
on questions concerned with 'mind' and 'subjectivity', can be seen as 
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a development in line with the spirit of both Garfinkel's and 
Wittgenstein's thought. The lillustrationg is thus more by way of 
example than of contrast. To this end, I will concentrate on a stricýly 
limited, although not unrepresentative, portion of Coulter's and 
Pollner's work, looking specifically at 'reality disjunctures', 
? interpretive assymetriest, and 'knowledge and belieft. 
I want to begin by looking at the way in which Coulter conceptualises 
the work that he is involved in. He writes in a recent unpublished 
paper that 
"The aim of the sort of analysis provided above is to 
reformulate the analytical problems in such a way that, 
although still tied to the concrete particulars of 
social interaction, they do not confuse social problems 
with sociological problems and they are not restricted to 
position-taking within the commonsense world of normative 
affairs. " (116) 
His concern is to provide analyses of social. interaction which avoid 
what Garfinkel refers to as 'normative description'. He-is not 
interested in-producing an account of the social world which investigates 
the specific Imeanings' which are given to the events which take 
place in the social world, but in looking at the practices and procedures 
which enable ImeaningS of any sort. In this way, the level of analysis 
of social phenomena which depends upon 'position taking' over specific 
social problems - for example with position taking over the causes of 
poverty or deviance - is transcended, and an approach to the social 
world is made possible which investigates 'meaning' itself as a 
phenomenon. As a resourcefor this investigation, Coulter uses 
conversational data. (117) His attitude towards the analysis of such 
data is interesting, and is worth recording: 
"A sound piece of analysis seems to be one that renders 
transparent some aspects of reasoning and communication 
in a logically coherent and parsimonious manner for some 
materials. Discerning connections and conventions hitherto 
known-but-unnoticed, and oriented-to but inexplicit, is a 
matter of observational acuity and conceptual skill, neither 
of which can be made available in formulaic terms. " (118) 
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His analyses, then, are intended to be both illuminating - in 
Garfinkel's terms, to promote reflection on an obstinately familiar 
world - and non-normative. Thus far, his enterprise is stated in terms 
that articulate well with Garfinkel's concerns, and which point to the 
level of social structure formulated as the 'formal structures of 
practical actions'. I want now to turn to the way in which Coulter 
carries out this program in relation to the study of 'subjectivity'. 
Coulter's approach to the study of subjectivity is firmly grounded 
in the work of the linguistic philosophy of mind which stems from the 
work of Wittgenstein and Ryle (119). His argument is, very briefly, 
that a Imentalist' approach to tmind' and 'subjectivity' condemns 
investigation of mental phenomena to a search for shadowy mental. objects 
and processes, whilst a behaviourist approach deals with,, "Ioperationaliz- 
ationst of such allegedly tinner processes' as intending, understanding, 
and the rest" (120) which shows a tacit acceptance of such objects or 
processes. Either way, an analysis of 'subjectivity' or 'mind, is 
severely complicated by the supposed essentially hidden and private 
nature of the phenomena to be investigated. Wittgenstein, however, as 
I showed in a previous chapter, suggests that this whole account of 
mental phenomena as mysterious, hidden objects, in fact rests on a 
misunderstanding concerning the nature of language - it rests on the 
fact that we view all concepts after the model of 'sense' and 'referent' 
so that a mental predicate such as IpainI is wrongly supposed to 'refer, 
to some $mental object*. Since. such mental objects are not visible, 
then we give them shadowy, mysterious status which then compounds the 
difficulties that we have in understanding IsubJectivel phenomena. 
Wittgenstein's solution is to see language as 'used', thus abolishing 
the sense reference model. 
Coulter's point is, essentially, that if Wittgenstein's point is 
sound, then the way to come to grips with subjectivity as a social 
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scientist is not to see it as somehow a repository for private objects, 
but rather to investigate the ways-in which mental predicates are 
ascribed. 'Understanding', for example, is not some mysterious process 
that goes on in the mind, but a way of saying something about the fact 
that someone has grasped a point, or has learnt to do something. It is 
at this point that Garfinkel's work becomes important again. His focus 
upon the problem of order suggests that mentalistic concepts could well 
be used by the members of a society to 'account' for certain phenomena 
in such a way that they exhibit an 'orderly' character. Concepts such 
as 'paint, 'understanding', 'love' and the rest are all ways of organizing 
and bringing order to the settings of everyday life. This being the 
case, it becomes possible to suggest that subjective phenomena are not 
fundamentally unresearchable because they are in some, sense 'inside' the 
skull of actors, but that they are 'transparent', and available to anyone 
investigating social order. ' To suppose otherwise rests on a misunderstanding 
of both language and the status of subjective phenomena. We can gain 
valuable insight into the phenomena of subjectivity by investigating 
the ways in which mental predicates are used, and by seeing their 
structural under pinnings and ordering capacities. A sociological 
approach to tsubjectivityl thus becomes possible. Coulter sums up the 
gist of his approach as follows: 
"Members' practical employment of mental categories in their 
routine affairs testifies to the transparency of mind in the 
only terms that preserve the integrity and intelligibility 
of our reasoning - intersubjective and conventional terms. 
We lose our bearings when we detach our questioning about 
psychological phenomena from their anchorings in the mundane 
world of-everyday interaction and its organization. " (121) 
Mind thus becomes Itransparent' for the sociological analyst. 
To introduce the way in which an empirical investigation of the 
social world based on this type of approach can actually be carried out, 
I want to look first of all at the way in which Pollner develops the 
concept of a 'reality disjuncture'. (122) This will lead on, in turn, 
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to an account of Coulter's study of 'interpretive assymmetriest, which 
extrapolates from Pollner's notion. - 
We all assume, Pollner points out (in common with Garfinkel) that 
we live in an intersubjective world, and that this is guaranteed by a 
'reality out therel about which agreement cari'always, in principle, be 
reached in the event of disagreement about 'what is the casel, or about 
'what really happened'. It is a fact, however, that "Some persons see 
what other persons do not". (123) These "contradictory experiences of 
the world" Pollner calls 'reality disjunctures'. In the normal run of 
events, it is often the case that given two contradictory accounts of 
some lobjectivet feature of the world, the perceptual experience leading 
to one of those accounts will be lironicized' in favour of some 
Idefinitivel version of that feature. For example, in cases of Idelusiont 
or $illusion', the faulted experience is tironicizedt in favour of what 
'really' happened, or what 'really' is the case according to some more 
'objective' account of the matter. As Pollner puts it 
"the ironicizing of experience occurs when one experience, 
tacitly claiming to have comprehended the world objectively, 
is honoured as the definitive version of the world intended 
by the first. " (124) 
This possibility of ironicizing experience is one aspect of the problem 
of 'subjectivity' in the sense that the merely 'subjective' version of 
events is the one which is lironicized' in favour of an 'objective, 
account. Such ironicization can be effected by ones own continuing 
experiences - for example, if one sees a puddle on the 
t, d up ahead on 
a hot day, and then as one gets closer the realisation dawns that it 
was really a 'mirage'. Equally it can be effected by ones own continuing 
experiences - for example if one saw a 'fuzzy' road sign one would doubt 
ones own perceptions, and not the sign writer's ability - and so on. In 
each case ones subjective perceptions are lironized' in favour of a more 
'objective' account. 
In the light of this notion of irony, Pollner defines freality 
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disjuncturest as follows: 
"A reality disjuncture is, in effect, a yet-to-be completed 
ironicization of experience. It is a yet-to-be complete 
ironicization inýthat a choice is yet to be made as to 
which of the competing versions of the world will prevail 
as definitive of that world. The choice may be deeply 
problematic. In principle either of the competing 
experiential versions may be chosen and treated as the 
definitive version in terms of which all manner of counter- 
experiences and counter-claims may be examined for their 
specious or otherwise inadequate character. " (125) 
Pollner goes on to point out that there are practices for both 
perpetuating and resolving these disjunctures. In the first case, such 
disjunctures can be maintained by each explaining away the others 
account of his experience, with neither accepting that his is a mistaken 
account. Pollner gives the following example, quoted from Milton 
Rokeach, of an interaction between a mental patient who thought that 
he was Jesus Christ, and a psychologist. 
"Through bilocation he could be in two places at once and 
through translocation he had the power to go instantaneously 
from one place to another. Leon also claimed to be able to 
perform miracles. He had once commanded a table to lift itself 
off the floor - and it had obeyed. When I expressed disbelief, 
he volunteered to repeat the miracle for me. He went into the 
recreation room and picked out a massive table. He then turned 
his back to it and, in a loud affirmative tone, commanded it to 
lift itself. 
-I don't see the table lifting. - 
'Sir, that is because you do not see cosmic reality'. " (126) 
It is not only in cases of mental illness that such disjunctures are 
maintained. In court room situations, for example, it is often the 
case that a witness or defendent will disagree with the police account 
of certain events, and will bring various practices to bear in order to 
maintain their version of what happened. In everyday life, too, such 
disjunctures are often visibly maintained when neither party will allow 
that his account is faulty, and both seek to ironize the perception of 
the other. 
At the same time, however, there are procedures for resolving the 
disjunctures. Such a resolution requires that we make some sort of 
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choice about which is the definitive version of what is the case. 
This does not, in the normal run of events,, require conscious 
deliberation since our common sense practices are such that these 
problems are managed in a routine fashion. For example "We have made 
a choice, we have encountered an ironicized experience when we 
characterize as 'overlooking' the course of activity--in which we point 
to the pen on the desk only to hear the searcher say that he does not 
see it. " (127) It is not me that is seeing, things, but you that has 
loverlooked' what I see. The alternative choice is also possible 
- consider "no, that's not it, it's just the shadow of the chaiP. 
What is being dealt with here are the practices and procedures used 
by members of a society to maintain the orderly character of the 
intersubjective world. As with the work of Garfinkel, it is not 
necessary to posit an 'objective world' opposed to 'subjective-experiences, 
of it. The mechanisms required to account for the maintenance of a 
'typical', 'normal' environment of objects are not 'inside the skull' 
of members of a society, but are visible for any researcher to see. 
other common practices for resolving such disjunctures are those of 
reporting one of the accounts of the contradictory experiences as 
'lying', tjoking', or 'metaphor'. As Pollner puts it 
"Such solutions declare, in effect, that intersubjective 
validation of the world would obtain were it not for the 
exceptional means and methods of observation, experience 
or reportage of the persons identified as employing them. " (128) 
The major part of Pollner's paper is taken up with investigating 
actual cases or reality disjunctures that are not resolved in these 
straightforward, everyday taken for granted ways. Thus he looks at 
cases of 'mental illness', at courtroom situations, and at some cases 
where sociological accounts of some matter lironicized' those of the 
people being studied without convincing the 'members' themselves.. In 
this way he is able to illustrate more graphically the thrust of his 
concept of 'reality disjunctures'. In order to investigate the type of 
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phenomena and practices involved here further, I want to turn now to 
Coulterts notion of an 'interpretive assymmetry', keeping in mind the 
whole time the ways in which his study relates to questions of Imind' 
and Isubjectivityl. 
It is often the case that "some member-independent (lobjectivet) 
phenomenon or state of affairs is acknowledged by interlocutors"-(129) 
but they do not agree on what it is that they are perceiving. These 
occasions Coulter calls linterpretive assymmetriest. They differ from 
straightforward 'reality disjunctures' in that agreement is already 
present about there being some 'phenomenon' to be explained or'accounted 
for: the disagreement is about how it is to be interpreted. If an 
interpretive assymmetry is found, then a reality disjuncture will have 
been avoided or resolved. 
Coulter's interest in such occasions lies in the fact that they 
are, clearly, able to be described in termsýof Isubjectivityl and 
'objective reality'. One could say that those members of society 
involved had different 'subjective' perceptions of the same 'objective, 
phenomenon, and that thus one could show that 'subjectivity' has somehow 
mediated between the 'real' object and what is actually perceived. It 
is this sort of occasion which the famous twood choppert who appears 
in the work of Weber and Schutz illustrates well. (130) ý The problem 
for the sociologist, given these assymmetries, is how to deal with them. 
If he is presented with, say, two different accounts of some matter 
is he to back one or the other of them, reproduce both of them, or 
attempt some synthesis of the two which attempts to define what 'really 
happenedt? In this sort of situation, 'subjectivity' becomes a 
considerable barrier to #objective' research, and one to which the only 
solution seems to be to take the side of one of the account producers 
or construct a 'more objective$ scientific account. This is precisely 
the situation which Garfinkel sees as the result of Inormative 
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description' in sociological theorizing. 
Coulter's aim is to find a way of dealing with such situations 
which avoids normative description but which enables insight into 
social interaction and upon problems of subjectivity. To do this) 
Coulter takes a conversation between a mental welfare officer and a 
former mental 'patient, in which the patient is complaining of being 
'knocked up' at night by his neighbours, with the result that he is 
unable to sleep properly. The patient is insistant that he is indeed 
being 1knocked up', and it is not the case that he is having 'delusions' 
- which is what the nurses at the'hospital he was at had told him, he 
thought in order to cover up for the fact that they too were 1knocking 
him up? to make him lose weight. The medical welfare officer does not 
simply dismiss his account as a delusion, as the nurses had done, but 
accepts that there was indeed something wrong but that the patients 
interpretation of what was happening was inadequate. Thus a 'reality 
disjuncture'-is avoided. The text of the interview between the medical 
welfare officer and the mental patient is worth recording here to 
ground this discussion. 
"Patient: /you said that that err, that I assume so and 
you () that it wasnIt so did ya not like. 
M. W. a-. Yeh, ye: :h 
Patient: You put it that I didn't more or less that I did 
not err ... 
M. W. O.: Well I-I-I said that it - it was probIly the - best 
explanation you could give for perhaps/ 
Patient: /under the circumstances/ 
M. W. O.: /yea under the circumstances, for - variations in your 
sleep pattern 
Patient: Yes 
M. W. O.: And err, in that sense you know it seemed fairly logical 
that you would do this". (131) 
Thus the patient's1knocking upI becomes the M. W. O. 'stvariations in sleep 
pattern4. There is an agreed upon "member-independent ('objective') 
phenomenon or state of affairs" which both the patient and the M. W. O. 
are interpreting, but their accounts of what that phenomenon is, are 
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radically different. What has happened here, however, that makes it 
an interpretive assymmetry and prevents a reality disjuncture, is that 
the practices and procedures for maintaining ones own account in the 
face of contradictions have not been brought into play. The mental 
welfare officer is not dismissing the patient's account as a Idelusionl,, 
as the nurses had done, so that-he has not attempted to maintain his 
own account as the definitive one by claiming that the other is just a 
nut case who would be expected to say that sort of thing. At the same 
time the patient, since he is not faced by a straightforward rejection 
of his perception of the situation, does not bring procedures to bear 
to maintain his account as the correct one - by saying, for example, 
that the medical officer could be expected to say thatthe neighbours 
were not knocking him up, because he was on their side - or perhaps he 
could claim that the medical officer could not perceive cosmic reality, 
or some other similar device. In short, the mental welfare officer's 
approach avoids bringing into play the practices and procedures which 
would result in the creation and maintenance of a reality disjuncture, 
and results instead in an interpretive assymmetry, in which neither 
account is directly ironized in favour of the other, but some 'member 
independentl reality is acknowledged by both. 
There is, here, then, a situation in which the same occasion is being 
perceived in different ways. The patient sees it as 'knocking up', 
the nurses as 'delusion' and the mental welfare officer as 'variations 
in sleep patterns'. If we were to take a subjectivistic approach to this 
state of affairs, as, for example, Schutz or Cicourel might do, then 
we are confronted with three different 'subjective realities'. If, on 
the other hand, we take an 'objectivistic' view, then we are left with 
the difficulty of deciding which account is 'in fact' correct, and 
we must Justify our choice - for example in terms of scientific or 
medical knowledge. Coulter, however, sets out to produce an account 
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that accepts neither view. Instead he wants to know how it. is that 
the total confusion which a subjectivist plurality of worlds would lead 
to is avoided in practice by members of a society whose interpretations 
differ, and how the problems involved in proposing just one lobjectivel 
account, and the necessity of justifying that account, are actually 
handled in practice. In other words, what are the practices and 
procedures that members of a society use to handle situations such 
as these, and maintain the orderly character of everyday settings. 
In the essay that I am looking at here, Coulter deals with just 
one device for handling such problems, namely the assignment of faults 
to one of the perceivers in such a way that his competence as a perceiver 
whose account is to be believed is called into question. Such devices 
are commonly used, and as with those for resolving reality disjunctures, 
are taken for granted and unnoticed. Examples from everyday life 
include such things as "you must be going deaf, he never said that$., ' or 
"No it was definitely a kestral - you need your eyes tested". Coulter 
lists six assignable faults (not, he insists, an exhaustive list) which 
is worth reproducing here. 
it (i) The literal status of the account. 
(ii) The perceiver as a physical organism. 
(iii) The perceiver's perceptual aids. 
(iv) The perceiver as a cognitive processor of his 
perceptions. 
(v) The perceiver as a person with Ispecial motives' 
to make his false perceptual claims. 
(vi) The perceiver as a socially-located person with 
restricted entitlements to (claim to) have 
Iseenl(or heard, etc. ) what he reports. " (132) 
on this list, tdelusion ascriptionst come under number (iv) (and sometimes 
(ii)) whilst the medical welfare officer's account of the 'knocking up' 
can be subsumed under 
Coulter goes on to point out that 'fault ascriptionst are not made 
on a random basis, but that there is a certain structural warrant for 
the fitting of an ascription to some particular person. As he puts it 
there is a preference 
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"to inspect the implicativeness for the intended hearer 
of the relationship between the usable fault-category 
and the membership-category of the hearer. " (133) 
Thus, for example, there would be a 'preference' for'ascribing faults 
under (ii) above, concerned with the perceiver as a physical organism, 
to 0 old or in some way disabled people rather than to a young twenty 
year old in sound physical condition, unless the remark was made in jest, 
or irritation, or some such. On the other hand, one is more likely to 
ascribe faults concerned with the literal status of the accounts to a 
second hand car salesman than to a priest. Thus there is a tie between 
the way in which an account producer is categorized by the fault 
ascriber, and the type of fault that is likely to be ascribed. Certain 
descriptions which include such ascriptions are more likely to be 
theard as correct' - as possible correct descriptions - than others. (134) 
Put in slight different fashion, some descriptions containing fault 
ascriptions will be heard as more 'normal', 'typical', 'orderly', etc., 
than others, and thus will preserve the sense of 'order' in the world. 
Thus, not only is it the case that a 'fault ascription' is one 
way of handling 'interpretive assymmetries' - one taken for granted 
practice for maintaining the orderly, normal, typical nature of our 
everyday world - but also the procedure of 'fault ascription' itself 
draws upon that orderliness in the sense that which fault ascription 
is appropriate for which account producer is not a random matter but 
rests on a structural warrant - rests upon what is Inormally the case'. 
The orderliness of the everyday world is thus preserved from two 
directions at the same time. On the one hand the problems that 
disjunctive perceptions or interpretations could create for an 
intersubjective reality are resolved by a set of common, taken for 
granted practices, whilst at the same time that very resolution 
reinforces a sense of what is 'normal' by ascribing faults in line with 
certain 1preferences' which rest upon taken for granted background 
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knowledge concerning what faults are 'typically' ascribable to what 
categories of people. 
What Coulter (and Pollner in his paper) are doing, then, is to 
describe the ways in which 'interpretive assymmetries' and 'reality 
disjunctures' are actually handled in daily life, and handled in such 
a way that order is maintained. They are, in a sense, looking at the 
structures which enable mediation between different subjectivities 
although such language, to the extent that it implies that the 
distinction between Isubjectivityl and 'objective reality' is a 
fundamental one, must be treated with care. They are not denying that 
people do indeed have different perspectives on the same things, or 
that such perspectives can usefully be referred to as *subjective', or that 
it is often the case that some particular person's account can be 
convincingly demonstrated to be wrong. Coulter puts the point 
as follows: 
"The sociologist's task, where he is interested in 
subjectivity, is to demonstrate how our given commonsense 
devices for conceptualizing and coping with subjectivity 
as a feature of everyday life get organized and used in and 
through orderly communication. There is no other Imedium. 
of access'. Common language-users and practical reasoners 
are not trying to be telepaths and failing any more than 
witches doing witchcraft are trying to be scientists and 
failing. " (135) 
These ways of 'coping with subjectivity' include the use of 
categories such as 'mental patient', and the faulting of accounts that 
are in some way disjunctive by use of various available faulting 
procedures. It is not the case that the sociologist must somehow get 
into the minds of members of a society to tease out their 'subjective 
meanings', as though these were objects lying around in their brain$, 
since 'subjectivity' is not that sort of thing. Rather, 'subjectivity' 
is itself bound up with all of the problems that are faced with 
disjunctive perceptions and the ways that are avilable to handle these. 
'Intentions', 'motives'. 'meanings#, 'understandings' and $misunderstandings 
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are not the names of peculiar mental objects, but are some of the 
concepts available to be used in the organisation of the daily round, 
a round which includes agreements and disagreements about, what is the 
case. 
Coulter's approach to 'knowledge and belieft has much in common 
with this attempt to come to grips with problems of tmind'. Once again, 
he is not interested in investigating what knowledge is, as if it were 
a 'thing' of some sort, nor in discovering the criteria which provide- 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a Itruel knowledge claim. 
Rather, he is interested in the ways in which tknowledget and 'belief' 
are used in the organisation of everyday order. Thus, for example, 
he points out the way in which a claim to Ibelievel something to be 
true is often a way of softening an assertion where to say that one 
'knew' would be to get saddled with all sorts of burdens of proof, 
evidence and so on. Similarly: 
"We may-propose, (then), that the ascription of belief 
to someone who makes a knowledge-claim hearably downgrades 
that knowledge-claim and articulates an assymmetry between 
the ascriber and the person(s) to whom belief is being 
ascribed. Belief-ascription can be a method for expressing 
one's reservations about the truth-value of someone's assertior(s). "(136, ' 
It is in this way that anthropologists often express their reservations 
about some particular native custom, as, for example, in a case where 
a rain dance is reported in terms of the natives 'belief' that it will 
bring rain even though the natives might well 'know' that it will. 
Thus information is reported, and understood, in terms that ensure that 
the anthropologist will not be locked up or have his competence 
questioned because he himself 'believes$ something that his readers 
'know' is not the case. Coulter states the relationship between these 
two terms in the following way 
"At the level of the social organisation of their use, we 
can speak of the categories "belief" and "knowledge" as 
forming a disjunctive category-pair ........ Other such 
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pairs would include vision/hallucination; telepathy/, 
trickery; ghost/illusion; flying-saucer/UFO; and 
ideology/science. " (137)' 
Thus one can use such pairs of terms to upgrade or downgrade, take 
seriously or denigrate etc. 
It is not, it must be stressed, that Coulter is here claiming that 
no-one has, or ever can, justifiably claim to tknowt something. He is 
not engaged in that sort of enterprise at all, just as he is not involved 
in denying that people tmean' things when they talk, 'see things differentlyt 
etc., etc. Rather he is seeking to illuminate knowledge claims by 
investigating "the social organisation of their use". He is investigating 
the structural level of 'what people do' which makes claims to tknowl 
something intelligible in the first place. As Wittgenstein put it, it 
is not agreements of opinion that makes something true or false, but 
on the contrary it is what they say that is true or false and they 
agree in the language they use - which is agreement in form of life, 
not opinion. -Coulter is, in a very strong sense, investigating the 
language which they use, and which through agreement to use it, makes 
claims to knowledge, as well as claims to 'objectivity' in the face of 
'interpretive assymmetries' and 'reality disjuncturest, both possible 
and intelligible. Coulter puts it thus: 
"The success or failure with which members make and handle 
perceptual claims is very much contingent upon at least some 
of the devices and procedures of reasoning described here. 
This is not to argue that such a contingent basis should 
subvert our ordinary claims to certainty and knowledge where 
ordinary methods of warranting are available or relevant: 
rather, it is to show how such certainty and knowledge can 
be socially generated. " (138) 
The interesting thing about the type of work that Coulter and 
Pollner engage in, and the type of orientation towards social phenomena 
which it displays, is that it uses insights germinated in the thought 
of both Wittgenstein and Garfinkel, but without taking the direction 
towards moral concerns with 'commitment? which characterises the work of 
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Blum and Mchugh. At the same time, however, it does not pursue the 
types of interest which I have shown in the work of philosophers of the 
social sciences such as Winch and Louch. Their work, on the contrary, 
accepts the importance of empirical investigation in the social sciences, 
and attempts to produce descriptions of social phen omena which avoid 
the normative description which is often seen as the only possible form 
of sociology. 
The influence of Garfinkel is evident enough. The concern with 
the way in which taken for granted practices and procedures organize 
and order the everyday social world in such a way that its Inormality', 
'typicality' etc., etc., are ensured and maintained. The concern with 
the fact that language should be seen as something used with a point over 
the course of interaction. An approach to questions concerned with 
'meaning' which looks not at the specific meanings that members of 
a society give to specific social phenomena but at the practicee and 
procedures which enable 'meaning' of any sort. An approach to questions 
of 'subjectivity' and 'mind' which follows the advice that there is 
nothing of interest inside the skull of a man as far as the sociologist 
is concerned - all there is is brains - so that the sociologist must 
investigate social mechanisms, not supposedly private mental objects. 
At the same time, the influence of Wittgenstein is evident, 
especially in Coulter's work, in a concern with the uses to which 
particular concepts can be put within particular language games. His 
concern with the games that can be played with 'knowledge' and 'belief', 
for example, reflects an interest in language games themselves which, 
whilst compatible with Garfinkells work, is not explicit in it. The 
influence of Wittgenstein thus provides a new dimension to the approach 
td social life generated by Garfinkel's ethnomethodology as it appears 
in Pollner and Coulter's approach to questions of $subjectivity, and 
'mind', in the sense that it directs attention towards particular ways 
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in which language and concepts are 'used' in relation to specific 
areas of the organization of social life. Where Garfinkelts concerns 
lead him to investigate general practices - such as the documentary 
method, or coding practices - Coulter and Pollner show the workings 
of more particular practices in relation to specific problems such as 
the resolution of a 'reality disjuncturel or the handling of an I 
'interpretive assymmetry'. At the same time, however, the concern with 
the problem of social order is not lost sight of, and a sense is gained 
of the way in which accounting practices, together with specific sets 
of concepts, are able to solve problems caused by situations which could, 
potentially, provide a threat to the maintenance of normality, typicality, 
and the rest. 
What this work illustrates, then, is two things. Firstly it 
demonstrates the way in which the affinity between Wittgenstein and 
Garfinkel can be exploited in the interests of sociological research. 
In this regard, Coulter's work especially is a working illustration of 
one of the main themes of this thesis - namely that a considerable 
number of parallels can be drawn between the work of Garfinkel and 
Wittgenstein to the advantage of ethnomethodology. Secondly, it shows 
the way in which Garfinkel's approach to Isubjectivityl and Opind' can, 
in practice, be given empirical content. By refusing to be drawn into 
the subjectivism of a Schutz or a Cicourel, or into a realism which 
naively posits a $real world', they draw out some of the implications 
for research into Isubjectivityl which the dissolution of the-subject/ 
object distinction and a consequent refusal to accept an object and 
designation model of language, can be seen to generate. In this sense, 
the concerns of Garfinkel which I have shown; to stem from his reading' 
of Gurwitsch, are given more body, and a thrust which takes them towards 
issues which are centrally important for sociology as a whole. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have presented the work of some of the best 
known writers who have been influenced by Garfinkel and Wittgenstein, 
and in the case of Cicourel in particular, by Schutz as well. I have 
tried to show some of the ways in which the seminal ideas contained in 
Garfinkel's approach to social order have been interpreted and 
developed, often in ways that seem to bear only an incidental relationship 
to the initial formulation of the ethnomethodological position. In 
the process, I hope that I have been able to show more clearly what is 
involved in Garfinkel's approach to the social world both by illustrating 
in more depth what certain aspects of it look like, in practice - as, 
for example, with the work of Weider, Coulter and Pollner in particular 
- and by showing something of what he does not mean by contrasting 
his position with that of others - here Cicourel's subjectivism, and 
Blum and Mchughts idealism are the main contrasting themes. 
Whilst it is true, however, that there are many writers who have 
been influenced by Garfinkel, it is also the case that there are none 
who have not developed his ideas or their implications in such a way that 
certain aspects of it are emphasised whilst others are left either 
implicit or are left out of account. Thus Weider does not consider in 
any depth what is implied in the notion of an underlying structure 
of practices in his work on the halfway house, whilst Coulter, 
by integrating aspects of Wittgenstein's thought into his studies, 
provides a different focus for broadly ethnomethodological themes. 
As the position as a whole develops, it seems likely that this process 
whereby aspects of it are followed through to find what light they can 
throw on social phenomena will provide the main interest. Garfinkel's 
work itself does not provide programmatic statements about the type of 
research that ought to be undertaken, but instead produces insights and 
suggestions which stimulate thought about the social world. It is this 
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generative character of his work, rather than its qualities as a completed 
system of sociological theorizing, -which is its strength and which makes 
it important for students of social life. 
This is not to say, however, that there are no central themes which 
one can say are specifically developed in Garfinkells work. As I have 
shown, his attitude towards 'meaning', towards practices and 
procedures, towards 'rules' and the 'formal structures of practical 
actionst, and so on, all of these things are central to the position 
which Garfinkel is proposing. Such concerns can be seen as contrasting 
with those of other sociologists, and even with those of some who have 
been influenced by his thought. He is attempting to define a distinctive 
perspective on social phenomena. What the implicationslof it are for 
social researchers becomes apparent only in the work done. 
In the next chapter, I want to look at what is currently the most 
productive line of empirical work to have been influenced heavily by 
Garfinkelts perspective, namely conversational analysis. The emphasis 
in this work, which was pioneered by Harvey Sacks and Emanuel Schegloff, 
is upon the conversational structures which enable indexical 
particulars to be used over the course of some specific conversation in 
such a way that sense is made for all practical purposes. These 
structures-are themselves 'practicest - they are the Inormall, 'typical', 
ttaken for grantedt practices and procedures which enable any 
conversationalists to make sense and understand one another. What this 
structure of practices looks like, the way in which it is analysed, and 
the precise status of the descriptions given of it are the subject of 
the following discussion. 
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In the context of a discussion about the relevance of phenomenology 
for sociology, Garfinkel says the following: 
"In my own experience there are several ways in which I 
have been pedagogically interested in the relevance of 
phenomenologistst writings for sociology. I'll add that 
under the example of Sacks, Schegloff, and their 
colleagues in conversational analysis, I am increasingly 
uncomfortable with such interests, and discourage those 
interests in my students. " (1) 
What is principally reflected in these remarks is Garfinkells continual 
insistence that empirical investigation of the social world is essential 
to sociology. This insistence is characteristic of all of Garfinkel's 
published writings, in nearly all of which the theoretical points that 
he is making are supplemented by a report of some empirical investigation 
or other, and it is very strongly present in even his earliest work - 
out of the six hundred or so pages of his doctoral dissertation, a third 
are devoted to empirical work. Thu s the work of conversational analysts, 
which places considerable emphasis upon empirical studies, can be seen 
as articulating wiýh Garfinkel's concern to relate theoretical 
considerations to empirical description of social phenomena. The links 
here, however, are more substantial than that. In purely historical 
terms, Garfinkel seems to have worked closely with Sacks, until the 
latters untimely death in 1975, a fact which is testified to by the 
paper "On Formal Structures of Practical Actions" which they joint 
authored, by their common focus as it emerges in the discussions which 
make up the Purdue Symposium on ethnomethodology, and by Coulter's 
remarks to the effect that the two men could be seen, in discussions, to 
work well together. (2) 
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It would seem, then, that there is warrant for attempting to 
trace quite strong links between conversational analysis and Garfinkel's 
writings, and over the course of this chapter I hope to do just this. 
I will investigate congruences between the approaches to problems of 
description of Garfinkel and Sacks, and similarities between the ways 
in which the problem of social order is conceptualized. In the process, 
various other affinities will emerge, for example in the approach to 
'structure#, 'language', and 'correspondence'. It will also become 
apparent that the link between the work of Garfinkel and Wittgenstein 
which I have discussed above, parallelsýthat between conversational 
analysis and Wittgenstein. Thus the notion of 'bedrock' or 'form of 
life' can be shown to relate strongly to the conversational structures 
which conversational analysts describe. 
In the first section I will deal with some of the affinities between 
Garfinkel and Sacks on a theoretical level. I will then move on, in 
the remaining-sections, to discuss the substantive work that has been 
done by Oonversational analysts, and to say something about the status 
of the description which they provide of conversational structures. - I 
will conclude by looking at the enterprise as a whole, particularly in 
relation to some remarks by Goffman in a recent paper. 
CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS AND GARFINKEL 
A first obvious point of convergence between the work of Garfinkel 
and Sacks is in their common interest in description. For both of them, 
the interest lies not in the substance of actual descriptions, but in 
how description is done. Sacks puts it thus: 
"Even if it can be said that persons produce descriptions 
of the social world, the task of sociology is not to clarify 
these, or to 'get them on the record', or to criticize 
them, but to describe them. That persons describe social 
life (if they can be conceived as doing so) is a happening 
of the subject quite as any other happening of any other 
subject in the sense that it poses the job of sociology, and 
in contrast with it providing a solution to sociology's 
problem of describing the activities of its subject matter. " (3) 
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The sociologist must, in other words, find ways of describing what 
it is that members of a society do when they describe the social world 
- he must investigate what it is to describe social life, rather than 
rely unreflectingly on already formulated descriptions of social life 
to provide him with his subject matter. His job is not to provide 
further, 'normative' descriptions of the social world which stand side 
by side with those of members of a society as competing accounts whose 
purpose is to tironizet them, but rather he must seek to unravel the 
practices and procedures which enable any (including sociological 
descriptions) of social life in the first place. Like Garfinkel, Sacks 
insists that descriptions do not simply 'correspond' to some 'reality', 
but that 'etc. ' procedures are needed to produce and understand an 
adequate description. The sociologists problem is to begin to 
understand that fact - to unravel what is involved in 'describing' in 
the face of that 'etc. '. 
The probIem, then, is identical to that which exercised Garfinkel, 
and which he discusses at length in his critique of Parsons which was 
outlined above. The nub of the problem concerns the subject matter of 
sociology - what is the 'object' which sociologists ought to be describing, 
the practices and procedures which enable description, or the substance 
of 'meaningful', already formulated descriptions of the social world? 
- and this problem in its turn concerns the relationship between 
sociology and common sense knowledge of the social world. Sacks puts 
it thus 
"The emergence of sociology will take a different course 
(when it emerges) from that of other sciences because sociology, 
to emerge, must free itself not from philosophy but from the 
common-sense perspective. Its predecessors are not as Galileo 
had to deal with, but persons concerned with practical problems, 
like maintaining peace or reducing crime. The 'discovery' of 
the common-sense world is important as the discovery of a 
problem only, and not as the discovery of a sociological 
resource. " (4) 
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The importance of the descriptions which members of a society produce 
is that they provide a problem for the sociologist - namely, how are 
such descriptions possible? - and it should not be thought that they 
somehow define what actually is the case in the social world. To 
suppose that they do is to mistake the relevance of such descriptions 
for sociology. 
From this point, as I have shown, Garfinkel turns to the work of 
Schutz, Curwitsch and Kaufmann to provide him with theoretical access 
to that aspect of the social world which he considers must be, investigated. 
Thus he formulates that level of social structure - the 'cognitive' level 
- which is concerned with tagreementt in terms of presuppositional 
assumptions, practices and procedures. Sacks, working within the 
framework outlined by Garfinkel, turns his attention towards 
conversational materials in an attempt to develop a "naturalistic 
observational discipline that could deal with the details of social 
action(s) rigorously, empirically, and formally. " (5) This is not, it 
should be emphasised, because of any idolization of conversation - Sacks 
makes it clear that he is interested in all interaction - and recent work 
by Schegloff has begun to investigate gestures in a fashion similar to 
the analyses of conversation that he and Sacks previously engaged in. (6) 
The point, rather, is to find ways to describe, in a rigorous fashion, 
the practices and procedures which enable meaningful interaction in 
everyday life, and one aspect of such interaction is conversation - as 
Sacks puts it 
"What one ought to seek to build is an apparatus which will 
provide for how it is that any activities, which members do 
in such a way as to be recognizable as such to members, are 
done, and done recognizably. " (7) 
The point, therefore, is to describe what it is that people do, in a 
rigorous fashion. 
Sacks' interest in descriptionthen, is a concern with that same 
level of structure which characterizes Garfinkel's work, and as with 
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Garfinkel it is a concern which is interwoven with a particular view 
of the nature of language, and of the problem of order. Language should 
not be seen as a structure which contains 'meanings', and which somehow 
'correspondst with 'reality', but rather the 'etcetera problem, must be 
faced up to and its implications accepted. (8) Instead of viewing 
language as a calculus, it must be recognized that it is used, in 
settings, for a variety of purposes, to make sense, and that this 
essential lindexicalityl of language is an inescapable feature of it for 
actors and sociologists alike. What must be done is to look at the ways 
in which language is used to produce descriptions that are-actually 
understood, at the sequential placement of descriptions within conversations 
and the tasks they perform - in short at the whole battery of practices, 
procedures and assumptions that enable language and descriptions to be 
used/formulated and understood, where such practices etc. are conceived 
to be taken for granted and the presupposition of orderly conversation, 
which is itself an aspect of social order in general. In line with the se 
concerns, and again in parallel with Garfinkel, distinctions between 
subjectivity and some objective world, and a concern with lessencesl - 
with essential meanings - are not present in Sacksl work or in the body 
of the conversational analysis literature. The central task-is conceived 
to be an investigation of that lintersubjectivet form of life - that 
structure of practices and procedures - which is the presupposition of 
observable order in the social world, and of meaningful interaction. 
To illustrate these points further, and in the process to indicate in 
more depth the congruences between Garfinkel and Sacks, I will make a 
few remarks about Sacks' view of language, and about the relationship 
between conversational analysis and the problem of order. I will deal 
with each in turn. 
The concern with language as used is particularly apparent in an 
article by Sacks entitled "Everyone Has to Lie' in which he produces an 
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analysis of the way in which the word leveryonel is used. He writes 
that 
"it is not at all obvious that a statement with the subject 
term everyone names a larger population than a statement 
with, e. g. the subject term doctors or men etc. " (9) 
In order to determine the truth of a statement with the subject 
term leveryonet it is not the case that one must always look around to 
see if indeed all of the people in the world are doing or being whatever 
it is that is being predicated of teveryonel. If a little girl says 
"everyone's going, can I go? ", although in some particular context 
what she means, and who she is indicating by 'everyone' might be quite 
clear, she need not at all be referring to a great number of people - it 
may be her friend at school that she means. The point is, however, 
that this does not mean that in this case the word is being used wrongly, 
or that this is an idiosyncratic use of the term or even that the 
dictionary definition of the word is in some way wrong or inadequate 
in that it does not cover this case. Rather the mistake is to have 
considered that 'everyone' must somehow have some fixed referent - to 
ignore the fact that words are used with a sense in a context and to try 
to find some 'essential' meaning for the word. As Sacks puts it 
"It may be the case that a determination of what "everyone" 
refers to turns on the utterance and the occasion of its 
use. Some readings were suggested - such as that "everyone" 
can be used programatically, can be used for a rather small 
set population, can be used for categories. By use of these, 
an approach that seeks, as oursdoes, to find how the 
statement might be possibly true seems not necessarily 
burdened with what might appear to be a more attractive 
approach - that is, to find that it could not be true (i. e., 
to formulate such a sense of "everyone" as permits the ready 
location of falsifying evidence). " (10) 
To simply take a definition of "everyone" and show that people use it 
incorrectly would simply not tell us very much. 
At this point the connection with the problem of order begins to 
become apparent. Given that language is used in this way in contexts, 
the problem for the conversational analyst becomes not to specify what 
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it is that people in a specific encounter actually mean by what they 
say to one another, but rather to unravel how it is that, in the face 
of so many different potential contextual determinations, they can 
use indexical expressions to make sense to one another - to describe, 
understand, curse, enlighten, question, etc., -etc. In other words, 
what must be done is to describe the mechanisms - the structures of 
practices - that enable members of a society to move from one conversational 
context to another, and to use language in an orderly fashion such that 
what they mean is generally quite clear and adequate for the purposes at 
hand. Such a structure must be both context free in the sense that it 
bridges all contexts and yet it must be context sensitive in that it 
must enable sense to be made, using language, in any context. (11) 
It is of no use to try to make some structure of 'meanings' mediate 
across contexts, as Schutz tries to do, since at once problems of 
'subjective' and tobjectivel meaning begin to arise, problems of 'context' 
and lindexicality' tend to be pushed into the background, and one is 
left with all of the difficulties created by the 'etcetera problem' for 
the nature of 'description' and its 'correspondencel with reality. 
Instead, what is needed is to unravel the structure of practices, within 
a form of life, which enable any meaningful conversation. 
This can be put in slightly different fashion to make the connection 
between analyses of conversation directed towards these conversational 
practices, and the problem of order, more explicit. These conversational 
structures are conceptualized as at that same structural level which 
Garfinkel indicates in his work. The interest is thus not in 'subjective 
meaningst, or in a structure of 'ideal types', or in a structure of 
Winch type 'rules', or in Cicourelian interpretive 'rules', or in, the 
structure of a 'cultural system', but rather in the presuppositional 
rules, assumptions, practices and procedures which enable rational 
action, or meaningful interaction, and thus which enable. social order 
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of which conversational order is a part. The possibility of holding 
meaningful conversations depends upon the practices and procedures which 
enable conversations to be orderly affairs. Thus to examine such 
practices and procedures is to examine something of what makes social 
order possible. 
Before concluding these introductory remarks it will be useful to 
look briefly at the way in which it is the practices and procedures that 
analysts share with the conversationalists whose talk they are analysing, 
that enables them to provide the descriptions of conversation that they do. 
This will both highlight the relationship between the structure of 
conversational practices and social order, and will place the account 
of the substantive work of conversational analysts, which is the subject 
of the next section, in correct perspective. 
In the Purdue Symposium, Garfinkel remarks that-ethnomethodologists 
are in fact 'members# performing the task of analysing society from 
within. (12) The possibility of performing an ethnomethodological 
analysis of conversation rests upon the fact that those analysing the 
conversational data are themselves competent conversationalists, and that 
they can therefore identify what it is that is being said over the course 
of some given stretch of talk. Put another way, the structures of practices 
which enable co-conversationalists to use and make sense of indexical 
expressions in a variety of contexts, (and thus to maintain the "orderliness" 
of conversations) is common to both co-conversationalists and the 
conversational analyst. It is therefore-the case that the analyst 
recognizes orderliness in a conversation because he shares certain 
competences with those whose conversations he is analysing. By the same 
token, the orderliness which he recognizes in the conversation is also 
recognizable to the conversationalists. Schegloff and Sacks put it thus 
"We have proceeded under the assumption (an assumption 
borne out by our research) that in so far as the materials 
we worked with exhibited orderliness, they did so not only 
to us, indeed not in the first place for us, but for the 
co-participants who produced them. " (13) 
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The problem for the analyst, therefore, becomes to find a way 
of describing in a non-normative fashion this order which is visible 
within conversation, and to do so in such a way that the various memberst 
competences which enable both analyst and co-conversationalists to generate 
and recognize that order, are made apparent. -The crucial question 
becomes "how is the order that is visible within this conversation made 
possible? ". To answer this question, the analyst must explicate and 
describe the structure of practices - the competences - which he shares 
iAe common with other members of society. 
What the analyst must not do, however, is to impose some structure 
from without upon the conversational data. His analysis must stand as a 
description rather than a Inormativel account of the data. Since the 
order is recognizable to members of a society, he must use that fact as 
his base line, in the sense that his description must investigate how 
they recognize the order - must describe how this is possible - rather 
than organizing the data in terms of some set of criteria imported from 
elsewhere - for example frational categoriest, or 'norms and values'. 
Sacks and Schegloff state this aim as follows in relation to closing a 
conversation: 
"These basic features of conversation, the problem of 
achieving their co-occurence, and the turn-taking 
machinery addressed to the solution of that problem are 
intended, in this account, not as analyst's constructs, 
but as descriptions of the orientations of conversationalists 
in producing proper conversation. " (14) 
The analyses are intended as descriptions of what is going on in the 
data, warranted by the data, and able to 'give backl that same data. It 
is not good enough to simply produce an analysis which has counted the 
number of occasions on which a particular featureýof a conversation occurs 
( for example a question) and the number of times on which a certain 
other feature follows it (for example an answer) and then to give an 
account of their relationship in terms of Oprobabilityl. What must be 
done is to find a description of the data which accounts for every 
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occurrence. As Schegloff puts it 
Not number of occurrences, but common subsumption 
under a more general formulation is what matters. " (15) 
The analyses are not inductive. Rather the point is to describe the 
structure of the utterances observed. There is no place for deviant 
case analyses - indeed if a 'deviant' case were found then the analysis 
would either have to be changed to incorporate it, or it would need to 
be rejected as inadequate. The analyses are beholden to the data, and 
stand or fall according to whether or not they are able to describe it 
- whether or not they can handle all instances of some particular feature 
of conversation practice. Schegloff again makes the point in relation 
to a discussion of the opening of a conversation 
"Rather than developing a deviant case analysis we set out 
to try to deepen the formulation ( ............. ) so that it 
would encompass with equal ease the vast majority of cases 
already adequately described and the troublesome variant. " (16) 
The task for the analyst of conversation, then, is rigorous and demandina 
and stands in a relationship to the data such that it can, in principle, 
be mistaken. In this way, the hope is that purely Onormativel 
descriptions can be avoided. 
In this section, then, I have tried to give some indication of 
the rationale of conversational analysis by relating it to the work of 
Carfinkel, drawing out the ways in which it attempts to describe that 
structural level which is concerned with the practices and procedures 
that are the presupposition of meaningful interaction and of social order. 
I have shown also, how it is the fact that the analyst shares certain 
competences with other conversationalists that enables him to do the work 
of description that he does. Having provided this background, I want 
now to move on to discuss in some detail the substantive work that has 
been done by conversational analysts. 
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CONVERSATIONAL STRUCTURES: 1) MEMBERSHIP CATEGORIZATION DEVICES 
In this section, I will look at Imembership categorization 
devices' to show how Sacks, in some of his earliest work, sets about the 
problem of providing descriptions of the structures of rules and practices 
which enable conversation - which enable indexical expressions to be used 
with a sense in a wide variety of different settings. This particular 
notion is, in fact, largely abandoned by Sacks (although not by many 
other analysts) as his work progresses, in favour of a concern with 
sequencing in conversation. Nonetheless it remains an interesting and 
potentially productive notion, and one which provides a vivid illustration 
of the type of enterprise that conversational analysts are involved in. 
Sacks$ early interest in the categories that members of a society 
use over the course of their interactions is seen in his analysis of 
telephone calls to an emergency psychiatric clinic in Los Angeles which 
dealt largely with calls from potential suicides who were looking for 
some sort of help. This work formed the core of his Ph. D. Thesis, and 
is reported in two articles - "An Initial Investigation of the Usability 
of Conversational Data for Doing Sociology", and "The Search For Help". (17) 
Probably the clearest expression of this aspect of his work is in an 
analysis of a story told by a two year old child, so I will look at this 
essay and the way in which a structural mechanism is developed to 
describe the categorizing work done by members of a society. 
The basic concept here is that of a 'membership categorization 
device' (M. C. D. for short) which is defined as follows: 
"any collection of membership categories, containing at 
least a category, which may be applied to some population 
containing at least a member, so as to provide, by the 
use of some rules of application, for the pairing of at 
least a population member and a categorization device 
member. A device is then a collection plus rules of 
application". (18) 
The sorts of thing that Sacks has in mind here are devices such as 'sex', 
which has two member categories, 'male' and tfemalel which go together 
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to form a set, and which can be used to describe someone. other possible 
devices are those such as 'family', which contains the categories Imother', 
'father', 'baby', ? children' etc., 'stage of life', which contains the 
categories 'baby', 'adult', 'child', etc., and so on. Many M; C. D. Is are 
what Sacks calls tduplicatively organisedt which means that 
"when such adevice is used on a population, what is done 
is to take its categories, treat the set of categories 
as defining a unit, and place members of the population 
into cases of the unit. " (19) 
What Sacks does is to take a story told by a child, and to analyse 
it in such a way that this basic concept - the 'membership categorization 
device' - its features, and the ways in which it is used (with the help 
of a few rules which I will mention in a minute), are illustrated and a 
general structural point is made about the organization of conversation. 
The story is "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up. ". 
The first thing that Sacks pointsout about this two sentence story 
is that both he and the majority of native speakers of English, would 
hear the smommy' that is mentioned, as the mommy of the 'baby'. This 
fact is not stated in the story, but nonetheless most people would, 
without any thought, consider that the baby and the mommy were related. 
Sacks' question is, how is this possible? How is it that this relationship 
is established and how might it be possible to describe the way in which 
a simple account of such a simple scene can be done in such a way that so 
much actually left unsaid is in fact understood? 
The answer is given in terms of M. C. D. s with the rules 'of application. 
It is first of all evident that the category 'baby' belongs in both the 
device 'family' and the device 'stage of lifel. It is also clear that 
smommy' belongs to the device 'family'. There are a set of rules that 
govern the application of such devices. The first of these is that a 
person can be heard as doing 'adequate reference' if he uses just one 
category from a particular device. It is not, for example, necessary 
for him to say, every time he wants to identify a mother, something like 
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'the mother who is related to the father with whom she had a baby which 
is their baby, and that baby is the sister of another baby who is also 
related to the father and mother etc. etc. ". All he needs to say is 
'mother', and enough has been said because of the way in which M. C. D. s 
are organized. This rule Sacks calls the 'economy rule'. 
There is another rule - the 'consistency rulet - which says that if 
" category from some particular device has been used for one member of 
" population, then other categories from the same device may be used for 
other members. Thus, for example, ýif one has already referred to someone 
as a 'husband', then one may refer to someone else as a *wife', rather 
than as, say, a 'woman'. As a corollary of this, there is a hearer's 
rule which states that "if two or more categories are used to categorize 
two or more members of some population, and those categories can be , 
heard as categories from the same-collection, then: hear them that way. ". (20) 
One further term is needed before going back to the original story 
to show how the apparatus thatSacks has developed accounts for the way 
in which it is heard. This is the notion of category bound activities. 
Briefly, the idea is that there are certain activities that go with 
certain categories. Thus, for example, Icryingi is category bound to 
'baby' within the device 'stage of lifet. 
If one brings all this to bear, upon the story "The baby cried. The 
mommy picked it up" it becomes possible to account for why it is that we 
hear the mommy as the mommy of the baby. Thus 
1. By the 'economy rule' we know that both Mommy and Baby do 
adequate reference to members of the population. 
2. The term 'baby' is contained in the two devices 'stage of life' 
and Ifamilyl. However the category bound activity $crying' relates the 
baby in the story to the device 'stage of life$. 
3. The 'consistency rule' (and the hearer's rule that is its corollary) 
suggests that the Imommy' in the second sentence should be heard as from 
the same device as the 'baby' in the first. The device which they share 
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islfamilys. 
4. The device 'family' is tduplicatively organizedt which means that 
when it is used, its categories are to be understood in terms of the unit 
of which they are a part - e. g. daddy, mommy, baby, etc. as parts of the 
'family'. 
5. Thus the tmommy' and the tbaby' in the story are both collected 
by the duplicatively organized device 'family', and are to be heard as 
going together - as from the same unit. 
6. Since the mommy is the mommy of the baby, and since mommies of 
babies that are crying, according to common wisdom, pick them up, then 
the story is heard as a perfectly Inormall and tcorrect' one. 
This brief account does not at all do justice to Sacks' analysis, 
but it does provide a basis upon which to form, a few comments. Firstly, 
it is clear that the findings of the analysis are highly general in that 
$membership categorization devicet is a concept that can be used on any 
number of different instances of categorization, in any number of 
conversations, in order to describe what it is that is being done, how it 
is that some particular categorization is heard as it is, and so on. 
Sacks gives an example of this further applicability of the model 
"it permits us to predict, and to understand how we can 
predict, that a statement such as 'The first baseman 
looked around. The third baseman scratched himself' will 
be heard as saying 'the first baseman of the team of 
which the third baseman is also a player' and its converse. " (21) 
Such hearings are provided for by the machinery contained in the notion 
of a membership categorization device: in this case the relevant 
device is 'team' of which 'baseman' is one category. The fact that one 
can predict the way in which these phrases-will be heard on the basis 
of the descriptive apparatus testifies to the adequacy of the description. 
Further examples of the use of the concept M. C. D. can be found throughout 
the conversation analysis literature, and the descriptions that result 
are often highly insightful. A good example of this is a recent article 
I 
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by Paul Drew which examines the cross examination of a policeman giving 
evidence to the Scarman Tribunal. (22) 
Secondly, the machinery that Sacks develops provides some insight 
into the ways in which words like-'baby', or Imant can be used to insult 
or praise, or to impute blame. For someone to refer to a fully grown 
man as a lbabyt because he is crying, is to insult him by using the 
categorization device 'stage of life', i. e. to use the category bound 
activity Icrying' to relate the man to that membership category to which 
'crying' is bound - namely 'baby' - when he should normally be described 
by the category Iman' from the same device. Similarly, for a mother to 
refer to her young son, who has just finished some useful task about the 
house, as her ImanI, reverses the procedure, placing the child in a 
position within the device 'stage of life' by means of the category 'man' 
to which he is not yet entitled. In this way he is praised for his good 
work. It is, in other words, the fact that categories are collected within 
devices, and are recognized as being so collected, that makes it possible 
to use terms (membership categories) over'the course of interaction to do 
work that is not 'descriptive' in the strict sense, but which could more 
adequately be characterized as tpraisingf, Iblamingl, linsultingt and so 
on. 
Thirdly, it is worth noticing that Sacks himself, in the article 
examined above, draws out the implications of his analysis to include the 
ways in which 'descriptions' are done adequately, and heard to be adequate 
by whoever hears them. This he does by way of a 'viewers' maxim': 
"If a member sees a category-bound activity being done, 
then, if one can see it being done by a member of a 
category to which the activity is bound, then: See it 
that way. " (23) 
In other words, if one could see either that a 'male' cried or that a 'baby' 
cried, (it being a male baby) then one would, if possible, see that a 
'baby' cried. Thus in deciding whether or not a description of some 
event is adequate or not, one applies the viewers' maxim so that 'the 
-340- 
male cried', said of a baby, is seen to be an 'incorrect' - or a least 
improper, or ironic, or bizarre etc. - description of the event. It is 
thus the case that 'correct' or 'possibly correctl descriptions are 
recognisable. 
Now the interest of this is twofold. Firstly it does enable us to 
describe something of what is involved in producing and understanding a 
correct possible description of some event or other. It is necessary 
to align category bound activities with their categories, and to use 
categories in relation to their devices. (24) But further than this, 
secondly, the fact that categories are used in this way demonstrates 
something about perceived 'normality' and tordert. The fact that one is 
able to hear 'the baby cried' as correct depends not only upon the 
categorization device itself (with its rules) but also upon the recognition 
that it is Inormall, in our society, for babies to cry, but not so much 
for men. This norm is what is used, as a resource, for discovering that 
'the male cried' could well be an incorrect description of what was 
going on. By the same token, however, the categories themselves - the 
relationship between them and the ways in which they are used - together 
with the viewers' maxim, are'used by speakers and describers in an 
orderly fashion to describe whatever is happening as an ordered, tnormalt 
event. At the same time, the hearers# maxims work to ensure that 
descriptions will be heard as normal. . 
What is most interesting about this is that it leads Sacks to 
rewrite the sociological notion of Inormt. Consider the following: 
"Via some norm two activities may be made observable as a 
sequentially ordered pair. That is, viewers use norms to explain 
both the occurrence of some activity given the occurrence of 
another and also its sequential position with regard to the 
other, e. g. that it follows the other, or precedes it. That is 
a first importance. Second, viewers use norms to provide the 
relevant membership categories in terms of which they formulate 
identifications of the doers of those activities for which the 
norms are appropriate. " (25) 
Thus, for example, it is the 'norm' which says that babies cry, whilst in 
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general men do not, which enables us to hear that 'the baby criedl is a 
possibly correct description where tthe male cried' leaves us wondering. 
Our sense of what is $normal? in our society provides us with sets of 
assumptions and preconceptions which enable us to differentiate between 
events, to explain them, to see them as instances of this kind of thing 
and thus as warranting the use of a specific category for its 
description etc. etc. Thus what is tnormall - that which is organized 
in terms of taken for granted practices and procedures in an 'orderly' 
fashion - serves to orient the member of society. Sacks characterizes 
the alternative sociological position as he sees it: 
"In the sociological and anthropological literature, the 
focus on norms is on the conditions under which and the extent 
to which they govern, or can be seen by social scientists 
to govern, the relevant actions of those members whose 
actions they ought to control. While such matters are, of 
course, important, our viewerls maxim suggests other 
importances of norms, for members. " (26) 
Here in Sackst account, the approach to social order that Garfinkel 
gives is once-again apparent. 'Norms' are not to be thought of as simply 
constraining - although it may well be the case that they are in some 
sense - but rather the way in which they are used by members of a society 
to organize their environment must be investigated. It is Inormalityt, 
Itypicalityt etc. itself, and the ways in which this is maintained which 
must be investigated if the ground floor of social order is to be 
uncovered, and this order itself provides materials for its own 
maintenance. By faccounting' for phenomena in terms of orderly, organized 
categories, that order is itself reinforced by Imemberst - Inormst need 
not be seen as causally effective mechanisms to account for order in 
society. 
Sacks' early concerns with conversation, then, focused on problems 
of categorization. Over the course of his work, however, his attention 
shifted towards an examination of sequential issues in conversation, and 
it is this that I want to move on to look at now. 
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CONVERSATIONAL STRUCTURES: 2) SEQUENCING AND THE TURN TAKING MACHINERY 
It seems probable that there were two main reasons for Sacks' shift 
of emphasis. Firstly,, in any examination of categorization, it becomes 
apparent that the sequential placement of a particular category is often 
important to the way in which it is understood. Thus, for example, the 
categories 'husband' and 'wife', heard in adjacent utterances in a 
conversation, are more likely to be heard as relating a husband to a wife 
through the duplicatively organized device Ifamilyl than the use of the 
same categories used several atterances apart and after a change of 
topic in the conversation. To account for this - to describe the fact 
adequately - it becomes necessary to look at the relationships between 
adjacent utterances, at the relationship between talk about different 
topics over the course of a conversation, and about the organization of 
talk about the same topic over the course of several utterances- i. e. 
to become involved in issues of 'sequencing' in conversation. Secondly, 
it is possible to gain far more precision when examining sequential 
issues than it is when treating M. C. D. s. As I shall show, the former can 
be analysed in a highly general and abstract fashion. The latter, however, 
seem almost inevitably to depend upon fairly specific categories - on 
the investigation of specific M. C. D. s - for the development of the basic 
ideas that are involved, which militates against-the demand for general, 
context independent, descriptions of the data. I will start this 
discussion of sequencing by looking at 'turn taking'. In an important 
paper on turn taking, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson discuss the kind of 
model that they have built to describe their data. It is, they say 
"a local management system, and ...... it is an 
interactionally managed system'. (27) 
What does this mean? The 'local management' of turn taking in 
conversation means that the allocation of turns is not done in terms of 
some broad over-arching plan which decides in advance precisely when and 
how some particular conversationalist should have a turn at speaking - as 
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for example would be the case in a ceremony - but rather it is organised 
on a turn by turn basis. In other words the allocation of turns is managed 
'locally' within the conversation as it moves on from one utterance to 
the next. What the model that Sacks et al build does is to provide 
'rules' which account, in a structural fashion, for the transitions from 
one turn to the next, from that next turn to another next and so on. It 
does not attempt to predict the course of some possible unit 'whole 
conversation', but is content to provide only for moves from-one turn to 
the next. 
The model that they build is also, they claim, interactJonally managed. 
The fact that the formal apparatus is locally managed - and not 
predetermined over its course - means that the parties to the conversation 
can themselves control the conversation in its course. Thus 
"The character and organization of the rules that constitute 
it as a local management system themselves determine its 
more particular organization in not only allowing and/or 
requiring turn-size and turn-order to vary, but in 
subjecting their variability to the control of the parties 
to any conversation. It is, therefore, among local 
management systems, a 'party-administered' system. " (28) 
In other words, the formal descriptions of turn taking in conversation. are 
such that the structures - the machinery - which is their substance 
contains as an essential feature, management by the parties to the 
conversation. The order in the conversation is not described as being 
the 'result' of some set of structures which are causally effective over 
the course of the conversation, but it is rather the result of management 
by co-conversationalists. It is the structure of members of society's 
practices and procedures for organising conversation that is being 
described, and not the structures of some given and formal whole 'a 
conversation', and thus to describe conversation is to describe the 
interactional work that goes into it. 
It is worth pointing out in passing here, before going on to describe 
the components and rules of the turn taking system, the ways in which this 
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formulation of turn taking articulates with Garfinkel's thoughts on the 
problem of order. It is the conversationalists themselves - their practices 
and procedures - who are seen to be organizing the fordert in the 
conversation. The notion of 'recipient design' makes this even more 
apparent: 
"By 'recipient design' we refer to a multitude of respects 
in which the talk by a party in a conversation is constructed 
or designed in ways which display an orientation and 
sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the co- 
participants. In our Lc? Grk, we have found recipient design to 
operate with regard to word selection, topic selection, 
admissibility and ordering of sequences, options and 
obligations for starting and terminating conversations, etc... 
as will be reported in future publications. " (29) 
It is not just the allocation of turns that shows co-conversationalists 
engaged in the mangement of conversational order, but a host of other 
features of talk. Further, these conversations themselves are part of a 
whole field of interaction which is being organised in its course, and 
underlying all of this too is a structure of rules, practices and 
procedures, all waiting to be described in the course of understanding 
forder' in society. 
To return to the turn taking system itself, Sacks et al write that 
"The turn-taking system for conversation can be described 
in terms of two components and a set of rules (30) 
The two components are 1. the turn-constructional component, and 2. the 
turn-allocation component, 
The turn-constructional component concerns the units out of which a 
turn at talking is built. There are two considerations. Firstly, 
I'sentential, clausal, phrasal, and lexical" unit types are amongst those 
that can be used in order to construct a turn. Anything from a long 
monologue to a Imm.. ' or a shake of the head (31). can constitute a turn 
over the course of some conversation, and the turn itself is made up of 
anything from one to several such lunit types'. Secondly, at the 
completion of every such unit - and each speaker is initially entitled to 
only one such - it becomes possible for another speaker to take a turn. 
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Put another way "The first possible completion of a first such unit 
constitutes an initial transition-relevance place. ". (32) Further, 
"Transfer of speakership is coordinated by reference to such transition- 
relevance places, which anyunit-type will reach. ". (33) 
The second component is the turn-allocation component. This governs 
who it is that is entitled to speak (or obliged to in some cases) at the 
completion of a unit. There are two possibilities, namely-the current 
speaker can select someone, or else someone can 'self selectl to take the 
next turn. Which of these possibilities in fact ensues is governed by a 
set of rules. These rules are (and I will simply reproduce them here) 
"l. For any turn, at the initial transition-relevance place 
of an initial turn-constructional unit: 
a) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as to involve the 
use of a 'current speaker select next' technique, then the 
party so selected has the right and is obliged to take next 
turn to speak; no others have such rights or obligations, 
and transfer occurs at that place. 
b) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the 
use of a 'current speaker selects nextt technique, then self- 
selection-for next speakership may, but need not, be instituted; 
first starter acquires rights to a turn, and transfer occurs 
at that place. 
c) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve the 
use of a tcurrent speaker selects next' technique, then current 
speaker may, but need not continue, unless another self-selects. 
2. If, at the initial transition-relevance place of an initial 
turn-constructional unit, neither la nor lb has operated, and, 
following the provision of 1c, current speaker has continued, 
then the rule-set a-c re-applies at the next transition-relevance 
place, and recursively at each next transition-relevance place, 
until transfer is effected. " (34) 
This basic machinery is able to describe the phenomenon of turn taking 
in conversation. Sacks et al move on, in the article under discussion, 
to show the ways in which it handles such obvious conversational phenomena 
as that speaker change recurs (or occurs), that turns'at talk are of 
different lengths, that only one speaker talks at a time except for brief 
overlaps (which are also accounted for) that the length of the conversation, 
its actual content, and the content of specific turns are not specified 
in advance, and so on. It stands, in other words, as a structural solution 
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to the problem of how to ensure a certain order over the course of some 
particular conversational interaction, and it does so in terms of a model 
that is, as I have shown above, a local management system that is 
interactionally managed. 
The turn taking system is, as it were, the ground floor of the concern 
with sequencing, and many further analyses presuppose this and work to 
produce fuller accounts of aspects of the transition from one turn to 
another within the overall structure of a conversation. I want to go on 
to look at some of the ways in which the concern with sequencing is 
developed by examining the paper by Sacks and Schegloff entitled "Opening 
up Closings" in which several interesting features of conversational 
organization become apparent. 
CONVERSATIONAL STRUCTURES: 3) SEQUENCING AND THE PROBLEM OF CLOSINGS 
The first thing to notice about Sacks' and Schegloffts discussion of 
closing a converation is that, like the discussion of turn taking, it is 
formulated in terms of structures, which are, again, structures of 
conversational practices. They look for a structural solution to the 
problem of 'closings' for reasons that have been mentioned in a previous 
section, but which it is worth re-emphasising here, namely-that 'the solution 
must be at once context-free and context-sensitive. It must account for 
the closing of conversations in such a way that the particulars of 
specific conversational interactions - i. e. the specifics of what was 
spoken about, the specific parties to the conversation, the specific context 
of the conversation etc. - do not appear as essential parts of the 
description of 'closings'. This must be done simply because closing a 
conversation is something done in many conversations, by many different 
conversationalists, in many contexts - it is a trans-contextual phenomenon - 
so that the analyst must describe the structure of the phenomenon 
independently of specific manifestations of it. At the same time, however, 
it must be possible for the structural machinery to be sensitive to 
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specific contexts, in that it is manifest in specific conversations on 
particular occasions. It must be a structure that accounts for the fact 
that this, particular, conversation is brought to a close - it must 
describe what it is that people do, in general, to close a conversation 
whilst at the same time it must show how these particular conversationalists 
closed this conversation on this specific occasion. Should the analysis 
fail to do both of these things, then it will be inadequate, since it will 
not describe the structure of practices which enable conversationalists 
to organize - order - their talk in such a way as to bring it to an end. 
With this in mind, then, I want to turn now to the paper "Opening 
up Closings". There the initial problem is stated thus: 
"how to organize the simultaneous arrival of the 
co-conversationalists at a point where one speakerls 
completion will not occasion another speaker's talk, 
and that will not be heard as some speaker's silence. " (35) 
The same thing can be put in the language of the model for turn-taking: 
"how to coordinate the suspension of the transition relevance of possible 
utterance completion", (36) In order to see how this problem is solved 
it is necessary, first of all, to look at the organization of certain 
special pairs of utterances called 'adjacency pairs'. 
Adjacency pairs are 
"sequences which properly have the following features; 
(1) two utterance length, (2) adjacent positioning of 
component utterances, (3) different speakers producing 
each utterance. " (37) 
In other words, they are pairs of utterances that 'go together, in some 
way, such as questions/answers, Summons/answers, Greetings/greetings, etc., 
etc. What is special about these particular pairs is that the *first pair 
part' (i. e. the first utterance of the two) has a more constraining effect 
upon the utterance that follows it (the second pair part) than is the case 
with the normal run of any two utterances that can be found over the course 
of some conversation. In other words, the constraints that are built into 
conversation by virtue of the turn taking machinery are strengthened in 
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the case of an adjacency pair sequence. This 'going together' of pairs 
of utterances is described by the term 'conditional relevancel. Schegloff 
defines the term thus: 
"By conditional relevance of one item on another we mean: given 
the first, the second is expectable; upon its occurrence it 
can be seen to be a second item to the first; upon its non- 
occurrence it can be seen to be officially absent - all this 
provided by the occurrence of the first item. " (38) 
This conditional relevance of second pair parts upon the completion of a 
first pair part is significant for a number of reasons, and it is worth 
mentioning two here to illustrate the point. Firstly, someone listening 
to a conversation, or taking part in one, will, on the occurrence of 
a first pair part, expect that a second pair part will be forthcoming. 
This means that he will try to hear the next utterance as, for example, 
an answer to the question asked, and the fact that they expect to be 
able to hear it that way will mean that if they are unable to do so, then 
what they will hear is someone being evasive, rude, stupid etc. (39) 
By the same token, secondly, a speaker whose lot it is to produce a second 
pair part, is in a position where the structure of conversational 
practices is such that he must produce, say, an answer to the question 
asked, otherwise he risks being thought of as evasive, rude, stupid, etc. 
Conditional relevance, in other words, provides both hearers and speakers 
with a particular motivation for listening or speaking in a certain way 
in relation to an utterance that is produced as a first pair part of an 
adjacency pair sequence. 
It is now time to return to the problem of how to lift Itransition 
relevance' in order to finish a conversation. In order to do this it is 
necessary to notice one further property of adjacency pairs, namely 
that because of the tie between the first and second pair parts they can 
be used to ensure that something or other that is desired to be done in 
the conversation, actually gets done. For example, if someone wants 
certain information, then it makes sense to use a question which, as the 
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first pair part of an adjacency pair sequence, can constrain ones 
co-conversationalist to produce an answer. Without the use of such 
'devices, there is no guarantee that what one wants done - the information 
that one wants - will ever get done. 
In the case of closing a conversation, it is evident that both 
parties want, at some point or other, to stop the conversation. Thus an 
adjacency pair solution to the problem looks ideal, since, it can provide 
a close ordering of the turn taking machinery in order to bring about the 
desired event - an end to the conversation. At the same time the very 
nature of the adjacency pair format is such that both parties to the 
conversation can show that they want to close it, and that they understand 
that the other wants to close as well. This is provided for by the need 
to produce the second pair part that is conditionally relevant upon the 
occurrence of the first, and by the fact that a failure to do so will be 
taken as a lack of understanding, or a reluctance to close,, or as being 
boring etc. - 
Thus Sacks and Schegloff are able to describe the way in which 
conversations are brought to an end in terms of a 'terminal exchange', 
which is something like, for example, A. Goodbye. B. Goodbye., or 
A. See you soon. B. Yea. So long., where a terminal exchange is an 
instance of a more general class of paired utterances: ladjacency pairs'. 
The closing of a conversation can thus be seen in terms of and described 
by a highly general, formal, structural apparatus. They sum up thus: 
"if where transition relevance is to be lifted is a systematic 
problem, an adjacency pair solution can work because: by providing 
that transition relevance is to be lifted after the second pair 
part's occurrence, the occurrence of the second pair part can 
then reveal an appreciation of and agreement to the intendedness 
of closing now which a first part of a terminal exchange reveals 
its speaker to propose. " (40) 
So far in this discussion of the sequencing aspect of conversation 
analysis, I have not looked beyond the problem of the relationship between 
one utterance and the next, and the way in which this is organised. In 
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order to get the full flavour of the work that is being done, however, 
it is necessary to consider broader issues concerned with sequencing 
which relate to the structure of the conversation as a whole in as much 
as there are ties between different parts of the conversation. -I will do 
this primarily in terms of Schegloff and Sacks discussion of the 
placement of the first pair part of a terminal exchange in the essay which 
I have been discussing above, before moving back to concerns adjacent to 
'conditional relevance' in a brief discussion of 'preferencel. I will' 
then move on to discuss the question of the status of the-structures 
that form the substance of the analyses of conversation. 
Two further features of conversational structure are relevant to a 
description of Iclosingst, namely Itopic' and 'pre-closings'. I will 
look at each of these in turn. 
Over the course of a conversation, there are various Imentionables' 
that co-conversationalists want to talk about. These mentionables may 
become the Itopic' of conversation. For the description of conversation 
to be adequate, it needs to show how it is that Imentionables' become 
'topics' of conversation, and how it is that the structural machinery 
allows several topics to be mentioned over the course of any one conversation, 
rather than, for example, the number of topics beging specified inadvance. 
How is it possible to move from one topic to another? Very little work 
has been done on this organisation of topic talk, but a few remarks have, 
been made by Sacks and Schegloff in relation to Iclosingst. Here they 
point out that there seems to be a preference within conversation for 
people to place certain mentionables in lappropriatel places-rather than 
just putting them anywhere. For example, it is not always politic to put 
some mentionables in 'first topic' position - such as some sorts of bad 
news - so that a conversationalist may wait until he is given an 
alternative and appropriate opportunity to say what ever it is that he 
wants to talk about. 
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This being the case, if the conversational structure were such 
that conversations were closed down with a bang at the end of a topic, 
then there would be a danger that unmentioned mentionables would not be 
given the chance to become the topic of conversation. Closing a 
conversation, then, must allow for the possibility of there being further 
topic talk - it must allow a space for so far unmentioned mentionables to 
be spoken about. It is at this point that the notion of_tpre-closingsl 
becomes apposite. 
A pre-closing is an instance of a general class of pre-sequences 
which includes pre-announcements, (41) and pre-invitations. (42) They are 
"heard via their sequential placement, but as placed not 
after some utterance, but before one. " (43) 
Within the overall structure of a conversation, they, as it were, 'cue' 




B: Jack Green. 
A: Hi Jack. 
B: How ya doin. Say, what're ya doin. 
(Sacks, 1ý67 lecture 8)" (44) 
IT 
makes it highly likely that an invitation will follow, and the listener 
will hear the phrase as leading to an invitation and will respond to it 
accordingly - e. g. A: Oh. I'm washing my hair, will put off the invitation, 
by providing an excuse in advance of it being given. 
Now pre-closings have, as pre-sequences, similar features, in that 
they act as a prelude to an actual terminal exchange. They are such 
utterances as A: O. K. B: O. K. or A: We-ell., which signal the end 
of a topic, and make it possible to place the first pair part of a terminal 
exchange in the next slot - as the next utterance - in the conversation, 
and thus close the conversation. The pre-closing, then, signals that the 
conversation could end at this point. The pre-closing, plus the terminal 
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exchange are called the closing 'section'. An example of this would be 
A: O. K. 
B: O. K. 
A: Goodbye. 
B: Goodbye. 
This issue of pre-closings relates back to what has been said above 
about topic talk. It is evident that over the course of a conversation, 
it is not the case that everytime a speaker says something like owe-ell' 
at the end of talk about some particular topic, the conversation moves on 
mechanically to its close. Although it would be possible to close the 
conversation at that point, it is often the case that another mentionable 
is made the topic of conversation at that point. In other words, by cueing 
a possible end of the conversation, it becomes possible for someone to 
insert another topic before it is too late. Thus a 'pre-closing' is 
only such after the closing section has been completed. At Utterance 
such as 'we-ell' which is followed by further talk is only a 'possible 
pre-closing' -: -i. e. it signals that the conversation could end at this 
point, and opens up the possibility for the introduction of further 
mentionables into the conversation. 
The machinery developed to describe the closings of conversations, 
then., illustrates the considerable flexibility that there is in the 
structure of conversation. It shows some of the ways in which 
conversational order is organised by the parties to the conversation, in 
that it suggests 
"that a closing section is initiated, i. e. turns out to 
have begun, when none of the parties to a conversation 
care to choose to continue it. " (45) 
These points are extended further by Sacks and Schegloff. They point out, 
for example, that possible pre-closings can take a very wide variety of 
forms - for example in a telephone conversation, "this must be costing 
you a lot of money" stands as one. They point out that material that 
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has come up over the course of the conversation itself can be used as 
a warrant for closing the conversation - again for a telephone conversation, 
"I'll let you get back to your work" can stand as a possible pre-closing, 
especially after the work was part of the substance of the telephone call. 
They point out also that the material for such possible pre-closings can 
be introduced early in the conversation, often before the first topic has 
been addressed - as when, for example, a telephone call begins with "I'm 
sorry to have dragged you away from your work". In fact all sorts of 
information, on all sorts of different occasions can be, and is, used by 
conversationalists to bring about what at first sight looks like a very 
simple task - namely ending a conversation - and their methods for-doing 
so are described in structural terms with the concepts that I have been 
examining above. 
The extreme flexibility of the conversational machinery is emphasised 
by the fact that even after a closing sequence has been completed, it is 
possible to bring up a further topic. What is particularly interesting 
about this type of case is that conversationalists can be seen to orient 
to the fact that in doing this they are in fact breaking the 'rules' for 
correct conversation. They do this by using 'misplacement markerst to 
indicate that they recognise that they have done something that is, 
strictly, out of place. Such utterances as loh by the way', or 'Just a 
minute', are used in this way. Sacks and Schegloff say this about them 
"Misplacement markers, thus, display an orientation by their 
user to the proper sequential-organizational character of 
a particular place in a. conversation, and a recognition that 
an utterance that is thereby prefaced may not fit, and that 
recipient should not attempt to use this placement in 
understanding their occurrence. " (46) 
The flexibility in the sequential machinery, then, is such that 
considerable interactional leeway is allowed to co-conversationalists, 
with the result that the ways in which people use language to organize 
and facilitate their everyday social affairs - for example to commence 
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or to cease some particular interaction, or to convey certain information 
- is carried on against a structural background that provides many open 
ended possibilities. Sacks and Schegloff write of closing sections: 
"to capture the phenomenon of closings, one cannot treat 
it as the natural history of some particu lar conversation; 
one cannot treat it as a routine to be run through, inevitable 
in its course once initiated. Rather, it must be viewed, as 
must conversation as a whole, as a set of prospective 
possibilities opening up at various points in the conversation's 
course: there are possibilities throughout a closing, including 
the moments after a 'final* good-bye, for re-opening the 
conversation. Getting to a termination, therefore, involves 
work at various points in the conversation's, and the closing 
section's, course: it requires accomplishing. " (47) 
It is this extreme flexibility'of converational practices that makes 
it such a powerful tool in the service of social interaction and in the 
maintenance of social order. 
In recent years, a considerable amount of work has been done on the 
sequential aspects of conversation. Sacks, for example, has, shown some 
of the ways in which jokes (48) and puns (49) have both a proper 
sequential position within the structure, of a conversation, and at the 
same time have various jobs to do and certain sequential implications. 
Puns, for example, at the end of-a story or a description, can demonstrate 
understandings of the story, whilst laughter at the end of a joke can 
illustrate that one has (or has not) a sense of humour. I cannot cover 
all of this ground here, and will not attempt to. Instead I will look 
at two areas concerned with sequential issues which illustrate something 
further about social interaction. I will begin by considering 'breaches, 
of the conversational structure. I will then move on to consider the 
issue of 'preference'. 
CONVERSATIONAL STRUCTURES- 4) STRUCTURE AND INTERACTIONAL CONTEXT 
By a consideration of what is involved in 'breaching' conversational, 
order, it is easy to see how a notion of 'interruption' can be developed. 
Given the two components and the rules which provide for turn transition 
in conversation, it becomes possible to see 'interruption' as a breach of 
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correct order in that it prevents the current speakerts turn from reaching 
a transition relevance point. This breach of conversational order then 
becomes as all breaches do, an accountable matter and it becomes possible 
to see the interrupter as 'rude' or 'aggressive' and so on purely because 
he has failed to maintain 1correctt conversational order, and has, in 
terms of the model, 'broken the rules'. It is interesting to note, for' 
example, that Moerman's students, analysing a tape of Lue conversation, 
were able to develop some notion of 'interruption' in spite of the fact 
that they did not themselves speak Lue, (50)- a fact which suggests that 
breaches of 'correct practices may perhaps be recognisable even cross 
culturally at this structural level, and that they will always, be 
something 'noticeable' and laccountablet. 
This accountable nature of breaches of correct conversational order 
is illustrated in an article by Zimmerman and West which seeks to throw 
light on the question of the relationship between the sexes as it is 
reflected in language. (51) Their approach is to measure the number 
of interruptions in conversation between members of the same sex, and 
between members of the opposite sex. The results suggest that in fact 
there are more interruptions in opposite sex conversations, and that most 
of them are done by the men. They suggest'that this is some indication 
of the inequality between the sexes in ordinary interaction. What is 
interesting here from the point of view of the conversational structures 
is not so much whether or not such results are valid or not, (although 
that too is an important and interesting question) but the sheer fact 
that visible breeches of the turn-taking system should be so noticeable 
and accountable in this way. 
Another interesting interactional spin off is that it becomes possible 
to suggest why it is that*lsilences' in a conversation are heard as 
belonging to someone rather than, in general, being simply lapses in the 
conversation. (52) A silence will always come at the end of someones 
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turn at talking, and thus at a transition relevance point. The rule 
set for the alocation of turns, which I set forward above, then comes 
into operation and depending upon which rule is relevant, some person 
will be heard to be silent if no one actually talks. Once again the 
result is that this breach in the correct order becomes an accountable 
matter, and someone can be theard' to be evasive,, rude, not paying attention, 
etc., etc., without actually having said a word. The power of the 
conversational structures becomes apparent in that even 'absences' 
become noticeable in terms of it, and this fact is describeable too 
in terms of the model for turn-taking. 
This accountability of silences, absences and interruptions is also 
important in as much as it provides a particular motivation for parties 
to an interaction to talk, and to do so in such a way that they will not 
be judged unfavourable. It provides them with an impetus to maintain the 
orderly, typical, character of the everyday conversational world, since 
consistent failure in these matters can result in isolation, confinement 
in mental institutions, or simply in a 'bad character'. Even occasional 
breaches of correct order can send ones co-conversationalists in search 
of some motive or other for ones errant behaviour. Thus conversational 
order - and in as much as this is connected to the general problem of 
order, social order in general - can be seen as self maintaining. It has 
built into it mechanisms for its own survival - it is self policing - 
so that it becomes unnecessary to posit 'sacred' norms and values to 
explain social order at this level. The structure of conversational 
practices takes care of itself. 
In the same vein, it is interesting to note that there are differences 
in the degree of constraint which inheres in the relationship between 
different types of utterances. Consider, for example, the differences 
between summons/answer sequences and question/answer sequences. Both are, 
broadly, adjacency pairs, But, in the case of the first, the person 
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summoned is expected to reply fairly rapidly, and it-is incumbent upon 
the summoner to speak again once the summons has been answered, (53) 
whilst in the case of the latter, quite long delays are possible between 
the asking of the question and the giving of an answer, and once given 
an answer, the asker of the question has no more obligation to speak 
again (although he does have the right) than is provided for by the 
normal workings of the turn-taking machinery. Thus although both can be 
described in terms of tadjacency pairs', their sequential implicativeness, 
and thus their implications for interaction in so far as absences and 
breaches are accountable matters, is different. The implications of this 
for interaction become even more interesting when one begins to consider 
cross cultural variations in degrees of the conditional relevance of 
utterances upon one another. Warm Springs Indians, for example, appear 
to find the question/answer sequence less constraining than English 
speakers do. (54) It could well be that this apparently insignificant 
detail has had a profound bearing upon the ways in which the Indians have 
been seen by the American settlers, and conversely, upon the ways in which 
the settlers were seen by the Indians. Such differences, as with absences. 
and silences, are accountable matters. 
A good example of an analysis of conversation that draws out some of 
the degrees of constraint that are apparent in conversation, and which 
shows in some detail certain aspects of the interactional relevance of 
the structure of conversational practices with reference to such 
constraint, is a study of the 'preference' structure of $second assessments, 
by Anita Pomerantz. The concept of 'preference' itself is addressed to 
the fact that certain types of utterances - 'seconds' - follow certain 
types of other utterances with considerably more regularity than possible 
alternative types of utterances, and at the same time, when the 
Idispreferred' alternative is used, it tends to have distinctive structural 
features which mark it as dispreferred. The best way to illustrate the 
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precise sense of the notion is with reference to Pomerantz's thesis. (55) 
Pomerantz writes: 
"Participants in conversation have orderly procedures to 
show that prior talk units have been received/not received, 
understood/misunderstood, appreciated/disappreciated, agreed 
with/disagreed with, etc. Assessments are systematically 
used for such purposes. " (56) 
Specifically, what she looks at is Isecond assessmentst which are 
"assessments produced by 'recipients' of prior talk". (57) The sort 
of utterances involved here are such things as the following: 
J: T's - tsuh beautiful day out isntt it? 
L: Yeh it's just gorgeous .... 
2. A: But gee, he has some beautiful things. 
B: Well isn't that nice. " (58) 
The second utterance of the pair, in each ease, is a second assessment. 
What the data that she analyses shows is that in the vast majority of 
cases, second assessments are in fact agreements. As she puts it 
"Massively throughout conversational materials, agreements 
are organized as preferred activities and disagreements as 
dispreferred activities. " (59) 
The fact that disagreement is dispreferred is apparent not only from the 
fact that they appear less frequently over the course of conversations, 
but also from the fact that the way in which disagreements are structured 
is different. Thus, for example, disagreements are often'prefaced by 
words such as 'well' - words which she calls "turn initial pre-disagreement 
components" - as in 
"A: She doesnIt usually come in on Friday, does she. 
B: Well, yes she does, sometimes. " (60) 
or by agreements, as in "Well yes, but ... 11, or sometimes Just by periods 
of silence that, equally, preface the disagreement. 
It thus appears that in second assessments, agreements with the 
prior Ifirstt assessment are 'preferred' and disagreements Idispreferred'. 
Both the distribution and the structure of these utterances is described 
by the structural term 'preference'. Similar features have been noted 
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for sequences of invitations/rejections-acceptances, where rejections 
are dispreferred, and the structural features of rejections is similar to 
that of disagreements. 
The interactional relevance of this notion of a preference structure 
becomes apparent once its nuances are investigated. It is not the case 
that this is an unwieldy structure, wholly insensitive to various 
different contexts of interaction, that simply plays itself through 
invariantly. Rather, given certain settings, and certain types of 
utterances, the structure itself is transformed in the service of 
interaction. Consider the fallowing sequence - 
"L: ... I'm so dumb I don't even know it. hhh! --- heh! 
W: Y-no, y-youlre not dumb, ... 
G: but itts not bad for an old lady. 
C: You're not old, Grandma .... 11 (62) 
Here there is a-first assessment, followed by a disagreement, but without 
the usual structural features one would expect. There is no preface 
- for example an agreement like 'yes ... But donIt you think', or 'Well 
yes ... but' and so on. Instead second assessments as disagreements 
"occupy the entire second-to-self-deprecation-units". (63) The point 
here is that what this illustrates is a different preference, namely that 
if the first assessment is a self deprecation, then the preferred second 
will be a disagreement., This can be seen, again, both in the distribution 
of disagreements after self deprecations, and in the structure of 
agreements. Thus, where agreements do occur, 'they will generally be 
tweak' agreements, or will include laughter (laugh tokens) to soften the 
agreement or perhaps will be delayed slightly by q pause. As Pomerantz 
puts it 
"If self deprecations are agreed with, i. e., have agreement 
components in second position, they tend to be single, 
unexpanded, weak components. " (64) 
Thus the structure of disagreements after self deprecations, is similar 
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to that of agreements after the majority of other first assessments in 
that it is a 'preference' structure, the difference in this case being 
that it is disagreements that are preferred, and agreements dispreferred. 
Similar observations are possible concerning seconds to 'compliments'. 
Here the point is that the recipient of a compliment has to provide a 
response to a first assessment which is a favourable assessment of himself, 
and yetat the same time, self praise is a dispreferred activity. Thus 
he cannot simply agree with the first assessment or he will be thought 
conceited or vain. So, therefore, the second to a compliment does not 
conform to the structure of seconds to most other assessments, but takes 
the form of a disagreement, or a return compliment, or an appreciation 
of the compliment and so on. (65) 
Pomerantz does give considerably more depth to her analysis of 
preference structures than it has been possible to present here, and I 
could not hope to cover all of the different points that she makes. 
However, the above discussion does provide the basis for a few further 
remarks about the relationship between the structures of conversational 
practices, and specific contexts of interaction. 
Firstly, the fact that preference structures can be described in 
this way, and that transformations of those structures can be illustrated, 
shows the way in which they are sensitive to particular interactional 
settings. The transformation of preference structures that takes place 
between settings in, which an assessment of, say, an ancient monument on 
the one hand, and a self deprecating assessment on the other, is 
being given is such that a different type of second becomes expectable 
in each case. That this is the case means that 'agreement' and 'disagreement' 
in the two types of settings has a different relevance in interactional 
terms - there are situations in which one is expected to disagree, and 
not to do so can give offence. There is, in other words, constraint built 
into this structure of preferences, and this manifests itself-in specific 
conversational interactions. The preference structure unlocks something 
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of what it is that we do - that sense of rule that does not imply 
interpretation, but is manifest in particular instances of complying 
with or going against the rule. There is not some hard and fast structure 
of invariant rules which it makes sense to try to identify as the 'things' 
which govern our interaction, but instead there are subtle structures 
of practices, which can be seen to be transformable according to the 
specifics of interactional settings, and these can become the object 
of sociological investigation. It is possible, in other words, to 
produce descriptions of conversational structures in terms of a machinery 
that is both context sensitive and context independent, which does not 
deal with invariance but with structures of transformations, and which 
gives a sense of the constraint which is inherent in 'what we dol. 
Secondly, it is worth mentioning some of the specific interactional 
relevance of'the notion of 'preference'. Consider; for example, the 
following. 
1. Courtroom situations, where the prosecuting lawyer forms 
up his questions -to a witness or suspect in the form of assessments of a 
situation with which the witness must either agree or disagree. Consider 
the juryls reaction. (66) 
2. Interview situations where someone is being grilled by an 
antagonistic interviewer. Consider the uses the 'preference' structure 
could be put to by the interviewer. (67) 
3. How it is possible to be considered unreasonable, aggressive, 
contrary, etc., etc., by continually disagreeing, even if the occasion. 
apparently legitimises it. (68) 
A third point, not strictly concerned with the interactional relevance 
of conversational structures, but with conversational analysis itself, is 
that this analysis of 'preferencet illustrates the cumulative nature of 
the enterprise as a whole. What 'preference', as a concept, actually does 
is to build upon the groundwork concepts made available in the turn taking 
-362- 
machinery, in investigations of topenings' and Oclosingsl, ladjacency 
pairs' and so on, and to generate more precise tools for both the analysis 
and description of the conversational data. It stands in a relationship 
of mutual dependence to other work done by conversational analysts, 
and as the work progresses, more and more scope and precision in the 
descriptive apparatus becomes available for use. Thus the formal 
structural basis of conversational order is unravelled in a systematic 
fashion. 
Over the course of the last few sections, then, I have tried to give 
some idea of the type of analyses that are being done by conversational 
analysts, and to show some of the ways in which they can be seen to have 
relevance for the sociological understanding of social interaction. The 
structures which I have been discussing are structures of the practices 
which members of a society use in the course of organizing their social 
environment in an orderly, normal, typical fashion. They use, for 
example, adjacency pair sequences to open or close a conversation, or 
to ensure that other desired events actually get done over the course of 
a conversation. That is not to say, of course, that such uses - such 
practices - are in some way lintentionall, even though in certain 
situations such as courtrooms, some skilled users of conversation do seem 
to deliberately manipulate the possibilities inherent in the conversational 
structures. Rather, such practices and procedures are 'taken for granted'. 
They provide the basic tools which are needed for an engagement in 
meaningful conversation in which 'intentional' matters can be discussed. 
They enable the orderly, typical character of social life to be maintained 
both by providing the motivation, via the accountability of absences and 
breaches of correct order, and the necessary structural machinery for its 
continuance. By ensuring that social order, at this level, is maintained, 
this structure of practices and procedures provides for the possibility 
of Imeaningl. 
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It is worth noticing in this context the way in which the 
conversational structures relate to questions of 'understanding'. The 
relationship is complex, and I will not attempt to unravel all of the 
strands here, although a few brief remarks are in order. Firstly, to the 
extent that the sequencing of utterances provides some motivation for 
thearingl certain utterances in a certain, way - e. g. as 'answers' - 
it-also provides motivation for 'understanding' in a certain way. In 
other words, an 'answer', for example, will be understood as such becau"se 
of its sequential placement within the conversation. Thus, what was said 
will be understood in a certain way. Secondly, it is evident that to the 
extent that conversational structures enable 'meaning', then they also 
provide the possibility of 'understanding'. - What is understood is 
Imeaningfull- the two terms cannot be separated from one another. It 
would seem, therefore, that to investigate what is involved in 
"understanding', in either everyday life or in social science, must involve 
some consideration of the structures of practices which make 'meaning' 
possible. 
With these few summary remarks, I want now to move on to consider 
the status of these. conversational structures. 
CONVERSATIONAL STRUCTURES: 5) STATUS 
,I 
have already pointed out in the introductory section of this 
chapter, that conversational analysis should be seen primarily as a 
descriptive enterprise, and as theoretically grounded in the work of 
Garfinkel in relation-to the problem of order. In the last sections I 
outlined what some of these descriptions of conversation actually looked 
like, illustrating in passing some of the ties between them and 
Garfinkel's work. I. now want to move on to look at the type of analyses 
that these are by investigating something of the nature of 'rules' as they 
emerge from the structural mechanisms posited of conversation. I will 
then supplement this by looking at the ways in which the concepts 
generated by these highly abstract 'rules' can be, and are being, 
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used within specific areas of sociological concern, pointing out that 
such analyses have both a different emphasis and illustrate a different 
perspective from those undertaken by Sacks and Schegloff. 
To provide a basis for this discussion I want to reproduce two 
quotations which have already appeared over the course of this thesis, 
but which have bearing upon the qeustion that is the concern here. The 
first is the definition of the 'formal structures of practical action, 
and the second is a remark by Schegloff to the effect that the object 
of conversation analysis is to provide general rules. Thus the first is 
about 'structures' and the second about 'analysis'. 
1. "by formal structures we understand everyday activities 
(a) in that they exhibit upon analysis the properties of uniformity, 
reproducibility, repetitiveness, standardization, typicality, 
and so on; (b) in that these properties are independent of 
particular production cohorts; (c) in that particular cohort 
independence is a phenomenon for members' recognition; and 
(d) in that the phenomena (a), (b), and (c) are every particular 
cohort's practical, situated accomplishment. " (69) 
2. (talking about openings) "The distribution rule is but 
one, if indeed a most typical, specification of the formulation 
to follow, and the deviant case is another specification. As 
Michael Moerman has suggested, the distribution rule is no less 
a Ispecial case$ for having many occurrences, nor the latter more 
so for having only one (in my corpus of materials). Not number 
of occurrences, but common subsumption under a more general 
formulation is what matters. " (70) 
Firstly, formal structures. A main interest in this notion lies in 
the fact that it was formulated in a paper written by Garfinkel and Sacks 
together. For this reason, it seems reasonable to suppose that it in 
some way articulates the structural concerns of both men. I have already 
tried to give some idea of the ways in which Garfinkelts solution to 
the problem of social order can be seen in terms of $formal structures'. 
I want now to look at the relationship between-'formal structures' and 
the structures of conversation. 
Formal structures are everyday activities. They are, in other words, 
what people do over the course of their daily round. Thus, in 
conversational terms, they ask questions, tell jokes, etc., etc. Upon 
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analysis these activities exhibit uniformity, reproducibility, and the 
rest. Again, in terms of conversation, 'analysis' is able to produce 
structural machinery which 'gives back' the conversational data which 
is precisely the point that Schegloff is making above. This machinery 
uncovers an order in the data, and describes it in terms of 'adjacency 
pairs', 'preference#, #pre-sequences' and so on. This order is 
'independent' of particular production cohorts in the sense that, for 
example, the orderliness of an adjacency pair sequence does not depend 
upon some 'intentional' act by the members of a society. It just is the 
way things are done - something taken for granted and1normall. At the 
same time, however, this orderliness is recognizable, to members, a fact 
which can be seen as soon as the orderliness is 'breached$ in some way 
- breaches, silences and the rest are recognized and are accountable 
matters. At the same time that everyday activities are orderly, and 
Chat order is independent and recognizable, it is also the-case that it 
is members' practices which maintain that order. Thus, for example, 
the orderly closing of a conversation, or the orderly production of a 
description, is something that depends upon the practices of members of 
society themselves. Their'practices actually maintain and produce 
conversational order on every occasion on which an orderly conversation 
actually takes place. 
I suggested in chapter 4 above, that there were-useful links to be 
made between the ways in which the notion of 'formal structures' is 
formulated, and the Wittgensteinian notion of a 'form of lifel. With the 
new dimension added to the idea- of 'formal structures' by considering 
conversational structures it becomes possible to view this connection too 
in a new light. Consider the following. 
11 "How am I able to obey a rule? " - if this is not a question 
about causes, then it is about the justification for my 
following the rule in the way I do. 
If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached 
bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 
i 
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"This is simply what I do". " (71) 
Or, again from the Philosophical Investigations: (notice that the first 
sentance is in the mouth of an objector it is the point that 
Wittgenstein is arguing against). 
" "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is 
true and what is false? " - It is what human beings say 
that is true and false; and they agree in the language 
they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form 
of life; " (72) 
Thus beyond justifications in terms of rules of what it is that I do, 
lies a bedrock of "what I do" -a bedrock of leveryday activities, as 
Garfinkel and Sacks put it. This sense of 'rule' - this sense of "what 
I do", a sense of rule that does not imply interpretation - links up, 
I have argued, with a tform of life'. A form of life is that agreement 
about "what I do" that includes the language we speak, which precedes 
'truth' and 'falsity', and which comes before 'intentional', 'meaningful' 
action. Only that which has meaning can-be true or false - truth and 
falsity are not to do with what people do as such, but are about descriptions 
of what people do. Yet at the same time, what people do is the necessary 
precondition for there being any truth or falsity, in that it'is their 
sharing of a 'form of lifel which makes possible the meaningful 
descriptions which can be true or false. 
Wittgenstein, however, stops at this point. He is not interested 
in an investigation of a 'form of life' since it just is what is the case 
- the precondition for meaning, justification, truth and falsity, etc. 
- and as such it is Ishowng in what we do rather than being something 
that must be described. The empirical social scientist, however, has as 
a possible subject for sociological description, "what people do" - the 
formal structures of practical actions. Amongst these formal structures 
are those which the descriptive machinery of conversational analysts such 
as Sacks have made available. Concepts like 'adjacency pair' and 
'conditional relevance' do describe "what people do" - they just are the 
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ways in which conversationalists go about producing orderly sequences of 
talk over the course of their interactions with one another. 
Conversational analysis, then, should be seen as uncovering the structure 
of the practices which enable meaningful, orderly conversation. The 
descriptions which they give of the conversational data provide a 
context free/context sensitive machinery which provides insights into 
the ways in which it is possible to use indexical expressions across a 
wide range of contexts. The conversational structures in their turn, 
can be seen as related to Garfinkel's concerns with, the problems of social 
order, a fact which is, reflected in the notion of the 'formal structures 
of practical actions'. As I have already argued above, these tformal 
structures# can be seen as a statement of something of what is intended 
in Wittgenstein's notion of a form of life, but as a statement which, 
unlike that in the 'Philosophical Investigations', points towards and 
enables empirical research. It is that research which conversational 
analysts are in fact engaged in. 
It is in the light of this that the claim of conversational analysts 
to be describing Imembers' problemst, rather than building analyst! s 
constructs, should be read. (73) The claim is not that members of a 
society have constant problems over the course of their daily lives if 
'problem' is taken to mean Idifficultyl or to involve conscious reflection 
of the 'what on earth am I to do next' type. Rather, the point is to 
describe how it is that the commonplaces of interaction that are done 
in a taken for granted fashion, and which by being done oil the wheels 
of social order, actually are done. How do conversations get begun and 
ended in a Inormall fashion? How do we ensure that everyone gets at least 
the chance to say his piece? 
It is worth remarking, here, that links can be (and have been) drawn 
between the way in which ethnomethodologists treat the social world, and 
the way in which Husserl insists upon the phenomenological and eidetic 
reductions as a prelude to any radical philosophy. (74) In both cases, 
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the level at which analysis is to be carried out requires an abstraction 
from the world of the 'natural attitude'. For Husserl, this 
abstraction, as I have shown in chapter 2, requires that one bracket 
ones belief in the 'existence' of objects in the real world in order to 
be able to examine the 'intentional' essences--which provide the 
presuppositions of all knowledge of the world. For ethnomethodology, 
on the other hand, what is, bracketed is a concern with whether or not 
specific Imeanings' which are given to social phenomena are Itruel or 
ladequatel. (75) The object of the exercise-is not to lironizel 
'member's accountsl, but to describe accounting practices themselves, and 
to this end the adequacy of such accounts need not be considered. The 
point is not to produce Inormativel accounts of social phenomena, but to 
investigate that structural level of practices and procedures which is the 
presupposition of social order, and thus of 'meaning' in the social world. 
It is dangerous, however, - to push the parallel that is apparent here too 
far. Even a cursory consideration of the matter reveals that intentional 
essences, uncovered within consciousness, are by no means the same thing 
as structures of practices and procedures uncovered by empirical 
investigation of social phenomena. And again, the presuppositions of 
knowledge are not the same thing at all as the, presuppositions of social 
order. Indeed, if the parallel is given any weight other than that of 
a point of passing interest, important aspects of the ethnomethodological 
position begin to become obscured. For example, the danger once again 
arises that Garfinkel and Sacks will be thought of as $subjectivist' 
and concerned only with rmtters of 'subjectivity$ rather than, as I have 
argued above,, them being involved quite deliberately in dissolving the 
distinction between 'subject' and 'object'. Similarly, Garfinkel's 
concerns with the fact that language is lusedl, which is also reflected 
in conversational analysis, threatens to become obscured if a more 
phenomenological approach to language is foisted on ethnomethodology. 
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Husserl was not centrally concerned with matters of lindexicalityl, or 
with problems of 'context', nor, indeed, with the majority of the concerns 
which provide the motive force for Garfinkel's thought about the social 
world. These concerns, as I have argued at length, have much in common 
with the work of the later Wittgenstein, and for this reason it seems 
a more useful exercise to explicate these links, and to see what the two 
positions can offer each other, rather than to insist upon the historical 
link to Husserl. 
That said, however, it is important to realise that the descriptions 
that conversational analysts give of conversations are indeed achieved by 
abstracting from particular instances of meaningful interaction in the 
social world. It is this abstraction which both enables the 'formal 
structures' to be identified and described apart from specific social 
contexts and meanings, and which at the same time gives the context 
free7context sensitive status to those descriptions, thus giving a high 
degree of generality to the findings of the analyses. This important 
point is perhaps-best illustrated by considering the 'if/then' character 
of the descriptions given of conversational structures. 
Take, for example, the description given. of closing sequences 
which I outlined above. The pre-sequence which heralds a closing should 
not, the way Sacks and Schegloff describe it, be taken as a point in the 
conversation at which a close becomes inevitable. For that reason, it 
is called a "possible pre-closing" to denote the fact that it represents 
only the possibility that a terminal exchange will follow. It only 
becomes a $pre-closing' in retrospect, after the terminal exchange has 
actually taken place. Thus, the form of the description is 'if this 
possible pre-closing sequence is heard as/taken as a pre-closing - i. e. 
if this warrant for initiating a terminal exchange is taken up - then 
what will follow will be a terminal exchange which will bring about the 
close of the converation'. Similarly with adjacency pairs -'if this 
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utterance is heard as a first pair part then upon its completion, a 
second pair part becomes conditionally relevant'. Added to each such 
description is a clause which says something to the effect of: 'if 
this does not happen, and its not happening is visible to the conversation- 
alists, then it will be an accountable matter$. 
What all this adds up to is that the descriptions given are not at 
all intended to demonstrate some predetermination of a particular 
conversation over its course;, but instead they recognize the necessity 
of providing for the 'members' role' in all conversations. This means 
that a particular sort of abstraction, which treats the conversational 
data as a set of possibilities, is needed if the data is to be adequately 
described. The descriptions are not concerned with the specifics of 
some particular conversational interaction, but with what the particular 
occasion being analysed can be shown to contain in general, formal 
structural, terms. This is done by considering the conversational 
structures in an lif/then' fashion. The formal structures of practical 
I 
action, as with a Iform of life', are conceptualised as enabling meaningful 
interaction, and not as determining it. Thus the form of abstraction which 
enables such structures to be analysed and described must be of a 
particular kind. 
The descriptive power and generality of the structural machinery that 
is built by conversational analysts to describe interaction, then, is 
the result of this particular kind of abstraction from specific 
conversational interactions. It is an abstraction that searches out 
structures that do describe all instances of a particular conversational 
phenomenon without remainder, and it seeks to do so at the level of the 
'formal structures of practical actions'. The process of abstraction 
and description recognises from the start that members of society are 
not automata, but can be seen to make choices, to manipulate the conversatior 
structures to further interactional ends, to misuse 'correct form', (76) 
and so on. The analyses cannot simply, find a pattern and impose it on 
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the conversational data as though some inevitable sequence could thus be 
produced and a universal law discovered. Instead, descriptions of the 
data must have built into'them an 'if/thenl character to capture the 
conversational interactions from which they are an abstraction. The 
alternative is a host of 'deviant case' analyses. 
This abstract level is not, however, the only one at which 
ethnomethodologists who have analysed conversation have produced 
descriptions of social phenomena. Some, like Turner, instead of 
concentrating on producing general descriptions from particular 
conversations, have used the general descriptive vocabulary and concepts 
that have been developed by the abstract analyses, in order to throw 
light on more specific interactional events, - such as, for example, 
courtroom interaction - or on specific interactional phenomena - such 
as snubs. I want now to look in some detail at this type of analysis, and 
at some of its implications for the conversational analysis enterprise. 
AN ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH 
A clear example of the type of analysis that I want to look at here 
is Turner's analysis of 'snubs', so I will give an account of this before 
going on to point out those features of it that are important for the 
purposes at hand. Turner begins with a transcript of a piece of talk 
between a former mental patient 'Bert', a group of other former mental 
patients (RobArt and Jake) and a counsellor. The subject under discussion 
is an encounter that Bert had with another former mental patient in 
which he claims to have been Isnubbedl. I will reproduce the transcript 
in full, in spite of its length, because it will make it easier to see 
the point of the analysis. 
"BERT. Yea, Yeah, that's correct. I uh uh really did know 
im and uh he was with me in the Alexander Psychiatric 
Institute in in Alexander, Western Province. II don't 
remember his name but we uh we always buddied around together 
when uh we were at the hospital and we always (0) French. 
And uh I saw him out at Western City about three weeks ago, 
and I said to Im, 'Hello, howarya doing? ' He said 'I don't 
know you - who are youlf 'Well, lookit', I said, 'You must 
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know me'. He says, 'No, I don't know you'. Now he was 
with another fellow there too - waal he didn't want to 
admit that he was in a mental hospital uh in a hospital - 
he didn't want to admit it to the other fellow that, was 
with him. So he just walked off and that was it. He 
wouldn't say hello to me. He wouldn't say nothin! 
ROB. What was you view there? Do you have your own views 
on that? A touchy point. 
BERT. Uh. 
?: (0) 
JAKE. Perhaps he didn't like the idea of being in that 
place. Maybe he ddn't want/ 
BERT. Well no he had to say it - there was another fellow 
with him you see/ 
JAKE. Well he didn't want to admit/ 
BERT. Who hadn't been in a mental hospital probably, and 
he was in the hospital. He didnIt want him to know. 
ART. You mean he 
?: this other guy 
COUNS. But he 
BERT. Oh, oh never been in a hospital 
BERT. He didn't want to know his friends. " (77) 
Turnerls question about these materials is "how might they be analysed in 
a sociologically relevant way - that is to say, as a demonstration of 
their orderliness? " More specifically; he claims that Bert's first 
utterances in the transcript are a complaint, and that they can be 
recognized as a complaint by any competent member of our society. What 
he wants to find out is how Bert manages to bring these utterances off 
as a complaint - "I now want to look at the production of a recognizable 
complaint in some detail, to look at the resources and components of 
Bert's complaint. " (78) 
Bert's complaint is that he was tsnubbedl, so the first thing to do 
is to find how it is that he describes the events in question so as to 
make it clear that he was, indeed, snubbed. He does this by insisting 
that he did know the snubber, and that the snubber knew him, because 
they had been in the mental hospital together, but that still his 
greeting was not returned. The point here is that upon the completion 
of a greeting, a return greeting becomes conditionally relevant - the 
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sequence is an instance of an adjacency pair. Turner sums up 
"So far, then, all we have seen is an account of a breached 
norm, the norm that requires acquainted persons to acknowledge 
one another upon meeting face-to-face. This component of the 
account constitutes the occurrence of a 'trouble', in this 
case, a snub. " (79) 
The next thing Turner wants to investigate'is to see how Bert's 
explanation of why he was snubbed actually works, this being an 
important part of the 'complaint' itself. Bert's explanation is "Now 
he was with another fellow there too - waal he didn't want to admit 
that he was in a mental hospital uh in a hospital - he didn't want to 
admit to the other fellow that was with him. So he just walked off and 
that was it". (80) The question is, Turner claims, why should the former 
patient have to admit that he had been in a mental hospital? and why 
should it be evident to Bert's listeners that he could well have to admit 
this? There are two possibilities here, both structural, and both 
drawing on the work of Sacks and Schegloff. 
Firstly, if all he had done was to return the greeting and move on, 
then his companion could well have asked "who was that guy you spoke to? " 
- which as a question, would make some answer conditionally relevant, and 
could well have led, even if he had lied about it, to further talk about 
his answer since the questioner has rights to speak again (perhaps with 
another question) once the answer is complete. 
Secondly, it would be quite possible that he would not get away 
with just a greeting. As Turner puts it, Schegloff has pointed out that 
"within the structure of a telephone call the caller may select the first 
topic for talk. " Now in face-to-face interaction it may be that a 
conversation will cease after the exchange of greetings (option 1 above). 
"However, it further appears to be the case that the initial 
greeter has the right to talk again when a greeting is 
returned, and that he thus becomes a 'first speakerl with 
respect to rights to topic selection. If this is the case, 
then (as I take it Bert and his listeners could see), to 
acknowledge a greeting by returning a greeting is to open 
oneself up to the initial greeter's developing a conversation 
and to his initiating a topic. " (81) 
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If one couples this to the fact that the meeting takes place many miles 
from the hospital, and that it is the first meeting since they have left 
the hospital, then 'as anyone knows' the chances are that 'first topic' 
would have been 'mental hospitals', with BertIs former fellow-patient 
having little chance to steer the conversation some other way, not being 
in a position to chose first topic. In other words, the structural 
features which Turner has drawn out of the situation, plus the situation, 
plus what everyone, (including Bert and his listeners)-knows (i. e. certain 
background knowledge) come together to make Bert's explanation of why he 
was snubbed actually work. 
There is one further aspect of the complaint that Turner investigates. 
This is that he takes it that the substance of Bert's complaint is not 
just that he has been snubbed, but that he has been snubbed because he was 
a former mental patient. In other words "for Bert the complaint-worthy 
item is presumbly that he sees that he himself had been identified as a 
'former mental-patientl; the snubber's own problems stemmed from Bert's 
former-patient status". (82) This being the case, then Bert's complaint 
is special in being a "category - generated activity" - i. e. it is 
such that it provides "for any members of the category (such as Bertes 
hearers) to see that 'what happened to himt could happen to 'us"'. (83) 
This again is a structural notion, which seems to owe much to Sacks, 
notion of a $membership categorization device'. What Turner is suggesting 
is that the noticeable absence of a return greeting is being accounted 
for in terms of the category incumbancy of the snubbed person - i. e. 
'Bert'. Thus the way in which Bert has been categorized (or perhaps has 
categorized himself) by means of a device which includes as members 
'mental patients', 'former mental patients' and 'non-mental patients' 
is seen as the structural basis for his accounting for the snub in the 
way that he does, and thus as the root of his problems. Once again, 
then, Turner brings formal structural insights to bear upon the particular 
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situation he is analysing in order to produce a description of it. 
Turner brings the whole of the analysis, including all three of 
the structural aspects that he has investigated, to make a point about 
'former mental patients'. The category 'former mental, patientt itself, 
he argues, is used by both former mental patients and others to account 
for aspects of everyday interaction in such a way that, although perhaps 
bizarre or unfortunate by 'normal' standards, they become structured and 
organized. By the same token, the category can be used as a resource 
for finding or discovering that some particular behaviour is bizarre 
or non-normal. These points are simply specific instances of Garfinkel's 
insistence that 'accounting practices' are members' methods for producing 
and making visible, social order -a point dealt with at length in 
chapter 4. Turner sums up 
"What I want to note, then, is that a plausible view of at 
least one class of Oproblemst of 'former mental patients' is 
that such problems are generated out of the same raw materials 
that provide for Inormall interactional routines, in particular, 
the invocation of norms governing such matters as meeting 
an old friendý It is in finding that such norms may be breached 
systematically, and the breach accounted for by the identification 
'former mental patient$, that Bert is able to propose that 'what 
happened' constituted a complaintworthy event. " (84) 
Put in slightly different fashion, Turner's point is that the formal 
structures of practical action are such that lbreaches' of the normal 
order of things is an accountable matter. These accounts that result 
from breaches are meaningful aspects of social life generated from 
structural conditions. 'Snubl is a way of accounting for one such 
breach, and the category 'former mental patient' another. What the 
analyst must do is to show this interrelationship between 'structures' 
on the one hand, and specific categories and accounts on the other. 
In the process the analyst must make use of the taken for granted 
knowledge that he holds in common with his fellow members of society 
to fully explicate his data, and his task is to unravel and display 
that knowledge as the analysis proceeds. 
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The result of all this is that Turner's analyses have the feel of 
a complex interweaving of structural considerations, concrete accounts 
of the social world, and taken for granted knowledge, in the pursuit 
of substantive insights into particular concrete conversational. interactions 
that can shed light on substantive sociological concerns - such as the 
problems of former mental patients. His is not the almost austere 
formal purity of Schegloff who writes " in the course of a discussion of 
the ways in which members of society talk about and describe places - e. g. 
'the pub down the road' - that he is not interested in specific Imembers' 
geographies', but only in structures- 
"Such geographies are a cultural fact to be discovered and 
perhaps subjected to a sort of "componential analysis" of 
place terms, but have no necessary further consequences for 
the analysis with which we are concerned here. " (85) 
This same contrast can be brought out further by noticing that Turner 
is quite happy to insist that the analyses he does are fundamentally 
ethnographic. It is not to the point, he argues, to have as ones goal 
in analysis the purification of the data from its ethnographic roots (86) 
but rather those roots must be made explicit. (87) By making it clear 
what background knowledge one shares with ones fellow members of society, 
structural and otherwise, then the texture of society against which and 
in terms of which 'complaints' and so on are done, can be made visible. 
There will always, for Turner, be the possibility of alternative 
ethnographic accounts of ones data, and it is the proposers of the 
accounts who must argue for their interpretations. He is content to 
provide insightful accounts of specific, ethnographic, conversational data 
which might have wider implications for other similar settings - for 
example other situations in which mental patients are talking about 
their troubles - but which are not aimed fundamentally at producing 
general, formal structural, descriptions of conversational data by 
abstracting from ethnographic detail itself. 
What Turner has effectively done, then, is to invert the concerns of 
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Sacks and Schegloff. Instead of abstracting from the particular to produce 
general descriptions, he uses the language and concepts of the abstract 
analyses to cast light on particular conversational materials. 
I want now to go on to discuss some of the implications of this 
difference in order to highlight further something of the status of 
these two ways of handling conversational data. I will begin by 
considering the relationship between the analyst and the co-conversationalist, ' 
whose conversation is being described. Goffman provides a useful point 
of entry into the questions that arise in this area: (88) 
"Observe now that, broadly speaking, there are three kinds of 
listeners to talk; those who overhear, whether or not their 
unratified participation is inadvertent and whether or not it 
has been encouraged; those who are ratified participants but 
(in the case of more than two-person talk) are not specifically 
addressed by the speaker; and those ratified participants who 
are addressed, that is, oriented to by the speaker in a manner 
to suggest that his words are particularly for them, and that 
some answer is therefore anticipated from them, more so than 
from the other ratified participants. " (89) 
The analyst of a conversation is almost invariably an overhearer 
in Goffman's terms. Now the problem is this: the sense of some 
particular utterance may be perfectly clear to the co-conversationalists 
themselves whilst being crucially ambiguous to the overhearer because of 
information which the speakers have which is denied to the outsider. This 
means that on some specific occasion, it may not prove possible to 
decide just what structural features an utterance actually has for the 
participants to the conversation. Thus, for example, something that 
looks like a question to an analyst may not be heard as such by the 
co-participants and thus, although an answer is not forthcoming, that 
fact may not, for the participants, be an occasion for comment -a breach 
may not have taken place. By the same token, what does not look like 
an answer to a question may, for theconversationalists, in fact be a 
quite adequate response to what was asked. It is not good enough to 
say that one must simply wait to see'what the conversationalists do - 
how the orient to the matter - to decide the structural features at issue, 
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since it nny well be that the data, on some specific occasion, does 
not legislate one way or the other. 
For all this, it must still be the case that for the majority of 
cases, the overhearer is at no such disadvantage. If this were not the 
case, then the whole possibility of conversational interaction would 
collapse since conversationalists in general would not have enough in 
common - in terms of common structures of practices - to be able to 
ground their talk with one another. There would be no common 'form of 
lifel. Nonetheless for that, such considerations do illustrate an 
important point about the difference between what might be called the 
lethnographic' and the 'formal' approaches to the analysis of 
conversational data. I will deal with each approach in turn. 
For Sacks and Schegloff, the fact that on some particular occasion 
it may be impossible to legislate unambiguously as to what structural 
features are present in the data provides no serious difficulties. The 
particular utterance under review can be described by saying that "if it 
is heard as x then the following utterance is y, whilst if it is heard 
as A then the following utterance is B". The fact that in this particular 
instance it is not possible to make a decision between x and A does not 
preclude the possibility of a description that points out the ambiguity 
in the data for the overhearer, and suggests what the possibilities are. 
Such ambiguities could only become 'in principle' difficulties with 
epistemological implications under some such hypothesis as "on all those 
occasions, and only on those occasions when the conversational data is 
ambiguous for the overhearer/analyst, the conversations from which the 
data are derived do not show for the participants the orderly properties 
described by the structural machinery. ". What is being analysed by Sacks 
et al is the formal structural machinery which they, as analysts, share 
in common with the co-participants to the conversations analysed. It is 
that which, in the majority of cases, enables them to understand and 
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analyse their data. That they sometimes are unable to produce an 
adequate analysis/description is put down as due not to the failure of 
this held in common structure of practices, but to the analysts' lack of art, 
omnipotence, knowledge, etc., etc. 
For Turner, on the other hand, the situation is different. Because 
the aim of his analysis is not to produce formal structural descriptions 
by abstracting from the particular contexts of the conversations analysed, 
but to bring the formal structural machinery to bear upon the specific 
instances of interaction to illuminate that setting, then it is important 
that the applicability of some particular structural feature be 
established more or less unambiguously. If it is possible to show, on 
some particular occasion, that his attribution of a particular structural 
feature to'some particular aspect of a conversation is ambiguous, for 
whatever reason, then the insight into that piece of interaction that 
is gleaned from that attribution is cast into doubt. It is no use for 
Turner to say 'if x then yt since such descriptions cannot generate the 
news from the particular setting that an ethnographic approach to the 
data, which seeks to throw light on the context of the interaction, needs 
if it is to succeed. A particular feature, say a snub, must be able to 
be identified in a more or less definite manner on the particular occasion. 
This discussion of problems with the relationship between analysts/ 
overhearers and the co-conversationalists illustrates two important 
differences between the sort of analyses being done by Sacks et al on 
the one hand, and Turner and otheislike him on the other. In the first 
place, there is an obvious difference in perspective upon the particulars 
of interaction. For the more formal approach of Sacks the particular is 
to be analysed for what it can yield in terms of general descriptive 
information, whilst for Turner it is something to be treated as important 
in its own right, and as something that all sorts of information, 
(structural, ethnographic, etc. ) should be brought to bear upon. (90) 
The second point of contrast lies in what is to count as an adequate 
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analysis: for Sacks, the object is to produce a descriptive machinery 
which will 'give back' the data -a set of rules which will enable him 
to fully describe the conversational materials analysed. (91) For 
Turner, on the other hand, the adequate analysis must cast insight into 
some corner of the everyday world in which we-'live. 
The main thrust of the contrast can be stated as follows: Sacks 
and Schegloff attempt to uncover and describe something of what is meant 
by the 'formal structures of practical action' in relation to the 
theoretical problem of social order, thus giving empirical substance to 
the solution to that problem, as it has been formulated by Garfinkel, 
by generating abstract descriptions of the practices and procedures used 
by members over the course of conversation. Analysts like Turner, on 
the other hand, attempt to show how this solution to the problem of 
order, can be seen to be relevant to the analysis of specific interactional 
contexts, thus generating descriptions that are tied to specific areas 
of concern, rather than having the abstract status of the work of Sacks 
et al. 
It would be wrong, however, to see the two'concerns as somehow 
contradictory. Although there are, indeed, significant differences 
between the two approaches, they both stand in a close relationship to 
the same solution to the problem of social order. Both are intent to 
emphasise the essential indexicality of eipressions, the fact that language 
is used, and the importance of considering in some way or other that 
level of social practices which is indicated by 'formal structurest. In 
a sense the two approaches are sides of the same coin, with the abstract 
formal approach providing the concepts and vocabulary which can be used 
to throw fresh light on specific areas of social life. (92) 
That said, however, there is an important issue underlying the 
relationship between these two approaches, and it is to this that I now 
want to turn. 
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FORMAL STRUCTURES AND MEANING 
I have suggested that the structures of conversational practices 
which Sacks and conversational analysts describe should be conceptualized 
in terms of $formal structures of practical actions'. This concept in 
its turn should be seen as indicating something of what Wittgenstein 
intended by a 'form of life', but formulated in such a way that it invites 
empirical investigation of a certain aspect of social structure. This 
aspect is conceptualised as that level of social structure which is the 
presupposition of social order and of Imeaningi in the social world, where 
$meaning' is to be seen as an embedded phenomenon and not as part of a 
Icalculust of some kind. The important point that I want to raise here 
is this: given that this structure of practices is to be seen as the 
presupposition of-meaningful interaction in the social world, how is one 
to articulate the relationship between these presuppositions and the 
ethnographic detail of everyday life? One way, as I have shown, is to 
perform the type of analyses that Turner engages in. The difficulty here, 
however, is that what emerges from this type of work is not a general 
solution to the problem of what such a relationship looks like, but the 
piecemeal application of concepts generated at a structural level to 
particular interactional contexts. Turner, in other words, inverts the 
relationship between the particular and the general rather than providing 
a satisfactory account of the ways in which these two aspects of social 
reality, identified by analysis, interpenetrate. 
It is important that the nature of this relationship is made clear. 
If meaning is to be satisfactorily treated as an embedded phenomenon, 
then it is imperative that the relationship between the structure of 
practices which enables meaningful interaction, and that interaction 
itself, be somehow specified. The alternative is that one is left with 
only half of the picture. I am not suggesting, it should be stressed, 
that existing analyses of conversational data do not provide insight 
into an important area of the social world. That is not the problem. 
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Rather the issue concerns the way in which the insights into this 
particular aspect of social life relate to other aspects of it. In 
order to specify more clearly what is at issue here, I want to discuss 
a recent paper by Goffman entitled "Replies and Responses". (93) With 
this as background, it will be possible to formulate some comments 
which might throw light on this difficult area. 
In his paper, Goffman seeks to uncover ways in which the apparatus 
developed by conversational analysts can be seen to have some relevance 
for his own work, and could be used to amplify in a structural fashion 
some of the insights into interaction that have provided the substance of 
his books over the last twenty five years. What this exercise 
essentially consists of is the expansion of the concept of 'adjacency 
pair' via Goffman's notion of a 'ritual exchange', a critique of this 
expansion followed by a reformulation of the original notion in terms of 
'moves' in the game of linteractiont of which Conversation is a part. 
Goffman states this conclusion thus: 
"It follows, then, that our basic model for talk perhaps ought not 
to be dialogic couplets and their chaining, but rather a 
sequence of response moves with each in the series carving 
out its own reference, and each incorporating a variable 
balance of function in regard to statement-reply properties. 
In the right setting, a person next in line to speak can 
elect to deny the dialogic frame, accept it, or carve out 
such a format when none is apparent. This formulation would 
finally allow us to give proper credit to the flexibility of 
talk. " (94) 
One should construct ones apparatus to take account of the fact that 
conversation is interactional and contexted. It is worthwhile setting 
out here some of Goffman's reasons for coming to this conclusion since 
they are highly instructive in the present context. 
Firstly, Goffman points out that a response to a particular statement 
(he uses Iresponset and Istatementl to signify the relationship between 
adjacent 'utterances? conceived in a broad sense) need not be linguistic. 
Thus a shake of the head will do, or a Igetting up' in reply to an order 
to stand. Not only that, but the original 'statement' itself may not be 
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linguistic. one is not dealing, he suggests, with 
"the statement of a speaker which his respondent addresses, 
not even a statement, but rather anything the speaker and the 
other participants will accept as a statement he has made. " (95) 
He gives an example 
"A. (enters wearing a hat) 
B. (shaking head) Ono, I don't like it'. " (96) 
Thus it becomes the case that, confronted with the conversational data, 
one only has part of the story, and the possibility of doing an adequate 
analysis of what actually took place in the interaction sequence is 
thrown into serious doubt. The conversational data, Goffman argues, 
needs to be seen in a broader context of interaction. 
A second point he raises concerns the fact that a response need 
not relate to the previous utterance, but can relate back to the 
conversation as a whole, or to some utterance prior to the last utterance, 
or even to some utterance of a prior conversation. What an utterance 
means, may not be obvious from its sequential placement after some prior 
utterance but may depend upon the context of the conversation as a whole. 
Thirdly, Goffman suggests that in the case of a 'greeting sequence', 
which as I have suggested above, is seen by conversational analysts as 
an example of an adjacency pair sequence, it makes more sense to see the 
whole sequence as itself a response to "the sudden availability of the 
participants to each other". (97ý The term 'adjacency pair', Goffman 
suggests, does not capture adequately all of what goes on over the course 
of a greeting. 
A fourth and final point that is extractable from Goffman's account 
is that how a particular utterance is, in fact, taken, may well depend 
upon the context of the utterances in which it is found. Thus, for 
example, 
"Two out of three or more co-participants can enter a 
jocular, mocked-up interchange in which each loyally plays out 
his appropriate part, ostensibly providing appropriate 
statements and ostensibly responding with appropriate replies, 
-384- 
while all the while the other participants look on, 
prepared to enter with a laugh that will let the jokesters 
off the hook, assuring them that their set piece was 
appreciated, and with this tactful appreciation provide a 
response to a statement which is itself an unserious 
dialogue embedded in a less lightly toned encounter. " (98) 
In this way, the joking utterances need to be seen in their context for 
their sense to be apparent, whilst the 'hearers" responses respond not 
to any one utterance, but to the whole sequence of them. 
Goffman does make further points, mainly in terms of detail, but 
those above provide enough of a framework for the gist of his argument to 
be apparent. Before dealing with each of these four points in turn, I 
want to make two general points about Goffman's argument here. Firstly, 
it is important to realise that all of the points he makes are firmly 
contexted by the concerns of his own work. Thus, for example, the 
argument that 'move' is a more useful term than, say, tadjacency pair', 
reflects his own concerns with the dramaturgical analogy and with games 
as useful heuristics in the analysis of the social world. What Goffman 
seems to be attempting to do in this article is to incorporate 
conversational analysis' insights into his own concerns by taking those 
aspects of them that he feels he can use. The result of this is that 
a rather narrow conception of what conversational analysis is trying to 
do emerges from the article. This leads to the second point, which is 
that Goffman seems to consider that conversational analysis is concerned 
entirely with adjacency pairs', and with adjacent utterances. As I shall 
show, most of his objections to the enterprise prove to be void once 
this misapprehension is put aside. 
Goffmants first concern is with non-linguistic elements of 
conversation. It is worth making two points here. Firstly, much of the 
work done by conversational analysts has been done on telephone 
conversations (99) precisely because of this difficulty. In a telephone 
conversation, the analyst is confronted with a set of data which is not 
complicated by hand wavings, head noddings, and the rest, so that he is 
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able to ignore the non-linguistic elements and produce descriptions of 
the data which can legitimately ignore what, in face to face interaction, 
is indeed a contributory aspect of the overall conversation. The hope is, 
that by starting with this simplified data a general structural machinery 
can be produced to describe telephone conversations which can then be 
elaborated upon for the purpose of describing face to face interaction. 
Secondly, work has already been begun, by conversational analysts, into 
the use of gestures in conversations, (100) although it is still at 
an elementary stage. The difficulties that are confronted here are 
perhaps obvious, but they include developing a vocabulary of concepts 
in which to talk about gestures, as well as the fact that such work is 
done with the aid of video tapes which cannot, at present, be reproduced 
for easy publication. In short, the reason why much of the published 
work on the analysis of conversation does not deal with non-linguistic 
aspects of conversational interaction seems to be due more to the complexities 
methodological and technical, involved in including them, than in any 
deliberate exclusion of such phenomena from consideration. 
Goffman's-second point, which concerns the relationship of some 
particular utterance to the conversation as a whole, illustrates what was 
said above concerning what seems to be Goffman's impression that 
conversational analysis deals only with adjacency pairs. In the account 
which I gave of the closings of conversations, it became apparent that 
Sacks and Schegloff were concerned to point out that Opre-closings' 
could indeed, in many cases, be seen to relate back to previous 
topics of conversation, and that this, which is related to the organization 
of topic talk, was an important feature in the descriptions of closings. 
Similarly, pre-sequences in general do not slot neatly into an adjacency 
pair format. Perhaps one of the best analyses which attempts to describe 
these broader relationships between elements of a conversation, is a paper 
on $formulations' by Heritage and Watson, (101) which, among other things, 
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describes the way in which co-conversationalists 'formulate' what the 
Oconversation so fart has been about, and orient their continuing talk 
to that formulation. 
The third point concerns what might be called pre-greeting sequences. 
The problem here is that the "sudden availability of the participants 
to each other" is a non-linguistic phenomenon, and thus, as far as 
analysis and description goes, presents the same difficulties which I 
mentioned above in discussing Coffman's first point. Undoubtedly there' 
are, in fact, all sorts of things that go on over the course of two 
people meeting, including facial gestures, changes in posture and so on, 
and it would seem at least likely that it would be possible to produce 
formal structural descriptions of such phenomena - i. e. that 'upon 
analysis' the ways in which people greet one another, -both linguistically 
and non-linguistically, would be shown to have orderly, typical, repetitive 
etc. characteristics. Precisely the problem is how to describe this 
- and I personally doubt whether referring to it as the "availability of 
the participants to each other" helps much in solving these difficulties. 
Nonetheless for that, the general point which Coffman is making here 
- that there is more to greeting that saying "hello" - does raise 
important questions which I will discuss later. 
The fourth and final point - that joking utterances can only be 
understood in their context - is not a question about 'formal structures', 
but addresses the 'meaning' of utterances. It is presumably the case 
that in order to bring off the *mocked-up interchange' that Goffman 
describes, the participants' actions - i. e. the way in which they were 
speaking - would have to exhibit Iformal structures' that were the same 
as those already described in terms of the conversational machinery, 
otherwise their remarks would have been unintelligible to anyone, and not 
just to the analyst. It might be the case that the analyst would not 
understand the precise import of the remarks on this occasion, but, as I 
have argued above in relation to ambiguities, this is not an in principle 
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difficulty for the analyses Sacks and Schegloff undertake. 
What these rejoinders to Goffmanls criticisms amount to is a 
suggestion that with his first and third points he takes too narrow a 
view of the aims of conversational analysis, and of the possibilities 
contained within it, that in his second point he shows a lack of 
awareness of some of the work, (other than that done on adjacency pairs 
sequences) which has been undertaken by analysts, and that in his fourth 
point he illustrates that he has not grasped the presuppositional levei 
at which the analyses are aimed. Goffmants problems in other words, 
can be answered by saying that he has missed the point of conversational 
analysis in a variety of ways, and that the actual focus of that work is 
such that it can be shown to be immuneýfrom such criticisms. Such a 
C 
response, however, is too simplý. It does not address what seems to be 
the fundamental point that underlies Goffmants remarks, and which is the 
present subject of discussion, namely the relationship between conversational 
structures, and the broader interactional context. Each of Goffman's 
points is aimed at this question in some way or other. He is not 
arguing against the enterprise as a whole - he sees a place for 
formalistic analyses, as the following quotation shows. 
"I do not mean to argue against formalistic analysis. 
However tortured the connection can become between last 
person's talk and current speaker's utterance, that 
connection must be explored under the auspices of 
determinism, as though all the degrees of freedom avilable 
to whomsoever is about to talk can somehow be mapped out, 
conceptualized, and ordered, somehow neatly grasped and h6ld, 
somehow made to submit to the patterning-out effected by 
analysis. " (102) 
What he does seem to be attempting to do, is to broaden the scope of 
such analyses. His own efforts at formulating a way of doing so, 
however, whilst instructive, are not, in the final analysis, adequate. 
I want to look at this formulation critically before moving on to 
suggest an alternative direction of approach. 
The elements of Goffman's solution are two concepts: Isystem 
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constraints' and $ritual constraints'. The former are those constraints 
which impose themselves on conversationalists as a direct result of the 
conversational system conceived of entirely in terms of the sequencing 
of utterances and the rules for that sequencing. Goffman considers that 
conversational analysis, to the extent that it focuses upon adjacency 
pairs, is concerned with these system constraints. Ritual constraintsS 
on the other hand, are concerned with 'good form' and 'good manners'. 
Goffman puts it that they are 
"constraints regarding how each individual ought to handle 
himself with respect to each of the others, so that he not 
discredit his own tacit claim to good character or the tacit 
claim of the others that they are persons of social worth 
whose various forms of territoriality are to be respected. " (103) 
He points out the difference between the two as follows: 
"Observe that although system constraints might be conceived 
of as pancultural, ritual concerns are patently dependent 
on cultu 
, 
ral definition and can be expected to vary quite 
markedly from society to society. " (104) 
Both system and ritual constraints have some part to play in "Keeping 
conversational channels open and in good working order", with ritual 
constraints coming in to decide how long a conversation will be, ensuring 
that an offer to open a conversation in the first place will in fact be 
taken up, and so on. 
The importance of this distinction for the issue under review is 
stated by Goffman as follows: 
"The notion of ritual constraints helps us to mediate between 
the particularities of social situations and our tendency to 
think in terms of general rules for the management of 
conversational interplay. We are given a means of overcoming 
the argument that any generalization in this area must fall 
because every social situation is different from every other. 
In brief, we have means of attending to what it is about 
different social situations that makes them relevantly different 
for the management of talk. " (105) 
The notion of ritual constraints is thus seen as in some way bridging the 
gap between the general structures of conversation, and the particular 
occasions of their manifestation within specific interaction situations. 
It is important to recognize that the distinction that Goffman is 
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making here is one that straddles the notion of Iformal structures' as 
that notion has been uncovered in terms of conversational practices over 
the course of this chapter. Neither the notion of Iritual constraint' 
nor that of tsystem constraints' articulates the sense of those 
structures which are described by conversational analysts, but rather 
both terms capture a part of what is meant. Consider what he has to say 
about tsystem constraints'. 
"We can, then, draw our basic framework for fade-to-face talk 
from what would appear to be the sheer physical requirements 
and constraints of any communication system, and progress from 
there to a sort of microfunctional analysis of various interaction 
signals and practices. Observe that wide scope is found here 
for formalization; the various events in this process can be 
managed through quite truncated symbols, and not only can these 
symbols be given discrete, condensed physical forms, but also 
the role of live persons in the communication system can be 
very considerably reduced .... It is assumed that the 
participants have jointly agreed to operate (in effect) solely 
as communication nodes, as transceivers, and to make themselves 
fully available for that purpose. " (106) 
Gone, in this account, is any sense of Imembersl practices'. Gone is the 
'if/then' forff of the descriptions. Gone is any sense of the 
organization of conversational order by the conversations participants, 
or the connection between conversational structures and the general 
sociological problem of order, or the notion of laccounting practices', 
of Iglossingf, or Iformulatingl, etc., etc. Gone too is the type of 
notion that is captured in the idea of a Opreferencel structure, where 
quite explicit comparisons are made b-etween that notion and Coffman's 
own 'supportive rituals' - "compliments may be seen as Isupportive 
rituals"', (107) a concept which is concerned not with 'system constraintst 
but with 'ritual constraints'. In short, Coffman's notion is too thin 
to capture what is contained in the conversational analyst's formulation 
of conversational practices. 
If Goffman's notion of 'system' differs substantially from 
conversational analysts' notions of 'structure', so too does his notion 
of 'ritual constraints'. I argued above that one of the most important 
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characteristics of the Iformal structures' was that they incorporated 
what Wittgenstein refers to as that sense of Orulet that does not imply 
interpretation. They simply are 'what people do', and it is as such 
that they enable meaningful, rational interaction. This is not, however, 
the case with 'ritual constraints'. Consider, for example, -the ritual 
demand that 'proper' dress be worn at certain functions. It is not 
the case that this 'constraint' simply reflects twhat people do'. It is, 
rather, a demand that requires interpretation according to all sorts of 
social conventions. What is actually worn is the result of interpreting 
the demands of the ritual constraint in this way or that - albeit within 
limits, but nonetheless the result of an interpretation. Precisely the 
same is true of ritual constraints within a conversation. There is a 
constraint to say something, and what that something is is constrained 
by all sorts of social conventions, but eventually something is said 
which is the result of interpreting the ritual demands of the situation 
in such and su7ch a fashion. It is not that some conscious, intentional 
act is necessarily involved, but rather that the carrying out of a ritual 
demand is not just 'what people do'. It implies that whatever was in 
fact done was done 'in the light oft, or gas a result of interpreting', 
some convention or other, and should be seen in terms of that fact. 
Put in slightly different fashion, the point is this: 'formal 
structures' is primarily concerned with 'howl something was said or done, 
with 'howl some particular piece of conversational action was managed in 
an orderly fashion, and to that end it seeks out the structure of the 
practices which enabled it. Goffman's 'ritual constraints', on the other 
hand, are concerned with 'what' was said in a conversation and the 
relationshipof what was said to 'why' it was said. The notion of 'ritual 
constraint' addresses the substance of a conversational interaction in as 
much as it looks to the social conventions which surround it and account 
for the particular *polite' or 'impolite' utterances which actually 
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ensue on some occasion or other, rather than the formal structural 
organization which enabled the conversation itself. 
The relationship between system and ritual constraints is stated 
by Goffman thus: 
"insofar as participants in an encounter morally commit 
themselves to keeping conversational channels open and in 
good working order, whatever binds by virtue of system 
constraints will bind also by virtue of ritual ones. The 
satisfaction of ritual constraints safeguards not only 
feelings but communication, too. " (108) 
The ritual constraints thus work alongside the system constraints, and 
reinforce them in the cause of better communication. At the same time, 
however, they extend the scope of the purely formal system by 
incorporating a further dimension of social conventions into the picture. 
It is this further dimension that gives the possibility of some 
articulation of the formal structures with the particulars of meaningful 
social interaction. 
It is fairly easy to seq, I think, how one could develop onwards 
from the notion of ritual constraint, by bringing in more and more social 
conventions, in such a way that the particular interaction is initially 
sketched in, then done in ink, and finally coloured with oil paints. 
Something of this sort seems to be in Goffman's mind when he speaks 
about investigating the connection between utterances in a conversation, 
saying that "However tortured the connection can become ... that connection 
must be explored under the auspices of determinism, as though all the 
degrees of freedom available ... can somehow be mapped out ... 11. (109) 
The analyst must start from system constraints., then investigate ritual 
constraints as these bear on the former, and then move on to look at 
whether or not the utterances are 'joking', tironic' etc. and explicate 
the context for that, all of the while incorporating both utterances 
and gestures, including distinctions between different kinds of 
speech acts, (110) including the nuances of meanings that each context 
throws up, and so on and so forth. Each aspectbas a part to play in the 
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description of what is going on in the particular setting, and so each 
aspect must be made to submit to formal analysis and description "under 
the auspices of determinism". By formulating Isystem constraints' as 
thinner than 'formal structurest, and 'ritual constraints, as more 
context specific, related to the general constraints of politeness and 
good manners which characterise social life, he is able to give an 
account of conversational structures which, as part system and part 
ritual, fit snugly into the whole context of meaningful social interaction. 
Thus the bridge is built between some sort of formulation of conversational 
structure and specific interactional contexts. 
The problem is, however, that too much comes over the bridge. If 
ones intention as a sociologist is to describe in a rigorous fashion 
social phenomena - and as I have shown, this is the aim of the work of 
both Garfinkel and-Sacks - then it is necessary to provide some sort of 
theoretical focus on the area of social life with which one is concerned. 
It is necessary to delimit, in some way, an area of interest. The 
alternative is an approach which tries to take on everything - the whole 
complexity of social life in its entirity - with no systematic focus to 
provide a coherent perspective. What Goffman1s two concepts do is to 
formulate a structural focus on conversation which seems to owe 
something to the work of conversational analysts, and then to ignore the 
theoretical position which gives it sense as a phenomenon worthy of 
interest. The object of the structural analysis thus becomes lost, and 
the whole of social reality, with all of its nuances of meanings, its 
conventions, its subcultures and contexts, and so on, are seen to be 
equally relevant to the problem of providing a structural description 
of the social world. The analyst thus becomes confronted with such a 
mass of 'relevant' data that it becomes difficult for him to know where 
to start. 
Goffman, in other words, ignores the particular relationship of these 
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structures to the problem of social order, and fails to realise that 
what is being dealt with is the presuppositions of that order and of 
meaningful interaction, yet it is these concerns that focus the work and 
provide its raison dietre. The danger thus becomes that the sociological 
investigator will search about this way and that for regularities to 
describe in structural terms, but with no precisely formulated idea of what 
it is that he is doing. Such unsystematic investigations of social 
phenomena run the risk of becoming peculiarly ellusive in the way that 
much of Goffman's work does - one feels that significant insights into 
social interaction have been gained, but quite how to capitalise on them 
remains beyond ones reach, and the structures unravelled seem somehow 
irrelevant amidst the mass of rich ethnographic detail. 
In sum, the route that Goffman takes in order to handle the problem 
of the relationship between the structure of conversational practices 
and-specific contexts of interaction is not adequate because it removes 
the reason for-focusing upon such phenomena in the first place, and 
because, by doing that, it leaves the sociologist with no perspective 
for handling the great mass of interactional data that confronts him as 
he stands before the complexities of the social world. The question 
remains, then, of how, precisely, an adequate solution to this problem 
can be formulated. Over the remaining paragraphs of this chapter I want 
to make one or two points that are relevant to the issues involved here. 
The clue here, I want to suggest, lies in the notion of 'presupposition'. 
Over the course of the last few chapters several different attempts at 
formulating a sociological approach towards the presuppositions of meaningful 
social interaction have been discussed, all of them derived in some way 
from the work of Wittgenstein and/or Garfinkel. All of them, however, 
have been shown to be inadequate for one reason or another. Thus the 
approach of Blum and Mchugh in terms of grounds seems to lead to a 
situation in which empirical research becomes either impossible, or at 
least very much secondary, because of an emphasis upon the connectedness 
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of all aspects of a 'form of life', conceived of as a totality. Winch's 
handling of the matter, on the other hand, suffers from the fact that he 
does not differentiate between different senses of 'rule', but sees all 
rules as Ithinglikel, and essentially meaningful objects in the social 
environment. In the present chapter it has be'come apparent that the 
notion of a structure of conversational practices developed by 
conversational analysts to investigate this same presuppositional level, 
is formulated in such a way that descriptions of them tend to become so 
highly general that it is difficult to conceptualise how they articulate 
with specific interactional contexts. 
What is interesting about the ways in which Garfinkel and Wittgenstein 
themselves approach this presuppositional level is that they both fail 
to specify in precise terms just exactly what it is that they are trying 
to say. The notion of 'form of life', for example, is not at all a 
clearly defined notion and its sense has to be gleaned from Wittgenstein's 
remarks on the clutch of issues that surround this area of concern - as 
he puts it "I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying 
something and having to look for it again: now her spectacles, now her 
keys. ". (111) Garfinkel's work, as has been seen, specifies the level 
of structure at which he is aiming, but performs experiments that are 
'aids to the sluggish imagination' rather than clear indications of 
precisely what phenomena he intends to indicate. Thus although he is 
insistent that empirical research is crucially important, and that the 
structure of practices and procedures must somehow be investigated, 
his actual 'findings' tend to be more suggestive than substantive, with, 
for example, the procedures of 'etc. ' Ifactum valet', 'let it pass' and 
so on lacking the type of precision that one would need for rigorous 
investigation and description of social phenomena. 
This lack of a clear direction in the work of the seminal thinkers 
is significant, I want to suggest, for two reasons. In the first place, 
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it is reasonable to assume that it is this that has led to the wide 
variations in attempts to formulate in more precise, and sociologically 
significant, terms just what is involved at this level of social reality. 
More than this, however, the lack of clear definition here can be exploited 
to suggest that the difficulties with the particular formulation of 
'formal structures' provided by conversational analysis are the result 
of their taking too narrow a view of what is involved at the 
presuppositional level. The suggestion here is, that what is needed is 
some attempt to articulate conversational structures, which are taken for 
granted practices and procedures, with other aspects of presupposed and 
taken for granted background knowledge and assumptions, as that knowledge 
is displayed in what people do over the course of their daily round. 
The result of doing this would be that a sense of particular interactional 
contexts would be made apparent in analyses in as much as particular 
presuppositional knowledge would be mobilised on particular occasions. 
The problem thus becomes to illustrate the interrelationships between 
conversational structures, as aspects of formal structures of practical 
actions, and a wider context of presupposed knowledge. I could not hope 
to give anything like a full account'of this matter at the present time, 
but it is worth indicating just some of the directions-in which such an 
investigation could progress. 
It is important to recognize, as a preliminary, that this approach 
has the advantage over Goffmants attempted solution of not requiring the 
sociologist to move away from the presuppositional level to give an 
account of the 'rules' which actors are conceived to actually follow or 
interpret. It thus restricts the scope of analysis, and maintains a 
clear focus on a specific aspect of social phenomena rather than letting 
in the whole of social reality as relevant to the analysis. The difference 
here can be illustrated quite clearly if one considers the difference 
between the notion of 'ritual constraint' on the one hand, and that of 
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'preference' on the other. Where the former notion implies 'interpretation' 
and trule following', and leads towards what Garfinkel-would term 
'normative description', 'preference' remains firmly a term that describes 
the structure of conversational practices. At the same time, however, 
there is contained within the notion of tpreferencel something of what 
Goffman seems to intend by 'ritual constraint$. Thus, for example, 
Pomerantz's description of the ways that 'second assessments' which 
follow on from Iself deprecations' are formulated gives a structural 
insight into what Goffman might term a 'ritual constraint' to the effect 
that it is impolite to agree with somebody who is running himself down. 
The description is formulated in such a way, however, that all of the 
overtones of 'interpretation', and of there being some sort of 
identifyable Ithinglikel social convention which actors are assumed to 
follow, is avoided. The description remains firmly tied to a particular 
structural level. 
That said, however, the problem still remains of how precisely these 
further dimensions of presupposed knowledge are to be handled in a 
structural fashion rather than irt an ad hoc way, and how they are to, be 
seen as related to practices. Turner, for example, as has been, shown 
above, does insist'that it is necessary, as an analyst, to explicate 
background knowledge, (112) but the ways in which he goes about this 
do not appear to be structured, and consequently it becomes difficult 
to see how it would be possible to systematically relate analyses of 
conversational, structures to the somewhat impressionistic insights that 
are given into taken for granted background knowledge. It is to this 
problem that I want now to turn. 
In the first place, there are clues in Garfinkel's work. In spite 
of the fact that, in the final analysis, it is difficult to know precisely 
what directions Garfinkel's work suggests, his attempts to specify 
'constitutive expectancies' and the features which define an object as 
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a member of the common sense environment seem to be aimed at precisely 
the kind of problem that is at issue here. It is an attempt, in other 
words, to make precise points about the characteristicscf taken for 
granted knowledge - the assumptions underlying it - which can then be 
seen as articulated with the practices and procedures which members of 
a society use in the maintenance of, social order. The ways in which 
these two aspects of the presuppositional sphere interrelate-is 
illustrated, in empirical terms, in studies such as that of Agnes, (113) 
which looks at the ways in which Agneswas able to pass as a female - 
how she learnt-to act like a female in spite of having been born male 
- whilst at the same time illustrating that she had to bring into play 
a considerable amount of knowledge about, for example, sex roles, in order 
to bring off her own role successfully. Such work, however, whilst 
suggestive, by no means provides a solution to the problem. 
A second, line of approach is suggested by the notion of a 
Imembership'categorization device', which does, incorporate a sense of taken 
for granted knowledge of what is the case. Thus to investigate the 
categories that are used to describe the social world, is simulataneously 
to investigate something of what it is that people take for*granted about 
it. The relationship between-'babies' and 'mothers', for example, is a 
case in point here, as is the relationship between 'crying' as a 
category bound activity, and Obabyl on the one hand and 'man' on the 
other, where 'everyone knowsl that 'men' don1t cry, but tbabiest do. 
Presuppositional knowledge about what is the case in the world is displayed 
in the ways in which categorization devices are used - i. e. 'norms', in 
the revised sense that Sacks gives to that term, become apparent. (114) 
At the same time, however, it is difficult at the present moment to see 
how membership categorization devices could be handled with any precision, 
or could be made to yield to precise structural analysis. It is perhaps 
for this reason that Sacks abandoned the term. 
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Thirdly, the type of analysis that Zimmerman and West have done 
on the number of $interruptions' in same sex and opposite sex conversations 
do give a sense of particular, taken for granted knowledge, being used in 
specific interactional settings. The fact that in cross sex conversations 
zz 
there were more interruptions than in same sex conversations, and that 
these were mostly done by men, suggests something about what we 'knowl 
about the relationship between sexes. A sense that, perhaps, men"knowl 
that they have some sort of dominant position in relation to women, and 
this is manifest in the way they talk to them. It is the combination 
of this knowledge with the structure of conversational practices (in 
this case, their breach) that on the specific occasion provides for 
an 'interruption'. In other words, such interruptions are a reflection 
of our 'form of life'. 
Fourthly, and finallyg the type of analyses which Coulter undertakes, 
in which he investigates the ways in which concepts, such as 'knowledge' 
and 'belief 1, -are used, again provides access to what it is that we 'know, 
at a presuppositional level. For an anthropologist to use the term 
'belief' to describe some set of native customs says as much about what 
he 'knows' to be the case, and about what he is prepared to accept as 
Cx 'fact', as it does about the native custom. The problem, once again, 
however, is that much work would need to be done to show the relationship 
between the structures of the use of such terms as they appear in language 
games and the structures of conversational practices, before it would be 
possible to generate any precise sense of the ways in which both 
contribute to particular interactional contexts. Nonetheless, to the 
extent that the ways in which such concepts, are used do reflect what it 
is that we presuppose, it seems reasonable to assume that an investigati on 
in this area could produce results which would be useful for the problem 
.1 
under review. 
It has to be admitted, however, that none of these approaches provides 
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any final solution to the problems involved here, and much work needs 
to be done in this area. Nonetheless for that, if such a broader notion 
of presupposition could be developed, then it might become possible to 
produce structural descriptions that were not only highly general, 
but which gave a more definite sense of partic-ular interactional contexts 
by including not only knowledge of 'how' to perform an action as a 
competent member of society, but also something of the knowledge 'that, 
is presupposed, as a resource, in the production and interpretation of 
such an action. Such an analysis must not, of course, treat such 
knowledge as a 'calculus', or as a structure of 'meanings' of some sort, 
but must instead see it as $displayed' in what people do. Like that 
sense of IruW which is manifest in specific instances of obeying or 
going against a rule, it must be conceptualized as manifesting itself in 
the language games that people in the social world actually engage in. 
This presents indeed a difficult task. 
Were it to be done in spite of the difficulties, then what would be 
produced would be a model of the presuppositions of social order and of 
'meaning' in the social world which would enable sociologists to 
understand 'meaning' as embedded in a whole context of taken for granted 
practices, procedures, assumptions, knowledge and so on. Such a model 
could not, of course, exhaust all of the ethnographic detail of particular 
settings, but it could enable us to understand the mechanisms which 
make them possible as orderly, meaningful affairs, showing how particular 
practices, assumptions and knowledge were brought to bear on this 
occasion whilst others account for that. If all of this could be handled 
in a rigorous, structural fashion, then perhaps some, at least, of the 
mysteries of social interaction would be made available for sociology. 
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It is difficult to understand the thrust of Garfinkel's work, and 
of ethnomethodology in general, if the presupposition which guides 
ones reading of it is that it represents unproblematically a continuation 
of the phenomenological tradition. (1) It is undoubtedly the case 
that Garfinkel read and was influenced by the writings of Husserl and 
Schutz and Gurwitch, and that these influences are visible in his work. 
Once one begins to look carefully at the ways in which this aspect of 
his intellectual heritage is worked out within his writings, however, 
it becomes necessary to ask whether it might not be more useful to read 
Garfinkel's work against a different background. The influence of Parsons 
and Kaufmann turns Garfinkel away from concerns with a priori essences 
of knowledge, or the ideal typical structure of the meaning contexts of 
the life world and towards a consideration of the problem of social order 
and the practices and procedures which enable such order in everyday life. 
True, the orientation towards the social world that results from the 
assimilation of these different positions into a single perspective 
does concern itself, crucially, with the level of 'presuppositions' - not 
of knowledge but of social order and meaningful interaction - which 
suggests a debt to Husserl, but then there are many ways of conceptualizing 
what it is that is presupposed, and Garfinkel's formulation seems to have 
far more in common with Wittgenstein's notion of a 'form of life' than 
it does with Husserl's eidetic structure of consciousness. It is for 
this reason that I have suggested, over the course of this thesis, that 
it is more useful to see what Garfinkel is attempting to do against a 
background provided by Wittgensteinian philosophy than to insist upon 
the historical link to phenomenology as the context in which to read 
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his work. To round off this argument I will firstly retrace the 
steps of the 'historical themel of this thesis before restating the 
thrust of the more theoretical points that have been made, emphasising 
something of their importance and suggesting a few of the difficulties 
and unclarities which require further work. 
The primary focus of Husserl's work was upon the transcendental. 
The phenomenological and eidetic reductions were designed to enable the 
meditating philosophers to enter a new realm of experience in'which the 
presuppositions of all knowledge would be available for description. 
When Schutz came to this work, his concerns were sociological and not 
philosophical so that he had to make adjustments which would fit it for 
his own purposes. Thus, over the course of his writings, he gradually 
came to abandon the transcendental motif altogether in favour of a 
purely mundane analysis of the structures of the life world. He was 
left, however, with difficulties that revolved round the relationship 
between subjedtivity and the intersubjective life world - between 
subjective and objective meaning contexts - which he was never able, 
satisfactorily, to resolve. His orientation to Imeaningl is thus 
problematic since by conceptualizing it as somehow contained in meaning 
contexts - as bound up with a structure of types - he was unable to 
account for the contribution of 'subjectivity' towards it. Although his 
early work stressed the 'transcendental constitution' of meaning in the 
reflective glance of consciousness, his abandonment of the transcendental 
motif as his work progressed, cut off this line of enquiry, whilst at the 
same time his account of the ! we-relationship* as the fundamental datum 
of the life world remained unconvincing as an alternative simply because 
the structure of this is left largely unclarified and fails to address 
the problems concerning the relationship between subjective and objective 
meaning contexts within the 'we-relationship'. Indeed such problems 
could, perhaps, only have been resolved by a transcendental analysis of 
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intersubjectivity, which Schutz considered to be impossible. 
Schutils conceptualization of 'meaning' in terms of an objective 
structure of types, is broadly paralleled by the early Wittgensteints 
treatment of language as a 'calculus' which somehow 1pictures' frealityl. 
In both cases 'meaning' is seen as in some sense an independent phenomenon 
which it makes sense to investigate independently of particular occasions 
of its manifestation. Unlike Schutz, however, Wittgenstein comes to 
abandon this formulation in favour of one which insists that tlanguagei 
and 'meanings should be conceptualized as embedded within language 
games and within a 'form of life'. The result of this shift of emphasis 
is that rather than seeing Isubjectivitiest opposed to some #objectives 
reality, and thus conceptualizing Imeaning' in terms of this opposition, 
the distinction between 'subjective' and lobjectivet is taken to be 
secondary to a 'form of life' which is a radically intersubjective 
sphere and the presupposition of language games, and thus of any 
meaningful interaction. Thus it becomes possible to see a resolution 
of the problems with Schutz's work in terms of a reconceptualization of 
the basic concepts with which he formulates his orientation towards the 
social world. His problems are the result of clinging to the notions 
of 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' which are part of his phenomenological 
heritage. 
Garfinkel's work synthesises a number of different influences and 
moulds them into a perspective which is very much his own. A concern with 
the problem of social order he takes from Parsons, an emphasis upon 
rules, practices and procedures from Kaufmann, an insight into the 
possibility of dissolving the distinction between subject and'object 
from Gurwitsch, notions of 'separate realities' and 'taken for granted 
knowledge and assumptions' stem from Schutz, and a concern with presup- 
positions from Husserl. Doubtless there are many more thinkers who have 
made some mark upon his thinking, but it is possible to see in the work 
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of those listed above'the germ of some of his most important insights. 
The result of his synthesis of these ideas is a position which insists 
that what is fundamental about the social world is not IsubJectivities' 
or 'objective meaning contexts' but the structures of rules, practices, 
procedures and assumptions which enable social: order and meaningful 
social interaction. Together with Wittgenstein he stresses the essential 
indexicality of language - that language is used within language games 
over the course of daily life - and that 'meaning' should be seen as 
an embedded phenomenon and not as something to be treated as a calculus 
or in terms of an objective structure of types. This emphasis suggests 
that the notion of presupposition which is developed over the course 
of his writings should be seen as having much in common with Wittgenstein's 
notion of a form of life, in spite of the fact that the impetus to 
investigate this particular level of social reality was probably 
triggered by his reading of phenomenology. In short, the orientation 
which emerges in the work of Garfinkel towards social phenomena can 
usefully be seen as having links with Wittgenstein's philosophical 
position-, with the important difference that Garfinkel's work is 
formulated specifically to provide for the possibility of empirical 
investigation of the social world. 
Other ethnomethodologists have taken up the task of investigating 
the social world in a variety of different ways which owe something to 
the seminal work of Garfinkel, occasionally with the explicit incorporation 
of insights gleaned from Wittgensteints work. Thus Weider, for example, 
investigates the embeddedness of meaningful phenomena such as 'rules', 
Coulter and Pollner analyse the mechanisms involved in maintaining or 
resolving disparate perceptions of reality, Blum and Mchugh unravel 
further dimensions of what is involved in a $form of life' and so on. 
Such approaches are distinctively ethnomethodological in as much as they 
do aim at that level of social structure which Garfinkel indicates in 
-11 
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his work, and which finally becomes formulated as the tformal structures 
of practical actions'. This distinctiveness can be seen by comparing 
the type of work done here with that of some of the Wittgensteinian 
philosophers of the social sciences, which differs in important respects 
from ethnomethodological studies, even though having something in common 
with them. 
Probably-the most productive branch of ethnomethodology is conversationa! 
analysis. By concentrating on structures of conversational practices 
they provide rigorous empirical descriptions of an important aspect of 
that level of social structure which Garfinkells work has indicated as 
the presupposition of social order and of meaningful interaction. As the 
work progresses it is to be hoped that it will broaden, the scope of its 
enquiry to encompass more of what is contained in Garfinkel's original 
notion than it has so far been able to do. ' To what extent this will 
prove to be possible, however, remains to be seen. 
Whilst the tracing of historical themes of development and 
convergence has been a central concern of this thesis, it has not been 
the only one' , and I want now to indicate briefly, something of the 
importance of the theoretical points that have emerged over the course of 
the discussion. The first of these concerns the problem of social order. 
The problem of understanding what it is that holds society together 
in one that has exercised theorists over the centuries. Solutions to 
the problem have included some notion of a social contract, theories 
about the role of the state, theories about religion or a 1conscience 
collectivel, internalized norms and values, and so on. If one is, as 
a sociologist, to come to some understanding of what society is and of 
how it works, then it is difficult to see how one can fail to attempt 
some solution or other to the problem of social order, and how ones 
solution is formulated determines to a large extent the way in which one 
will conceptualize the relationship between members of a society and 
society as a whole. I have shown this above in relation to Garfinkel's 
-410- 
criticisms of Parsons where the latter's social actor is seen to be 
incapable of 'seeing through' the Isacred norms' - he becomes, in 
Garfinkel's words, a 'judgemental dopel. (2) 
What is most interesting about Garfinkel's account of this important 
matter is that it both provides for the possibility of a structural 
solution to the problem, whilst at the same time giving due weight to the 
role of members of society in the maintenance of order. It does not 
posit structures that have some peculiarly other worldly existence, and 
which somehow control what it is that members of a society do when they 
act, but instead formulates the structural level in terms of what it is 
that people do. The structures are structures of practices, and these 
structures enable the social world to be an orderly place. It is the 
fact that people do things in a certain way that both manifests social 
order and at the same time enables it. Thus, for example, it is the 
fact that the letc. 1 procedures, or the-'documentary methodl. are used that 
enables a particular setting to be orderly, and to be seen as orderly. 
It is the structure of such practices and procedures, together with 
taken for granted assumptions, that enables any setting to be an orderly 
affair. To put the same thing in terms of conversational structures, it 
is the fact that sequences such as adjacency pair sequences are used over 
the course of a conversation that enables the conversation to procede in 
an orderly fashion, and at the same time, the structures that are 
describable in the conversational data are the result of the fact that 
people do carry on conversations in this fashion. The structural 
description is part of what it is that people do. 
Conceptualizing social order in these terms has two important aspects. 
In the first place, it provides the theoretical warrant for an empirical 
investigation of the mechanisms involved in the organization of society 
at this level. It directs the sociological investigator towards a set 
of phenomena which it is possible to describe in a more or less rigorous 
-411- 
fashion, and which provide insight into the workings of the social world. 
By continuing to look at such practices it may be possible to uncover 
in a systematic fashion something of what accounts for social order 
without having to be satisfied with vague generalizations about social 
norms, or thinglike 'rules' which social actors are conceived to interpret 
and follow. It provides, in other words, the possibility of producing 
a model of the taken for granted practices that enable the orderly 
character of our everyday lives, and such a model would greatly clarify 
our understanding of social interaction and its relationship to social 
mechanisms. 
A second important point is contained in the notion of 'bedrock' 
that is implicit here. What Garfinkel's formulation suggests is that 
the Obedrocki of the social world should be conceived not in terms of 
biological properties, or the human capacity for 'rationality$, or in 
terms of psychological factors, but in terms of social mechanisms at a 
particular level of social structure which is not independent of the 
ways in which members of a society go about their business. It is a 
statement, in other words, that does not demand that the sociologist 
must look for a solution to the problem of order in terms of some 
principle beyond the domain of his subject matter - the study of society 
or in terms of some theoretical entity such as a 'norm' or a trulel that 
is conceived to exist over and against members of a society and which 
holds some unspecified status as a 'social' object. The bedrock of the 
social is available at the level of what people do. Thus to understand 
social order it is necessary to look at what people do, and not at their 
brains, or into their minds, or their psyches, or at the rational 
categories in terms of which they are conceived to act. This is not to 
say that investigation of social phenomena other than those indicated 
by Garfinkel is in some way invalid. It is, rather, to suggest that 
investigation of society could not be complete without taking some account, 
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at least, of this 'bedrock' which Garfinkel has pointed towards. 
It is interesting to notice that many critics of ethnomethodology 
have either ignored or failed to grasp the fundamental fact that-it is 
concerned with social order, and as a result have considered that it 
has nothing at all to offer a study of society. Worsley, for example, 
refers to ethnomethodologists as 
lfaýnew generation of sociologists, who, unlike the positivists 
they scorn, actually know little about society because they 
do not wish to know. " (3) 
and Mayrl has referred to ethnomethodology as "Sociology Without 
Society"-in a recent-article. (4) The problem here seems to be that 
the majority of sociologists already have some presupposition or other 
as to what it is that makes society work, whether it be power, authority, 
norms, values and so on, and in the light of such presuppositions it is 
evidently the case that ethnomethodology can, indeed, say nothing about 
society. The possibility that there might be important phenomena to be 
uncovered at the structural level at which Garfinkel directs his attention 
does not fit straightforwardly with the already formulated picture of 
what society actually is that such critics are working with, and the 
result is that what could be important insights into tsocietyl are 
rejected out of hand as insignificant. Many critics even go so far as 
to suggest that not only is the intellectual position that is espoused 
here wholly unacceptable, but that its proponents are themselves socially 
unacceptable to right thinking sociologists. Thus they are dubbed 
'hippiest, or accused of forming a 'cult'. (5) It seems to me, at least, 
that such intellectual and social exclusion of ethnomethodology and its 
proponents on the basis of preconceptions as to the 'true' nature of 
society, cannot but militate against the possibility of rational debate 
within the discipline as a whole, and against the development of our 
knowledge about social phenomena. 
The second important theoretical point that I want to emphasise 
here concerns Imeaning' as a social phenomenon. I have suggested over 
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the course of this thesis that in terms of a series of indicators 
designed to highlight the orientation towards Imeaning' which the 
various theorists that have been discussed have taken up, Garfinkel and 
the later Wittgenstein can be seen as proponents of a fundamentally different 
position from that of Schutz and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. 
The heart of this difference lies in the fact that they treat 'meaning, 
as inextricably embedded within a 'form of life', or a structure of 
practices, procedures and assumptions, rather than as somethi which it 
makes sense to investigate in terms of an independent structure or calculus. 
Not only is this way of conceptualising 'meaning$ different from that of 
Schutz, but it also stands opposed to that which the majority of sociologists 
hold to. 
The chief advantage of treating meaning in this way is that it 
becomes possible to make sense out of the fact of indexical expressions, 
and in general of the context dependent nature of any comaunication. It 
enables one to understand Garfinkel's observation that, in a conversation, 
one says more than can be said in so many words. It also gives us a 
means of understanding the problem surrounding the 'correspondence' of 
concepts with 'reality' which the theory dependent nature of facts poses 
for a theory of knowledge, in that it suggests that the problem itself 
is the result of a misunderstanding concerning the nature of language and 
the beaning' of concepts. It is a problem, in other words, that stems 
from trying to find the 'essence' of a concept, or of looking for Ikernall 
meanings, rather than recognizing that language is used, in family 
resemblance fashion, to make sense within language games, and that 
'theories' and 'facts' should be seen in the light of this. In short, 
treating Imeaningl as an embedded phenomenon provides a perspective 
which can throw fresh light on some features of language, concepts, 
and theory which are very puzzling as long as one continues to think in 
terms of such things being somehow independent phenomena that stand 
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over and against, and in some relationship to, a 'real world'. 
The important point here is that ethnomethodology does seem to 
offer a means of entry into social phenomena that takes this notion of 
meaning seriously. By investigating the practices and procedures within 
which 'meaning' is embedded - which enable meaningful interaction - in 
a rigorous fashion it begins to unravel just what is involved in something 
being 'meaningful'. It offers the possibility of producing a model 
which accounts for the phenomenon of meaning in the social world. By 
the same token, it offers the possibility of investigating some of the 
social mechanisms which enable one to tunderstandt meaningful phenomena. 
Thus, to take an example from conversational analysis, the structure of 
an adjacency pair sequence, with the conditional relevance of the second 
pair part upon the completion of the first, is a mechanism that provides 
that, if possible, the utterance following a question will be understood 
as an answer. The utterance, in other words, will be heard and 
understood in-terms of its sequential placement within the conversation. 
The hope is that as investigations of such structures continue, it will 
be possible to build more complex models which provide significant 
insights into these processes of producing and understanding meaningful 
utterances, and of meaning in general as an embedded phenomenon. 
It is interesting to notice, here, that on this point too the aims 
of ethnomethodology seem to have been widely misunderstood. This is 
reflected particularly in the mass of criticisms of ethnomethodology's 
'subjectivism'. Such criticisms seem to depend, at least in part, on 
placing Garfinkel's work unreflectingly within the phenomenological 
tradition, presuming that he can be criticized as an appendage of 
Schutz. (6) Thus, Mayrl, for example, writes that ethnomethodology's 
subjects are 
"essentially solitary individuals coping with definitions in 
a world wherein Others are relegated to the status of 
settings' features. " (7) 
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Or again McSweeney suggests that there is an 
"extreme subjectivism which is largely implicit in the 
work of Garfinkel and Sacks, and finds expression in 
varying degrees of explicitness in other writings. " (8) 
And again Bauman writes that 
"ethnomethodology shares some of the most-pernicious 
difficulties of the early existentialism. Having located 
the only admissible foundation of the social world in the 
field of the subjective, ethnomethodology must face, on 
the cognitive plane, the same insoluble dilemma which 
crucified early existentialism on the moral one. " (9) 
Such remarks miss the mark, once again, because it is presupposed that 
the only possible way to conceptualise knowledge is in terms of 
subjectivities opposed to a #real world' which they have, somehow, to 
grasp. Thus, since there is no apparent tendency towards realism or 
positivism in ethnomethodological writings, then it must be the case that 
they are subjectivistic. The point is, however, that what both Garfinkel 
and Wittgenstein seem to be attempting to do is to radically reconceptualise 
the nature of theory, knowledge, meaning and the rest. They are claiming 
that what must be accepted, the given so to speak, is a form of life, or 
a set of practices - what people do - and this is not at all a 
subjectivistic formulation. Ethnomethodology is not concerned with 
'subjective meanings' in any sense at all, but with meaning as embedded 
within what we do over the course of our daily lives. To realise this 
is to begin to grasp the importance of Garfinkells work and of those 
who have used it as a resource. 
One final theoretical point is in order at this juncture concerning 
$relativism'. The danger with conceiving of 'meaning' as embedded within 
a form of life is that it becomes difficult to account for communication 
between different cultures, since it seems natural to equate 'form of 
life' with 'culture'. If different cultures have different customs and 
different ways of going about things, and given that 'meaning$ is 
dependent upon what it is that people do, then it would seem that what 
is meaningful in one culture would not be understandable in another because 
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the context which gives it its sense would be missing. Thus how it is 
possible for anthropologists, missionaries or travellers to communicate 
with members of another culture which is very different from their own 
becomes something mysterious. 
What is interesting about ethnometh6dologY, and particularly I am 
thinking here of conversational analysis, is that the approach it takes 
to 'meaning' enables the problem to be treated as an empirical one. It 
becomes possible to suggest that at the bedrock level at which their 
analyses are directed it is similarities between the practices and 
procedures which members of different cultures use in making sense to one 
another that accounts for the possibility of cross cultural communication, 
and by the same token, that it is dissimilarities that account for some 
of the difficulties. Such differences and similarities can be studied 
and described, and could well provide considerable insight into what is 
an important area. 
With these remarks on relativism I come to the end of this summary of 
the theoretical themes of this thesis. I do not want to claim that any 
of the issues that have been raised have somehow been settled once and 
for all, or that a definitive perspective on the social world is provided 
by ethnomethodology. Although it does seem to me that the position I 
have tried to outline over the course of this thesis does have merit, 
and can throw considerable fresh light into some of the murky corners 
of the social world, it should be remembered that it is still very much 
work in progress that is struggling to put flesh onto what could well 
be proved to be important insights. 
The difficulties which I pointed out-at the end of the previous 
chapter on conversational analysis are the type of problem that has 
to be faced, where the difficulty is one of clarifying precisely what is 
involved at the particular structural level that is being analysed and 
described. In Garfinkel's work, for example, the precise'structural 
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relationships between assumptions, practices and procedures, rules and 
taken for granted knowledge need to be examined and specified, whilst 
in conversational analysis the same difficulty takes the shape of a 
need to articulate, conversational practices with broader aspects of 
taken for granted knowledge at the presuppositional level. There seems, 
however, to be no a priori reason why thisshould not be a possible task, 
and one that, if undertaken, could provide a clearer formulation of the 
purpose and subject matter of the ethnomethodological enterprise than is 
currently available. 
Another area of problems concerns the precise sense of the 
distinction between normative and literal description. It is clear that 
this is a distinction to be made within the sociological language game 
itself, and that it is not to be paralleled to the difference between a 
neutral observation language and theory laden facts. It would seem, also, 
that there is an important distinction to be made here - for example 
there does seem to be a difference between the moral description of an 
action (perhaps 'losing ones temper') and the non-moral describing of 
some aspect of the purely physical world (perhaps a tbrick wall'). The 
descriptions that can be given of conversational practices seem to come 
part way between these two, in as much as the analyst needs to be able 
to identify particular actions - for example, lasking a question' - in 
the first instance, but then goes on to describe what happens in 
non-moral terms - as a 'first pair part'. The problem concerns, I 
suspect, the relationship between common sense and sociological knowledge 
and interests in the subject matter, and this is a difficult question 
indeed for any form of sociology. Once again, however, there seems to 
be no reason why such relationships could not be clarified and a coherent 
account of the matter provided which specified "the conditions under 
which literal observation and documentary work necessarily occur". (10) 
Although there are, undoubtedly, problems that must be faced, and 
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although it is possible that the solution to some of these may, in time, 
transform the whole nature of the ethnomethodological enterprise, it is 
not enough to consequently discard the entire ethnomethodological corpus 
as inadequate. There is no sociological position that is without 
difficulties, and if sociological research and thinking over the years 
have shown nothing else, they have certainly provided ample evidence of 
the complexity of society and its peculiar resistance to satisfactory 
systematic investigation. What ethnomethodology offers to the body of 
sociological knowledge is a perspective upon a certain level of social 
structure concerned with the practices and procedures which enable social 
order, which provide for the possibility of meaningful interaction, and 
within which 'meaning' is embedded. Should it prove possible to construct 
models of this level of social structure then our knowledge of society 
would be greatly advanced. It would become possible to grasp something 
of what is involved in 'understanding', 'meaning', 'communication$, 
lintersubjectivityt, and so on, from an entirely fresh perspective that 
could cast light into some of the more murky corners of such phenomena. 
In short, there is much of promise in the corpus of ethnomethodological 
writings that ought to be exploited in the interest of furthering 
understanding of society. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
1. Pivcevic, 1972, argues convincingly that a genuinely 
phenomenological sociology is an impossibility. 
2. Garfinkel, 1967, p. 66. 
3. Worsley, 1974, p. 16. 
4. Mayrl, 1973, p. 15. 
5. Mayrl, 1973, p. 28, Worsley, 1974, p. 15, Coser, 1975, p. 697, and 
elsewhere. 
6. One example of this tendency is furnished by Baumann, 1978, Chapter 
8, which lumps together Schutz, Garfinkel, Blum and Mchugh, 
Cicourel and Wittgenstein without giving any indication that 
there might be differences between them. 
7. Mayrl, 1973, p. 26. 
8. McSweeney, 1973, p. 144. 
9. Bauman, 1973, p. 17. Many other commentators also accuse ethnomethod- 
ologistg of being subjectivistic, for example Attewell (1974). 
Zimmerman (1978) has written a strong rejoinder to AttewellIs 
paper, which makes interesting reading in the context of the 
present discussion. 
10. Garfinkel, 1967, p. 103. 
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